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Preface
This volume contains papers presented at E-Vote-ID 2021, the Sixth Interna-
tional Joint Conference on Electronic Voting, held during October 5-8, 2021.
Due to the extraordinary situation provoked by Covid-19 Pandemic, the confer-
ence is held online for second consecutive edition, instead of in the traditional
venue in Bregenz, Austria. E-Vote-ID Conference resulted from the merging of
EVOTE and Vote-ID and counting up to 17 years since the first E-Vote confer-
ence in Austria. Since that conference in 2004, over 1000 experts have attended
the venue, including scholars, practitioners, authorities, electoral managers, ven-
dors, and PhD Students. The conference collected the most relevant debates on
the development of Electronic Voting, from aspects relating to security and us-
ability through to practical experiences and applications of voting systems, also
including legal, social or political aspects, amongst others; turning out to be an
important global referent in relation to this issue.
Also, this year, the conference consisted of:
– Security, Usability and Technical Issues Track
– Administrative, Legal, Political and Social Issues Track
– Election and Practical Experiences Track
– PhD Colloquium, Poster and Demo Session on the day before the conference
E-VOTE-ID 2021 received 49 submissions, being, each of them, reviewed by
3 to 5 program committee members, using a double blind review process. As
a result, 27 papers were accepted for its presentation in the conference. The
selected papers cover a wide range of topics connected with electronic voting,
including experiences and revisions of the real uses of E-voting systems and
corresponding processes in elections.
We would also like to thank the German Informatics Society (Gesellschaft
für Informatik) with its ECOM working group and KASTEL for their partner-
ship over many years. Further we would like to thank the Swiss Federal Chan-
cellery and the Regional Government of Vorarlberg for their kind support. E-
Vote-ID 2021 conference is kindly supported through European Union’s Horizon
2020 projects ECEPS (grant agreement 857622) and mGov4EU (grant agree-
ment 959072). Special thanks go to the members of the international program
committee for their hard work in reviewing, discussing, and shepherding papers.
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Jörn Müller-Quade
Improving the Accuracy of Ballot Scanners Using Supervised Learning . . . 235
Sameer Barretto, William Chown, David Meyer, Aditya Soni, Atreya
Tata and J. Alex Halderman
Enhancing Privacy in Voting
Who was that masked voter? The tally won’t tell! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
Peter Y. A. Ryan, Peter B. Roenne, Philip Stark, Dimiter Ostrev,
Najmeh Soroush and Fatima-Ezzahra El Orche
Extending the Tally-Hiding Ordinos System: Implementations for
Borda, Hare-Niemeyer, Condorcet, and Instant-Runoff Voting . . . . . . . . . .       269
Fabian Hertel, Nicolas Huber, Jonas Kittelberger, Ralf Küsters, Julian
Liedtke and Daniel Rausch
Hyperion: An Enhanced Version of the Selene End-to-End Verifiable
Voting Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Peter Y. A. Ryan, Peter B. Roenne and Simon Rastikian
The Road to Deploying e-Voting
The challenges of enabling public scrutiny . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
Xavier Monnat and Simon Oswald
Use of Electronic Voting in the Albanian Parliamentary Elections in 2021 304
Jurlind Budurushi
Use of innovative technologies in the electoral process in Armenia . . . . . . . 320
Ardita Driza Maurer, Justin Nettman and Rafik Grigoryan
Usability and Voter Perception
Voter Perceptions of Trust in Risk-Limiting Audits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 335
Asmita Dalela, Oksana Kulyk and Carsten Schürmann
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shammer, Noemı́ Folch, Herbert Leitold, Arne Tauber, Detlef Hühnlein
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Stéphanie Plante University of Ottawa
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Send Two, Receive One Ballot Encoding
Josh Benaloh
Microsoft Research
Abstract. Numerous designs for end-to-end verifiable voting systems
have been proposed in recent years to accommodate in-person voting
scenarios and Internet voting scenarios, but very few have been offered
to support vote-by-mail and none that are practical with current equip-
ment and processes. This work describes a simple approach to end-to-end
verifiable vote-by-mail that can be implemented with little change to ex-
isting processes. A specific architecture is described in this work, but
the basic technique can also be used to enable many existing end-to-end
verifiable systems to support vote-by-mail.
Since most election jurisdictions utilize some combination of in-person
voting and vote-by-mail, there is great value in an approach which al-
lows both modes to be unified into an end-to-end verifiable system that
produces a single verifiable tally.
1 Introduction
Vote-by-mail (VbM) is becoming an increasingly popular mode of voting, and
the importance of VbM is drastically magnified in a time of pandemic when in-
person voting creates potential health risks. However, it is difficult to ensure the
integrity of VbM systems, and while expert assurances can be given, there is no
direct evidence provided to voters that their votes have been correctly recorded
and counted.
End-to-end (E2E) verifiability is an existing technology that allows voters to
confirm for themselves that their votes have, indeed, been correctly recorded and
counted. Specifically, in an E2E-verifiable election, two properties are achieved.
1. Voters can confirm that their own votes have been correctly recorded.
2. Any observer can confirm that all recorded votes have been correctly tallied.
Many end-to-end (E2E) verifiable election systems include an interactive step
in which voters have an opportunity to make a choice to confirm the accurate
recording of their votes. While such an interaction can be instantiated in-person
or even via Internet voting, such opportunities are generally not available for
voters who cannot interact directly with a voting system.
The lack of support for vote-by-mail not only limits the assurances that can
be offered to mail-in voters, it also poses significant challenges for many practical
environments which offer an assortment of modes. Many jurisdictions do not
1
wish to report tallies separately for in-person voters and mail voters. However, 
E2E-verifiability requires the publication of a public tally to be verified. Thus, if 
only in-person votes are verifiable, the in-person and mail-in vote tallies must be 
reported separately. This can make many E2E-verifiable systems incompatible 
with the basic requirements of many jurisdictions.
The techniques of STROBE-Voting bridge that gap by allowing the same 
verifiable system to be used for both in-person and mail-in voters. STROBE-
Voting is described herein as a companion to a class of E2E-verifiable voting 
systems following the approach of Benaloh in [4]. Such systems include Helios 
[1], STAR-Vote [3], and ElectionGuard [11]. However the techniques of STROBE-
Voting can also be applied to pre-printed ballot designs like Scantegrity [7] and 
Prêt à Voter [9].
With STROBE-Voting, mail-in voters can simply hand-mark paper ballots 
as they do with traditional mail-in ballots. The blank ballots can be delivered 
by post or downloaded over the Internet. Voters who choose to do so can retain 
information that enables verification and then check the retained data against 
election artifacts posted by election administrators — usually after the close of 
voting.
Comparison to Remotegrity
Like STROBE-Voting, Remotegrity [15] is a design which can be applied to 
multiple E2E-verifiable systems to enable mail-in voting. However, Remotegrity 
requires code voting and scratch-off labels and only applies to pre-printed ballot 
systems. STROBE-Voting is much simpler — requiring no special effort on the 
part of voters — and is applicable to a much wider array of E2E-verifiable 
systems.
Limitations
STROBE-Voting is not a voting system unto itself but rather a heuristic tech-
nique that can be applied within a wide variety of systems. As such, it is not 
appropriate to include proofs of effectiveness outside of the context of individ-
ual systems. However, to better explain how STROBE-Voting can be used, a 
more detailed example is included to demonstrate how STROBE-Voting might 
be applied.
As with Remotegrity, a simplifying assumption is made herein that central-
ized ballot printers will not compromise privacy by retaining secret info about 
ballots they print. This is an important limitation which will be discussed in 
greater detail subsequently in this work. One use case eliminates this assumption 
by utilizing electronic ballot delivery in which secret data that could compromise 
voter privacy is generated on voter devices and never exposed.
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2 Sample Methodology
A STROBE-Voting ballot can look almost identical to a traditional vote-by-mail 
paper ballot. The only additions are a very short code beside every selectable 
option (e.g., two letters or three digits) and a larger (32-byte) hash code at the 
bottom of the ballot. Voters need do nothing more than fill in ovals (or make 
other marks) corresponding to their selections. Any additional voter actions are 
completely optional.
A randomized encryption is produced for each selectable option on each bal-
lot (the encryption changes for each new ballot). These encryptions are retained 
but not printed on ballots. Instead, the encryptions are locked by being hashed 
together, and this hash of all encryptions on a ballot is printed at the bottom of 
the ballot. Other than the ballot hash, the only vestiges of the encryptions that 
appear on ballots are short codes that are deterministically derived from each 
encryption and printed beside the corresponding options. The short selection 
codes are entirely locked by the larger ballot code and serve simply as identi-
fiers for each selection. The only restriction on selection codes is that they must 
be unique within each contest on a ballot. If the internal randomness used to 
produce a ballot and ultimately the long ballot code results in duplicate short 
selection codes, then all or part of that randomness is replaced until all short se-
lection codes within a ballot are unique (within each contest). It is important 
to recognize that even though the selection codes are very short, there 
is no way to search for or deduce the selections to which they corre-
spond without breaking the corresponding encryptions. The ease with 
which one can find other encryptions which produce identical short 
selection codes is not a security threat since the encryptions are fully 
locked by each ballot’s long ballot code.
The randomness used for each encryption can be generated independently, so 
if a short selection code collides with another for the same contest, the random-
ness used in that encryption can be changed. This can be repeated as necessary 
to ensure that all short selection codes within any contest are unique. In theory, 
a single-byte short selection code can accommodate as many as 256 selections 
per contest. However, the time to generate suitable encryptions would slow sig-
nificantly as the number of options approaches 256. Of course, the code can be 
lengthened as desired to accommodate larger numbers of selections, for compu-
tational efficiency, for usability in a large ballot if it is desired to have all short 
codes be distinct across the entire ballot, or if (as may be desirable for some 
scenarios) all of the randomness on a ballot is to be generated deterministically 
from a singe seed
As with Helios, STAR-Vote, ElectionGuard, and related systems, every se-
lectable option is encoded with exponential ElGamal [12] which facilitates easy 
distributed key generation and homomorphic tallying. To preview the more de-
tailed description given below, a vector of encryptions is prepared for each se-
lectable option in which the encryption corresponding to the selected option 
is an encryption of one and the remaining values are encryptions of zero. The 
encryption of each selection is hashed with SHA-256 and then truncated to a
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single byte to form the short selection code for that selection.1 The byte can be
represented in human readable form in a variety of ways including a two-letter
code, a three-digit code, a letter followed by a digit, or the common form of two
hexadecimal characters.
As described above, if two of the selections within any one contest yield the
same short selection code, some of the randomness used for encryption is changed
to ensure that all selection codes within any single contest are distinct. Finally,
all of the full encryptions used to produce all of the short selection codes are
hashed together to form the 32-byte ballot hash code. As will be detailed below,
within each contest, the encryptions are sorted before being hashed to avoid
revealing the association between the encryptions and the individual selections
to which they correspond.
Every set of STROBE-Voting encryptions is paired with an independently-
generated twin set of encryptions. Each voter receives both twins and makes
selections using either one of the two encryptions sets.
In its simplest presentation, each voter receives (either by post or by down-
load) two blank STROBE-Voting ballots with the instructions that only one
should be returned and the other may be used as a spare in case of errors. How-
ever, it will be described later how STROBE-Voting can be accomplished by
providing only a single ballot to each voter.
After receipt of a STROBE-Voting ballot, an election jurisdiction publishes
the following.
– All of the encryptions, short selection codes, and the long ballot code on each
of the received ballot and its twin2 (note that this step could be performed
on all ballots prior to receipt)
– Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NZIK) proofs that every encryption is ei-
ther an encryption of zero or an encryption of one, that exactly one element
in each vector is an encryption of one, and that every position has exactly
one encryption of one across all of the vectors for a contest
– All of the short selection codes corresponding to selections the voter made
on the received ballot
– Decryptions and randomness used to generate all encryptions on the ballot
that is the twin to the ballot received
This information allows voters and observers to check that all ballots are
well-formed. Because a voter could have cast either one of the two twin ballots,
evidence of the correctness of the cast ballot (the encryptions correctly match the
1 A hash isn’t strictly necessary here. Any deterministic function of the encryption
vector would suffice. One could even just use the last byte of the last encryption
of the vector. The selection code merely serves as a convenient means of identifying
which of the encryptions (published elsewhere and locked by the 32-byte ballot code)
has been selected.
2 Within each contest, the encryptions should be sorted alphanumerically according to
their short selection codes to avoid revealing the association between the encryptions
and the selections.
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printed options) is indirectly provided by the demonstration of the correctness 
of its uncast twin ballot.
In effect, the published NIZKs prove to all observers that each ballot is well-
formed and does not carry more (or fewer) votes than allowed. The twin ballot 
provides evidence to the voter that the selection codes recorded for that voter 
correctly match the selections made by the voter.
The well-formedness of any ballots in the published record can be confirmed 
by independent election verifiers. So a diligent voter need only check that the 
correct short codes are listed for the returned ballot (identified by its ballot hash 
code) and that the hash code of the twin is listed as an unsealed ballot and has 
matching short codes. A convenient way of displaying uncast twin ballots to 
voters is to publish an image of each blank twin ballot. This enables a diligent 
voter to easily compare this published image with the physical ballot (which 
remains in the voter’s possession) and confirm that the short codes match. This 
allows for a clean division of responsibilities wherein those voters who choose to 
do so can verify the correct recording of their selections by simply comparing 
ballots and codes — without having to perform any mathematical operations. 
Verification of ballot correctness can be combined with verification of election 
results — which can be done by any interested parties (including voters) by 
writing and/or executing independent election verification applications.
3 Undervotes
To accommodate the possibility that some voters may choose to not vote in some 
contests, each contest also has a blank or did-not-vote option and associated 
short selection code. This did-not-vote option is treated like any other selection, 
and its short selection code is derived from a vector of encryptions of zero for 
all ordinary options and an encryption of one associated with the did-not-vote 
option. If the voter does not select any of the contest options, the short selection 
code associated with the did-not-vote option is published for that contest as 
part of the information associated with the returned ballot. This prevents the 
published information from revealing which contests were voted on any given 
ballot.
In some elections, there are contests in which a voter is permitted to select 
more than one option. In such cases, the short selection code for each selected 
option will be published. Multiple did-not-vote selection codes will be provided 
for that contest — enough to accommodate the number of selections a voter 
may make for that contest. For example, in a “select up to three” contest, three 
did-not-vote selection codes are prepared and shown on the ballot. If a voter 
makes three selections in that contest, the three corresponding selection codes 
are published. If the voter makes only two selections, the two corresponding se-
lection codes are published together with one of the three did-not-vote selection 
codes. One selection requires the publication of the one selected short code to-
gether with two of the did-not-vote selection codes, and no selections requires 
the publication of all three did-not-vote selection codes.
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4 A Detailed Example
To better describe the approach, a small example is included below. It is assumed
that a single public encryption key has been produced by combining (using a
threshold key distribution) ElGamal public keys generated independently by a
pre-determined set of election trustees.3 Encryption using public key is denoted
by E .
Suppose that an election is to be conducted with a single “vote for one”
contest featuring candidates Alice, Bob, and Carol. To accommodate the possi-
bility that a voter might not choose any candidates, a fourth pseudo-candidate
did-not-vote is added and treated just like any actual candidate.
The structure of the encryptions of the votes in is shown in the following
table.
Candidate voted for Vote (vector of encryptions) Sample selection code
Alice ⟨E(1), E(0), E(0), E(0)⟩ Q4
Bob ⟨E(0), E(1), E(0), E(0)⟩ D6
Carol ⟨E(0), E(0), E(1), E(0)⟩ L7
did-not-vote ⟨E(0), E(0), E(0), E(1)⟩ R9
The selection codes are generated as one-byte truncations of SHA-256 hashes
of each associated vector of encryptions. The short selection code for each vote
is printed beside the oval used by the voter to select a candidate. Other than
the inclusion of a single long ballot code on each printed ballot (described fur-
ther below), the addition of a short selection code beside each oval is the only
observable change to a physical ballot.






The encryptions associated with each ballot are made public as part of the
election. However, they are re-ordered (sorted according to their short selection
codes — which are guaranteed to be distinct) to avoid revealing which encryption
corresponds to which candidate.
The public information associated with a ballot is shown below.
3 There is nothing novel about the generation and sharing of exponential ElGamal
keys to produce a single ElGamal key for which threshold decryption is possible.
This is done in STAR-Vote, ElectionGuard, and (without the threshold decryption
capability) Helios. Since the details are not relevant, they are not included herein.
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Vote (vector of encryptions) Sample selection code
⟨E(0), E(1), E(0), E(0)⟩ D6
⟨E(0), E(0), E(1), E(0)⟩ L7
⟨E(1), E(0), E(0), E(0)⟩ Q4
⟨E(0), E(0), E(0), E(1)⟩ R9
Ballot code: XC3K0-A21BM-8WP8Q-MWQ6E-UYW9Y-ZPBL5-93LRE-M3J62-MJ1W7-87DYF
The published information associated with each ballot also includes the fol-
lowing non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic
[13]).
– Every encryption is an encryption of either zero or one (Cramer-Damg̊ard-
Schoenmakers disjunctive technique [10] applied to Chaum-Pedersen proofs
[8] of encryption of zero and encryption of one).
– Every row is shown to have exactly one encryption of one (Chaum-Pedersen
proof that the product of the encryptions in each row is an encryption of
one).
– Every column is shown to have exactly one encryption of one (Chaum-
Pedersen proof that the product of the encryptions in each column is an
encryption of one).
All of the encryptions for this contest are then hashed in the sorted order 
shown here using SHA-256 to produce the long ballot code that is printed on 
the ballot. (In a ballot with multiple contests, the encryptions of each contest 
are hashed together in this way — preserving contest order — to form a single 
ballot code).
The long ballot code serves to lock all of the encryptions on the ballot. With-
out this long code, a malicious election administrator could substitute different 
encryptions that produce identical short selection codes in some or all contests 
(recall that the actual encryptions are not displayed on the ballot). These dis-
tinct encryptions could correspond to selections that do not match those printed 
on the ballot (for instance, switching two candidates) and allow votes to be 
thereby changed. Hashing all of the encryptions into the long ballot code makes 
it infeasible for an attacker to change any of the encryptions without causing the 
hash to no longer match the long ballot code (which is displayed on the ballot).
At the conclusion of an election, all of the selected encrypted votes are ho-
momorphically combined to form encrypted tallies which are then verifiably 
decrypted to produce verified tallies — as in schemes with similar homomorphic 
tallying.
While the NIZK proofs above demonstrate that each ballot — and therefore 
each encrypted vote cast on each ballot — is well-formed, it does nothing to en-
sure that the short selection codes are matched against the correct candidates on 
each ballot. This is the function of the twin ballots which will be fully decrypted 
after the conclusion of voting.
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5 Single-Ballot Variations
Whether it be due to cost or discomfort, some jurisdictions may prefer to not
provide two blank ballots to each voter. The approach described above can be
executed on a single-ballot design as follows.
Postal Delivery of Blank Ballots
Instead of a single short selection code beside each selectable option, two inde-
pendent selection codes are printed (e.g., Q4-M1). A single ballot code computed
as the hash of the two (implicit) ballot codes is printed at the bottom of this
ballot. A voter may then indicate which of the two short code sets (left or right)
are to be published as cast and which are to be fully decrypted. This choice may
be made explicitly (by having the voter mark a choice directly on the ballot) or
implicitly by another means (such as using the way that a ballot is folded4 or
the orientation in which it is placed in its return envelope5 as a selector as in
[5]).
The challenge here is usability for voters. While an explicit choice may be
more natural for a voter who wishes to verify (e.g., “I chose to have the left
codes revealed and the right codes used to record my vote.”), it is difficult to
present this choice to voters in a way that does not risk confusing voters who
have no interest in verification. An implicit choice eliminates the risk of con-
fusing uninterested voters, but it can complicate the process for both election
administrators and voters who wish to verify their ballots. For instance, if ballot
orientation is used, verifying voters would need to carefully note the orientations
in which they insert their ballots into their envelopes, and election administra-
tors would need to carefully note the orientations of received ballots and to
take different actions based upon these orientations. While this can meet the
definition of E2E-verifiability, it stretches credulity to suggest that this could
be performed at scale by enough voters and jurisdictions to have a meaningful
impact.
For these reasons, it may be preferable to use the simpler approach of pro-
viding each voter with two entirely distinct ballots and instructing that only one
be marked and returned.
Electronic Delivery of Blank Ballots
If blank ballots are delivered to voters electronically, voters can “request” mul-
tiple ballots and return only one. In this case, unreturned ballots can be opened
as though they were delivered by post. But it is no longer necessary to provide
two ballots to each voter. Instead, the mere threat that a requested ballot may
not be cast renders improper ballots detectable.
4 Tri-fold ballots have two natural distinct foldings — putting either the top third or
the bottom third between the remaining two thirds.
5 A typical rectangular ballot can naturally be inserted into an envelope in one of four
orientations.
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This process can be further improved if blank ballots are generated by voters
themselves on their own devices. Uncast ballots can be challenged for integrity
either by having the printing device open the encryptions directly or by voters
returning blank ballots along with cast ballots for central decryption. When done
this way, no device outside of the control of a voter will know the associations
between ballot selections and short codes on any cast ballot. This gives voters
far greater privacy guarantees than with centrally-printed ballots.
6 Usability
From the perspective of voters, there are many benefits to the basic approach of
mailing two blank ballots.
– The explanation of one ballot being a spare is quite simple and natural. It
seems less likely to cause confusion than many alternatives.
– Voters needn’t be burdened with of the question of which set of encryptions
to use.
– Simple disambiguation rules can be used by election officials to disambiguate
cases when voters return both ballots — avoiding disenfranchisement of these
voters.
– Interested voters who want to check the accuracy of their unreturned ballots
can retain the entire ballots to facilitate these checks.
– A copy of the long ballot code can be printed onto a tear-off strip immediately
below (or above) the copy that remains on the ballot.6 This facilitates an
easy check by voters prior to removing the strip.
Single ballot variants may be easier and more economical for election admin-
istrators, and they do not hinder voters who are not interested in verifying their
ballots. But voters who want to verify the integrity of their ballots will need to
somehow make (and record for their own use) decisions about which set of ballot
codes to use and record some or all of the unused ballot codes and associated
selections. This seems like quite a lot to ask — even from a diligent voter.
There would be great temptation — especially in the single ballot case — for
a voter to retain a photograph of a ballot before returning it. But this should be
discouraged because it could facilitate coercion (see the discussion of coercion
and vote-selling in section 8).
7 Hybrid Voting Systems
The encryption used in the above description of STROBE-Voting is compatible
with that used in Helios, STAR-Vote, and ElectionGuard.
This is especially important because many jurisdictions that collect some
votes in-person and others by mail do not wish to report tallies separately across
modes. In such jurisdictions, the lack of an E2E-verifiable VbM method can
6 The idea of a tear-off strip was suggested by an anonymous reviewer.
9
inhibit the use of E2E-verifiability for in-person voting — even if only a small 
portion of votes are received by mail. STROBE-Voting can bridge this gap and 
thereby help promote the adoption of E2E-verifiable solutions.
Hybrid modes do impair statistical analysis since the models of ballot chal-
lenges are different. In Helios, STAR-Vote, and ElectionGuard, there is no limit 
to the number of ballots that can be challenged or spoiled by a single voter
— although challenging of ballots is usually rare. With most instantiations of 
STROBE-Voting, there is effectively one challenged ballot for every ballot cast. 
A much larger proportion of VbM ballots than in-person ballots will be chal-
lenged, but a highly-skeptical individual voter has no means to raise the direct 
confidence of an individual cast ballot beyond 50% unless the voter is offered 
some means to request additional blank ballots.
While this does not seem to be a problem in practice, it does make it more 
difficult to calculate the assurance level of an election. However, since there 
would likely be a far greater portion of challenged ballots in the VbM votes, the 
addition of STROBE-Voting to an in-person E2E-verifiable solution will almost 
certainly not reduce the level of assurance in the integrity of the tally.
8 Attacks
Since this work is intended primarily to describe a concept that may serve as a 
component of other systems, rigorous security proofs are not presented. However, 
some potential attacks are addressed here.
Collision of short selection codes
It might seem as though the short selection codes create a potential weakness. 
However, longer codes would not provide any additional security. The security 
is derived from the encryptions of the votes and the hash of these encryptions 
that forms the full-length ballot code on each ballot. The short selection codes 
serve only as simple deterministic identifiers to distinguish between the vari-
ous encryptions. While it would not be difficult to create alternate ballots with 
matching short selection codes that apply to different selections, there would be 
no benefit in doing so. The association between the short selection codes and 
the selections they represent is determined entirely by the long ballot code for 
which it is infeasible to find collisions.
Small perturbations
Since each voter receives two ballots (or two sets of codes on a single ballot), a 
malicious election administrator could send a single voter one good ballot and 
one corrupted ballot (or one corrupted code set) and hope that the voter casts 
the corrupted ballot (or code set). In so doing, the malicious administrator would 
be exposed to a 50% risk of its fraud being revealed, but there would be a 50%
chance of successfully corrupting a single ballot. The chance of corrupting n
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ballots without being revealed would be 1 in 2n, so this is not likely to be a very 
fruitful attack.
A system can also be designed to allow particularly suspicious voters to 
receive additional ballots — thereby enabling the voter’s probability of detecting 
fraud to be raised as far as desired (within practical limits).
Clash attacks
Clash attacks involve an authority providing identical ballots to multiple voters 
who might be likely to cast identical votes. The authority might then record only 
one of the identical ballots. The intent would be to allow each voter to be able 
to verify the correct recording of a vote without revealing to the voter that this 
is a duplicate.
However, as with other E2E-verifiable designs following the “cast or spoil” 
approach of [4], clash attacks are not a concern. The ability to spoil a vote or 
ballot can reveal an attempt to create a clash in the same way that it can reveal 
an attempt to create an incorrect encryption — and with similar probabilities 
and risks to a malicious system. In the case of incorrect encryptions, the system 
will be revealed as malicious if a voter chooses to spoil an incorrectly encrypted 
vote. In the case of attempted clashes, the system will be revealed as malicious 
if one voter chooses to cast a particular ballot while another chooses to cast the 
twin. In this latter instance, the first voter would expect to find the associated 
ballot code on the list of cast ballots while the other would expect to find the 
same ballot code on the list of uncast/spoiled ballots. Putting the same ballot 
code on both lists would immediately implicate the voting system as malfeasant.
Note that the device that created an errant ballot may not be required to be 
involved in its spoiling — or even be aware of its spoiling. The election trustees 
who share the private key to decrypt election tallies can decrypt any spoiled 
ballots on their own. So failure to open a spoiled ballot would be a direct and 
public impeachment of the integrity of the election.
Attempting to vote two ballots
Different jurisdictions manage their VbM ballots in vastly different ways. In 
some instances, blank ballots are considered a controlled resource and putting 
two ballots into the hands of voters might create a risk of double voting.
However, in many jurisdictions, the controls are placed at the time ballots 
are received. For example, in the author’s home state of Washington in the U.S., 
voters can easily download and print as many blank ballots as they wish. Upon 
receipt of each completed ballot, election officials check a signature and eligibility 
(including that no prior vote from that voter has been received in that election) 
before accepting and counting the ballot.
Clearly a two-ballot approach is a better fit for a jurisdiction that does not 
place controls on blank ballots. A jurisdiction in which a vote on any legitimate 
ballot will be accepted and processed will presumably fair better with a single-
ballot variation.
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Susceptibility to coercion and vote-selling
Like any unsupervised mode voting, vote-by-mail can subject voters to coercion
and allow vote-selling more easily than supervised modes of voting.7 No attempt
is made here to justify or advocate for VbM. However, it is reasonable to find
ways to make VbM methods as strong as possible. Adding E2E-verifiability to
VbM doesn’t eliminate the coercion and vote-selling threats, but it nevertheless
improves integrity by enabling verifiability of correct recording and counting of
votes. This allows votes cast by mail using STROBE-Voting to be combined with
votes cast by other modes to produce a single unified verifiable tally.
For better or worse, VbM is widely used and its prevalence is growing. VbM
is stronger with STROBE-Voting than without. That said, STROBE-Voting can
provide another vector for coercion and vote-selling beyond ordinary VbM. The
combination of a genuine photograph of a ballot that has been cast together with
the published short codes for that ballot offers a strong indication of the contents
of a recorded vote. This can be mitigated by a variety of means — including the
use of image editing and other tools — some of which may be provided by election
administrators themselves. It should also be noted that this form of coercion is
only possible before a vote is cast — a voter who, after following the instructions
and casting a proper ballot, is asked to reveal the ballot contents will have no
means to do so. This is why more direct means of verification are not offered
to voters. However, it is important to maintain context and understand that
with or without STROBE-Voting, remote voters can either choose to have or be
coerced into having an observer during the voting process or to simply surrender
a ballot entirely.
Privacy implications of centralized ballot printing
As with numerous other approaches to make paper delivery of blank ballots E2E-
verifiable (e.g., [2], [5], and [15]), centralized printing of blank ballots may enable
a central entity to retain information that can later be used to compromise voter
privacy. This concern can be mitigated with indirect approaches like code voting
([6]) at a significant cost to usability.
It is important to note that this threat can be eliminated entirely if ballots
are delivered electronically and generated privately on voter devices as described
at the end of section 5.
9 Conclusions
STROBE-Voting is a technique that is simple both to understand and to imple-
ment. It enables E2E-verifiable election systems designed for in-person voting to
be extended to serve mail-in and other remote voters.
7 Juels, Catalano, and Jakobsson ([14]) offers a possible approach to deter vote-selling
and coercion in remote voting, but the usability creates practical challenges.
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While the acronym STROBE is only vaguely suggestive of the technique used
in which some, but not all, of the ballots are “illuminated” by decryption, the
methods have the potential to have an important impact on the use of E2E-
verifiability and to promote new research to make E2E-verifiability even simpler
to deploy and use.
Although the value of E2E-verifiability today is clear in an environment where
numerous voters are questioning whether their votes have been correctly counted,
there is ample room for new research and developments in areas such as dispute
resolution, coercion-resistance for remote voting, and privacy enhancements for
remote printing. STROBE-Voting adds another tool that can be used to enhance
the applicability and value of E2E-verifiability.
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Improved Verifiability for BeleniosVS
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Abstract. The BeleniosVS electronic voting scheme offers an attractive
mix of verifiability and privacy properties. Moreover, using the ProVerif
protocol-verification tool, BeleniosVS has automatic machine-aided anal-
ysis of (end-to-end) verifiability in 96 different threat models with the
machine-aided analysis finding proofs in 22 cases and finding attacks in
the remaining 74 cases. The high number of threat models covered by
ProVerif delivers a much richer security analysis than the norm.
We revisit the BeleniosVS scheme and propose several refinements to
the ProVerif security model and scheme which increase the number of
threat models in which the scheme has verifiability from 22 to 28. Our
new ProVerif security model also implies end-to-end verifiability but the
requirements are easier to satisfy. Interestingly, in all six improvements,
both the changes to the security model and one or more changes to the
scheme are necessary to prove verifiability.
Keywords: Verifiability · Machine-checked proofs · ProVerif ·
BeleniosVS
1 Introduction
Secure electronic voting is a difficult security problem with numerous competing
constraints. The key approach to securing electronic elections is so-called “end-
to-end verifiable electronic voting” which is usually broken down into three sub-
properties: namely, cast-as-intended, collected-as-cast and counted-as-collected.
Cast-as-intended captures the idea that the encrypted ballot the voter casts
contains the vote she intended. Collected-as-cast captures the idea that the cast
ballot was collected by the election authority without tampering. Counted-as-
collected captures the idea that the collected ballots are properly counted. Our
work focuses on the end-to-end verifiability of the BeleniosVS voting scheme [6],
which is the culmination of a line of schemes starting with Helios [1].
BeleniosVS, like all voting schemes, should provide verifiability and privacy
under reasonable assumptions. Privacy captures the intuition that nothing more
should be leaked about the voter’s ballot than can be discerned from the out-
come of the election; for the rest of this paper we will eschew further discussion
‹ Rajeev Goré acknowledges the support of the National Centre for Research and De-
velopment NCBR, Poland, under the PolLux/FNR-CORE project STV (POLLUX-
VII/1/2019).
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of privacy. BeleniosVS has end-to-end verifiability under certain trust assump-
tions; that is, under certain trust assumptions we can be assured that for every
honest voter, the encrypted ballot in the tally which belongs to her (because the
accompanying signature verifies with her verification key) does indeed decrypt
to the ballot she believes she cast. As we have previously said, BeleniosVS has
been analysed in 96 different threat models, 22 of which have verifiability which
makes providing a simple description of the assumptions problematic.
Informally, BeleniosVS achieves end-to-end verifiability under certain as-
sumptions as follows:
1. it achieves cast-as-intended because a voter can check that the cast ballot
contains the vote she intended under the assumption that either the audit-
ing device or registrar—which we will formally introduce in section 2.1—is
honest;
2. it achieves collected-as-cast since the voter can check that the ballot posted
by the voting server was the one she cast, under the assumption that the
registrar is honest; and finally
3. it achieves tallied-as-collected because a voter can check the zero-knowledge
proofs produced by the talliers which ensure the published ballot is correctly
decrypted and tallied.
4. moreover, the authentication measures (signatures) prevent the ballot box
from being stuffed unless the registrar is corrupt.
Any claimed verifiability and privacy properties must assume some underly-
ing security model. There are two prominent such models called the symbolic 
(Dolev-Yao [11])) model and the computational model (more specifically, most 
voting schemes are analysed in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) [3]). The 
symbolic model assumes that the underlying cryptographic primitives are black-
boxes (perfectly secure), and the attacker can only use these primitives as such. 
On the other hand, the computational model assumes that all data types are 
bit-strings and all computation is done by probabilistic polynomial-time Tur-
ing machines. The computational model captures more attacks but is harder 
to reason about; both models miss certain classes of attacks (such as timing 
attacks).
The authors of Belenios provided mathematical proofs of the correctness of 
the claimed verifibility and privacy of Belenios using ProVerif [5], an automatic 
theorem prover for verifiying properties of security protocols which uses the 
symbolic model. In contrast, tools such as Coq [4] and EasyCrypt [2] work in 
the computational model. We also use ProVerif for our work.
ProVerif is sound wrt the symbolic model: that is, if it finds an attack or 
concludes there isn’t one then we can be sure that these conclusions are true 
in the symbolic model. However, one challenge in using ProVerif for compli-
cated schemes is its incompleteness: that is, there are queries on which ProVerif 
may not terminate, and hence be unable to decide whether or not there is an 
attack, in which case, we learn nothing by using ProVerif. Due to this, Bele-
niosVS [6] was not able to be directly proved end-to-end verifiable in ProVerif:
16
rather the authors introduced sufficient conditions for verifiability; these condi-
tions are checked by ProVerif. Both the sufficient conditions and the definition 
to which they refer have the advantage over prior definitions of enforcing vote 
eligibility; that is the definitions prevent the stuffing of the ballot box with 
unauthorised votes. However, this comes at a high cost because the definition 
no longer distinguishes between systems where attacks are detected and system 
where attacks are not detected but rather deems both to be insecure (Sec. 3). 
We present new related conditions which do distinguish between detected and 
undetected attacks but at the cost of not capturing ballot stuffing; any scheme 
proved secure under our new conditions should separately be proved to be free of 
ballot stuffing. It remains an open problem to devise a definition which combines 
the strengths of both the original definition in [6] and ours.
In general, theorems about verifiability (in ProVerif) are either about the 
unreachability of certain “undesirable” states or about correspondence asser-
tions; we will be interested in correspondence assertions. These are of the form 
“if event e has occurred then event e1 has occurred previously”. For example, a 
state where the voter n believes she voted for a particular candidate c should im-
ply that the ballot published next to her name is for candidate c. To encode this 
into ProVerif, let VERIF(n,c) denote that voter n believes she voted for candi-
date c and let TALLY(n, c) denote that the ballot published for voter n decrypts 
to candidate c. Then we model our previous claim by saying that VERIF(n,c) 
ñ TALLY(n, c); that is if a voter believes a certain vote is cast then it was. 
ProVerif attempts to prove that this correspondence holds for all executions of 
the protocol or alternatively to find an execution which does not satisfy the cor-
respondence. (For those interested in the technicalities we recommend reading 
the ProVerif manual [5]).
ProVerif identifies many attacks on BeleniosVS in the ProVerif security model, 
but some of these attacks are not “real’ because they cannot manifest in the im-
plementation of BeleniosVS; the false “attacks” identified by ProVerif would 
have been detected by the voter during the voting phase. For example, the ad-
versary votes on behalf of the voter (without detection) but does not fake the 
voting server’s acknowledgment when the voter tries to vote (the lack of which 
the voter will detect). The six threat models in which we improve on the previous 
analysis are all interesting since they require both our changes to the security 
model and to the scheme. Specifically in all six, ProVerif correctly identified 
that the scheme was insecure (both in the ProVerif model and with respect to 
end-to-end verifiability); however, the attacks ProVerif found would have been 
detected by the voter and hence are not proper attacks on verifiability. If we 
introduce our improved security model ProVerif still finds attacks (albeit more 
complicated than the previous attacks). The more complicated attacks were the 




– We identified that the definition of end-to-end verifiability in [6] does not
meaningfully capture verification failures; this results in a definition which
is much closer to integrity than verifiability. The use of the definition to
analysis verifiability returns false attacks which obscures the real attacks
and hinders the analysis of improvements to the scheme.
– We refined BeleniosVS to include a defence-in-depth approach, using vari-
ous overlapping independent means to mitigate attacks. Even if the voter
chooses not to verify the voting sheet, the voting device and server (if hon-
est) will still perform certain checks and notify the voter whether or not they
(the voting device and server) believe the ballot was cast successfully. Con-
sequently, in our refined scheme, verifiability may hold even if the adversary
can cast ballots on behalf of the voter, since the attack will still be detected
(depending on the exact threat model).
– The ProVerif encoding of cast-as-intended in [6] required the property to
hold even if the verification checks failed. We changed the property so that
no guarantees are provided if verification fails. This weakens the security
requirement while preserving the sufficiency for verifiability (though not for
the definition of verifiability in [6])
– We refined the channel analysis to be more consistent. Our refined analysis
highlights the importance of keeping basic protections like TLS and digital
certificates.
Our more nuanced sufficient conditions ensure that the attacks found by ProVerif 
work against the real scheme and are not artefacts of our model and verifiabil-
ity definition. These attacks highlighted edge case vulnerabilities which we pre-
vent by introducing simple mechanisms. Overall, our refinements to the security 
model and scheme increase the number of threat models in which the scheme 
has verifiability from 22 to 28.
2 Background
In Helios [1], the election authority sends an email to each eligible voter con-
taining instructions on how to construct a valid ballot. The voter constructs 
her ballot on her personal computing device, which encrypts the ballot using 
the public key of a special voting server run by the election authority, it also 
constructs (zero-knowledge) proofs that the encrypted ballot is well-formed wrt 
the instructions. She sends her ciphertext to the voting server over the internet, 
thus the voting server collects the (encrypted) ballots and proofs from all voters. 
These encrypted ballots and proofs are published by the voting server, and the 
published ballots are decrypted and tallied by a group of (physically distributed) 
authorities called the talliers. While the voting server has some means (normally 
email address) to authenticate votes from eligible voters, there is no external 
mechanism (such as signatures) to authenticate that the ballots cast actually 
came from eligible voters.
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The Belenios family of voting schemes originated with Belenios [10] which is a
more secure version of Helios [1] with better authentication of ballots. Specifically
in Belenios, each voter has a signing key—and verification key—which the voters
use to sign their encrypted ballot and proofs. Anyone can now check that the
submitted ciphertext came from an eligible voter by verifying the signature with
the voter’s verification key. However, a coercer could simply demand that the
voter divulge the randomness used in the encryption of their vote, enabling the
coercer to learn how that voter voted once the ballots are published.
The next version, BeleniosRF [7], replaced the signatures and proofs with
rerandomisable alternatives, which allow the voting server to randomise the ci-
phertexts, proofs, and signatures before publishing. Now, the coercer cannot be
certain that the randomness is what the voter claims it to be, so the voter cannot
be coerced to prove how she voted using this tactic. BeleniosVS [6] extends Bele-
niosRF by including a cast as intended mechanism in which the voter can check
that the cast ciphertext decrypts to the vote she intended to cast. However, due
to the rerandomisation, she cannot check the ballot posted by the voting server
was the one she cast. Being unable to perform a direct collected-as-cast check in
either scheme complicates the end-to-end verifiability claims of these schemes.
2.1 BeleniosVS
For completeness we will introduce the BeleniosVS protocol here; the original
description can be found in [6]. We will avoid giving in full all the technical
details that are not relevant to our contributions.
The protocol involves seven distinct primary entities.
The election administrator publishes the parameters of the election includ-
ing the list of eligible voters and candidates.
The registrar generates the voter credentials and voting sheets and issues
them to the voters. A voter’s voting sheet contains encryptions—of the
candidates—which are signed using her credentials.
The voter uses her voting device to cast a ballot from the voting sheet she
received from the registrar with the password she received from the voting
server. Optionally she can use her auditing device to verify the correctness
of the voting sheet.
The voting device receives the password and ballot from the voter which it
submits to the voting server.
The auditing devices check the correctness of the voting sheet.
The voting server performs some basic checks and if they pass, posts the
ballot to the bulletin board.
The bulletin board is public and can be audited by anyone.
The tallying authorites takes the ballots from the bulletin board from which
they compute and publish the result.
The system proceeds in the following three phases.
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Setup phase: The election administrator publishes the election parameters.
Then the tallying authorities generate the encryption public key and secret
keys. The registrar then prepares the voting sheets by generating signing
credentials (keys) for each voter; it, then for each voter, encrypts the can-
didates using the encryption public key and signs each ciphertext with the
voter’s signing credential. The registrar also includes, for later auditing, on
the voting sheet the signing credential and the randomness used to encrypt
the candidates. It then sends the voting sheets to the voter.
Voting phase: The voter receives the voting sheet through some channel other
than her voting device. She can optionally get her auditing device to check
the correctness of the voting sheet. The voter also receives a password from
the voting server. The voter, using her voting device authenticates to the
voting server using her password. She then scans the signed ciphertext cor-
responding to her preferred candidate into her voting device. The voting
device submits this ciphertext to the voting sever. The voting server checks
the validity of the signature and that no ballot had already been received
from that voter. If both checks pass the voting server post the ciphertext to
the bulletin board and sends an acknowledgment to the voter by way of the
voting server.
Tallying phase: The tallying authority decrypts the contents of the bulletin
board and publishes the result with appropriate proofs.
3 Verifiability
The authors of BeleniosVS extending on [8, 9] give a pen-and-paper definition
of end-to-end verifiability in the symbolic model (Sec. 3.6 of [6]). The informal
variant of definition from [6] says that the election result should contain only
– the votes from the voters who successfully performed the verification speci-
fied by the protocol;
– some of the votes from the voters who did not make any verification;
– and at most k dishonest votes where k is the number of dishonest voters
(under the control of the attacker).
A carefully reader will have noted that the list above makes no mention of what
happens to votes from voters who attempted to verify but are unsuccessful, that
is for whom the verification checks failed. One would assume that such votes
cannot be included in the tally (except as part of the dishonest votes). However,
the formal definition given in [6] considers detecting cheating as equivalent to
not checking at all and so such voters are put in the second group (which was
informally described as not making any verification).
The formal (pen-and-paper) definition is defined using events, which denote
the progress of the protocol for each voter.
Voter(id, cred, l): voter id is registered with credential cred. The label l
records if the voter is honest or dishonest.
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Voted(id, v): voter id has cast a vote for v
Goting-to-tally(id, cred, b): ballot b has been recorded on the bulletin board
by the voting server. According to the voting server, b is associated with voter
id with credential cred.
Verified(id, v): voter id has voted for v and has successful performed all re-
quired checks. She should be guaranteed her ballot will be properly counted
for v.
The description of Verified is misleading because it is used in [6] even for vot-
ers who do not audit. We think the use is correct but the description should 
be updated, since even if the voter does not make any additional checks it still 
models that their device told them the ballot was correctly recorded. An obser-
vant reader will have noted that events provide no way to denote a voter who 
performs the security checks and detects a problem; for this reason we added 
a new event. However, due to a technicality in the current model a voter who 
receives an error during a verification check halts; because of this, at present, all 
voters who finish have successfully verified. (Future work may wish to resolve 
this issue but we chose not to because it would require us to change already 
defined events.)
Finished(id, cred): voter id with credential cred has finished voting.
3.1 Changes to the ProVerif model
In this section we will discuss our changes to the model which are motivated 
by the investigation of the ProVerif model in [6] and the attacks that ProVerif 
finds. In [6, page 379] Cortier et al. write “in all cases...[which are marked as 
insecure]..., we found a real attack.” The statement is completely accurate but 
at least for us was confusing. The statement means that there are attacks against 
BeleniosVS in the ProVerif model but it does not mean that the attacks would 
go undetected in reality. In other words, we initially incorrectly interpreted the 
statement to mean that the authors validated the model by checking the attacks 
found by ProVerif were attacks on the real system. In fact, their ProVerif model 
finds various spurious attacks and we make several refinements to the model to 
remove them. We stress that though the attacks are spurious the system (without 
changes) is still insecure in the relevant threat models. We have checked that 
all threat models in which ProVerif finds an attack in our enhanced model have 
attacks against the real system. It is important to remove these spurious attacks 
so that ProVerif can finds attacks that would work on the deployed scheme. 
Once ProVerif found the useful attacks we were able to update the scheme with 
countermeasures and have ProVerif validate that the countermeasures worked.
Our more complicated security conditions and scheme require us to use more 
recent features of ProVerif which have only been added after the ProVerif version 
used in [6]. Even so when considering cases where the register is corrupt, and 
hence, the public credential may not be unique, we had to assume an extra axiom 
to make it terminate. The axiom states that only one ballot per name is added
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to the ballot box (if the server is honest) which is true since the server enforces 
the condition (Refinement 4). (It might be possible for ProVerif to check this 
property and so remove the axiom but we were unable to do so).
One of the difficulties we faced in this work was deciding how to interpret 
various ambiguities in the original paper [6]. We have tried to make use of the 
ProVerif files to clarify the authors’ intent but with somewhat limited success; the 
models of the different properties in ProVerif capture slightly different variants 
of BeleniosVS. For example, the comments in the verifiability model suggest the 
channel between the voting device and voting server is authenticated but not 
encrypted. Whereas the receipt-freeness definition assumes the channel is secret. 
We have attempted to unify these to the largest extent possible.
What does it mean to verify and whose voter is it anyway? In e-voting 
we tend to think of verification by the voter as Boolean, the voter either does or 
does not (choose to) verify (her ballot). To some extent, in the original ProVerif 
analysis of BeleniosVS analysis, and to a greater extent in our refinement, such 
verification is a sliding scale which captures different actions in different threat 
models. Even a voter who takes no explicit verification steps is still modelled 
as believing her intended vote was cast as intended (unless her computer tells 
her something went wrong). So, even for a voter who does not take any extra 
verification steps, her device (if honest) will report an error unless all of the 
checks the device performs pass.
It is standard in the analysis of e-voting voting schemes to split voters into 
honest and dishonest. However, in our refined threat model of BeleniosVS, we are 
confronted with voters whose credentials are completely leaked but who make 
no attempt to cooperate with the adversary; should they be modelled as honest 
or dishonest? The issue is more nuanced than it might first appear and we adopt 
the approach of considering voters honest if they attempt to vote (and complain 
if they fail) but dishonest if they do not attempt to vote themselves or do not 
complain when voting fails. In doing so we have eliminated the earlier category 
of “voters who did not make any verification”, all voters either attempt to vote 
and report any error raised by their device, or are considered dishonest.
3.2 The sufficient conditions were not necessary.
As we have noted, the description of Verifiability in Sec. 3.6 of BeleniosVS paper 
[6] does not explicitly say that the properties do not have to hold if verifiabil-
ity checks fail. Indeed, the ProVerif definition of cast-as-intended requires the 
properties to hold even if verification fails.
Refinement 1 We changed the ProVerif cast-as-intended definition so that the 
condition need only hold if the voter doesn’t complain.
In the ProVerif security model for BeleniosVS each property has two vari-
ants, one which identifies the voter by name and another which identifies the 
voter based on credential. This is necessary because names are only a reliable
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identification if the voting server is honest, and analogously credentials are only
reliable if the registrar is honest. We updated both the cast-as-intended defini-
tions but for brevity only describe the change on the name based definition since
they are nearly identical.
Cast as intended (ID-based)-Old: For every ballot in the tally, belonging to name
n for choice v either the voter n is dishonest or the voter is honest and intended
to cast a ballot for v. (We denote by ˛ variables which may take any value.)
GOING TO TALLYpn, ˛, ˛, vq Ñ
(VOTER(n, ˛, Cqq _ (VOTERpn, ˛, Hq ^VOTEpn, vq).
Our updated variant is nearly identically but adds the requirement that the
voter has not complained.
Cast as intended (ID-based)-New: For every ballot in the tally, belonging to name
n for choice v either the voter n is dishonest or the voter is honest, believes their
ballot to have been correctly cast and intended to cast a ballot for v. (We denote
by ˛ variables which may take any value.)3
GOING TO TALLYpn, ˛, ˛, vq ^ FINISHEDpn, ˛q Ñ
(VOTER(n, ˛, Cqq _ (VOTERpn, ˛, Hq ^VOTEpn, vq).
Refinement 2 We split the bidirectional channel between the voting device to
the voting server into separate channels in each direction. This allows us to refine
the adversary’s control over the channels. In particular, we refine the case where
the voter’s password is leaked so that the adversary can impersonate the voter
but not the voting server.
While the first two refinements prevent certain attacks, they do not actually
improve the security of the scheme in any threat model since the adversary can
perform slightly more complicated attacks to break verifiability. Nevertheless,
removing these simple attacks is necessary so that ProVerif identifies the more
complicated attacks.
4 Changes to the scheme
In addition to our changes to the model we also made two changes to the scheme.
Refinement 3 The voting device sends a random nonce to the server along with
the vote. The voting server sends this nonce back with the acknowledgement. An
honest device only tells the voter that her ballot was cast if the nonce received
with the acknowledgement matches the nonce sent.
3 Intuition would be better served by using VERIFIED in place of FINISHED in the
correspondence assertion below, however for technical reasons this is not possible.
Since in our situation FINISHED implies VERIFIED for honest voters, there is no
technical issue.
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We have deliberately kept this refinement simple to increase deniability; in-
terestingly neither the paper introducing BeleniosRF [7] or BeleniosVS [6] de-
scribe in detail how the voter should mislead the coercer.4 The formal security
definitions for both do not capture what the adversary learns by demanding the
acknowledgment from the voters. Intuitively, both schemes have good coercion
resistance but various nuances are not captured by the formal definition. Intu-
ition also suggest that our refinement does not worsen the situation since the
nonce is chosen uniformly, randomly and independently (of the ballot).
The nonce returned to the device is the one submitted with the accepted
ballot, since assuming the voting server and device are honest the adversary
cannot fake the acknowledgment. However, one might wonder if the adversary
can learn the nonce and then submit a different ballot with this nonce and hence
trick the voter. We have proved in ProVerif that the adversary can (when both
the voting server and voting device are honest) only learn the nonce after the
ballot is received by the voting server (at which point no further ballot will be
accepted). The ultimate validation of the refinement is that it ensures verifiability
in scenarios which are otherwise vulnerable to attack.
Refinement 4 The voting server keeps a list of the names of those who have
voted. It will not accept more than one vote from each name.
The original scheme ensured that only one ballot was accepted per credential but
allowed multiple votes to come from the same name (though this should never
occur if the registrar and voting server are honest). We extend the scheme to
also prevent multiple ballots being accepted for the same name. This refinement
(and the accompanying axiom we mentioned earlier) are necessary for ProVerif
to terminate in two cases where the registrar is dishonest. So far as we can tell
this is an artefact of the proof; that is we know of no attack, in an otherwise
secure threat model, which is prevented by this refinement. Nevertheless, the
refinement seems eminently sensible and we recommend its use in practice.
5 Conclusion Key Takeaways
Based on our analysis and investigation we draw the following two conclusions;
the first is important for automatic machine-checked analysis and the second for
all e-voting schemes.
Model validation Our work highlights the importance of validating the at-
tacks found by automatic theorem provers; it is always important to check
that they work on the deployed scheme.
Defence in depth Our work highlights the importance of basic consistency
checks in the honest protocol.
4 There is some informal discussion but it is unclear what threat model is trying to
be captured.
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Distinction between verifiability and eligibility verification The defini-
tion of “verifiability” in [6] being closer to integrity had the virtue of cap-
turing ballot stuffing attacks which our new definition does not; our new
definition is satisfied even if it is possible to cast ballots on behalf of honest
voters, who don’t vote, without knowing their credential. Our new definition
would need to be used alongside a definition of eligibility verification which
prevents this attack. Future definitions may wish to consider introducing a
special category for honest voters, with leaked credentials, who do not vote.
We show in table 1 a summary of the ProVerif analysis. We have highlighted
our improvements in blue. We list the assumptions on participants and informa-
tion with blank denoting honest,  denoting dishonest (or leaked), and - denoting
none. R denotes the registrar, VS the voting server, VD the voting device, AD
the auditing Device, CS the code sheet, P the password. We also include an
example attack where relevant.
Dishonest parties and leaked data Properties Attack
R VS VD AD CS P Verifiability
X NA
  X NA
  X NA
-  X NA
   X NA
  -  X NA
-  X NA
 
Ś
Casts a different vote
 
Ś







  X NA
   X NA
 
Ś
Casts a different vote
 
Ś
Casts a different vote
 
Ś
Casts a different vote
 
Ś
Casts a different vote
  X NA
  X NA
   X NA
  X NA
-   X NA
Table 1. Security model
Future work In most of the remaining threat models the adversary can vote on 
the voter’s behalf and this goes undetected because either the voting device or
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voting server is dishonest, there are also eight threat models where the registrar
can break verifiability for voters who do not audit their code sheet. These lines
of attack seem impossible to prevent without introducing new players (or new
channels between existing players). Future work, particularly if it has a concrete
deployment situation in mind, should revisit if it is feasible to introduce the new
players or channels. For example, the voting server could send an SMS to the
voter acknowledging that her ballot was received.
As we have noted, the formal definition of “verifiability” in [6] is intuitively
much closer to integrity (than verifiability) since it does not model verification
checks that fail. We leave as future work updating the formal definition of end-
to-end “verifiability” in the symbolic model to catch verification failures; we,
also, leave as future work formally showing that our refined sufficient conditions
satisfy the (as yet nonexistent new) formal definition.
Source code The ProVerif source files are available at
https://github.com/gerlion/Improved-Verifiability-for-BeleniosVS.
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Abstract. Belenios is an online voting system that provides a strong no-
tion of election verifiability, where no single party has to be trusted, and
security holds as soon as either the voting registrar or the voting server
is honest. It was formally proved to be secure, making the assumption
that no further ballots are cast on the bulletin board after voters verified
their ballots. In practice, however, revoting is allowed and voters can
verify their ballots anytime. This gap between formal proofs and use in
practice leaves open space for attacks, as has been shown recently. In this
paper we make two simple additions to Belenios and we formally prove
that the new version satisfies the expected verifiability properties. Our
proofs are automatically performed with the Tamarin prover, under the
assumption that voters are allowed to vote at most four times.
Keywords: Electronic voting · Formal verification · Verifiability.
1 Introduction
Election verifiability aims to ensure that the outcome of an election, relying on
a given electronic voting protocol, correctly reflects the votes of eligible voters.
One of its important features is that it should be software independent and
end-to-end: even if an adversary corrupts (the software on) voting platforms,
election authorities, or voting servers, the public information published on the
bulletin board should be sufficient to verify that the election outcome correctly
reflects voter choices. This verification is performed by honest parties, which
are typically a subset of voters and election auditors. Especially for voters, the
verification procedure should also be easy to use, in order to achieve widespread
adoption and security guarantees.
Helios is an internet voting system that targets this notion of end-to-end
verifiability [1,6,7]. However, an important assumption is that the voting server
is honest. Otherwise it could stuff ballots, allowing the adversary to add illegiti-
mate votes, most easily for voters that have not voted. In general, for usability,
revoting is allowed and voters can verify their ballots anytime after voting. In
that case ballot stuffing is possible even for voters that have verified their ballots
successfully. For example, the server can let some time elapse after a ballot was
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cast, and cast a new ballot in the name of the same voter. This looks like revoting
to observers and will not be noticed by voters verifying their ballots right after
voting. The so-called clash attacks allow ballot stuffing in a more surreptitious
way [22,23,26]: the adversary gives the same credential to two voters, one single
vote is cast for them, and the adversary can cast an additional ballot with no
change in the total number of ballots. If revoting is disallowed or ballot verifi-
cation is after the voting phase, this requires voting platforms to be corrupted,
since the adversary needs to supply the same ballot for two voters. Otherwise,
it was shown in [9] that corrupting the voting platform is not needed: one voter
can verify one ballot and another voter can subsequently verify another ballot
for the same credential.
Belenios extends Helios in order to get stronger election verifiability [2,16].
There is no single party that has to be trusted: verifiability holds as soon as either
the voting server or the voting registrar is not corrupted. The registrar generates
public credentials, publishes them on the bulletin board, and distributes the re-
spective private credentials to each voter. The public credential is the verification
key of a fresh signing key pair, while the private credential is the corresponding
signing key. Ballots are signed and election authorities can verify on the bulletin
board that all ballots have been cast by the expected legitimate party. A second
advantage of Belenios is that it was proved to satisfy a formal notion of election
verifiability, both in the symbolic model [15] (for a particular variant) and in
the computational model [14]. This adds confidence that verifiability is satisfied
by the protocol specification. Nonetheless, several problems of Belenios and of
verifiability definitions in [14,15] were shown in [9], leading to weaker guaran-
tees than expected. In the typical scenario when revoting is allowed and voters
can verify their ballots anytime, attacks on verifiability are still possible, most
damaging in the case when the registrar is corrupted. Even in the ideal case
when both the server and the registrar are honest, ballot reordering attacks are
possible, breaking individual verifiability. These attacks are outside the scope of
proofs in [14,15], since they do not consider the typical scenario of revoting.
Usability, Everlasting Privacy and Verifiability. There are two main fea-
tures that, put together, allow these attacks on verifiability in Belenios. The
first feature is that, in practice [2], revoting is allowed and voters can verify
their ballots anytime. This is important for usability and, eventually, also for
coercion-resistance [11,21]. The second feature is that the voting server does not
know the link between the public credentials and the corresponding voter iden-
tities. Only at ballot casting time does the voter reveal this link, and the server
ensures its consistency, e.g. that the same public credential does not correspond
to two different voters. Revealing minimal information about the association
between voters and their public credentials is important in order to ensure ever-
lasting privacy: even if an adversary may break the underlying encryption scheme
and penetrate the private logs of the server, the connection between voters and
the corresponding votes should remain private. A similar pattern underlies all
attacks in [9]: a corrupted voter can be used by the adversary to cast a ballot
for a public credential corresponding to an honest voter. Even if honest voters
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successfully verified their ballots, revoting allows the adversary to undetectably
replace them with its own ballots (when the registrar is corrupted), or with
earlier ballots submitted by the same voters (when the registrar is honest).
Our Contributions. We propose two simple additions to Belenios and we
prove that election verifiability of the resulting system, that we call Belenios+,
is strictly stronger in all three scenarios that are subject to attacks in [9]. Each
scenario is defined by the corruption abilities of the adversary: A1 - both the
server and the registrar are honest; A2 - the server is corrupt and the registrar
honest; A3 - the server is honest and the registrar corrupt. In all cases, we as-
sume the adversary may corrupt the secret key of the election, any number of
voters and the communication network. For voters, the proposed additions do
not require any change in the voting and verification procedures, maintaining the
same usability as Belenios. We do not communicate any new information to the
voting server regarding the link between voter identities and public credentials.
We simply enforce the veracity of the information the voter already commu-
nicates. This means that our additions should not affect everlasting privacy in
Belenios (everlasting privacy has not been formally proved for Belenios, but it
is thought to hold when revoting is not allowed [16]). Our security proofs are
in the symbolic model, automatically performed with the Tamarin prover [24],
although we need to make some further abstractions, as explained below. We use
the verifiability definition of [9], which is more general than [14,15], accounting
for revoting and different corruption scenarios.
Belenios relies on a zero-knowledge proof in order to verifiably attach a label
to each ballot cast. The label is the public credential of the voter who constructs
the ballot and the ballot cannot be detached from the intended label. The goal
of this construction is to ensure that each ballot is consistently cast for the
intended public credential. Our techniques enrich the structure of the label in
order to ensure stronger consistency properties. The first problem that we tackle
is a ballot reordering attack, which is possible in all three corruption scenarios,
i.e. even for the weakest adversary A1. Omitting some details (presented in
Section 2.2), the attack is as follows: an honest voter with public credential cr,
may submit two successive ballots b1 and b2; then, relying on a corrupt voter,
the adversary can cast b2 before b1, for the same public credential cr. The honest
voter may then verify b2 and expect it to be tallied, whereas b1 is tallied instead.
The solution we propose for this problem is to augment the label in the zero-
knowledge proof such that each new ballot can also be verifiably linked to the
ballot that was cast just before for a given public credential. This proof is publicly
verified on the bulletin board, thus it also helps in the scenario A2.
The second problem in Belenios relates to the scenario A3 and is at the root
of several attacks in [9]: because the voting server does not know in advance
the connection between voter identities and public credentials, an adversary cor-
rupting the registrar and a voter may submit any ballot for any public credential
cr, and claim it corresponds to that corrupt voter. In particular, this may be a
ballot b constructed by an honest voter that received the public credential cr
at registration. This leads to the fact that the honest voter may successfully
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verify b on the bulletin board, while afterwards the adversary is able to cast its
own ballot bA for the credential cr. The solution we propose for this problem is
to further augment the label in the zero-knowledge proof such that the voting
server can ensure that the cast ballot is intended for the corresponding voter.
However, we need to make sure that only the server can verify the link between
a ballot and the voter identity. That is why the label does not directly contain
the identity id of the voter, but a commitment to id, for which the server learns
the randomness from the voting platform. The randomness can be discarded by
the server after reconstructing the commitment and verifying the proof. To hide
the identity from an all-powerful adversary against the bulletin board, we can
use standard commitment schemes that are perfectly hiding, for example the
Pedersen commitment [25].
Abstraction. In practice, the two additions we make do not significantly affect
the complexity of running Belenios. However, the fact that we need to recur-
sively link every new ballot with a previously cast ballot significantly affects the
running time of Tamarin. To overcome this difficulty, we assume that each voter
casts at most four ballots, in effect allowing revoting only thrice (all attacks of
[9] occur in scenarios with at most two ballots per voter). We leave as open the
problem of formally proving (or disproving) the validity of this assumption. We
note that formal results that bound the number of agents or voters for verifica-
tion have a similar flavour [8,12,13].
Paper Structure. Section 2 contains preliminaries about election verifiability
and attacks on Belenios. In Section 3 we describe our improvements and in
Section 4 we describe the protocol specification and automated verification with
the Tamarin prover.
2 Preliminaries
We describe Belenios in more detail in Section 2.1. The formal notion of election
verifiability and the attacks on Belenios are described in Section 2.2.
2.1 Introduction to Belenios
Apart from voters (V), the parties in the Belenios protocol [16,2] are:
– Administrator (A): determines the list of eligible candidates and the list of
eligible voters.
– Bulletin Board (BB): public ledger containing election information: the pub-
lic key, the list of candidates, the list of public credentials for eligible voters,
the list of cast ballots, the final outcome and proofs of correctness. We de-
note specific portions of BB with suffixes. In particular, BBkey contains the
public key of the election, BBcast contains the list of ballots cast for each
public credential, and BBtally contains the list of ballots chosen for tally. BB
can only be changed by writing new information on it; previously written
information cannot be changed.
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– Trustees (T): generate the secret key of the election, publish the correspond-
ing public key on BB, compute the final outcome.
– Registrar (VR): for each eligible voter, it creates a fresh signing key pair
(vk, skey); vk is the public credential, which is also denoted by cr in the
following; it publishes the list of all public credentials on BB.
– Voting Server (VS): receives ballots cast by authenticated voters and pub-
lishes them on BB; voter authentication is done via passwords.
– Voting Platform (VP): constructs ballots for voter choices; authenticates
voters with respect to VS and transmits ballots to VS; each ballot contains
a ciphertext encrypting the vote, a signature of the ciphertext with respect
to skey of the corresponding voter, and zero-knowledge proofs.
– Election Auditors (EA): perform audit and verification of proofs on BB. The
validity of the ballot is verified by VS at ballot-casting time, and can also be
verified by EA at any time afterwards on BBcast.
Setup Phase. A determines the list of eligible voters id1, . . . , idn, and sends
the list to VR and VS. VR generates the public and private credentials for
each voter, while VS generates login passwords. Each voter id receives the tuple
〈cr, skey, pwd〉 during setup phase and BB is updated by the following:
BBkey : pk; BBcand : v1, . . . , vk; BBreg : cr1, . . . , crn.
Voting Phase. In this phase, voters interact with their voting platform VP to
construct a ballot b, which is sent together with their public credential cr to
VS. Upon authentication of the voter and validity checks with respect to cr, the
ballot is published on BBcast.
VP : c = enc(v, pk, r); s = sign(c, skey); prR = proofR(c, r, 〈v1, . . . , vk〉);
prL = proofL(c, r, cr); b = 〈c, s, prR, prL〉;
VS : authenticates id with pwd; receives b and the public credential cr;
verifies s, prR and prL; and stores (id, cr) in Log;
BBcast : (cr, b).
The signature ensures the voter holds the private part of the public credential
cr. The zero-knowledge proof prR ensures that the ciphertext contains a vote
in a valid range 〈v1, . . . , vk〉. The proof prL ensures that the ballot (and the
ciphertext) is verifiably linked to the label cr, and cannot be cast for any other
credential cr′. In the cryptographic construction, the underlying zero-knowledge
proof system takes the arguments of proofR and proofL and returns prR and prL
[14,16]. Moreover, the following consistency property is ensured by VS for the
Log storing the association between voter identities and public credentials:
(id, cr) ∈ Log ∧ (id, cr′) ∈ Log ⇒ cr = cr′ and
(id, cr) ∈ Log ∧ (id′, cr) ∈ Log ⇒ id = id′.
This prevents a corrupt voter to use a public credential already used by an honest
voter, and also to cast ballots for more than one public credential. In addition
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to ensuring basic integrity properties, consistency of the log also prevents ballot
copy attacks like in [17]. The individual verification procedure enables voters to
check their ballots on BB anytime during the election. Specifically, they should
check that the expected ballot b is published next to their public credential cr
on BBcast.
Tally Phase. The ballots which will be tallied are selected and marked as
input for the tally procedure. Selection typically chooses the last ballot cast by
each cri and we have BBtally : (cr1, b1), . . . , (crn, bn). bi = ⊥ if no ballot was cast
for cri. Based on the homomorphic properties of ElGamal encryption [18,20],
ciphertexts corresponding to non-empty ballots on BBtally are combined into a
ciphertext c encoding the total number of votes for each candidate. Then, c is
decrypted by trustees to obtain the result of the election.
2.2 Election Verifiability and Attacks on Belenios
We consider the symbolic definition of election verifiability from [9], which is an
extension of the symbolic definition introduced in [15]. Election verifiability is
modelled as a conjunction of properties Φhiv ∧ Φeli ∧ Φcl ∧ Φ◦res, where:
Individual verifiability: Φhiv ensures that if an honest voter successfully veri-
fied the last ballot they cast, then the corresponding vote should be part of
the final tally.
Eligibility: Φeli ensures that if a voter successfully verified a ballot, then the
corresponding public credential should be recorded at registration on BB.
Moreover, any tallied ballot should correspond to a public credential recorded
at registration.
No clash: Φcl ensures that no two voters can successfully verify their ballot for
the same public credential.
Result integrity: Φ◦res ensures that the adversary can cast a ballot for a given
public credential only if the corresponding voter is corrupted or has not
performed the individual verification procedure for any of the ballots cast. A
stronger notion of result integrity, denoted by Φ•res, prohibits the adversary
to cast a ballot even if the voter has not verified any of the ballots cast.
A violation of Φres is called ballot stuffing; a violation of Φcl is a clash attack.
Belenios is expected to satisfy election verifiability in the following adversarial
scenarios: A1 - both the server and the registrar are honest; A2 - the server
is corrupt and the registrar honest; A3 - the server is honest and the registrar
corrupt. Security should be ensured by private signing keys - when the registrar
is honest, and by private passwords and server logs - when the server is hon-
est. However, [9] shows several attacks resulting from the fact that the server
does not know the association between a public credential and the identity of
the corresponding voter. A corrupt voter can then cast a ballot for any public
credential, as soon as the adversary manages to obtain ballots signed with the
corresponding private credential.
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Ballot Reordering Attack by A1, A2 or A3. Assume an honest voter id
with public credential cr casts ballots b1 and b2, in this order, and only verifies
b2. Then b2 should be counted for the respective public credential. However, the
adversary can cause b1 to be counted instead. The attack scenario is as follows:
V(id, cr) : casts b1 and b2, which are blocked by A;
A : casts b2 for cr (relying on a corrupted voter or voting server);
BBcast : (cr, b2) is verified by the voter V(id, cr);
A : casts b1 for cr;
BBtally : (cr, b1).
In a normal execution, the reception of b1 or b2 from id would link cr to id,
thus the adversary cannot cast b1 after b2 when the server is honest - unless it
corrupts the password of id. The crucial point of the attack by A1 is that b2 is
cast for the same public credential cr by a distinct corrupted voter.
Ballot Stuffing Attack by A3. When an honest voter id1 with cr1 casts a
ballot b, the adversary can block and cast it in the name of a corrupt voter id2, for
the same public credential cr1. The voter id1 successfully verifies b. Subsequently,
relying on a corrupt registrar, the adversary can cast another ballot bA for
cr1. This violates result integrity Φ
◦
res and individual verifiability Φiv, since an
adversarial ballot bA is cast for cr1, even though the corresponding voter is
honest and has successfully verified the ballot b.
A : corrupts VR and V(id2) to obtain 〈cr1, skey1, pwd2〉;
V(id1) : casts b, which is blocked by A;
A : casts b with 〈cr1, pwd2〉, and VS stores (id2, cr1) in Log;
BBcast : (cr1, b) is verified by V(id1);
A : casts bA with 〈cr1, pwd2〉, which is accepted and published;
BBtally : (cr1, bA).
If the voter id2 verified the cast ballot b, this also counts as a clash attack
in the definition from [9], as it requires resistance to clash attacks even for
corrupted voters. A variation of this attack can also lead to a weaker form of
ballot stuffing: the adversary can submit bA before id1 has a chance to cast a
ballot. In that case, the voting server will not accept any further ballot from
id1, since this would break the consistency of the log for cr1. Formally, this is a
violation of Φ•res. Our techniques in the following protect against (strong) ballot
stuffing, ballot reordering, and the clash attack. They do not protect against the
weaker form of ballot stuffing, i.e. the violation of Φ•res.
3 Towards Improved Election Verifiability
In Belenios, the aim of the zero-knowledge proof prL = proofL(c, r, cr) in a ballot
b = 〈c, s, prR, prL〉 is to verifiably link the ciphertext c = enc(v, pk, r), and there-
fore the ballot b, to the public credential cr for which b is cast. We denote the
corresponding verification procedure by verL(prL, c, cr). A valid proof can only
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be constructed by the party who constructs the ciphertext, by proving knowl-
edge of the corresponding randomness r with the label cr. This is called labeled
encryption in [14]. The idea is that the ciphertext cannot be detached from the
label: the adversary cannot copy c, or create a ciphertext related to the encoded
vote, and cast it for a different credential cr′. This is required in order to pro-
tect from attacks against privacy like in [17]. Concretely, the labeled encryption
in Belenios is based on ElGamal encryption with a Chaum-Pedersen proof of
knowledge, where the label cr is part of the input to a hash function (SHA256)
that computes the challenge for a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof.
We enrich the structure of the label in order to also protect against the
attacks presented in Section 2.2. The elements of the new label structure can
be given as inputs to the hash function along with cr in the Chaum-Pedersen
proof, thus we can rely on the same labeled encryption construction as Belenios.
Moreover, we prove in Section 4 that no further attacks are possible on election
verifiability in the resulting system. We present the new structure of the label
stepwise: first a label structure that protects against ballot reordering attacks by
A1,A2 or A3; then a label structure that protects against other attacks by A3
(in particular ballot stuffing); finally, combining the two labels protects against
all attacks by A1,A2 or A3.
3.1 Protection Against Ballot Reordering
We assume initially there are empty ballots next to eligible public credentials on
BB. Moreover, a specific portion of BB is reserved for displaying the last ballot
cast for each credential:
(Before voting) BBlast : (cr1,⊥), . . . , (crn,⊥)
(During voting) BBlast : (cr1, b1), . . . , (crn, bn)
When the voting platform VP constructs a new ballot for a voter with public
credential cr, it fetches from BBlast the last ballot b′ next to cr. Then, in the
construction of the proof prL, instead of cr, VP uses the label h(cr, b
′), where h is
a collision-resistant hash function mapping the pair (cr, b′) into the appropriate
domain for labels:
` = h(cr, b′); prL = proofL(c, r, `); b = 〈c, s, prR, prL, `〉.
BBcast records all ballots cast for cr, and their order cannot be changed on BB.
Election auditors can look at any two consecutive ballots b′ and b cast for a
credential cr and verify that
verL(prL, c, h(cr, b
′)) = ok,
thereby ensuring that the party constructing b indeed expects it to follow b′.
In particular, if an honest voter casts b2 after b1, the adversary cannot cast b2
first, since it would have to generate a proof linking b2 to an earlier ballot b0,
which is impossible since the adversary does not know the randomness in the
ciphertext corresponding to b2. This label structure ensures election verifiability
in corruption scenarios when the registrar is honest, i.e. A1 and A2.
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3.2 Protection Against a Corrupted Registrar
The main cause of the ballot stuffing and clash attacks, in the scenario with a
corrupted registrar, is that the adversary can block a ballot b of an honest voter
and cast it under the identity of a corrupt voter, while maintaining the same
public credential associated to b. Subsequently, after the honest voter verified b,
the adversary can override it with an own ballot bA. In order to prevent this, we
enrich the label attached to b so that it includes a commitment to the identity
of the voter. More precisely, during ballot casting for a voter id, VP generates
a fresh randomness t, constructs the label 〈cr, com(id, t)〉 and sends t together
with the ballot to the voting server VS. Since the label cannot be reconstructed
publicly by election auditors, we explicitly include it in the ballot. We have:
VP : ` = 〈cr, com(id, t)〉; prL = proofL(c, r, `); b = 〈c, s, prR, prL, `〉,
VS : receives (cr, b, t) from VP for a given id; `′ = 〈cr, com(id, t)〉,
casts b if and only if `′ = ` and verL(prL, c, `) = ok.
In the attack scenario described above, the adversary cannot construct a
proof pr′L so that b is cast by VS under the identity of a corrupt voter. Indeed,
the ciphertext in b cannot be detached from the identity of the honest voter.
More generally, we prove that this structure of the label is sufficient to ensure
election verifiability in the corruption scenarios when the server is honest, i.e.
A1 and A3. Election auditors can still check the proof prL on BB, but they
are only be able to ensure the ballot is cast for the expected public credential
cr and will not have knowledge of the underlying id. Note that we cannot use
the id directly in the label, as this would reveal the link between id and cr.
Moreover, the commitment scheme should be perfectly hiding, in order to resist
an all-powerful, e.g. quantum, adversary.
3.3 Putting the Labels Together
We combine the labels from Section 3.1 and Section 3.2 as follows:
`1 = h(cr, b
′); `2 = com(id, t); ` = 〈`1, `2〉.
We call Beleniostr (from tracking) the variant of Belenios where we augment the
label as described in Section 3.1, Beleniosid the variant where the label is as in
Section 3.2 and Belenios+ the variant where the label ` is as described in this
section. For a protocol P , a corruption scenarioA and a property Φ, we denote by
(P,A) |= Φ the fact that P satisfies Φ in the corruption scenario A. Let Φ◦E2E be
the election verifiability property Φhiv ∧Φeli∧Φcl∧Φ◦res as described in Section 2.2
and in [9]. In the next section, we describe the specification and automated
verification with Tamarin. They allow us to derive the following results:
( Beleniostr, A ) |= Φ◦E2E for A ∈ {A1,A2},
( Beleniosid, A ) |= Φ◦E2E for A ∈ {A1,A3},
( Belenios+, A ) |= Φ◦E2E for A ∈ {A1,A2,A3},
while we have ( Belenios, A ) 6|= Φ◦E2E for A ∈ {A1,A2,A3}.
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The property Φ◦E2E corresponds to the standard verifiability notion used in
[14,15]. In particular, this notion ensures that, if an honest voter successfully
verified a ballot b for a public credential cr, then b is counted in the final tally
as the contribution of cr. A stronger notion of verifiability, denoted by Φ•E2E, was
also proposed in [9]: if a ballot is counted for a public credential correspond-
ing to an honest voter, then it must necessarily have been cast by that voter
- independently of the individual verification procedure. In the scenario A3, an
adversary corrupting the registrar and a voter can cast a ballot bA for any pub-
lic credential, violating the strong verifiability notion Φ•E2E, even in Belenios+.
The label 〈h(cr, b′), com(id, t)〉 does not help here, since the adversary can freely
combine the identity of a corrupted voter with any credential, sign the ballot
and construct valid zero-knowledge proofs. If the honest voter already submitted
and successfully verified a ballot b, then the adversary cannot make VS accept
bA for the same public credential under the identity of a corrupt voter. This
is due to the fact that the association between the honest voter and the public
credential is recorded by the server in the log upon accepting b. That is why
Φ◦E2E holds for Belenios+.
4 Specification and Verification
4.1 Specifying Protocols in Tamarin
We perform our analysis of Belenios+ using the Tamarin prover, which is based
on a multiset rewriting framework. We only illustrate the most relevant features
of Tamarin here. For a detailed understanding of Tamarin we refer the reader
to [3,24,27]. In Tamarin, messages (or terms) are built from a set of function
symbols and properties of cryptographic primitives are modelled by a set of
equations. Protocol state information and adversarial knowledge are represented
by facts, modelled relying on special fact symbols. Protocol actions are specified
by multiset rewriting rules, denoted by [L]−−[ M ]→[N ], in which a set of premise
facts L allows to derive a set of conclusion facts N , while recording certain events
in action facts M .
Example 1. In a voting protocol, the generation of a secret/public key pair can
be modelled by the following multiset rewriting rule, that we denote by Rkey:
[ Fr(k) ]−−[ !BBkey(pk(k)),Phase(′setup′) ]→[ !Sk(k), !BBkey(pk(k)),Out(pk(k)) ]
where Fr(k) denotes the randomly generated fresh key k as a premise. The con-
clusion facts !Sk(k) and !BBkey(pk(k)) record the secret and the public key of
the election, respectively; the term pk(k) represents the public key itself, while
!BBkey(pk(k)) represents the fact that pk(k) is a public key published on BBkey.
If a fact is preceded by !, it means that it can be consumed (i.e. used as premise)
any number of times by other protocol rules. Otherwise it can be consumed only
once, and it is called a linear fact. The fact symbols In and Out are used for
communication over the network, controlled by the attacker. The action fact
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BBkey(pk(k)) records the event that the public key is published on the bulletin
board. The action fact Phase(′setup′) records that the rule should be executed
in the setup phase. The following rules set up candidates v1 and v2 and voter
identities id:
Rcand : [ In(〈v1, v2〉) ]−−[ Phase(′setup′) ]→[ !BBcand(v1), !BBcand(v2) ]
Rid : [ In(id) ]−−[ Phase(′setup′) ]→[ !Id(id) ]
To cast a ballot, the voter with identity id makes a choice between the candidates
recorded on BBcand and encrypts the vote v using the public key from BBkey
together with fresh randomness r. The output including the voter identity id
can be sent to the server over the network. To model this action, we define the
following rule, where the event Vote(id, v) is recorded as an action fact:
Rvote : [ !Id(id), !BBcand(v), !BBkey(pk(k)),Fr(r) ]
−−[ Vote(id, v),Phase(′voting′) ]→[ Out(〈id, enc(v, pkey, r)〉) ]
Cryptographic operations are specified by equations. For example, decryption
using the private key k is specified by:
dec(enc(v, pk(k), r), k) = v
where the term enc(v, pk(k), r) represents the encryption of v with public key
pk(k) and randomness r. It can be decrypted only if the secret key k is provided.
A restriction in Tamarin is a logical formula that constrains the applica-
tion of protocol rules. For example, the restriction ∀x, y, i, j. BBkey(x) @i ∧
BBkey(y) @j ⇒ x = y applied to the rule Rkey in Example 1 means that it
is not possible to have two different election keys. The symbol @ refers to the
timepoints i and j in the execution trace when the rule Rkey is applied. We
can also express a timepoint ordering or equality. For example, the restriction
∀i, j. Phase(′setup′) @i ∧ Phase(′voting′) @j ⇒ i ≺ j means that all setup
actions should occur before voting actions. A restriction can also encode the
equality predicate, enforcing that u and v are equal in any occurrence of the
action fact Eq(u, v) : ∀u, v, i. Eq(u, v) @i⇒ u = v.
We note that formal verification with Tamarin does not guarantee full-proof
security, as Tamarin itself may have bugs. Recently, there is research aiming to
underpin fully automated provers like Tamarin with foundations from interactive
theorem provers like Coq [4,10,19].
4.2 Specification and Verification of Belenios+
We define a set of equations used for specifying decryption (1), signature verifi-
cation (2), verification of a range proof (3), and verification of a proof attaching
a label to a ciphertext (4):
(1) dec(enc(x, pk(y), z), y) = x,
(2) ver(sign(x, y), x, pk(y)) = ok,
(3) (∀i) verR(proofR(enc(xi, y, z), z, 〈x1, . . . , xk〉), enc(xi, y, z), y, 〈x1, . . . , xk〉) = ok,
(4) verL(proofL(enc(x, y, z), z, `), enc(x, y, z), `) = ok.
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To specify the set of equations (3) in Tamarin, the number of candidates k
has to be fixed in advance. We use k = 2, but any constant would work. For
modelling the actions of participants in the protocol, we define a set of rules
and restrictions. For the complete specification, we refer to the Tamarin code
online [5]. It is an extension of the code corresponding to Belenios in [9]. In the
following, we discuss two of the most important rules in the specification: ballot
casting as it happens on the voting platform VP and on the voting server VS. We
highlight the difference between Belenios+ and Belenios in red. We use special
linear facts in order to track the last ballot cast for each credential: VPlast(cr, b0)
- to be used by the voting platform, and BBlast(cr, b0) - to be used by the voting
server. The rule for ballot casting on the voting server makes sure these two
facts are in sync. For voter credentials, we use special facts !Reg(id, cr, skey) and
!Pwd(id, pwd) to store credentials received from the registrar and from the server,
respectively. Ballot casting by VP is represented by the following rule:
RVPvote : construct a ballot, authenticate and send it to VS
let c = enc(v, pkey, r); s = sign(c, skey); ` = 〈h(cr, b0), com(id, t)〉;
prR = proofR(c, r, vlist); prL = proofL(c, r, `);
b = 〈c, s, prR, prL, `〉; a = h(〈id, pwd, cr, b, t〉) in
[ !BBcand(v), !BBkey(pkey),Fr(r),Fr(t), !Vlist(vlist), !Reg(id, cr, skey),
!Pwd(id, pwd),VPlast(cr, b0) ]−−[ Vote(id, cr, v),VoteB(id, cr, b) ]→
[ !Voted(id, cr, v, b),Out(〈id, cr, b, a, t〉) ]
where we use the Tamarin construction let. . . in for assigning terms to variables.
The rule abstracts password-based authentication with the help of a hash func-
tion, essentially ensuring that only a party knowing the password can cast a
ballot for a given id. In reality, the randomness t used for the commitment
should be sent on the same secure channel as the password. However, the se-
crecy of t is not important for verifiability properties, thus we can send it on
the public channel. The rule RVPvote consumes the linear fact VPlast(cr, b0), thus
it can be executed only once for any ballot posted on BB. This mechanism is
complemented by the ballot casting rule on the server side:
RVScast : authenticate voter, verify and publish ballot
let ` = 〈h(cr, b0), com(id, t)〉; b = 〈c, s, prR, prL, `〉;
a′ = h(〈id, pwd, cr, b, t〉) in
[ In(〈id, cr, b, a, t〉), !BBkey(pkey), !Vlist(vlist), !BBreg(cr), !Pwd(id, pwd),
BBlast(cr, b0) ] −−[ a′ = a, ver(s, c, cr) = ok, verR(prR, c, pkey, vlist) = ok,
verL(prL, c, `) = ok, Log(id, cr), !BBcast(cr, b) ]→
[ !BBcast(cr, b),BBlast(cr, b),VPlast(cr, b) ]
where we receive a ballot from the voter and perform the corresponding valida-
tion steps: verifying the password, the signature and the zero-knowledge proofs.
The fact containing the last ballot cast is consumed, and new facts are produced
for the new ballot: one to be consumed by the voting platform, and one to be
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consumed by the server when the next ballot is cast. In order to obtain termina-
tion, we have a restriction limiting the number of applications of this rule to at
most four for each voter. The following rule and restriction model the individual
verification procedure, where the restriction ensures that the voter verifies the
last ballot cast:
RVver : [ Voted(id, cr, v, b),BBcast(cr, b) ]−−[ Verified(id, cr, v),VerB(id, cr, b) ]→[ ]
BBcast(cr, b) @i ∧ BBcast(cr, b′) @j ∧ VerB(id, cr, b) @l ∧ i ≺ l ∧ j ≺ l
⇒ j ≺ i ∨ b = b′
Corruption Scenarios. We have three adversary models A1, A2 and A3, as
described in Section 2.2. Trustees are corrupted by default: we have a rule that
takes the secret key as input from the attacker. For other corruption abilities,
we have the following rules:
CVcorr : corrupt voter to reveal credentials
[ !Reg(id, cr, skey), !Pwd(id, pwd) ]−−[ Corr(id, cr) ]→[ Out(〈id, cr, skey, pwd〉) ]
CVSpwd : corrupt server to determine password
[ !Id(id), In(pwd) ]−−[ ]→[ !Pwd(id, pwd) ]
CVScast : corrupt server to stuff ballots
[ In(〈cr, b〉),BBlast(cr, b0) ]−−[!BBcast(cr, b) ]→
[ !BBcast(cr, b),BBlast(cr, b),VPlast(cr, b) ]
CVRreg : corrupt registration of public / secret credentials
let cr = pk(skey) in
[ !Id(id), In(〈skey, cr′〉) ]−−[!BBreg(cr′) ]→[ !Reg(id, cr, skey), !BBreg(cr′) ]
Moreover, when the server is corrupted, in the rule RVSvote we only keep the ver-
ification actions that can be publicly performed by election auditors. Table 1
contains verification results for the corresponding specifications with Tamarin,
obtained with the specifications posted online [5]. We can see that the positive
results for Belenios+ are the union of the positive results for Beleniostr and
Beleniosid, in each of the corruption cases A1, A2 and A3. In Table 2, we give
execution times for the verification of Belenios+ when we bound the number of
ballots per voter accordingly. Tamarin does not terminate without such a bound
(it takes more than one hour for five ballots per voter).
5 Conclusion and Future Work
We have introduced a simple extension of Belenios and we have proved with the
Tamarin prover that the resulting system improves election verifiability in vari-
ous corruption scenarios. These additions do not affect usability and efficiency of
Belenios. We also claim that (everlasting) privacy is not affected, but this has to
be formally proved. The bulletin board has the same structure, but the order in
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Table 1. Verifiability analysis of the variants of Belenios.
Φ/Aj
Belenios∗ Beleniostr Beleniosid Belenios+
A1 A2 A3 A1 A2 A1 A3 A1 A2 A3
Φhiv 7 7 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Φeli 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Φcl 3 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Φ•res 3 3 7 3 3 3 7 3 3 7
Φ◦res 3 3 7 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
∗ : Verification results for Belenios as in [9].




2 ballots per voter 17 sec 8 sec 57 sec
3 ballots per voter 1 min 33 sec 2 min 47 sec
4 ballots per voter 12 min 6 sec 15 min 15 min 53 sec
which all ballots are cast for a given credential should be clear. Our open prob-
lems are related to the formal verification and to the design of electronic voting
protocols. Our specification makes certain abstractions that should be lifted or
formally justified, for greater confidence in results. The most important abstrac-
tion is the one limiting the number of ballots to four for each voter. Concerning
the design, our techniques still do not achieve the stronger notion of election ver-
ifiability, that prevents the adversary from casting ballots even for honest voters
that have not verified their ballots. We also think election verifiability could be
achieved in stronger corruption scenarios, e.g. when both the registrar and the
server are (partially) corrupted. For example, it could be interesting to achieve
public verifiability for the fact that each ballot is associated to an eligible voter,
while perfectly hiding the actual identity of the voter. This would limit the cor-
ruption abilities of the registrar who generates the public credentials, without
relying on the server to perform the verification.
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Abstract. Trust is crucial for the adoption and use of new technologies.
This paper seeks to advance our knowledge of why people trust or dis-
trust disruptive electoral technologies such as remote internet voting. It
argues that because of the complexity of the systems in question, most
potential users are unable to form independent opinions on the system’s
trustworthiness and are likely to rely on cues provided by trusted social
actors such as their preferred political parties. The paper develops a set
of hypotheses from this conjecture, and tests these with survey data on
approximately 5200 Estonian voters in the context of 11 elections held
between 2005 and 2019. The findings suggest that partisan attachments
are an important determinant of trust in e-voting and that the parti-
san gap in trust cannot be reduced to differences in socio-demographic
voter profiles. Our results, however, do not support the conjecture that
less educated individuals are particularly likely to take cues from their
preferred parties when assessing the trustworthiness of e-voting.
Keywords: e-voting · internet voting · trust
1 Introduction
In recent decades, trust has become an important focus in technology studies.
As a precondition for the adoption and use of new technologies [35, 26], trust can
make or break specific innovations, with potentially far-reaching and cumulative
macro-societal effects. In the context of the ongoing digital transformation af-
fecting all spheres of life, it is vital to understand the nature, sources and effects
of trust in the context of technological change.
The growing literature on the subject has clarified important conceptual
questions and produced notable empirical findings. The conceptual work has fo-
cused on the role of uncertainty and vulnerability in trust situations, differences
between various objects of trust, such as people, organizations or technologies,
as well as the relevant properties of the trustor, trustee, and the broader insti-
tutional context. In terms of explaining trust in new technologies, the literature
? The work for this paper has received funding from European Union’s Horizon 2020
research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 857622
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has tended to prioritize user perceptions of the functionality and reliability of
specific technologies. In doing so, the literature on trust converges with tech-
nology acceptance models which emphasize perceived usefulness and perceived
ease-of-use [10]. However, the literature has to date paid limited attention to
how cognitively constrained individuals form opinions and beliefs about highly
complex technological systems.
This paper focuses on the proposition that when forming beliefs about the
trustworthiness of new technologies, potential users rely on cognitive shortcuts,
taking cues from trusted social actors. Grounded in well-established theories
of bounded rationality, this approach postulates that when forming judgments
about new technologies, people behave as cognitive misers who rely on heuristics
in order to reduce the time and effort associated with making up one’s mind.
Considering the complexity of new digital technologies as well as the rapid pace
of technological replacement, the cue-taking approach has potential to lead to
new insights about the determinants and dynamics of trust.
We use cue-taking theory to explain popular trust in remote internet voting
(e-voting) in Estonia. E-voting is a disruptive technology that significantly alters
the calculations and behavior of stakeholders in the electoral process, including
voters, parties, candidates and electoral authorities [23]. Estonia introduced re-
mote internet voting in 2005 and has used it since then in all local, national and
European Parliament elections. Usage rates have grown rapidly, with e-votes
constituting almost a half of all votes cast in national and European Parliament
elections in 2019. While high and growing usage rates are suggestive of high
levels of trust, our data shows that Estonian voters differ greatly in terms of the
extent to which they trust e-voting. We derive a set of hypotheses about parti-
san attachments and voter trust in e-voting, and test these with survey data on
approximately 5200 voters in the context of 11 elections held between 2005 and
2019.
This paper is organized in six sections. The next section examines the concept
of trust in the context of technological innovation. The third section revisits the
literature on cognitive shortcuts in opinion formation, and presents the argument
that voters take cues from their preferred political parties in forming beliefs
about e-voting. The fourth section introduces the research design, data and
methods. The fifth section describes the positions of Estonia’s main political
parties on internet voting. The sixth section presents the results of the analysis,
focusing on the level, correlates and predictors of trust in e-voting. We conclude
with a brief discussion of the implications of our findings.
2 The Concept of Trust in the Context of Technological
Innovation
Trust is generally understood as belief in the reliability, truth, or ability of some-
one or something. Trust has been defined in various ways in different disciplines,
and the copious literature on the nature, causes and effects of trust has suffered
from several problems including the lack of conceptual clarity and specificity. An
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Integrative Model of Organizational Trust that stands out for conceptual rigor
and underlies a large body of subsequent scholarship defines trust as “willingness
of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expec-
tation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor,
irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party” [28]. This model
distinguishes between the characteristics of the trustor (propensity to trust) and
the characteristics of the trustee (factors of perceived trustworthiness, including
ability, benevolence and integrity). It argues that trust refers to the trustor’s
willingness to enter into a risk-taking relationship with the trustee, and makes
an important distinction between trust as a belief and trusting behavior [28].
While most of the scholarship on trust is concerned with trust in people or
organizations, a recent strand of research focuses on trust in technology. Several
studies have proposed relevant definitions and measures, arguing that we need a
better understanding of what makes technology itself trustworthy, “irrespective
of the people and human structures that surround the technology”[29, p. 2]
This approach has strong affinities with technology acceptance models which
emphasize the inherent characteristics of specific technologies, such as perceived
usefulness and ease-of-use [10] as well as performance expectancy and effort
expectancy [38].
Focusing on technology as the object of trust calls for specifying how trust
in technology differs from trust in people, and what the implications of these
differences are. To trust a person is to trust “a volitional and moral agent” while
to trust technology means to trust “a human-created artifact with a limited
range of capabilities” that lacks free will and moral agency[29, p. 5]. However,
these differences do not challenge the basic definition of trust as a belief that
the trustee has the attributes necessary to perform as expected in a situation.
Both types of trust are compatible with definitions that emphasize vulnerability
and willingness to assume risks as being central to trust. Both types of trust are
affected by contextual conditions such as situational normality and structural
assurance which refer to the belief that risks will not materialize because the sit-
uation is ”normal, favorable, or well-ordered” and because “promises, contracts,
regulations and guarantees are in place” [29, 30]. Furthermore, it is important to
understand that the diverse objects of trust may form complex systems in which
technologies, people, organizations, and contextual conditions such as institu-
tional and legal settings are intertwined and interdependent. Whether people
distinguish among the different components of the system, whether they trust
some components more than others, and how trust in specific components affects
trust in the system as a whole remain questions for empirical inquiry.
The above clarifications enable us to spell out what we mean by trust in re-
mote internet voting. The trustor is the potential user – i.e. a person eligible to
vote. The object of trust is a system consisting of people, organizations, institu-
tions, laws, rules, norms and specific technologies. The system is highly complex,
consisting of multiple interconnected components each of which can constitute
a separate object of trust. For instance, a user could have different levels of
trust in each of the specific technologies used (e.g. ID cards, authentication,
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e-voting software, vote encryption systems, protocols and algorithms, servers,
etc), as well as in people and organizations involved in the design, production,
testing, operation, control, promotion and evaluation of these technologies (in-
cluding developers, tech companies, governments, lawyers, electoral authorities,
etc). Importantly, a lack of trust in one specific component of the system may un-
dermine trust in the system as a whole. Remote internet voting entails a plethora
of potential vulnerabilities and risks, including the risk that the vote is not cast
as intended, that the vote cast does not remain secret, and that by download-
ing e-voting applications, users infect their devices with viruses and malware.
Beyond personal risks, e-voting can be associated with a range of macro-level
risks (e.g. failure to conduct free and fair elections, a crisis or breakdown of
democracy). Trust in remote internet voting thus means willingness to rely on
the diverse components of such a voting system based on the expectation that
the system performs its declared functions (secure and fast location-independent
voting in free and fair elections) irrespective of the voters’ ability to monitor or
control the system.
While the growing literature on trust in technology has done much to clar-
ify the concept and illuminate the sources and effects of trust, it has not yet
paid sufficient attention to the question of how people form beliefs about highly
complex (systems of) objects. Arguing that the literature on trust in technology
would benefit from insights from the broader literature on opinion and belief
formation on complex issues, the next section revisits the literature on cognitive
heuristics and contemplates the role of political parties in shaping public beliefs
about the trustworthiness of e-voting.
3 Trust or Not to Trust Technology? Taking Cues from
Political Parties
For decades, scholarship on opinion formation and decision-making has empha-
sized the cognitive limitations of human judgment, arguing that individuals tend
to rely on cognitive heuristics in order to reduce informational and computational
costs [32, 34, 17, 6]. A heuristic is a mental shortcut that leads to fast, frugal and
mostly accurate decisions in many situations characterized by uncertainty [18].
However, reliance on cognitive heuristics is also associated with errors and re-
duced accuracy, cognitive bias, stereotyping and prejudice [34].
Cue-taking is one type of heuristic that individuals use in order to reduce cog-
nitive effort involved in problem-solving, opinion formation and decision-making.
Because of the cognitive and temporal costs of rational reasoning, individuals
look to other trusted social actors, such as political elites, for signals suggesting
what to think or how to behave [27, 41]. The likelihood that individuals rely on
elite cues when forming opinions and making decisions increases when informa-
tion is scarce or difficult to obtain, when issues are complex, uncertainty is high,
when time is constrained, and when the ability to process information is low.
In the context of competitive democracies, a theory of opinion formation
based on elite cues must take into account partisanship. There is a large and
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diverse literature focusing on party cues and the effects of party attachments on
individual opinions and decision-making [9, 22, 3, 7, 8]. It is argued that citizens
follow the lead of the party they sympathize with the most in forming policy
opinions, and are particularly likely to do so when the issues in question are
complex. There is significant evidence that individuals rely on party cues when
making up their minds on issues such as European integration [2, 20, 19, 31], the
state of the national economy [5], climate change [12], foreign policy [4] or nuclear
energy [25]. While much of the literature on partisanship effects has focused on
the United States, party attachments have been shown to affect policy opinions
in a variety of contexts, including multi-party systems and new democracies [7].
Despite the prominence of the party cues theory in political research, it seems
that this approach has not been applied to explaining opinion formation on new
digital technologies. Widely used models of technology acceptance and use, such
as UTAUT [38] include social influence as one of the explanatory factors. Social
influence is defined as ”the degree to which an individual perceives that impor-
tant others believe he or she should use the new system” [38, p. 451]. However,
the category of social influence in these models is concerned with subjective
norms, culture, image and reputation, not with cue-taking as a form of cognitive
shortcut.
There are three interrelated reasons why opinion formation on e-voting is
highly likely to involve cue-taking from political parties. First, because remote
internet voting is quick and convenient, saving voters time and money, many
voters will want to use it. Before doing so, however, they need to determine
whether the system can be trusted. In other words, there are strong incentives
to form an opinion on e-voting in the first place. Second, the issue is highly
complex: few voters have the time and ability to form independent opinions
on the trustworthiness of the technological, legal and institutional aspects of
remote internet voting. Thus, voters are highly likely to look for and rely on
informational and computational shortcuts in forming opinions. Third, political
parties can be expected to be important cue-givers because they have much
at stake in the introduction of new technologies that transform the electoral
process. Technological innovations that alter both the cost-benefit calculations
involved in the act of voting, as well as perceptions, norms and understandings
related to elections, have the potential to differentially impact electoral support
for specific parties. Thus, parties are likely to form positions, corresponding to
their perception of how e-voting affects their electoral prospects and those of
their contenders. They may frame new technologies in particular ways, seeking
to legitimize or de-legitimize their use. In sum, the combination of these three
factors makes it highly likely that parties engage in cue-giving and voters in
cue-taking regarding e-voting.
We derive the following hypotheses from the above discussion:
H1: Citizens who vote for parties that endorse remote internet voting are
more likely to trust remote internet voting than citizens who vote for parties that
criticize this voting mode.
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H2: The partisan gap in trust in remote internet voting cannot be reduced to
differences in the socio-demographic profiles of party voters.
H3: The effect of party cues on an individual’s trust in remote internet voting
is conditioned by the individual’s level of cognitive sophistication.
4 Research Design, Data and Methods
The hypotheses specified above are tested using individual-level survey data
as well as party-level data from Estonia from 2005 to 2019. During these fif-
teen years, eleven nation-wide elections with an e-voting option have been held,
including four local, four national and three European Parliament elections. Es-
tonia remains the only country in the world that offers all of its voters the
opportunity to cast a vote online. E-voting has been available in all nation-wide
elections since 2005, and the share of e-votes has grown steadily, reaching almost
50 per cent of all votes cast in 2019. In Estonia, e-voting is highly institutional-
ized and has become part of the regular framework for conducting elections. In
the context of a study focusing on trust in e-voting, this means that the object of
trust is an existing, widely used system that all voters have the option of using.
This differentiates the Estonian case from all other currently existing electoral
contexts in the world. For more information on the organization and uptake of
internet voting in Estonia see [1, 33, 36].
In this context, Estonian political parties have had more reason and more
time to form positions on e-voting than their counterparts around the world.
Party positions have evolved together with the Estonian e-voting system, and
have both reflected and influenced societal and expert debates on the matter.
As there have been no initiatives to systematically collect data on Estonian par-
ties’ positions on internet voting, such as a survey or manifesto study, this study
infers party positions from a range of available sources, including votes in the
parliament, party manifestos and campaign materials, statements by party lead-
ers and officials, as well as media and social media coverage of party activities.
This analysis focuses on the positions of six largest parties, three of which have,
at various times, expressed skepticism towards e-voting.
To examine voter trust in e-voting, we use individual-level survey data from
the Estonian electronic voter study 2005-2019, which is comprised of 11 post-
election cross-sectional surveys covering all elections in which the option of re-
mote internet voting has been available. Each survey had a sample size of roughly
1000 respondents, and the samples are representative of eligible voters in terms
of age, gender, ethnicity and region. We focus only on self-reported voters, re-
sulting in a dataset of roughly 5200 respondents.
We use the following measure of trust in e-voting: ”Do you trust the procedure
of internet voting?”. Answers to this question were recorded on a four-category
Likert scale between 2005 and 2011 and on a 0-10 scale since 2013. In both
cases, we split the responses mid-scale and turned the variable into a binary
trust variable (0 - do not trust; 1 - trust) to be able to compare effects across
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the years. Respondents who chose category 5 on the 0-10 scale were randomly
assigned to either side.
To investigate the hypotheses we employ the following approaches. After de-
scribing the level of trust in e-voting over the years, we turn to the question
of whether trust in e-voting differs from trust in political institutions as well
as trust in online transactions. To answer this question, we examine correlation
matrices of various survey items. Second, we examine the dynamics of trust in
e-voting over time according to party choice. Given that some Estonian par-
ties have changed their stances on internet voting over time, an examination
of whether and how voter attitudes have followed these changes provides par-
ticularly compelling evidence of cue-taking. Third, we run eleven separate logit




1 − Pr(trustt = 1)
}
= β0 + β1demoraphicst + β2partychoicet + β3trustt
(1)
The dependent variable is trust in e-voting in election t and the indepen-
dent variables are standard socio-demographics (age, gender, income, education),
weekly internet usage frequency, self-reported computer skills of the voter, party
choice in the given election, average trust in other state institutions and trust
in internet transactions. We run a separate model for each election and include
independent variables stepwise in order to assess whether and to what extent
party cues override the effects of other factors. Given that we include trust in
internet transactions, internet usage intensity as well as self-reported skills as
controls, this approach should constitute a rigorous test of the party cues and
non-reducibility hypotheses (H1 and H2). Finally, to test the sophistication hy-
pothesis (H3) we examine the predictive margins of trust by party choice and
education level.
Below, we will first elaborate on the positions of the Estonian political parties
before turning to an analysis of voter attitudes.
5 The Positions of Estonian Political Parties on E-voting
Despite a sustained political commitment to developing internet voting that
spans two decades and ten coalition governments, there has been significant par-
tisan conflict over e-voting in Estonia. Out of the six main parliamentary parties,
three (Pro Patria, the Reform Party and Social Democrats) have endorsed and
promoted e-voting. Pro Patria and the Reform Party, both on the center-right,
were leading government parties in the early 2000s when expert and political
discussions on e-voting were first launched, the decision to deploy internet vot-
ing was taken, and the necessary legislation prepared. The liberal, pro-market
Reform Party has been the dominant government party during the observed
period, leading coalition governments from April 2005 to November 2016. For
most of this period, it was in coalition with Pro Patria and the Social Democrats.
Throughout this period, the three parties’ positions on internet voting – along
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with that of the government as a whole – have been highly positive, depicting e-
voting as an important element of the Estonian e-state, a long-standing priority
of Reform-led governments.
Three other major parties - the Center Party, the People’s Union, and its
successor, the Conservative People’s Party – have adopted critical stances on
internet voting at various points of time and with varying levels of intensity.
For most of the observed period, the three parties were in opposition (with
the exception of the Center serving as a junior partner in a Reform-led coalition
government from April 2005 to April 2007, and the People’s Union being included
in government from April 2003 to April 2005). In November 2016, however,
Center became the leading government party, ruling, initially, together with Pro
Patria and the Social Democrats, and then, following March 2019 elections, with
the Conservative People’s Party and Pro Patria. Below, we summarize available
evidence about negative cuing by the Center Party, the People’s Union, and the
Conservative People’s Party.
The Center Party, a liberal centrist force with a reoccurring populist streak,
was one of the two parties that voted against the introduction of internet voting
in 2005. Between 2005 and 2013, it voiced occasional criticism of e-voting. For
instance, following the 2011 national elections, MP Ando Leps claimed that
the Estonian e-voting system was ”completely untrustworthy,” rendering the
election legally invalid [37]. The Party stepped up criticism of e-voting after
the October 2013 local elections. Party Chairman Edgar Savisaar published an
article in the party newspaper Kesknädal in which he claimed that right-wing
parties won elections by forging election results [39]. In spring 2013, an NGO
connected to the Center Party ran a street campaign in Tallinn, featuring 68
posters with slogans such as “They may delete your vote,” “Every e-vote is a
potential threat to Estonia’s independence” and “They can give your vote to
whoever they want” (ibid.) In both 2011 and 2014, the Party helped fund visits
of foreign experts who produced critical reports of the e-voting system. In 2014,
the Center Party Board sent a letter to Estonian and EU top officials requesting
immediate cancellation of e-voting due to “fundamental security problems” [40].
In April 2015, the Party’s Council adopted a resolution which claimed that e-
voting was a security risk, and argued that e-voting violates the requirement of
uniformity and secrecy [24]. The resolution said that even if government parties
had not abused e-voting to date, such abuse may occur in the future (ibid).
However, the Center Party appears to have discontinued its criticism of e-
voting after it became the leading government party in November 2016. Still, in
March 2017, the party proposed a bill which foresaw shortening the e-voting pe-
riod from seven days to three [39]. However, Party Chairman and Prime Minister
Jüri Ratas publicly confirmed that the government endorses internet voting. In
September 2017, the government led by Ratas had to manage the most serious
crisis in the history of Estonian e-government which occurred after foreign sci-
entists found a vulnerability affecting hundreds of thousands of ID cards used in
Estonia [21]. With the reputation of the Estonian e-government system at stake,
the government led by Ratas worked hard to solve the crisis and control dam-
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age. Since the event, the Center Party has refrained from criticizing e-voting. In
sum, the Center Party was critical of remote internet voting from 2005 until late
2016, while its position since November 2016 can be characterized as neutral or
favorable.
The Estonian People’s Union, a socially conservative rural party, was founded
in 1999 and ceased to exist in 2012. It was one of the two parties that voted
against the introduction of e-voting in 2005. Furthermore, its former Chairman
Arnold Rüütel, then President of the Republic, twice refused to proclaim the
law instituting internet voting, arguing that the provision that allows the voter
to alter his or her e-vote violates the principle of uniformity of elections. He
also asked the Supreme Court to declare the law invalid [13]. In 2006, Jaak
Allik, Deputy Chair of the party group in the parliament, argued that e-voting
is in principle not observable and electoral authorities are not able to ascertain
whether the person who voted with a particular ID card is the legal holder of
the card [11]. The party suffered major electoral losses in general elections held
in spring 2007. This decline seems to coincide with the subsiding of negative
rhetoric directed at e-voting.
The third major party that has criticized e-voting is the Estonian Conserva-
tive People’s Party (EKRE). Founded in 2012, the populist far-right party first
gained parliamentary representation in 2015 and entered the governing coalition
in spring 2019. While the party seems to have kept a low profile on e-voting
during the first four years of its existence, it has, over time, turned into a vocal
critic of the system. In spring 2017, Henn Põlluaas, Deputy Chairman of the
party group in the parliament, called for an international audit of the Estonian
e-voting system. Half a year later, EKRE filed a complaint with the Electoral
Committee, demanding that internet voting in upcoming local elections be can-
celled due to security vulnerabilities affecting ID cards [14]. In March 2019,
Deputy Chair of the party, Martin Helme, claimed that for him, the trustworthi-
ness of e-elections was “non-existent” because the integrity of elections “cannot
be monitored or verified” [16]. Over the course of 2017-2019, EKRE’s news portal
Uued uudised published 26 articles expressing various doubts about e-elections,
pointing at shortcomings in procedures and emphasizing the need to evaluate
and improve the security of the system. After EKRE joined the governing coali-
tion in April 2019, it was assigned the portfolio of the Minister of Foreign Trade
and Information Technology. Kert Kingo, who held the position for half a year
in 2019, convened an e-voting working group to assess the verifiability, security
and transparency of Estonia’s electronic voting system – a move that many in-
terpreted as being politically motivated [15]. In sum, between 2017 and 2019,
EKRE’s position on e-voting can be characterized as highly critical.
Differences in party positions appear to reflect the differential utilities that
parties derive from e-voting. Voter uptake of e-voting varies by party choice as
shown in Figure 1. While the vote shares of the two largest parties (Reform
and Center) have been fairly comparable, hovering between 23 and 29 per cent
in national elections (Figure 1a), the Reform Party gets about four times as
many e-votes as its main political opponent (Figure 1b). Also, Pro Patria and
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the Social Democrats are clearly more successful in attracting e-votes than the
Center Party. Although previous studies have demonstrated that e-voting does
not increase turnout or mobilize non-voters [33], it is clear that the importance
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Fig. 1: Total vote shares and e-vote shares in national elections 2007-2019
6 Voter Trust and Its Correlates: Results Based on the
Estonian Electronic Voter Study
Data from the Estonian electronic voter study suggests that e-voting has enjoyed
high levels of trust in Estonia since its inception. According to the first survey
conducted in 2005, a few months after the first e-enabled election, about 80 per
cent of the voters said that they trusted the system. The level of trust has ebbed
and flowed, reaching the lowest level of 54 per cent in 2013, but recovering after
that and hovering around 69-70 per cent in the two elections held in 2019.
Before proceeding to analyze the predictors of trust in e-voting, it is impor-
tant to establish whether and how this type of trust is related to trust in other
institutions. Running bivariate correlations (coefficients not shown due to space
limitations but available from authors upon request) between trust in internet
voting and trust in the parliament, government, politicians, the state and in-
ternet transactions show that trust in e-voting is correlated with trusting other
institutions but the correlations are systematically weaker compared to correla-
tions between trust in different state institutions. This is a strong indication that
trust in e-voting is substantively different from trust in other state institutions
and that respondents are able to distinguish e-voting from other objects and
evaluate its trustworthiness separately.
Also, it is important to establish whether and how much trust matters when
it comes to the decision whether to use the system or not. Figure 2 shows the
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association between trust and usage of e-voting, extracted from a regression
model where usage is the dependent variable and trust is an independent variable
alongside conventional socio-demographic measures. The results confirm that













































Fig. 2: The effect of trust on usage of e-voting (2005-2019)
Turning to the question of how party cues affect voter attitudes, Figure 3
shows the level of trust in e-voting by party choice over time. Multiple things
stand out. First, the figure shows that party supporters fall into two distinct
groups, the low-trust (Center, EKRE voters) and the high-trust group (all oth-
ers). Second, the share of trustors fluctuates over the observed period for two
parties. Trust among Center Party supporters starts out high, then plummets
and then grows again. These fluctuations reflect the temporal evolution of the
Center Party position on e-voting: the Party was initially indifferent towards this
voting mode, then started to heavily oppose it and finally switched to positive
rhetoric after becoming the leading government party in late 2016. EKRE sup-
porters have moved from a high-trust group to a low-trust group almost linearly
as the party leadership’s opposition to e-voting has grown more vocal.
Next, we ran a regression model in order to ascertain the effects of party
choice on trust in e-voting, controlling for socio-demographic variables as well
as computer literacy, internet usage and trust in political institutions as well
as internet transactions. Table 1 presents a part of the regression model output
(effects of control variables not shown). A number of findings stand out. First, in
the early years of e-voting, party choice was not a significant predictor of trust.
Statistically significant effects of party choice appear from 2011 onwards and
persist when internet usage, PC skill level, trust in internet transactions as well as
socio-demographics are controlled for. Second, we see how the explanatory power
of these models, especially their ability to classify low-trust voters, improves over
time and then diminishes again. These fluctuations correspond to shifts in the
Center Party’s stance on e-voting. Third, as the reference group are Center Party
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Fig. 3: Level of trust in e-voting by party choice
voters, we can conclude that the supporters of the Reform Party, Pro Patria and
the Social Democrats are clearly more trusting of e-voting than Center Party
supporters. This finding is in line with the significantly larger share of internet
votes accruing to these three parties compared to the Center Party.
Table 1: The effects of party choice on trust in e-voting (2005-2019)
2005 2007 2009 2009 2011 2013 2014 2015 2017 2019 2019
local national EP local national local EP national local national EP
Reform Party 0.027 0.061 0.064 0.029 0.224 0.273*** 0.238** 0.357*** 0.149* 0.301*** 0.311***
(ref: Center) (0.058) (0.052) (0.050) (0.064) (0.127) (0.071) (0.081) (0.081) (0.063) (0.062) (0.073)
Pro Patria 0.041 0.109 * 0.119 ** 0.077 0.259 * 0.198 ** 0.307 *** 0.406 *** 0.075 0.162 ** 0.229 **
(0.058) (0.050) (0.047) (0.063) (0.127) (0.070) (0.084) (0.081) (0.079) (0.075) (0.085)
Social Democrats -0.074 0.063 0.100* 0.014 0.226 0.110 0.237** 0.397*** 0.227** 0.281*** 0.241***
(0.081) (0.056) (0.048) (0.071) (0.127) (0.068) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074) (0.067) (0.075)
People’s Union -0.101 0.001 - 0.234 na na na na na na
(0.086) (0.081) - - (0.184) na na na na na na
EKRE na na na na na 0.161 0.080 0.324*** -0.102 -0.011 -0.176
na na na na na (0.217) (0.129) (0.089) (0.088) (0.073) (0.098)
Other party -0.011 0.052 0.027 0.079 0.232 0.217*** 0.178* 0.325*** 0.101 0.123 0.129
(0.059) (0.053) (0.047) (0.056) (0.120) (0.058) (0.077) (0.077) (0.058) (0.072) (0.079)
Sensitivity 98.45 99.59 98.38 98.94 96.87 85.8 93.42 88.89 92.03 91.07 92.92
Specificity 16.67 2.00 27.66 10.64 34.21 78.33 68.89 63.83 53.73 60.26 52.14
Pseudo R2 0.176 0.198 0.453 0.171 0.383 0.619 0.584 0.422 0.478 0.514 0.440
Observations 459 532 479 426 395 472 318 530 548 554 484
Average marginal effects with standard errors in parentheses.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Finally, we turn to the question of whether the effect of party cues on trust in
e-voting is moderated by the voter’s cognitive sophistication. Figure 4 shows the
predictive margins of trust in e-voting according to the highest level of education
attained. Overall, the results suggest that trust in e-voting does not depend
56
Party Cues and Trust in Remote Internet Voting
on sophistication. However, regardless of which party we focus on, a pattern
emerges where in the first years of e-voting lower education was associated with
higher levels of predicted trust, while in the last four or five elections, the highly
educated are more prone to trust e-voting than the less educated. It is not
clear why such a reversal has occurred - because confidence intervals for the
educational categories overlap, we cannot substantively interpret these results.
What is clear, however, is that when trust in e-voting declines among supporters
of a particular party, it does so across all educational categories.
7 Conclusions
This study sought to contribute to the burgeoning literature on trust in new
technologies by systematically evaluating the proposition that voters take cues
from political parties when evaluating technologically complex voting systems
such as remote internet voting. It derived three hypotheses from the discussion
about the correlates and predictors of trust, and tested these with individual
and party-level data from Estonia, covering the period 2005-2019.
The results lend support to the party cues hypothesis, which postulated that
citizens who vote for parties that endorse e-voting are more likely to trust e-
voting than citizens who vote for parties that criticize this voting mode. In the
case of Estonia, this means that voters who cast a vote for the Center Party,
the People’s Union or the Conservative People’s Party have been less likely to
trust e-voting than voters who voted for other parties. The second hypothesis,
which posited that the partisan gap in trust cannot be reduced to differences in
the socio-demographic profiles of party voters, was also confirmed. The effects of
party choice on trust for e-voting persisted when a variety of socio-demographic
controls, along with general trust in political institutions, computer literacy,
internet usage and trust in internet transactions were controlled for. The third
hypothesis which expected the effect of party cues on an individual’s trust in e-
voting to be conditioned by the level of political sophistication was not confirmed.
These results confirm the potential of societal actors to shape mass percep-
tions of new technologies, with consequences for the uptake and use of such
technologies. The fact that political parties have ’skin in the game’ in debates
about voting modes increases the risk that e-voting will become politicized. To
the extent that the voters’ propensity to use e-voting technology varies by party
choice, parties derive differential utility from the availability of this voting mode.
Feedback effects among such utility, the cues parties send to their voters, and
the resulting differences in usage rates have the potential to lead to a growing
polarization of trust in and usage of e-voting along party lines.
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Fig. 4: The effect of education on trust in e-voting by party choice (predictive
margins)
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Abstract. This paper investigates the drivers and barriers of internet voting and 
the implications of a global pandemic for the development of the respective 
technology. In contrast to the expected uptake in the early 2000s of internet 
voting, the technology is still rather seldomly used in election systems around the 
world. The paper at hand explores the different forces that drive or impede 
internet voting adoption from a political, social, legal, organizational, contextual, 
economic and technological perspective. In an exploratory approach, 18 expert 
interviews and extensive complementary desk research were conducted.  
The findings identified 15 general drivers and 15 general barriers for the process 
of internet voting adoption. The evidence suggests that for a large part, the 
political features, trust and perception are the most pivotal factors to internet 
voting development.  
Keywords: Internet Voting, Drivers and Barriers, Framework of Internet Voting, 
Technology adoption, e-Democracy 
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1 Introduction 
From Richard Buckminster Fuller [1] in the mid 20th century over Bill Gates [2], who 
predicted in his book The Road Ahead that “voters will be able to cast their ballots from 
home or their wallet PCs” to Apple’s CEO, Tim Cook that “dream[s] of [voting on 
phones]” [3], the idea of deploying remote electronic voting has been envisioned by 
technology leaders since the first half of the last decade. A vision that was increasingly 
voiced at the beginning of the early 2000s as the interest in the internet and information 
and communication technologies (ICT) grew bigger.  
Bill Gates’ quote translated into present understandings probably refers to what is 
nowadays called internet voting (i-voting), which is a form of remote voting that is 
conducted in unsupervised environments such as one’s home. If one compares his quote 
with the quote by Tim Cook, it does not sound very different, despite being said around 
26 years earlier. In fact, the technology has been around for over two decades and has 
not diffused as it was expected that it would be. During the early 2000s, a great interest 
in novel technology existed, and much investment occurred alongside the general 
developments of ICTs to enhance democratic processes. Experts and politicians back 
then were convinced that in the course of the following 20 years, every democratic 
election would be conducted via electronic voting and even using the internet [4]. 
Although today that is still not the reality that we live in, the quote by Tim Cook seems 
to reflect a still present vision for contemporary leaders to be able to conduct elections 
online.  
Therefore, the question can be raised why i-voting has not adopted as it had been 
expected and what are factors that drive internet voting.  Moreover, due to the current 
global COVID-19 pandemic, several elections that were meant to take place were 
postponed, and discussions about whether to implement novel, sustainable and long-
term voting solutions in response to the current events have appeared [5]. Remarkably, 
the interest in i-voting technology has heightened due to the global developments in 
response to the COVID-19 pandemic [6] which makes our research more timely and 
relevant. The understanding of i-voting’s diffusion, its driving as well as impeding 
forces seem to be common questions that have been raised in academia and yet lack a 
holistic overview and common first understanding, which this paper aims to provide.  
This paper solely focusses on i-voting, which is a specific form of electronic voting 
(e-voting), but for a better understanding of research intersections between these two 
topics, the following section depicts previous work related to both issues.  
Previous works on e-voting have investigated diffusions of e-voting in Europe and 
drivers and barriers around e-voting [7] on adoption factors of e-voting by young people 
[8] the evolution of e-voting [9], the global e-voting status [10] and to provide an e-
voting framework [11]. On i-voting, previous studies examined the global status quo
[12, 13], studied the origins of remote online voting [4], aimed at providing a historical
overview on i-voting usage [14, 15] and facilitating conditions for i-voting
implementation on the examples of Estonia and Switzerland [16]. Furthermore, i-voting
adoption was explicitly investigated for the Estonian case [17], and respective adoption
phases were identified for the Estonian case [18]. Last, another work looked at the
adoption stages and on what levels internet voting will occur [19]. This respective paper
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identified two levels and five adoption stages of internet voting diffusion on which this 
paper is building on to investigate the respective drivers and barriers that impact the 
technology acceptance on these levels. 
In conclusion, previous research either looked at part drivers and barriers or 
facilitating conditions in specific contexts. However, no comprehensive study has been 
conducted so far that investigates general drivers and barriers that are observable along 
the various adoption and trialed contexts. In line with that identified research gap, this 
paper poses the following research question: What is driving internet voting and what 
barriers exist to further adoption? In order to answer this question, the work at hand 
conducted in an exploratory way some 18 expert interviews and extensive 
complementary desk research. The applied methodology used for this paper, is 
explained subsequently. 
2 Methodology 
In order to study what hinders or benefits the implementation of internet voting, we 
want to identify its drivers and barriers. To do so, we conducted a qualitative empirical 
study with a nonexperimental design including expert interviews, as promoted by 
Brown & Hale [20]. This research was conducted using an inductive epistemological 
approach to acquire knowledge. The inductive process, as opposed to the deductive 
method, is a “bottom-up [technique in which] evidence is collected first, [from the 
observation of the world] and knowledge and theories built from this” [21]. In order to 
guide the data analysis, a conceptual model was created ad hoc1, integrating 
propositions included in five innovation diffusion theories. This model (see Figure 1) 
explains how different dimensions are embedded into one context that shapes the 
process of diffusion of internet voting, in an evolutionary process that is impacted by 
perceptions, adopter categories and discourses. Furthermore, it establishes the 
differentiation of internet voting adoption on two levels: political and individual. The 
model presents five dimensions, various stakeholders and factors that impact the 
technology acceptance process within societies.  
In order to make this paper better readable, we will briefly introduce some necessary 
stakeholders. First, the relevant social groups [23] which have a need or specific 
interest in the new innovation which creates a demand within society for the respective 
technology. Second, change agents or opinion leaders [24] shape public debate around 
an innovation due to their privileged position in society. Third, individual drivers are 
the citizens themselves who would be accepting technology based on the expected 
utility against the expected effort [25]. The following empirical research will explore 
the drivers and barriers and their allocation on the respective level of adoption 
1 For a better understanding, see: 22. Licht, N.: Insights into Internet Voting: Adoption 
Stages, Drivers & Barriers, and the Possible Impact of COVID-19.  Ragnar Nurkse 
Department of Innovation and Governance. Tallinn University of Technology (2021)  
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Fig. 1. Framework of Internet Voting 
The data collection of this research was conducted via semi-structured expert 
interviews and complemented by desk research, allowing cross checking experts 
opinions with other sources. The study followed the framework provided by Krimmer’s 
mirabilis [9] that aids to identify the respective stakeholders involved in the 
implementation process of e-voting technology. In the context of this research, it was 
limited to three stakeholders: i) Media/observer, ii) election management and iii) 
inventors or vendors of voting technology. More precisely, it was focused on 
practitioners/EMBs/policymakers, scholars and election observers, as well as vendors 
or inventors of i-voting technology. A total of 18 interviews were conducted, 
transcribed, confirmed and analyzed in NVivo, via a deductive codification approach 
proposed by Mayring [26]. Data triangulation is granted through confirming cross-
checking answers against either statement of other interviewees or findings from the 
literature [27]2.  
This research has natural limitations with regard to its research design. Primarily, the 
finding of appropriate experts can limit the findings of the study to the extent that either 
not the most applicable experts might have been identified or that specific experts did 
not confirm to participate in the research [28]. In particular, it was more challenging to 
achieve an even distribution among gender and geographics. Also, during the interview 
process, issues may arise, mainly due to the lack of testing the human language, which 
may cause ambiguity and hence distort the originally intended meaning of words by the 
expert. Furthermore, qualitative research as such, as to their lack of generalizability as 
it would be the case in quantitative research [29].  
2 The empirical findings will be cited as in-text citations with the interview number in brackets, 
in the following format: e.g., single citation (1), multiple citations (1;2; 3…).  
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3 Analysis & Discussion of Drivers and Barriers 
Given the dual nature of the process of adoption of technology we divide the 
information obtained from the expert interviews as well as the desk research in two 
main framing contexts, on the one hand, the context referring to the Political and 
Socioeconomic situation and, on the other hand, the Technological one.  
3.1 Political and Socio-Economic Context Dimension 
In line with the theory, the context is very influential in the establishment of election 
systems [30]. The findings further resemble the supporting framework and can be 
divided into social, economic, cultural/historical, political, organizational, legal and 
procedural elements.  
Civil Society. 
The different processes of construction of a society favor or disfavor the discussion, 
critique, and proposition of i-voting technology. A more diverse society consisting of 
academia, civil society organizations (CSO) and experts, enable a more varied 
discourse about i-voting and can be either driving or impeding diffusion. These groups 
are drivers if they, for example, promote the inclusion of excluded voter groups through 
i-voting or might be barriers if they voice security or transparency concerns.
Furthermore, regions with a high number of IT-related content creation and the
communication thereof, due to strong CSOs and expert groups, are somewhat reticent
to adopting new voting technologies as they have stronger groups driving the discourse
around the risks (5;8;10;13&14). However, the presence of solid lobby groups within
society, fighting for the rights of visually impaired persons and expatriate voters, have
been, on the other hand, identified as strong drivers for internet voting adoption on the
political level (7;9;10;11&15).
Vendors. 
Also, the lack of expert communities and hence a lack of expertise within society 
tends to make these contexts more susceptible to be targeted by vendors. High-level 
lobbyism by vendors is very effective when no counterparties contribute to expertise to 
the debate (2;8). Technology in elections is considered because of the commercial 
implications and strong lobbying efforts by vendors that persuade governments to adopt 
new technologies in their elections (1;2). One of the interviewees (1) specifically 
mentioned the push of the commercial drive and its implications for voting technology 
adoption. Moreover, contexts with less regulated procurement methods, and the lack of 
civil opposition that is run by non-governmental actors, who are knowledgeable in that 
field, tend to faster purchase new voting technologies (NVTs) and in less sustainable 
way (1;2). Academia and expert groups have been identified as vital stakeholders in the 
adoption discussion due to their ability to aid in overcoming suspicions or doubts 




Internet voting systems (IVS) and the respective infrastructure that is necessary to 
promote i-voting can be very costly in short-term consideration, not only in terms of 
purchasing but also maintenance of an IVS (4;6;16). From a long-term perspective, the 
associated costs per vote via IVS are remarkably lower than conventional votes and 
some cases have considered internet voting for the reason of cost reduction (1;4;11) 
[31, 32]. However, most cases that have introduced i-voting still provide traditional 
paper voting, i.e., postal voting, as an alternative option to prevent vote coercion, which 
in fact adds additional costs (2;6).  
Culture and History. 
Our findings suggest the existence of differences in the interpretation of vote secrecy 
and universal suffrage depending on the cultural context, which influences the 
perception of IVS (6). In more detail we observed that a relatively relaxed 
understanding of secrecy and a strong approach towards universal access might lead to 
enhanced i-voting efforts. On the contrary, where a particular emphasis on secrecy is 
present, further i-voting diffusion might be rejected if not enough proof is given via 
universal verifiability of how a vote is cast, counted and kept secret. Last, an increased 
emphasis on universal suffrage, and therefore, a strong focus on the inclusion of 
diaspora voters or visually impaired people might lead to higher IVS uptake (6;15).  
Elections are, in some contexts, seen as a community-based exercise in which the 
electorate follows their duty to go and vote. That exercise might be perceived as an act 
of physically convening and voicing one’s opinion and would culturally not accept to 
replace that with technology (5). This case does not describe the opposition of 
technology per se but the predominant proposition of tradition (3;6). Regarding 
historical influences, our interviews conclude that post-crisis situations or the newly 
gained independence of regions impact the creation of new voting systems (1). Often, 
the act of removing old election systems is an act of trust-building and demonstration 
of recent ruling in which NVTs are perceived as neutral third party that politicians and 
administrations have no influence over (1;3;5). 
Political Context. 
. In nearly all interviews, the political will was identified as both a powerful driver 
as well as a strong barrier. First, governments use i-voting technology as political 
agenda to demonstrate modernity and progress in their political activity (17). Some 
contexts have attributed electoral affairs to a ministry and restructuring the state 
alongside the electoral system is used for political campaigning purposes (2;18). In 
essence, political actors aim to appear progressive and modern and wish to use tools 
like IVS to prove also tech-savviness (18). Significant technological developments can 
be traced back to politically motivated events and decisions. If technology is perceived 
to be beneficial for the incumbent party, it is promoted; if not, the same party may 
become the greatest opponent to NVT development (1;2;3;5;10;15). This observation, 
also known as the “middleman paradox”, refers to the phenomenon that incumbents 
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resist the move towards e-democracy because they perceive that the altered election 
system might lead to a decrease of their own political power and control [33]. In line 
with further evidence, change of government was named to be another influential 
factor. Two scenarios were identified which have been concrete barriers to IVS 
diffusions: 1) the election of a new governing party, also ascribable to the middleman 
paradox (6;14); and 2) a civil conflict in which the transformation of the election system 
is put on halt (2). Regarding the first scenario: If certain political actors identify that 
their electorate is opposing the idea of i-voting and that their competitor might benefit 
from online voting more than they expect to do, evidence shows that this actor tends to 
discontinue i-voting for purely political reasons [34] (6;11;14). Furthermore, the 
findings show that i-voting is a highly sensitive subject with attached political risks, 
associated costs and resources needed; therefore, unless a concrete need requires it, 
governments tend to refrain from touching that subject (4;6;11;14;15).  
The second dimension refers to accessibility and universal suffrage, which have been 
identified to be among the strongest general drivers for i-voting adoption. Accessibility 
refers to the idea that “people with disabilities should be able to use all public spaces 
and services in the same way as other people” [35]. Online voting can enfranchise 
disabled people as they can more easily register and authenticate themselves and cast 
their vote from their home (3;7;9;10;15). The provision of universal suffrage identified 
by the OSCE [36] entails, further, the idea to integrate the entire electorate into the 
elections. Universal suffrage can be interpreted in different ways, and countries, as well 
as semi-autonomous regions, have been considering for a significant part to introduce 
i-voting because of their aspiration to include overseas or territorially challenged voters
into their elections more efficiently. Nearly all conducted interviews mentioned the
aspect of voting provision for the diaspora, overseas diplomats, consular staff, general
populations in extreme territorial conditions or overseas soldiers. Essentially, the
intrinsic motivation is political and only promoted if the incumbent expects to gain from
including these groups of voters, as sometimes the diaspora consists of political
opponents and hence its exclusion from electoral matters is deliberate (5;6;8;9;10;18).
Another impact of diaspora voters concerns their foreign impact through campaign
donations and exercising of their often-strong socioeconomic status and power on
domestic political debate (2).
Organizational Context. 
Another element to mention is, that as populations increase and administrative 
capacities need to be restructured to enable higher procedural efficiency, new 
technologies allow better election management and further ease electoral processes, 
especially regarding cumbersome remote voting processes such as postal voting 
(4;5;8;15;16). And yet, from the study, it is clear that voter coercion and vote-buying 
in remote and uncontrolled election environments still remain to endanger the integrity 
of elections, and for that, specific contexts that initially have seen technology as a 
practical solution refrain from particularly adopting i-voting (4). Also, the context’s set-
up, procedural traditions and hurdles as well as the degree of digital governance and 
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the understanding of digital services play a substantial role in driving i-voting adoption 
due to the spill-over effect that tends to occur in digital ecosystems (2;7;9;14;17). 
Legal Context. 
The obtained results present evidence that legal frameworks need to be established 
for an effective i-voting introduction (14;16). Passing appropriate legislation, however, 
tends to be rather difficult because the law is rigid in nature, and ICT is relatively 
flexible and needs to be evaluated regularly. Law, once passed, will remain as a 
reference text for future considerations and cannot simply be changed on demand (14). 
Specific contexts experience the already written law to be a barrier, and lawmakers 
would need to pursue passing actively or amending the law, which allows for IVS 
considerations. 
Furthermore, empirical data shows that law is subject to interpretation and that 
certain regions may therefore understand the legal text differently and hence court 
interpretations can be essential in the development of IVS (6;7;8). Cases were identified 
in which important court decisions prevented further NVT adoption and influenced 
third parties not to adopt (6;8), or judgements existed that paved the way for i-voting to 
be adopted (15). In the interviews, it was further identified that there is a lack of a 
general legal and technical framework/design that describes and defines the 
appropriated provisions of i-voting systems. This lack becomes a barrier because the 
standard according to which a potentially suitable system would be compared against 
does not exist, and hence the debate is less structured (9;10;11). The other scenario was 
described that a legal framework exists, but it is impossible to comply with the 
requirements, and it makes it merely impossible to proceed with i-voting development 
(9).  
3.2 Technological Context Dimension 
The following issue concerning technology and security features mainly concern the 
adoption process on the pollical level but is influenced by the narratives and discourses 
on the individual level. Although, during the interviews, it was mentioned that various 
technology designs exist, we generically refer to ‘the technology’ as such in order to 
enable a more holistic discussion. Besides the existing technological capabilities to host 
and conduct elections using i-voting, a threshold for many countries in terms of 
technology and security is the concrete definition of what technology should be used 
for the elections in form of a concrete framework (10;14). Furthermore, certain contexts 
lack respective experts that know how the systems work and that are able to provide 
the right guidance for it to be successfully implemented (11;13). Hence, a legal 
framework could also become a barrier, not just a facilitator for sustainable 
implementation. Legal frameworks can be worded in various ways, promoting or 
demoting the usage of remote online voting components (9).  
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Furthermore, technology is considered so complex that most citizens tend not to 
understand how the vote is being cast, counted, kept secret and how they can verify that 
their vote was counted as intended (3;16). Therefore, it is technically possible but often 
not viable to exchange a functioning system that is operating with paper (e.g. postal 
voting) with a new system that needs to provide transparency, secrecy and integrity 
proof to all stakeholders. Hence, the complex nature, in cases, is seen to be a barrier 
(1). It is, moreover, important to differentiate hereby between full-scale adoption and 
partial adoption. In contexts of partial adoption, technical failures and security breaches 
seem less concerning than if they were to occur in full-scale adoption contexts. 
Therefore, imposing the task of expanding with i-voting diffusion is a more complex 
endeavor than offering it for a share of the eligible electorate (2;15).  
One of the biggest challenges from the technology side is to provide either individual 
or universal verifiability (1). The technical abilities exist to provide these features in a 
reliable way, but need to be acknowledged by the decision-making party in order to be 
fully useful (10). Although the demand for such verifiability feature to be present in the 
election system has increased, barely any state legislator has acknowledged and 
integrated such features into their requirements which can be both a barrier as well as 
a driver (14). On the one hand, it facilitates eased implementation efforts as they need 
to meet fewer requirements. On the other hand, the system is also more vulnerable to 
criticism of transparency and integrity.  
Furthermore, internet voting does require not only the technology but also the 
infrastructure that would facilitate the execution of the election. Such infrastructure 
would be broadband networks with high penetration rates, especially in remote areas. 
If no internet access exists in remote areas, there is no utility gain from adopting IVS 
for the purpose of including remote areas better into elections (5;16;18). The mentioned 
issue is subject to the geographical context and is related to the digital divide, which is 
a term used to describe the gap between contexts that benefit from digital technology 
and those who do not [37]. The empirical findings suggest that the digital divide, which 
had been more so visible in the early 2000s, was a barrier to many non-Western contexts 
(4;16) [38-40].  
Hence, these findings suggest that while none sufficient ICT infrastructure seemed 
to have been a barrier for IVS in non-Western contexts, the increase in broadband 
penetration with the beginning of the second decade drove IVS development to see the 
first advent of IVS cases in non-Western contexts [38]. Still, the digital divide remains 
to exist and further is a barrier to IVS development in certain regions (16;18) [41]. The 
following section analyzes and discusses the perception and discourse dimension. 
3.3 Perception and Discourse Dimension 
One of the major findings from the interviews in terms of perception is regarding the 
issue of trust. Although trust is hard to measure and still subject to ongoing academic 
investigations, certain parameters could have been identified. The public perception is 
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mostly referring to the drivers and barriers that impact the diffusion that occurs on the 
individual level after the political decision has been made to introduce IVS in society.  
The findings support the assumption that election systems are as much trustworthy 
as the people who erected and proposed them. Hence, if people mistrust the government 
and or EMBs who implement IVS, they tend to mistrust the technology (5). 
Furthermore, regardless of the previous trust given to one election system, it is not 
granted that this trust is simply transferable to any novel election system. On the 
contrary, it seems that strong trust in EMBs in primarily Western democracies might 
be one of the bigger barriers to i-voting adoption as the primary assumption is to 
question whether new technology is necessary and simultaneously to endanger a well 
working system (1;10;14). This may be further supported by the concept of path 
dependency, which states that individuals would decide to trust and use a system based 
on previous experiences, decisions and preferences that they made [42, 43]. That 
phenomenon exists along with all fields of social spheres and might certainly affect the 
choice of usage of election systems.  
Internet voting technology requires a great amount of trust from the electorate since 
its technological setup is relatively complex, and very few experts do understand the 
system entirely (1). Whether one may trust in one particular aspect or not is rather 
incoherent with objective measurements. Regardless of objectively measured and 
relatable evidence that would suggest that appropriate i-voting technology exists, many 
cases experience one of the biggest barriers to be the lack of trust (1;3;5;11;14). 
Additionally, objectivity and trust tend to be fragmented by public discourse and the 
strong presence of social media that influences public opinion on electoral matters [44]. 
Moreover, specific expert groups and CSOs have made it their duty to detect and inform 
about vulnerabilities in i-voting systems particularly, since the 2016’s US presidential 
election, increased interest in cybersecurity around elections (6;7;9;18). Although 
public discourse has been identified to be a barrier in many instances, there are also 
cases in which pressure by CSOs and media on politicians have paved the way for the 
introduction of IVS (15). 
Although certain risks had been already present in the early 2000s and cyber hacking 
and lobbyism against the introduction of i-voting existed since the first hour (10), it 
was, however, on a much smaller scale. In comparison to nowadays, there was less 
awareness of the entirety of cyber-risks and also less internet usage penetration in 
general (6) which can nowadays be seen as a barrier to further diffusion. The perception 
of technology its potentials and risks has shifted. Common cyber threats and dangers 
have been put more in focus around the discussion for i-voting introduction than it was 
the case in the early 2000s. That is mostly due to the fact that the technology was 
relatively novel and less experimented with than it is nowadays. Hence, more threat and 
risk awareness exist as common knowledge in the electorate, and hence success stories 
back then might not be as successful today (6;7).  
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Since i-voting technology is to a degree somewhat intangible for the large share of 
people, i-voting demonstrations are used to build trust in the system (1;10;14). 
Including rhetoric and competence demonstration seem to be useful in convincing the 
electorate about the system, as suggested by the findings. These demonstrations can be 
of bureaucratic nature, in which the focus is rather on the institutions and has been 
proven to be successful in contexts in which a history of malfunctioning of institutions 
exists. In a context in which previously technical failures in election systems had 
occurred, trust-building via technology demonstrations have proven to be successful 
(14). Perception, then, may be impacted by security breaches and technical failures. 
The identified cases in which that occurred show different results for the degree of 
usage (6;7;14). Hereby, a necessary differentiation has to be made between the roles 
that academia or CSOs play and the media. These stewards of discourse certainly have 
identified to be impacting the diffusion process and certainly media on the individual 
diffusion level. However, more data is needed to look into the issue impact of trust in 
election systems as a result of technical failures.  
From the empirical findings, we identified the drivers for the political decision level, 
to be universal access and accessibility for disabled voters, the pursuit of a contactless 
democracy, they wish to appear modern, the vendor’s push, the process improvements, 
the perception of technology to be a neutral third party, the perception of increased 
administrative integrity, cost reductions, strong lobby groups, expected increase in 
voter turnouts and the presence of high socioeconomic power and well-established 
technical infrastructure. On the individual adoption level, we presented evidence that 
drivers exist such as convenience voting, spill-over effects within a digital society and 
the socioeconomic status of voters. Following barriers were identified for the political 
level adoption process: the middleman paradox, political crisis, change of government, 
security concerns, theoretical technical vulnerabilities, strong opposition from CSOs 
and academia, lack of a framework, lack of technological infrastructure, lack of 
verifiability, procedural barriers and the change of legal requirements. Barriers to 
adoption on the individual level have been identified as path dependency, cultural 
traditions, mistrust in technology and mistrust in EMBs and governments. 
Table 1. Overview of the Drivers of Internet Voting 
Drivers 
Political level 
Universal access (Expatriate & overseas staff voting, voting in territorially challenging 
locations) 
Accessibility 
The political will to appear modern and innovative 
Contactless democracy 
Vendor’s commercial drive 
Increase turnout/prevent further decline 
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Strong lobby groups 
Perception of technology as neutral third party 
Cost reductions 
Process improvements 
Integrity improvements in administrative operations 
Socioeconomic status and high technological infrastructure (geographics) 
Individual level 
Convenience voting 
Spill-over effect within already digitised societies and their ecosystem 
Socioeconomic status of the voter 





Change of government (related to middleman paradox) 
Security concerns 
Theoretical technical vulnerabilities 
Strong opposition from academia & CSOs 
Lack of a framework 
Lack of technological infrastructure/Digital divide 
Lack of verifiability 
Procedural barriers 




Mistrust in technology 
Mistrust in government and EMBs 
4 Conclusion 
In order to answer the question on what drivers and barriers exist that prevent further 
internet voting diffusion, subsequently, the discussion occurs first on the political level 
and then on the individual level.  
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The driving or lobbying stakeholders on the political decision level, are the diaspora, 
territorially challenged voters or disabled voters which resemble the described relevant 
social groups. Further the groups lobbying for these relevant social groups on the 
political level and hence driving stakeholders as for example lobby groups, academia, 
CSOs or vendors have a resemblance to the change agents and opinion leaders 
identified in the conceptual model. Further findings suggest that the political will is a 
major driver for i-voting adoption on the political level as to prevent decreasing voter 
turnouts or the urgency to provide an appropriate election system for the context of an 
evolving contactless democracy or to appear modern through the introduction of NVTs. 
Last, the degree of the socioeconomic status, influences whether the political level even 
considers the move towards NVTs to be feasible or not.  
On the individual adoption level, although, the aspect of convenience voting is still 
under further academic investigation, the empirical findings suggest that the proposed 
theory of relative utility in regard to effort can be confirmed for the individual level. 
Furthermore, the findings have also identified that, although an early interest might 
exist for i-voting, individuals tend to not maintain that interest if they experience no 
further usage of the infrastructure than for merely voting online from time to time. In 
the case of Estonia, this steady interest was achieved through the wider usage avenues 
of the e-ID for bank transactions for example [45]. In contrast, the Austrian case failed 
to mobilize enough supporters for its online voting systems because it had no further 
utility to its voters than to vote [4]. Ergo, a wider-context deployment of ICT 
technology and the practicality of a digital ecosystem might create a spill-over effect 
and hence drive i-voting technology for the technology acceptance on the individual 
level.  
From the finding, a central part that impedes further global i-voting adoption has 
been the middleman paradox. This is a central barrier for many regions as the first 
adoption decision is made on the political level and later transferred to the individual 
level. However, the fear of losing one’s own power that could only be bypassed if an 
urgent need for the election reform would appear, impedes further i-voting in many 
contexts around the world. Further contextual barriers were identified to be security 
concerns, lack of verifiability and theoretical vulnerabilities. Moreover, mistrust and in 
combination with public discourse are opposing forces to the development of NVTs as 
CSOs, academia and expert groups in many cases actively oppose the idea of i-voting 
implementation due to security and verifiability concerns. Their ability to provide 
expertise, facilitate communication, to have access to prototypes and further resources 
such as data and expert knowledge makes them to effective change agents and opinion 
leaders that frequently lobby against IVS diffusion.  
A particular barriers to adoption on the individual level has identified to be path 
dependency [43, 46]. It being a purely social issue, cultural norms and values amplify 
the problem of path dependency and confirm the cultural explanation for why 
technology is adopted. The social construction of society and perception of technology 
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are decisive in explaining adoption and would be confirmed by the issue of path-
dependency. Mistrust in technology is strongly depending on perception and consists 
of the fear that the technology might not be secure, which mostly is related to the fact 
that the technology is too complex for the average person to understand fully. 
Furthermore, the mistrust might also exist towards the decision-makers generally, and 
therefore the technology might not be accepted.  
In conclusion, the research question can be answered through the depicted evidence 
showing that in total, 15 drivers, 12 on the political and three on the individual level 
and 15 barriers, with 11 on the political and four on the individual level, have been 
identified. Strong driving and impeding forces alike were found on the political level 
to be the absence or presence of political will, necessity and the so-called middleman 
paradox. Even if the list of drivers and barriers is balanced, the reality shows that the 
implication of them is not following the same pattern, since the reduced number of 
adopters of i-voting brings to the conclusion that barriers play a more important role in 
the process of adoption than drivers. Further detailed case studies in selected countries 
could shed new light on how these drivers and barriers interact in particular 
administrative and political contexts and bring to the final decision of implementing or 
not i-voting. Additional research would be necessary in the field of trust in elections 
and specifically in election technology as well as the respective roles attributed to 
building or harming trust through the two discourse drivers that are academia or CSOs 
and on the other side the media. From the interviews it became apparent that these 
groups another study is merited but in which their roles especially in the individual 
diffusion process is further investigated. Possible questions to consider could be how 
can trust be measured and how can trust-building of new voting technologies be formed 
and what roles do media and academia play in that process? Last, in order to understand 
how various contexts, deal with electoral crises and why certain regions stopped their 
internet voting, while others remain to deploy IVS in their elections, a follow-up study 
on Estonia’s foreign cyber interference, France’s discontinuation in 2017 and Norway’s 
case of their technical vulnerabilities may be appropriate. In this proposed study, it 
would be sensible to look at the positioning of academia and CSOs and the reasons why 
that may be the case and under what circumstances that might change and impact the 
adoption and diffusion of internet voting. In summary, internet voting has been around 
for more than two decades and identified to be a logical tool for democracy and yet 
lacks large-scale adoption. In this paper we analyzed and presented general drivers and 
barriers that impact the adoption and diffusion process and illustrated further research 
areas that merit further investigation. Internet voting, being a process in a political 
process is also highly impacted by political factors itself and therefore significant 
qualitative differences between the respective drivers and barriers for the respective 
contexts might exist.  
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Abstract. Based on a quasi-experimental design of the 2021 Ecuadorian presi-
dential elections, I investigate the effect of postal voting, on-site electronic vot-
ing (DRE voting) and Internet voting on non-resident citizens’ effective voter 
turnout. This short paper shows that, while DRE voting has no significant im-
pact on turnout, turnout among non-resident citizens using Internet voting and 
postal voting is significantly higher compared to neighboring electoral districts. 
Keywords: E-voting, Internet voting, Turnout, Ecuador 
1 Introduction 
In preparation of the 2021 elections in Ecuador, the electoral management body 
decided to run pilots testing different voting modalities for Ecuadorian voters living 
abroad. In these pilots, three different voting modalities were tested in three overseas 
electoral districts: postal voting (Ottawa district), on-site electronic voting / DRE 
voting (Buenos Aires district) and Internet voting (Phoenix district). In all other over-
seas electoral districts, non-resident voters cast their votes in-person in consulates and 
other diplomatic venues. In the form of a quasi-natural experiment, these pilots con-
stituted a unique opportunity to investigate the impact of different voting modalities 
on the decision of some voters to participate in elections. This paper explores the 
impact of postal voting, DRE voting and Internet voting on turnout for voters living 
abroad in an overlooked country (Ecuador) at the occasion of the two rounds of the 
2021 presidential elections and to contribute to the burgeoning literature on the con-
sequences of different e-voting modalities for voter’s behavior. In particular, recent 
scholarly works have empirically investigated turnout among non-resident voters 
using Internet voting, yet mostly in Western countries [1-3]. 
2 E-voting and effective turnout in Ecuador 
Compared to traditional measures of turnout, my operationalization of effective 
turnout takes into account the invalid votes (i.e., the blank and null votes) in the cal-
culation of turnout. It is measured as the number of valid votes divided by the total 
number of registered voters. The analysis of effective turnout is particularly relevant 
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in the case of Ecuador as DRE and Internet voting systems provide the voter with two 
additional options: two buttons are available on the screen – usually at the bottom of 
the list of parties or candidates – allowing the voter to express a blank or a null vote 
instead of a vote for a specific party or candidate. Moreover, the share of null and/or 
blank vote is traditionally high in Ecuadorian elections, usually around 10% for the 
presidential elections.  
Based on the analysis of turnout figures for the two rounds of presidential elec-
tions in Ecuador (7 February and 11 April 2021), I compare the measure of effective 
turnout across four different types of ballots: paper ballots emitted in-person in the 
consulate building (i.e., ballot box votes), postal paper ballots (i.e., postal votes), elec-
tronic ballots filled in-person in the consulate building (i.e., DRE votes) and internet-
based ballots (i.e., Internet votes). I include in the analyses the three electoral districts 
where pilots have been running by the Ecuadorian electoral management body and the 
two geographically closest electoral districts using ballot box voting. For instance, the 
Phoenix district (Internet voting) is compared with the Houston and Los Angeles 
districts (ballot box voting). This geographical proximity allows to limit the socio-
demographic variation of the characteristics of the electorate in various abroad dis-
tricts and to control for the potentially differentiated impact of the Covid-19 situation 
on voter mobilization. Data originates from official elections results [4] and figures 
are based on average turnout in both gender groups. 
I observe that the introduction of alternative modalities of voting affected turnout 
figures compared to neighboring districts (see Fig. 1 and 2). In the electoral district 
where DRE voting was used, the average effective turnout for the presidential elec-
tions is slightly higher than in neighboring districts using ballot box voting. Differ-
ences are within the margin of standard errors, meaning that there are no significant 
differences in turnout between districts using DRE voting and districts using ballot 
box voting. This finding is in line with global South scholars that found no statistical-
ly significant effect of DRE voting on turnout in Brazil and in India [5-6]. 
Contrary to DRE voting, the impact of Internet voting on turnout is significantly 
more important and positive. On average, effective turnout is higher by 13% in the 
electoral district using Internet voting compared to neighboring districts using ballot 
box voting. It therefore seems that Internet voting has a significant and positive im-
pact on turnout in this electoral district located abroad, confirming previous studies on 
non-resident voters in the USA and Switzerland [1-2]. Finally, postal voting has a 
similar positive impact on turnout as the electoral district implementing this voting 
modality displays an effective turnout more than 20% superior to turnout in neighbor-
ing districts based on ballot box voting. 
The Covid-19 pandemic placed elections in many countries between a rock and a 
hard place, and election officials worldwide have been considering the implementa-
tion of alternative methods of voting. By demonstrating that turnout among Ecuadori-
an non-residents using remote voting (i.e., postal and Internet voting) is significantly 
higher than turnout among those casting their votes in the polling stations, this short 
paper provides an argument for election officials that envisage additional voting mo-
dalities for non-resident voters in future elections. 
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Fig. 1 and 2. Average effective turnout per voting modality in the 2021 elections in Ecuador 
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Abstract. With electronic voting (e-voting) systems under increased
cyber-attack by malicious agents, it is critical that the security of these
systems be thoroughly evaluated. This article describes techniques used
to comprehensively analyze a prototype mobile voting system utilizing
blockchain technology. For identified vulnerabilities, an attack method
is described in order to exploit these issues and suggestions are made in
order to help resolve the security implications of the attack. This analysis
considers multiple layers of the network stack, including the voting appli-
cation suite of software, as attack vectors. From this, the lessons learned
can be used to improve future electronic voting systems by identifying
the various attack surfaces regardless if they were successfully exploited
or not. This in itself will help add to specific domain knowledge of at-
tacking e-voting systems to utilize blockchain technology.
Keywords: electronic voting · blockchain voting · penetration testing
1 Introduction
Due to recent revelations about electronic voting system attacks by Russia [6]
and, ironically, in light of Russia’s own blockchain voting system vulnerabilities
[3], there is an urgent need to understand the security posture of existing and
future voting systems. This paper examines a US election system prototype
that utilizes blockchain technology. A future voting system may or may not be
based on this prototype, but by thoroughly testing the security posture of such
a system we will have a better understanding of the risks exposed or secured
by this design. Democratic societies depend upon the integrity of free and fair
elections. Cyber-attacks on voting systems undermine confidence in electoral
results and present a serious concern to representative democracies.
1.1 Background
A US government organization, that has requested to remain unnamed, plays an
important role in national elections. In order to improve voter experience and
? This work was supported in part by Colorado State Bill 18-086.
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ease election administration, this organization developed a mobile application
compatible with both Apple and Android operating systems. The organization
approached the Colorado National Cybersecurity Center (NCC) about field test-
ing this R&D concept. The NCC, in turn, introduced this organization to the
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs (UCCS), who agreed to conduct a field
test in the form of a mock election. In preparation for the mock election, the
team at UCCS offered to replicate the prototype architecture and evaluate its
deployability, and also conduct both active and passive testing to evaluate its
security.
Note that the system tested was a conceptual design, to help prove that a
digital system could meet the requirements of a voting system. As designed it
was never intended to go into a production electoral system at any level; local,
state, or federal, let alone the US 2020 presidential election.
There have been penetration tests performed and the results published on
other internet based e-voting prototypes [14], but the authors are unaware of
any other prototypes that utilized blockchain infrastructure in the US. There
have been many warnings against using blockchain in e-voting systems dating
back a few years, including recent analysis [8].
1.2 Cases against blockchain utilization
The architecture of this prototype is predicated on blockchain technology in or-
der to register and verify elections, register voters, and record submitted ballots.
Initially, blockchain capabilities seemed to intersect with a number of proper-
ties critical to a secure voting system, however, a report from The National
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) itemized a num-
ber of weaknesses in employing blockchain technologies for voting systems [7].
The authors state that the blockchain could utilize other subsystems that could
alleviate some of these disadvantages but that these subsystems could be used
without the blockchain to begin with. The purpose of this paper is to compre-
hensively explore the consequences of deploying blockchain systems and their
dependencies, which introduces additional attack surfaces for malicious actors
to drop some vote transactions and favor others.
1.3 Testing methodology
At the request of the organization, and with help from their contractor, UCCS
replicated the prototype architecture to evaluate its deployability, and also con-
ducted active and passive testing to evaluate its security. Due to certain propri-
etary constraints, testing was necessarily limited to those components that were
made available to UCCS. So for instance, UCCS was unable to conduct a white
hat inspection of the source code due to intellectual property rights. For similar
reasons, penetration testing was also limited, and the team was unable to per-
form a complete in-to-outside evaluation. Still, the team was able to perform a
fairly comprehensive outside-to-in evaluation by attacking the blockchain smart
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contract bytecode, network stack, application dependent libraries, operating sys-
tem, containers, system/application configuration, and voter privacy. Our team
was only allowed to test one instance of the implementation.
2 Voting System Architecture
The voting system targeted in the attack consisted of a mobile application (app)
for Apple iOS and Android, a web server for the prototype app and EO APIs,
and middleware servers between the application level APIs and the blockchain
related servers (middleware servers), which coupled the back-end functionality of
the system: Key Management Service, Identity Management Service, Database
Servers, and Blockchain Nodes.
The prototype is a scalable architecture designed for independent opera-
tion at state and local levels with support from the organization. In deployed
configuration, the mobile application, web server, middleware servers, and key
management infrastructure are controlled by the organization, whereas the iden-
tity management system, database servers, and blockchain nodes are under the
control of state and local EOs.
Prototype testing was planned to culminate in a large-scale mock election.
In preparation for the mock election, UCCS was responsible for instantiating
and configuring all components that would fall under the control of state and
local EOs, with the exception of the Key Management Interoperability Protocol
(KMIP) and identity management services. The organization retained control
and responsibility over its components, plus the simulated state identity man-
agement service system. UCCS used Linux cloud compute resources for all of
the deployed systems under their control. This allowed for relatively inexpensive
deployment of the prototype architecture, and had the further advantage of al-
lowing UCCS to clone these systems for authorized independent testing when
the organization needed exclusive access to the primary system.
The functional flow of a prototype election begins when an EO sets up an
election database and sends notices to voters via mail inviting them to download
the app. Following the instructions received in their mailed invitation, prospec-
tive voters can then download the app through conventional means onto their
iOS or Android device. Voters then use the app to sign-up with an existing
account to an election by either scanning an activation QR code or manually
entering the code that’s on their invitation. Voters then log into the mobile app
to cast their electronic ballot using conventional navigating and selection tech-
niques. Voters then affix their signature by signing on the device touch-screen
before submitting their ballot to be counted. An EO verifies the ballot signature
before consigning it to be registered in the blockchain. Only after it is verified
in the blockchain will the vote be tabulated.
The operational flow of a prototype election begins when the designated EO
is added to the election database and blockchain. The EO then authenticates
through the secure voting web site. The EO can subsequently instantiate a new
election and voter registry by submitting an election spreadsheet through the
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web interface. The spreadsheet contains districts, precincts, parties, the various
contests, ballot types, ballot types to precinct mappings, and voter activation
codes. The middleware server processes this request and generates the corre-
sponding database requests. The middleware server deploys the associated voter
registry, election registry, election, and election verification smart contracts. The
middleware server then adds the election and voter registry as an election in-
stance by constructing and submitting a blockchain transaction for the election
instance. When this is completed, a ballot activation code is sent to the voter
via mail. This code was created when the election was instantiated. The activa-
tion code is correlated to the voter’s registration ID number in the database and
an account is created for the voter on the blockchain. Once the voter authenti-
cates through the application, by supplying a voter supplied PIN and verification
code, then the voter is allowed to select the contests and sign the ballot before
submitting the completed ballot. With ballot submission the database records
the meta data; election ID, affidavit, submission date, status, election contract
address, and voter registration ID. The voter transaction is then recorded on the
blockchain as having voted. The ballot itself is then recorded on the blockchain
from the voter’s account. Through the web interface the EO looks for the submit-
ted ballots and either approves or rejects submitted ballots based on affidavit,
etc. If approved then the voted ballot’s metadata is marked as approved in the
database and a transaction is sent to the blockchain indicating that the ballot
submission by the voter has been approved. The EO can also call election ver-
ification smart contract functions to audit the specified election. The essential
components of the system are detailed in the following sections.
2.1 Mobile Application
The prototype app allows the user to register as a voter in the election. In a
real election, mail is sent to the voter for account setup for the targeted election.
However, in preparation for the mock election, accounts were already provisioned
for each e-mail address for the participants of the mock election. For the mock
election, e-mails were sent containing activation codes (QR codes) for activating
their accounts for an election whereas in a real election, a separate mail would be
sent to the voter with a QR code for the targeted election. The voter then scans
the QR access code in order to register for the election. The user then provides
their e-mail address, mobile phone number, and creates a five digit PIN. Once
a user is registered for an election the user is allowed to sign-in by providing
their mobile phone number and the PIN that they created. A verification code
is sent, which allows the user to sign-in. Once signed in, the user is allowed to
select the ballot and vote for the corresponding candidates and propositions for
that election. Before submitting the ballot the voter is required to draw their
signature on the touch-screen.
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2.2 Web Server
The web servers provide the user interface for both the voter registration and
voter ballot submission, as well as the EO responsible for creating, registering,
and verifying elections and submitted ballots. This functionality is provided
by the middleware server on the back-end. In the test configuration the web
server was not login accessible for white hat testing during this project. Network
connections were secured with HTTPS.
2.3 Middleware Servers
The middleware servers are a crucial system that correlates registered elections,
registered voters, and submitted ballots to the various back-end software subsys-
tems as previously described. The middleware servers were not login accessible
for white hat testing during this project. The middleware servers were configured
for load balancing.
2.4 Database Servers
The database servers, running MongoDB (v4.0.10), store each of the registered
election templates, voters, voters registered, and submitted voter ballots. For
testing, three database servers were deployed on Ubuntu cloud compute re-
sources. A replica set was configured with one primary server and two secondary
servers. Network connections were secured using TLS and encryption-at-rest was
configured for the collection with the master key residing on a KMIP server.
2.5 Blockchain Nodes
The middleware servers validate and send voter and EO transactions to the
blockchain nodes. The blockchain nodes were running Parity-Ethereum (v2.6.0),
which were instantiated from Docker images. The wallets are stored on the mid-
dleware servers in order to sign and submit transactions on the blockchain.
For testing, five blockchain servers were deployed on Ubuntu cloud compute re-
sources. The configuration employed simulated the decentralization advantages
of a blockchain system, lending to the unique environment of local, state, and
federal governments in this problem space. The consensus protocol configured
was Proof of Authority (PoA) with Authority Rounds (Aura) for the private
chain. The step duration was set to four seconds. Network connections were
secured with the respective node’s provisioned secret key.
3 Attacking the System and Application Configuration
While deploying the prototype architecture, UCCS encountered a number of
deployment instructions that introduced vulnerabilities exposed by penetration
testing: file permissions/ownership, disclosing passwords/keys through command
arguments, and minimal firewall rule-sets.
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3.1 Permissions/ownership on sensitive files
On a number of Unix based file systems the default umask(2) is 0022, which
means that a file created by the user will be readable/writable by user, and
readable by group and other, assuming ACLs are not involved. With blockchain
infrastructure there are several sensitive files to be aware of:
– The node-key and account password can be stored in the blockchain node
configuration file
– The account password can be stored in a separate file on the blockchain node
– Files that contain passwords used to decrypt certificate files (with key pairs)
Administrators should ensure that these files are only readable by a user
that has the least amount of privileges for the required access that it needs of
the system. During penetration testing we found that the voting system certifi-
cate file and some configuration files were initially readable by ”other” as some
deployment instructions did not consider default file permissions and ownership.
The files that were inadvertently left open would allow both passive and
active attacks on the MongoDB and blockchain nodes. Eavesdropping of voting
data could be possible. The worst case scenario could entail a man-in-the-middle
(MITM) attack that would modify voter data information to alter the outcome
of the election. Even with forward secrecy (FS), if the attacker can manipulate
the session key then the cipher suite, e.g. Ephemeral Diffie-Helman (DHE), is
still vulnerable. Guidance on hardening server systems is discussed in [10].
3.2 Disclosing sensitive information to unprivileged users
Another common mistake we found was providing passwords, secret keys, etc.
as process arguments. This will allow unprivileged users to view sensitive in-
formation by executing ps(1) or searching the system’s proc(5) structure. Well
designed software will allow a configuration file version of utilizing this argument.
Keeping sensitive information in the corresponding file readable only by the user
of the process will prevent further exploitation of the system. During penetra-
tion testing of the voting system, node-key material was exposed by starting the
blockchain virtual machine with this argument.
With the node-key an attacker can impersonate the node in order to create
a denial of service (DoS) at the least. If an unprivileged attacker can access the
majority of the nodes’ proc structure then the attacker would be able to launch
a 51% attack on the consensus nodes. If a 51% attack is successful then the
attacker could allow transactions that vote for the candidate of their favor and
drop all other votes.
3.3 Minimal set of firewall rules
It is imperative that the firewall rule-set be as restrictive as possible between
peers and other dependent subsystems. A better way to do this is to start with
essential ports, e.g. SSH (in order to log into the system), and add rule-sets as
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dependencies are discovered through ingress dropped packets. Even blockchain
nodes will have different ports that are required to be open, so each node type
(e.g. authority node, user node, etc.) should have a separate firewall group.
During penetration testing there were extraneous ports that were exposed on
the various systems/subsystems due to the superset of ports used in the firewall
group. For example, the blockchain types of user node and authority nodes were
grouped into one firewall rule-set.
Luckily none of these opened ports had other processes that were bound to
them. If they had, then at the least a DoS attack could be launched against
the associated service. This could be accomplished by a flood attack or through
a memory handling error of the service. Worst case scenario would involve a
memory handling error with privilege escalation.
4 Attacking the Blockchain
As previously enumerated, blockchain systems incorporate a number of capa-
bilities that lend themselves very well to the requirements of a voting system.
However, blockchain’s strengths can also be its weakness.
4.1 Breaking the consensus of the node set
If the consensus protocol of the blockchain nodes can be broken, then the attacker
has essentially performed a DoS attack on the infrastructure. Breaking consensus
protocol can occur in multiple ways, depending which consensus algorithm is
used. For example, when using authority rounds, there are strict rules that each
of the step nodes have to adhere to during their round. It is time sensitive to the
step. Therefore, attacking the timing system of each of the nodes or a shared
time sync service can break a node’s turn. For example, if the node’s system-
time, which is based on the time sync protocol, is skewed a couple of seconds
then that node would either observe that their peer nodes are out-of-step or that
the other nodes would notice that the compromised server is out of step with
themselves. As a result, they would either fail or worse, fork a new chain. This
could affect the consensus of the nodes and in web3’s (Ethereum’s client library)
current state, a client that binds to the forked chain’s node would have issues
with freshness, as the smart contracts or transactions would unexpectedly not be
in sync. During penetration testing, controlling the time sync caused the targeted
blockchain node to break consensus with its peers. With the total set of three
authority nodes, after the second targeted node was compromised, consensus was
broken. Therefore, when utilizing remote time sync protocols, such as Network
Time Protocol (NTP) consider using underlying security protocols (e.g. TLS or
IPsec) to secure time sync communication.
4.2 Deriving the private key of the sender account
Each block in a blockchain has digital signatures which is used to verify the
authenticity of the transaction as the associated sender of the corresponding
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transaction. Some blockchain implementations, such as Ethereum Virtual Ma-
chines (EVMs), use Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) to
verify transaction signatures. Unfortunately client libraries when constructing
these signatures had incorrectly generated uniform values [2], k -values, leaving
the keys vulnerable to attack.
For the voting blockchain system, there were no duplicate r -values found
that could be used to derive the sender’s private key. Duplicate r -values would
indicate the same k -value because r = gk mod q, where g is the generator under
the prime field p, and q is the order of the base point G. From this an attacker can
find the signer’s private key by first calculating the k -value. Once the attacker
has k then solve for x from s:
s = k−1(e + xr) mod q (1)
ks = e mod n + xr mod q (2)
xr mod n = (ks− e) mod q (3)
x = r−1(ks− e) mod q (4)
where (r,s) is the signature, e is the hash of the message, and x is the sender’s
private key.
It is recommended that implementations use best practices when deriving
uniform k -values. RFC 6979 is one such methodology that ensures stronger se-
curity properties are met for ECDSA signatures.
4.3 Brute forcing encrypted wallets
Brute forcing encrypted wallets is also possible, especially if weak cryptographic
parameters are specified and deployed, for instance:
– Number of hash iterations: 10240
– Key Derivation Function (KDF): PBKDF2
– Wallet account address: e.g. 0xbadcafedeadbeef...
During penetration testing, weak parameters were utilized by the deployed
wallet but the password used to encrypt the wallet was very strong. However,
if the password was shorter and had the minimal set of character classes then
the associated password could be brute-forced by even a moderate GPU in a
relatively short period of time. Better security parameters recommended for this
deployment would be:
– Significantly increase hash iterations to at least 262144
– Use a stronger KDF, such as SCRYPT
– Remove the unnecessary account address for privacy reasons. For instance,
in Ethereum, the account addresses can be derived from the private key. The
private key can be used to derive the public key. The public key can be used
to derive the account address.
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Just increasing hash iterations from 10240 to 262144 increases the estimated
computational time from 15 days to 1 year and 244 days on a modest Nvidia
GeForce GT 710 with 2GB of memory at a hash rate of 1,800 H/s. There were
not enough resources on the system tested when using SCRYPT as the KDF,
vs. PBKDF2.
4.4 Breaking blockchain privacy
Having a decentralized service allows for inherent duplication, but does not pro-
vide mechanisms for deduplication. If private data is accidentally incorporated
as transaction data to the chain then there is no way of redacting this infor-
mation, either from soft or hard-forks in the chain. During penetration testing
of the voting system’s blockchain there were no discernible user identifiers that
could correlate a voter with an individual when used as voter ID input to the
vote submission smart contract transaction. The sender account address did not
reveal any other information about the voter.
In addition, the vote submission transaction does not reveal any of the can-
didates or propositions selected in the ballot. The reason for this is that the
ballot template uses an index for each of the selected candidates or propositions
instead of names. However, after correlating the outcome of the election to the
submitted ballots, the candidates could be inferred by observing the index # of
the ballots. In addition, any write-in for the ballot would be submitted in clear
ASCII text as an input argument to the vote submission transaction. An attacker
could easily identify voter write-ins simply by decoding the ASCII characters.
There is no easy solution for the write-in privacy scenario. A hash would not
work given that write-in candidates could be arbitrary and encrypting write-in
information would require additional resources which would further increase the
attack surface of the system.
4.5 Compromising the smart contracts on the blockchain
There are a number of utilities that can be used to test the security of smart
contracts, specifically with the Ethereum framework:
– MAIAN[5]: has greedy, suicidal, and prodigal test cases. The greedy and
prodigal test cases deal with cryptocurrency and therefore not relevant to
the election smart contracts, accounts, and blockchain reward system. The
suicidal test case checks for the EVM kill op-code that could be called by
anyone that would disable the associated contract.
– Mythril[4]: contains a dozen test cases that check for insecure delegate calls,
deprecated op-codes, insecure low-level calls, integer overflow and underflow,
etc. Smart contract source code is not required.
– Echidna[12]: uses fuzz testing of smart contract interfaces. Echidna requires
that the targeted smart contracts be modified in order to support invariant
testing. This requires a stub function to be created which allows Echidna
to assert smart contract logic: always true, sometimes false, and transaction
reversion.
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– Slither[13]: utilizes a number of test cases in its suite: uninitialized state,
local, or storage variables, reentrancy vulnerabilities, unused return values,
multiple calls in a loop, unused state variables, etc.
During penetration testing, access to the Solidity smart contract source code
was not permitted. This constrained testing to just Mythril and MAIAN. Nei-
ther Mythril nor MAIAN found any vulnerabilities/errors in the four voting
smart contracts’ byte-code tested: Election Registry, Voter Registry, Election,
and Election Verification.
5 Attacking the Voter Application
The voter application front-end and back-end were targeted from both a black-
box and white hat approach. The blockchain nodes that were tested were running
in Docker containers for the authority and user nodes running on Ubuntu. The
database servers that were tested were also running on Ubuntu. There were mul-
tiple vectors targeted during penetration testing of the aforementioned systems,
including:
– Packet crafting, using two techniques, to induce a memory handling error
for either DoS or privilege escalation attack.
– Employing vulnerability scanners to check for any known attacks with the
application or dependent libraries
– Static analysis, by scanning dockers images for any known vulnerabilities in
the application or dependent libraries.
– Launching a replay attack from the voting mobile application, blockchain,
and database traffic.
– Exploiting the privacy of voter information/demographics
5.1 Packet crafting
The goal with this attack was to attempt to exploit memory handling issues
with the targeted application and the dependent libraries down the network
protocol stack. Tests were created for the packet crafting framework, Scapy[11].
These tests were made in an attempt to trigger a segmentation violation and/or
to gain elevated privileges through direct memory manipulation to a privileged
operation, e.g. shell access.
During penetration testing of the voting systems both the blockchain and
database instances successfully handled fuzz testing and null/zero length mes-
saging. The targeted applications did not have any memory handling issues and
gracefully rejected the crafted packet that was sent. However, the fuzz and null
messaging was large granular, which means that the crafted payload was con-
textually significant at the OSI transport layer. In the blockchain and database
stack, the associated session, presentation, and application layers were not tar-
geted because of the lack of Scapy modules available, bundled or 3rd party.
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Further investigation is required to develop Scapy modules that will support
read/writes at JSON, WebSockets, RPC, and blockchain procedure call granu-
larity. This will allow a much more targeted attack on the encoding and data
structures of the application and its network stack.
5.2 Vulnerability scanning
In general, there are many areas for vulnerability scanning. Foremost is network
scanning, looking for open service ports and testing known vulnerabilities of
these services. Another is scanning the operating system for any known vulnera-
bilities that may be detected. However, administrators do not normally think of
Docker containers as vectors for security vulnerabilities. In fact the issue is con-
cerning considering that distributions statically bundle the dependent libraries
of their application and forget to update the images once security vulnerabilities
have been fixed in the dynamic distribution of the underlying operating system.
Trivy[1] is a static scanner that scans docker images looking for any known vul-
nerabilities of the system libraries. If a vulnerability is found Trivy will report
the CVE # and severity of security issues found.
For the Docker containers running the blockchain servers, Trivy reported that
the underlying Ubuntu libraries were two major versions behind and four minor
releases behind: native 18.04.3 vs. Docker 16.04. The blockchain server’s library
dependencies, libc6 and libudev1, had 15 vulnerabilities of high, medium, and
low severity scores. There were four vulnerabilities that were considered high
and possibly relevant for glibc: CVE-2017-18269, CVE-2019-9169, CVE-2018-
11236, and CVE-2018-6485. Further investigation is required to see if these high
severity issues can be exploited with the blockchain server as a consumer.
Metasploit 7[9] was run remotely against the blockchain nodes and database
servers. The ports were open to simulate that a network peer had been com-
promised. However, there were no exploits found with the blockchain server’s
network stack:
TCP/UDP->HTTP/WebSockets/IPCSocket->RPC->JSON->blockchain server
However, this has no specific coverage by Metasploit. The particular database
server tested does not have coverage as well. Further investigation is required to
develop specific modules for the application protocol and encoding schemes of
each of these services in Metasploit.
5.3 Replay attacks on various subsystems
When testing the voting mobile application, network traffic was captured from
the mobile application (using a reverse proxy), database, and blockchain servers.
The traffic captured was associated with voter registration (sign-up and sign-
in) and subsequent ballot submissions. This traffic was subsequently replayed
from the respective systems using tcpreplay(1). Tests revealed that there were
no memory handling issues on any of the services running, however message
latency increased noticeably with the database servers, which deserves further
investigation.
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5.4 Exploiting the privacy of voter information
During penetration testing a goal was to exploit sensitive voter information.
Sensitive voter data could consist of passwords, name, address, SSN, signatures,
etc. It was discovered that signatures were stored in the database collection
as the affidavit of the submitted ballot of the voter, with the image stored in
PNG format. The EO’s responsibility is to manually look at the provided voter
signature and compare this image with a known signature before approving or
rejecting the submitted ballot.
Even though the database servers utilize encryption at rest, the human sig-
natures could be intercepted by a web proxy, discussed in the next section. Given
the high target value of signatures the threat of an insider poses some risk.
5.5 Attacking through reverse web proxy
During penetration testing, the mobile application is susceptible to eavesdrop-
ping and tampering of voting information. This can be accomplished by using a
reverse proxy with a root certificate. An attacker can intercept submitted votes,
tamper with votes, or perform a DoS (vote submission dropped). The intercep-
tor scenario can also occur legitimately on corporate devices and networks. User
owned devices and their corresponding browser’s will detect and alert that inter-
ception has occurred, however users are unfortunately trained to click-through
warnings in order to gain access to a known service. After all the US voter app
must be trustworthy, right? Yes, but the attacker could control the network and
the corresponding network proxy. There are a number of techniques to prevent
or detect this type of attack, based on the various capabilities of the attacker:
– Browser key pinning could be used to detect proxy issued certificates vs. the
actual web server’s.
– In recognition of corporate infrastructure, the mobile voter app could disclose
to the end user that voting could allow interceptors to observe/change voting.
– The browser could use DNS based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE).
However if the attacker also controls the user’s DNS access then the attacker
could drop DANE requests.
– Traffic could be tunneled through a VPN in order to bypass the attacker’s
web proxy. However this access may also be denied if the attacker also con-
trols the network’s egress access.
– The web applications could utilize the Web Crypto API to encrypt payloads
between the voter’s mobile device web browser and the web server end point.
Even though an attacker could thwart the voter app’s counter-measures, it
is better to hard fail than fallback to a mode that would allow an attacker to
exploit voter data.
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5.6 Attacking mobile app voter sign-up and election registry
The sign-up interface requires an activation QR code or activation number asso-
ciated with the target election for that user. However, during penetration testing,
if another user’s activation code was intercepted by an attacker that code could
be used as long as the user had a valid account based on e-mail address. After
entering a valid activation code the user is prompted for an e-mail address, phone
number, and PIN. While entering the e-mail address the string is automatically
checked in real-time, which gives an attacker instant verification on whether this
is a registered account or not. The phone number can be an arbitrary number
chosen by the attacker. The PIN is a sequence of five digits. After submitting, a
six digit verification code is sent to the specified mobile number.
Sign-in requires a phone number and the PIN that was previously created by
the voter. After entering the phone number and entering the PIN, the app will
indicate nothing when entering the data, however when switching focus between
the two fields, text under the respective fields will indicate whether either of
the two fields is incorrect. This allows a persistent attacker to brute force either
the phone number or PIN. Given a PIN that has only five digits this would
not take an attacker long to guess with instant feedback. Once submitted a
six digit verification code is sent to the specified phone number, for two-factor
authentication. If the verification code is entered incorrectly the user will not be
allowed to submit the code because the submit button is disabled until the actual
code is entered. Again this gives the attacker real-time feedback on whether
the verification code is valid or not. With six digits this is also guessable by a
persistent hacker or bot.
In order to prevent these types of attacks the text fields should disable real-
time checks on the entered data. Only when the data has been submitted should
there be feedback on success or failure. If authentication fails, regardless of
whether it was due to an in valid account or PIN/password, a generic error mes-
sage should be displayed. Indicating neither specific account or PIN/password
failure. Failures should either trigger an n-strikes algorithm, where the user is no
longer able to authenticate for x amount of time or an exponential back-off al-
gorithm used to only allow another attempt after xy amount of time has expired
(where x is a constant and y is the attempt number).
To fix the arbitrary activation code issue the account (e-mail address) must
be bound to the activation code rather than pairing the sign-up account with
activation code.
6 Recommendations
6.1 Security attestation of integrated blockchain systems
Anytime a new electronic system is employed it is more accessible to legitimate
users, but also opens new vectors for malicious users. Given the high stakes of
democratic elections it is imperative that the entire election system’s security is
analyzed. This paper analyzed all available layers in the stack of the blockchain
and dependent systems. Criteria for evaluating a potential system includes:
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– Determine if blockchain is the right solution for the problem space and that
all simpler solutions have been exhausted to meet the same requirements
without introducing additional risks.
– Insist that the source code be shared in order to provide transparency and
assurances that principles of secure programming have been followed. In-
cluding, static and dynamic analysis (e.g. fuzz testing) of the source code.
– Ensure that configuration files have the most restrictive permissions and
ownership for the processes that require access to the associated information.
– Key material or passwords are never passed through commands line argu-
ments, regardless if they are short-lived or long-running processes.
– Provide the most restrictive firewall rule-sets that start with restricted access
to predetermined ingress and egress traffic, expanding only after bringing up
the system.
– Understand how the blockchain establishes consensus and probe against
these mechanisms and any of their dependencies for any possible procedural,
privilege escalation, and DoS attacks.
– Establish assurances of the cryptographic elements and their dependencies
used to construct signatures on the blockchain.
– Check the cryptographic parameters of wallet configurations and establish
adequate strengths from the KDF algorithm used, hash iterations, and suf-
ficient privacy in case the wallet is exposed.
– Because of blockchain’s decentralization, take care to ensure that the data
contained in the block’s transactions does not expose private data or could
be used to infer sensitive information.
– Due to blockchain’s immutable nature and the complexities of transitioning
from insecure smart contracts, thoroughly analyze all smart contracts that
will be deployed on the blockchain through static and dynamic analysis.
– Think like an adversary by attacking the system through packet crafting,
vulnerability scanning, replay attacks, passive/active attacks, and targeting
the application and all dependent libraries/protocols/systems.
6.2 Correlating Voting Principles
There are a number of voting principles that systems should adhere to in order
to meet the requirements of a free and fair election, regardless if they employ
blockchain technology or not:
– Privacy: In order to prevent voter coercion or vote buying, a cast ballot
should remain anonymous throughout the voting process. Unfortunately, in
the system tested an attacker could look at the blockchain’s transactions in
order to find which voting slots were selected by any particular account. If
the database were to become compromised the blockchain accounts could
be correlated to the voter’s ID. Moving to off-chain transactions for privacy
defeats the purpose of including blockchain in the architecture in the first
place. This was attacked successfully in penetration testing, see section 4.4.
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– Coercion resistance: Having the vote cast on the user’s personal device and
transported over the internet allows for coercion on many levels. The voter’s
personal device could have malware such as keyloggers that can record the
user’s vote for the coercer. Having the vote sent over the internet allows for
middleboxes and web proxies to inspect the user’s vote. The user’s mobile
device itself can be viewed or screen recorded in order to help ensure the
coercer of the desired vote. This was also exploited, refer to section 5.5.
– Verifiability: The system tested did not provide individual verification by the
voter that their vote was received/recorded or by any public observers in the
tallying and results phase of the election. Verification can be accomplished
while still maintaining voter privacy by utilizing a number of cryptographic
primitives such as homomorphic encryption, leveraging mix networks, and
employing zero-knowledge proofs at the voter verification, tallying, and re-
sults phase of the election.
– Fairness: With the system’s vote slot design, blockchain transactions can be
observed while the election is in process. This would violate election fairness
as votes for candidates could be exposed/published before the tallying and
results phase of the election, thereby giving the currently winning candidate
a positive view. This vulnerability was discussed in section 4.4.
– Correctness: This encompasses that only valid voters are allowed to vote,
voters can only vote once or a vote is counted only once, ballots can not be
tampered with without detection, all valid votes are counted in the results,
and invalid votes are not counted in tallying nor in the election results.
Blockchains do have properties that meet a number of correctness crite-
ria, however there are much more specific and mature technologies, i.e. se-
cure databases, that do not introduce unnecessary attack surfaces, including
blockchain’s decentralization, consensus algorithm, and supporting libraries.
These potential attacks were referenced in sections 4.1 and 5.2.
6.3 Future Work
Due to a number of factors, there were several work items that we could not
explore further during our time with the e-voting system.
– Obtain permission for the smart contract source code to comprehensively
test vulnerabilities of the targeted system.
– Implement Scapy modules specifically for the blockchain and database stack.
– Develop Metasploit modules to support various layers of the blockchain
stack. Compared to Scapy, testing could go further in exploiting any vul-
nerabilities found.
– Research exploiting the CVE vulnerabilities found by Trivy.
Given our resources, limited time with the test systems, non-existent modules
for the blockchain and database stack, and lack of access to the source code,
the authors estimate, with all of the above work to be done, that we have only
completed 50% of a comprehensive penetration test.
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7 Conclusion
With the intensive efforts to disrupt democratic societies of their inalienable
right to have a free and fair election, it is critical that voting systems are vetted
holistically and objectively as possible. Deploying blockchain as a framework
for the voting system plays to blockchain’s strengths of having a decentralized,
immutable, verifiable, and robust subsystem. However, our research and related
penetration testing of a blockchain based electronic voting system prototype
has shown that a blockchain’s strengths can also be its own weakness. Having a
decentralized ledger allows access to those accounts that may fall victim through
various attacks on the wallets and even forms of social engineering. The vectors
of attack are numerous on these systems and are only as strong as its weakest
subsystem. Vigilance is required to protect the precious right of voting, but
not even vigilance will be enough without looking at the system holistically.
Technology alone currently does not meet the high assurances required for free
and fair elections. Our hope is that this work will add to the body of knowledge
of what and how an e-voting system that utilizes blockchain technology could
and will invariably be attacked.
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Abstract. The Covid-19 pandemic has had a major impact on annual
general meetings (AGMs) of shareholders worldwide. In 2020, quickly
passed emergency laws prohibited on-site AGMs. Therefore, shareholder
meetings shifted from a physical to a virtual voting event.
In this paper, we present our large-scale study on the security of 623
virtual AGMs held by German companies including corporations listed
in stock indices such as DAX and MDAX. We found several severe vul-
nerabilities in six out of eight online voting platforms, breaking confiden-
tiality, integrity, and availability. In 72% of all virtual AGMs at least one
of the three security goals was compromised. We responsibly disclosed
all weaknesses and helped to develop fixes.
Keywords: annual general meeting (AGM) · online voting · web secu-
rity
1 Introduction
Due to the Covid-19 pandemic emergency laws have been adopted in several
states worldwide. They prohibit annual general meetings of shareholders with
physical attendance. Therefore, the DAX-listed company Bayer AG conducted
the first purely virtual annual general meeting (vAGM) in Germany on April
28, 2020. Over 5,000 shareholders participated at a total cost of around € 1
million [4].
In 2020, the vAGMs emerged to the new standard for shareholder meetings.
The vast majority of German stock corporations (78%) conducted a virtual event
in last years AGM season. This trend proliferated in 2021 and in the long term
politics already consider vAGMs as permanent alternative to general meetings
with physical attendance [13].
An AGM allows shareholders to vote on both company issues and the election
of the company’s board of directors. Therefore, the shareholders’ AGM is the
foundation for sound corporate governance. Shifting the face-to-face meetings to
the virtual world launched manifold new potential security risks. Consequently,
? This article is based on a study first reported in the “Tagungsband zum 17.
Deutschen IT-Sicherheitskongress des BSI” [6].
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companies outsource the organisation and execution of vAGMs to specialized
vendors that provide an online voting plattform (oVP) to the shareholders. Due
to the novelty of oVPs and their usage, the security is barely studied. Thus, we
raise the following research questions in this paper:
– RQ1: Which oVPs exist and how large is their market share in Germany?
– RQ2: How secure are those oVPs in respect to well-known web attacks?
To answer these questions, we conducted an empirical study covering 623
vAGMs of German corporations in the period from April 28 to December 31,
2020. In total, we identified 15 AGM service providers with eight different oVPs.
On basis of our threat analysis and the attacker model (Section 2) we performed
a systematic security analysis. To this, we participated in 46 vAGMs with 71
different user accounts. Our methodology is presented in Section 3.
During our security analysis, we found critical threats in the context of
vAGMs which (partially) correlate to well-known vulnerabilities and attacks de-
rived from the Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) Top 10 list1
[9]. Our analysis involves information gathering beforehand and the examination
of the deployed security best practices. Based on the results, we estimated the
potential attack surface.
In summary, six out of eight oVPs, covering 72% of the 623 vAGMs, had
critical vulnerabilities that compromised at least one of the three information
security goals, namely confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Our attacks al-
lowed the fraudulent alteration of shareholders’ votes, the complete takeover of
shareholder accounts, effective denial of service attacks, and the large-scale leak-
age of personal data. By spending approximately € 20 an attacker was able to
access the personal data (e.g. name, address, date of birth, etc.) of all share-
holders, including voting behavior and number of voting rights, from all vAGMs
conducted on the vulnerable oVP. In total, 161 vAGMs were affected by this
privacy issue. Section 4 presents the empirical study including the revealed at-
tack surface and the found vulnerabilities. Afterwards, we discuss our findings
in Section 5 and conclude in Section 6.
Contributions. In summary, we make the following contributions:
– We conducted a large-scale study by systematically analyzing the security of
623 vAGMs in Germany. To our best knowledge, we are the first that have
done such an evaluation.
– We found several severe vulnerabilities in six out of eight real-world oVPs
breaking the information security goals confidentiality, integrity, and avail-
ability of the underlying online-voting systems. In 72% of all vAGMs at
least one security goal was compromised. The found vulnerabilities affected
vAGMs of major companies listed in stock indices such as DAX and MDAX.
– We disclosed all vulnerabilities found to the platform owners in a responsible
disclosure process and supported them in developing fixes.
1 The OWASP Top 10 list represents a broad consensus about the most critical security
risks to real-world web applications.
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2 Threat Analysis
In the following, we present threats that arise from the assets and the use cases
an oVP typically provides. These threats may be exploited by vulnerabilities
existing in the oVP itself or in the associated infrastructure. An attacker can
use these vulnerabilities to launch attacks that may break the security goals (i.e.
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of the oVP. Therefore, a successful
attack may break some or all underlying election principles.
2.1 Assets and Use Cases
From the attacker’s perspective, the most valuable asset stored in an oVP is the
personal data of the shareholders. This data comprises first name, last name,
place of residence, number of shares/votes, voting behavior, and the type of share
possession (own/proxy). Furthermore, each shareholder has a unique shareholder
number, often used as username to log in to the oVP. In addition, sensitive data
such as full address, e-mail address, telephone number, date of birth, nationality
and the bank that reported the shareholding is often stored, too.
Looking at the functionality, an oVP typically provides the following use
cases:
– Online voting functionality
– Voting by electronic absentee ballot including changes/revocations
– Authorization of and instructions to the company’s proxies
– Granting power of attorney to a third party
– Voting confirmation via a generated pdf document
– Submission of questions to the company (in advance of the AGM)
– Declaration of objections to AGM resolutions
– Content section to provide additional documents such as presentations, an-




In our attacker model, the perpetrator possesses the following capabilities:
1. Access to oVP: The URL to the oVP is published in the public invitation
to the AGM and/or on the company’s website. Therefore, the oVP can be
accessed by anyone via the Internet.
2. Log in to the oVP: We assume, that the attacker is a shareholder of a
company using a susceptible oVP for their vAGM. Therefore, the attacker
has his own legitimate oVP account with username and password. Please
note that buying one share is sufficient to attend the company’s AGM.
3. Victim may click on a link: Further, the attacker may trick a legitimate
vAGM participant (the victim) to click on a link (e.g., by posting on a
discussion forum or sending an e-mail). The victim must be logged into the
oVP at the same time.
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2.3 Results Threat Analysis
In Table 1, we summarize the results of our threat analysis. We consider three
severe real-world threats, each of which compromises one of the three fundamen-
tal security goals. For each threat we mapped the corresponding vulnerability
classes from the OWASP Top 10 list as shown in the second column. In our em-
pirical study, we used this vulnerability classes to perform a systematic manual
black box penetration test (see Section 3). The last column shows well-known
attacks that can be used to exploit the vulnerabilities. In the following, we briefly
explained the attacks:
1. Brute force password guessing: If weak passwords are used to log in to
the oVP they may be guessed by an automated brute force attack.
2. Session fixation attack [5]: In a successful session fixation attack, the
victim uses a session id predetermined by the attacker. In consequence, the
attacker can take over the victim’s identity on the oVP.
3. Broken access control: Due to missing or incorrectly implemented access
control mechanisms authenticated users may be able to access sensitive data
(e.g., the personal data of other shareholders) or may trigger unauthorized
actions.
4. Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) [14]: These attacks arise when a
malicious web site causes a victim’s web browser to execute an unwanted
action on a trusted site. Regarding the usage of an oVP this can be for
example changing the victim’s voting behavior.
5. Brute force account locking: A frequently used countermeasure to pre-
vent automated password guessing is to lockout accounts after a defined
number of incorrect password attempts. However, this measure may easily
be abused by the attacker to lockout hundreds of user accounts. This allows
an attacker to exclude individual or all shareholders on attending the vAGM.
Table 1. The results of the threat analysis mapped to OWASP Top 10 vulnerabil-
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3 Methodology
In this section, we describe the methodology used to carry out our systematic



























vAGM? URL Attack surface
1 2
3
Fig. 1. The methodology we used for our systematic security analysis. First, we iden-
tified the existing vAGM service providers. In the second step, we analyzed the attack
surface by collecting publicly available information about the different oVPs. Finally,
we conducted a black box penetration test.
tion letters and served us as data source. We used these announcements to check
if the company wants to conduct the shareholder meeting virtually. If yes, the
following steps were carried out:
1. Identify AGM service provider: We identified the mandated AGM ser-
vice provider (source: invitation letter) and the URL to the oVP (source:
company website and/or invitation letter).
2. Information gathering: To estimate the potential attack surface and to
gain an impression of the security best practices deployed, we collected the
following publicly available information:
a) Technologies used: We used the free browser extension Wappalyzer [11]
combined with manual investigation of HTTP headers to find out the
technology stack used (i.e. third-party software libraries, operating sys-
tem, webserver type, and infrastructure components). Furthermore, we
2 The Federal Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) is an official publication of the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany that announces all legally relevant company news. All announcements
are freely available under https://www.bundesanzeiger.de.
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analyzed whether outdated software libraries with known vulnerabilities
were used.
b) Security header rating: Nowadays, a large number of well-proven HTTP
security headers (e.g. HSTS3) exist that can be used to increase the se-
curity of web applications. The deployment of these security headers was
investigated using the free website “Security Headers” developed by Scott
Helme [2]. The service assigns ratings ranging from A+ (very good) to F
(insufficient).
c) SSL Labs rating: Another important cornerstone of the oVPs’ security is
the correct deployment of the TLS protocol (formerly known as SSL) to
secure the network traffic via HTTPS. The free service “SSL Labs”[10]
was used to analyze and rate the security of the TLS configuration. The
service assigns ratings ranging from A+ (very good) to F (insufficient).
3. Black box penetration testing: To get full access to the oVPs, we bought
shares of different companies and registered to the shareholder meetings.
Building on the results of our threat analysis (cf. Section 2), we then per-
formed a manual black box penetration test to find exploitable vulnerabili-






In this section, we present the results of our empirical study we conducted on
the security of German vAGMs throughout the general meeting season 2020.
We systematically investigated the oVPs we found in the wild according to the
methodology presented in Section 3. To fully carry out the security evaluation,
we participated in 46 vAGMs with 71 different shareholder accounts.4 The eval-
uation period starts with the first German vAGM (Bayer AG) on April 28, 2020
and ends on December 31, 2020. In total, 623 vAGMs were held during this
period. In two cases we could not identify the mandated AGM service provider.
Of the remaining 621 vAGMs, 584 (94%) were conducted by 15 different AGM
service providers. In 23 cases (3.7%), a video conferencing system such as Zoom
was used without a dedicated oVP. Here, polling was done conventionally by
absentee voting, fax or even e-mail. On 14 vAGMs (2.3%), the companies used
an oVP software developed on their own.
Figure 2 shows the market share of all discovered AGM service providers
in Germany. The AGMs conducted via a video conferencing system and the
in-house developed AGM portal solutions are not considered further.
3 HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) [3] is a security header for HTTPS connec-
tions that is designed to protect against downgrade attacks and session hijacking.
4 To legitimately attend a vAGM you need to buy at least one company share. In
most cases we had two accounts per vAGM.
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During further investigations of the oVPs, it turned out that the AGM service
providers UBJ. GmbH, GFEI AG, ITTEB GmbH & Co. KG, BADER & HUBL
GmbH, HV-Management GmbH, AAA HV Management GmbH, Art of Confer-
ence, and HV AG use the same underlying platform. Therefore, we summarized
them to “BS portal”. In the end, the number of different oVPs discovered re-
duced to eight platforms.
The oVPs of the three largest AGM service providers Computershare GmbH
& Co. KG, Link Market Services GmbH and Better Orange IR & HV AG dom-
inate the market for vAGMs with a total market share of 66.8%. On the fourth
place BS HV portal has a combined total market share of 19.2%. The remain-
ing 8% are shared by four service providers, namely C-HV AG (3.1%), ADEUS
Aktienregister-HV-Service GmbH (2.9%), HVBest Event-Service GmbH (1.0%),
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Fig. 2. Number of conducted vAGMs per service provider. The top three service
providers dominate more than two thirds of the vAGM market in Germany. Service
providers marked with “∗” are using the same underlying oVP. Therefore, they are
summarized and referred to as “BS portal”.
4.1 Information Gathering
Table 2 summarizes the results of the information gathering. Seven out of eight
oVPs examined are classic web applications with server-side application logic.
Only Computershare GmbH & Co. KG relies on a modern Javascript-based
single page application. The portals are built in various programming languages
(1x Javascript, 2x PHP, 2x ASP.net and 3x Java), frameworks (Angular JS,
JavaServer Pages, Java Server Faces, Telerik Web UI, and CodeIgniter), and were
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deployed on different web servers (3x Microsoft IIS, 2x Nginx and 1x Apache).
In two cases, we were unable to identify the web server used.
In total, ten outdated software libraries with known vulnerabilities were
found in five of eight oVPs (market share: 52.4%). The vulnerable libraries
date from 2015–2019. No software libraries with known vulnerabilities were dis-
covered in the oVPs of Link Market Services GmbH, BS portal, and HVBest
Event-Service GmbH.
All oVPs are accessible via HTTPS and deploy the TLS protocol. Regarding
the SSL labs rating, four out of eight oVPs achieved a B rating (market share:
49.2%). Link Market Services GmbH, Better Orange IR & HV AG, and FAE
Management GmbH (market share: 41.9%) achieved an A rating. Only the oVP
of ADEUS GmbH achieved the best possible rating of A+ (market share: 2.9%).
In the security header rating, Computershare GmbH & Co. KG, and ADEUS
GmbH performed best with a C rating (market share: 28.8%). HVBest Event-
Service GmbH achieved a D rating. The remaining HV portals with a market
share of 64.2% achieved a F rating.
Table 2. The results of the information gathering from step 2 of our methodology.







































4.2 Black Box Penetration Testing
Authentication. First, we examined the password based authentication. The re-
sults are shown in Table 3. All AGM service providers deploy numeric usernames,
which are assigned in an ascending order. They are usually 4–5 digits long, start-
ing with leading zeros. Due to this type of account assignment, the usernames
are easy to guess.
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Next, we analyzed the password policies each service provider employs. This
analysis is based on 71 legitimate vAGM accounts. With one exception, all ser-
vice providers assign randomly generated passwords to the accounts. The pass-
word length ranges from 5–10 characters. The password space consists of upper-
case and lowercase letters and numbers from the ASCII charset. Additionally,
in one case, the special character “*” was included in the password space. The
HVBest Event-Service GmbH oVP does not use random passwords. Instead, a
combination of the number of shares held, zip code, and place of residence of the
shareholder must be entered to authenticate.5 The password policies of HV AG
and Art of Conference could not be investigated as we did not have any accounts
(market share: 0.6%).
The oVPs of Better Orange IR & HV AG and HVBest Event-Service GmbH
did not respond with a generic authentication error message on wrong login
attempts (market share: 20.5%). Instead, they indicate to the user whether either
username or password was wrongly entered. This provides an attacker valuable
information.
Link Market Services GmbH and HVBest Event-Service GmbH additionally
secure their logins via CAPTCHAs6 which must be solved in order to login
(market share: 22.4%).
The oVPs of Computershare GmbH & Co. KG, C-HV AG, ADEUS GmbH,
and FAE Management GmbH locked accounts after entering multiple wrong
passwords (market share: 32.9%). While FAE Mangement GmbH locked the
accounts temporarily for approx. 30 minutes the other three oVPs need manual
intervention of the support for unlocking. All other service providers, did not
lockout accounts after entering multiple wrong passwords.
Session Management. The three oVPs Better Orange IR & HV AG, BS portal,
and C-HV AG were vulnerable to session fixation attacks (market share: 41.8%).
The logout functionality of the oVPs of Better Orange IR & HV AG and Com-
putershare GmbH & Co. KG was without any effect (market share: 45.4%). In
consequence, the user session remained valid after the user had clicked on the
logout button.
Access Control. We revealed a severe broken access control vulnerability in Com-
putershare’s oVP (market share: 25.9%). No further broken access control vul-
nerabilities were found at any of the other oVPs.
CSRF. Solely, FAE-Management GmbH was susceptible to CSRF attacks.
Table 4 summarizes the results of our penetration testing objectives session
management, access control, and CSRF.
5 HVBest Event-Service GmbH told us that they also support alternative authentica-
tion methods.
6 A “Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart”
(CAPTCHA) is a challenge–response test used to determine if a human is interacting
with the service.
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Art of Conference n/a
Table 4. The results of the security evaluation of session management, access control,










Computershare GmbH 7 7
Link Market Services GmbH




HVBest Event-Service GmbH n/a n/a n/a n/a
FAE Management GmbH 7
Total successful attacks (
∑
: 7) 3 2 1 1
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5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the results of our security evaluation presented in
Section 4.
5.1 Information Gathering
Vulnerable libraries. We found ten third-party libraries with known vulnerabili-
ties in five of eight oVPs with a market share of 52.4%. It should be noted, that
using a susceptible library does not necessarily mean that the vulnerability can
be exploited. For example, vulnerable code that never gets executed cannot be
exploited by an attacker. However, today’s security best practice demands that
vulnerabilities should be patched as soon as possible. In contrast, the vulner-
abilities found were publicly known for 1–5 years and proper security patches
exist.
TLS security. The TLS configuration of the oVPs did not reveal any severe
vulnerabilities. Due to the server-side support of TLS 1.0 and 1.1, half of the
oVPs only obtained a B rating. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)
recommends to remove support of both protocol versions because of their inher-
ent weaknesses since mid-2018 [7]. Finally, the IETF deprecated both versions
in March 2021 [8]. We would recommend to turn off support of legacy TLS 1.0
and 1.1. This would immediately improve the security of the web traffic without
loss of compatibility.
Security headers. The security header analysis showed that a large number of
security headers are rarely deployed by the oVPs. This reveals a unnecessarily
large attack surface. The adoption of widely supported security headers may
prevent or at least hinder many known attacks. From developers perspective
these “low hanging fruits” can easily be implemented in a short time.
Overall, the results revealed a broad attack surface providers’ could easily
reduce.
5.2 Black Box Penetration Testing
Authentication. Seven out of eight oVPs generate random passwords for the
shareholder accounts. This prevents weak passwords, such as “12345” or the use
of same passwords for different services. According to the current recommenda-
tions of the German Federal Office for Information Security, a secure password
should be at least eight letters long and should consist of upper and lower case
letters, numbers, and special characters. Additionally, passwords that do not
use all four character types should be significantly longer (>12 characters) or
multi-factor authentication should be deployed [1].
These password requirements were not met by any of the investigated service
providers. AAA Management HV GmbH deployed the weakest password policy
with a password space of 105 combinations. HVBest Event-Service GmbH did not
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use passwords in all examined cases. Instead, for authentication it was necessary
to enter username, number of shares held, postal code, and place of residence.
Compared to a strong password policy this type of authentication is consider-
ably weak as the required credentials are easy to obtain (zip code and place of
residence) or guessable (number of shares).
The AGM service providers argued that complex password policies would
lead to higher support costs. Due to the critical threats that may arise by de-
ploying weak authentication mechanisms, we strongly recommend more complex
password policies or multi-factor authentication.
To counter brute force password guessing attacks HVBest Event-Service
GmbH and Link Market Services GmbH deploy CAPTCHAs. However, the
CAPTCHAs prompted to users are simple in structure and not robust enough
to satisfy current security best practices (see Figure 3). In 2010 J. Yan and A.
S. El Ahmad showed how CAPTCHAs of this type can be can be broken [12].
Fig. 3. Examples of CAPTCHAs deployed by Link Market Services GmbH (left) and
HVBest Event-Service GmbH (right).
To prevent systematic password guessing attacks, four oVPs lockout accounts
after multiple incorrect login attempts. Furthermore, FAE Management GmbH
tries to mitigate permanent blocking by automatically unlocking accounts after
approximately 30 minutes. However, in all cases an attacker may block individual
or all shareholder accounts right before a vAGM. Due to the predictable nature
of the usernames this can result in an effective denial of service attack (DoS).
In addition, Better Orange IR & HV AG and HVBest Event-Service GmbH
(market share: 20.5%) allow to identify valid usernames depending on the error
responses. Thus, we recommend displaying a generic error message to the user
(e.g. “Login failed!”).
Session management. We discovered session fixation attacks in three oVPs
(45.8% market share) allowing an attacker to completely take over the victim’s
user session. To mitigate this attack, a fresh session id must be assigned to the
user after successful login. Finally, the broken logout functionality found in two
oVPs (market share: 45.4%) may also allow session hijacking if session data gets
compromised. For example, if an attacker gets access to the victim’s browser
after clicking on the (defect) logout button.
Access control. We found a severe vulnerability leading to a broken access control
attack in the most prevalent oVP operated by Computershare GmbH & Co.
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KG (market share: 25.9%). The vulnerability allowed an attacker to get full
access to the personal data of all shareholders including name, address, date of
birth, voting behavior, and number of shares held from all vAGMs conducted
by Computershare.7 The only prerequisite was a legitimate account by buying
at least one share and registering for the vAGM. Unfortunately, the attack was
not limited to the vAGM the account was created for – it allowed to read out
the personal shareholder data of all conducted vAGMs.
CSRF attacks. We found one oVP susceptible to CSRF attacks (market share:
1.0%) that may allow to (stealthily) change the voting behavior of the victim.
For this, the victim must click on a link provided by the attacker while having
an active user session to the oVP.
Summary. Our results were summarized in Table 5. The table shows which
security goals were broken by the attacks found per oVP. We have not considered
the ramifications of the weak password policies found as we did not execute
brute force password guessing attacks on the oVPs. However, all AGM service
providers contacted during the responsible disclosure process classified this as a
critical attack vector that has to be mitigated.
In total, we found in six out of eight oVPs (market share: 71.6%) attacks that
at least broke one security goal. Solely, the oVP of Link Market Services GmbH
exposed no exploitable vulnerabilities. The oVP of HVBest Event-Service GmbH
could not be fully tested due to missing login accounts. Nevertheless, the results
of the information gathering show that both portals expose a unnecessary large
attack surface.
Table 5. Summary of the broken security goals per oVP and the affected market share.





Computershare GmbH & Co. KG 25.9% 7 7
Link Market Services GmbH 21.4%
Better Orange IR & HV AG 19.5% 7 7
BS portal 19.2% 7 7
C-HV AG 3.1% 7 7 7
ADEUS GmbH 2.9% 7
HVBest Event-Service GmbH 1.0% n/a n/a n/a
FAE Management GmbH 1.0% 7∑
Broken security goals (market share) 4/8 (67.7%) 4/8 (42.8%) 3/8 (31.9%)
7 According to article 40, section 1 of the German Securities Trading Act, major
shareholders are known to the public as they must publish the acquisition/disposal
of shares when reaching or falling below major holdings (i.e. 3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%,
25%, 30%, 50%, and 75%). However, changes of voting rights within the prescribed
limits and all other shareholders remain anonymous to the public.
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6 Conclusion
The Covid-19 pandemic defined vAGMs as the new normal for shareholder gath-
erings. They have established themselves as a system-relevant crisis instrument
within a very short time. However, in the long run they will only be successful
if the underlying oVPs provide an adequate level of security. The results of our
empirical security study on vAGMs in Germany show that there is room for
improvements. In six out of eight oVPs with a market share of almost 72%, we
discovered severe vulnerabilities. It is important to stress, that we only investi-
gated the oVPs against well-known web attacks and analyzed the deployment of
security best practices in order to measure the potential attack surface. There-
fore, we only scratched on the surface of the portals’ security. Our findings are
a first step to increase the security level at vAGMs and helped to sensitize the
AGM service providers.
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Abstract. Events surrounding the 2016 election violently shook the U.S.
elections environment. Since then, numerous policy changes have been
implemented. Despite this, the 2020 election was still one of the most
contentious elections in U.S. history, up to and including historic-levels
of violence and unrest. We conducted post-mortem interviews with three
election officials at the county level in Texas to get a better idea about
what went well, what when poorly, and what must be addressed going
forward. How well did the policy changes post-2016 bolster our confidence
in elections in 2020? The answer is quite a lot, but not enough to accom-
modate new issues like the COVID-19 pandemic and unforeseen levels
of domestically-generated misinformation, which overshadowed policy
successes in securing systems from outside manipulation by cyberattack.
1 Introduction
The 2016 U.S. presidential election witnessed overt attempts by foreign powers
to influence the outcome [23]. Multiple elections jurisdictions across the U.S.
experienced attempts to infiltrate the infrastructure they use to conduct elections,
with infiltration succeeding in at least two states [9]. In the wake of these
attacks, significant effort was made to shore up the defenses of elections in
the United States, including significantly more funding for elections [25], the
establishment of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA),
and major emphasis on information sharing bodies like the Information Sharing
and Analysis Centers and Organizations [11]. Numerous social media companies
also significantly revamped efforts to combat misinformation that was widespread
during the 2016 elections.
These efforts were largely successful, with the U.S. elections community
concluding that the 2020 presidential election was “the most secure in American
history” [13]. Despite this assessment and the tremendous amount of money
and effort poured into election infrastructure, the U.S. witnessed something
extraordinarily rare after the 2020 election: political violence. On January 6th,
hundreds of people stormed the U.S. Capitol building, injuring the security force
attempting to protect the building and killing one officer [4]. Calls of violence
have run rampant after the election, and even elected officials expressed serious
skepticism, up to and including voting against certifying the election results [29].
In this paper, we attempt to shed light on how these two seemingly disparate
things can both be true at the same time: elections in the U.S. are more secure
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than ever before, and yet discontent with the electoral system and concerns about 
its security are at an all time high. We argue that many of the policy changes 
made post-2016 did have a significant impact on the robustness of the electoral 
process, as shown by the deft response to an unforeseen and formidable challenge: 
the COVID-19 pandemic. Much of the policy changes made in the wake of 2016 
empowered information sharing and the acquisition of better election equipment, 
which made states’ efforts to transition to processes that limit the spread of 
coronavirus significantly easier. Whereas elections in years past had struggled to 
respond to the ever changing landscape, the increased resources and awareness 
allowed jurisdictions to respond rapidly.
However, these rapid responses also created a new problem: the spread of 
misinformation. We conducted interviews with three election officials in Texas, a 
state that saw dramatic changes to its election policies in response to COVID-19, 
including extended early voting periods and modified rules around absentee 
voting [30]. All three interviewees indicated that the election itself went smoother 
than anticipated, but that misinformation proved to be a much more difficult issue 
to contend with. In an environment where election logistics were changing rapidly, 
and one where the spread of misinformation had already proven to be an effective 
attack vector, voters were bombarded with constantly changing and inconsistent 
information about when, where and how to vote. Worse, voters were also subject 
to conspiracy theories heralded at the highest level of government about the 
insecurity of voting systems and the illegitimacy of the election results [3].
Our interviews with elections officials helped us to better understand that 
worked and what did not work in Texas in 2020. We find that the additional 
resources and communications greatly bolstered the security and efficacy of 
elections. However, our interviewees also expressed great concern over the rise of 
misinformation, suggesting that while efforts to improve elections in Texas and 
the U.S. at large have had some success, significantly more work is needed.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we give a brief 
overview of elections in the United States, as well as the key policies that constrain 
them. In Section 3, we describe how and why we chose to interview election 
officials to shed light on the state of elections in the U.S.. We present case 
studies based on our interviews in Section 4, Section 5, and Section 6. Finally, we 
conclude in Section 7, synthesizing the knowledge our research has revealed and 
providing some recommendations for policy changes and future lines of research.
2 Elections in the United States
Elections in the United States are a complex system of multiple government 
entities with different degrees of jurisdiction, a small number of vendors, and a 
onerous regulatory regime. For brevity we choose to elide much of the complexity, 
and will try to provide just enough context to support the remainder of the 
paper.
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2.1 Whose election is it anyway?
As the United States is a republic of states, its constitution delegates the vast 
majority of election responsibilities to the states, who in turn may delegate 
responsibilities down to local counties or townships. The exact degree of delegation 
varies widely between states; for example the states of Hawaii and Georgia largely 
run elections at a state level, handling most of the logistics and administration 
centrally while delegating the running of polling locations to counties. In contrast, 
states like Michigan and Wisconsin delegate almost all tasks to the local township 
level. Therefore, where responsibility for election security lies varies widely with 
each state.
In Texas, the state where our interviews were conducted, counties perform 
most of the election procedures. The state performs some regulatory tasks like 
deciding which type of voting equipment counties may purchase, distributes 
funding from the state and federal governments, and enforces policies about when 
and how elections may be conducted. However, county election officials ultimately 
have the power over what type of voting equipment to purchase (provided it is 
approved by the state) and therefore how voters are allowed to cast their ballots. 
Texas has a variety of voting technology, ranging from all-electronic DRE systems 
to hand-marked, hand-counted paper ballots. Most counties use a combination 
of voting technologies to accommodate absentee voting, voters with disabilities, 
and other considerations like the need for ballots in multiple languages.
County officials must also maintain significant information technology in-
frastructure, including: websites and social media accounts on which election 
information is distributed; email servers; and the technology required to maintain 
and program voting equipment, including voter information, ballot preparation 
and tabulation, and results reporting.
2.2 Help America Vote Act
Most of the requirements surrounding voting systems trace their lineage to the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002 (HAVA). HAVA was passed in response to the 2000 
presidential election, in which a close contest ultimately came down to ballots 
cast on out-dated and poorly usable voting equipment in the state of Florida [16]. 
HAVA provided $2 billion to states to upgrade their outdated voting equipment. 
HAVA also created several new regulations about voting equipment, including the 
Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG), requirements against which voting 
equipment can be certified. The VVSG includes performance and correctness 
requirements, as well as requirements that voting systems accommodate voters 
with disabilities.
HAVA is widely regarded as having brought direct-recording electronic voting 
machines (DREs) into popular use, as they were some of the only market-ready 
equipment at the time that could meet VVSG requirements for accessibility. 
In the years since HAVA’s passing, DREs have fallen out of favor due to their 
insecurity, and been replaced with a wide array of technology, including hand-
marked, optically scanned paper ballots and ballot marking devices [8]. Because
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certification to VVSG standards is expensive and time-intensive, voting technology 
tends to lag behind modern technology standard. Until the passage of VVSG 2.0 
this year (an update to the standard), the security of voting technology was an 
after thought as it was not required for certification.
HAVA is also the mechanism through which federal funding is made available 
for elections. In 2019 and 2020 two disbursements of HAVA money were made, 
with the first designed to improve election security [25] and the second designed 
to bolster states’ responses to the COVID-19 pandemic as part of the CARES 
Act [14].
2.3 Elections in Texas
Texas is a state in the southern region of the United States, among one of the 
largest states with a population of approximately 29,145,505 based on 2020 esti-
mates [34]. Texas has approximately 16,955,519 registered voters as of November 
2020 and 8,745 precincts as of November 2018 [35].
The state does not have stringent requirements on type of voting equipment 
deployed to polling locations, however it does require that systems be certified by 
the U.S. Elections Assistance Commission. In practice, this means that systems 
in Texas are certified to the first version of the VVSG, which dates to 2005. 
This version of the VVSG contains little in terms of security requirements from 
voting systems. In addition to EAC certification, Texas also retains independent 
certification, such that a voting system may not be certified in Texas even if it is 
EAC certified.
The outdated standards and otherwise somewhat laissez faire environment 
means that Texas is one of the most diverse states in terms of voting equipment. 
Systems in Texas range from hand-marked, hand counted paper ballots to ballot-
marking devices to DREs that have no paper record at all [35]. Texas also supports 
early voting, where voters can vote in a polling location several weeks before the 
official electoin day. Texas additionally supports absentee voting, however voters 
must qualify to vote absentee via a number of conditions, like disability, military 
status, or out-of-state residence at the time of the election.
2.4 The 2016 election and its aftermath
The 2016 election was one of the most contentious elections in recent memory. 
Misinformation and hacking campaigns were carried out by numerous foreign 
actors to attempt to sway the election, the most prominent being Russia [23]. 
Election officials around the country were often caught off guard and unable to 
respond to these attacks due to lack of resources, training, and communication 
(a fact which all three of our interviewees confirmed).
In response to the shortcomings of the 2016 election, the federal government 
designated elections as critical infrastructure, which provided additional support 
from the federal government to elections infrastructure, and established the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), tasked with aiding 
sectors like elections in improving their robustness to cyber attack. Additional
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emphasis was placed on Information Sharing and Analysis Centers(ISACs) with 
the establishment of the EI-ISAC, channels through which information like critical 
security vulnerabilities and incidences could be disseminated to local elections 
officials [11].
In 2019 additional HAVA money was disbursed to allow jurisdictions to 
upgrade their aging voting equipment. All three of the election officials we spoke 
to had recently upgraded at least some of their voting equipment in part due to 
this additional funding.
In addition to the federal push to improve election security, the state of Texas 
passed two bills to improve the state’s ability to repond to cyber attacks. Texas 
passed House Bill 8, the Texas Cybersecurity Act, in 2017, which “provides specific 
measures to protect sensitive and confidential data and maintain cyberattack 
readiness.” The bill was passed partially in response to the state’s being targeted 
in 2016 [21], but also due to the widespread increase in cyber attacks against 
the state in recent years [6]. Texas House Bill 9, the Texas Cybercrime Act, was 
passed as a companion bill that “updates the Texas Penal Code to recognize 
several new types of cybercrime and their punishments.” These laws expand 
officials’ roles to protect essential data for which they are responsible.
2.5 The COVID-19 pandemic
In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, most states rapidly pivoted their election 
infrastructure to de-emphasize in-person voting, believed to carry and increased 
risk of transmitting the disease. States greatly expanded voting by mail, extended 
voting hours, and procured extra equipment to be used in polling locations to 
limit the spread. An additional $400 million was disbursed to states via HAVA [14]. 
In total, more voters voted through non-traditional means in 2020 than ever 
before [28].
However, while some states like Michigan, Arizona, and Wisconsin could pivot 
to sending out ballots by mail, some policies proved inflexible. The absentee ballot 
counting period in these states does not ordinarily start until election day, as 
historically most voters vote in-person and the proportion of vote-by-mail ballots 
is relatively small. Amidst a tsunami of mail in voting, however, these counting 
rules led to significant delays in results reporting on election night. These delays 
were fodder for misinformation campaigns, and helped fed into the narrative 
that the election results were illegitimate [12], a narrative that was picked up by 
elected officials in Texas and elsewhere [19].
3 Examining preparedness
In order to delve into the effectiveness of measures taken post-2016, as well as 
to assess how an election could be “the most secure in American history” while 
simultaneously resulting in political violence, we set out to interview election 
officials who were responsible for running the 2020 election. We solicited interviews 












Harris 2,480,522 BMD $12,362,000 $4.98
Bexar 1,189,373 BMD+DRE $4,278,082 $3.60
Cameron 218,910 HMPB+BMD $1,498,560 $6.85
Table 1. Case Study Counties in Texas with Details—Summary data for the 
three counties where we interviewed election officials. Harris is the largest county in 
Texas and second largest county in the United States. Bexar County comprises about 
half of Harris’s population, and Cameron County one tenth. All three counties spend 
similar amount of money per voter on elections.
medium- and large-sized counties in the state of Texas. Texas was chosen in part 
due to proximity to the researchers as well as it represents a good mix of election 
policies, voting equipment, and demographics in comparison to the United States 
as a whole [34,35]. Together, the election officials we interviewed oversee elections 
for 23% of voters in Texas [35].
We interviewed officials from Bexar, Cameron, and Harris counties (who chose 
to remain anonymous) with the hope of understanding how secure their voting 
systems are and whether they have the necessary resources to provide the best 
security for the voting machines. A summary of information about the counties 
we interviewed can be seen in Table 1.
The interviews we conducted were semi-structured, with a predetermined 
set of questions to prompt our interviewees, shown in Appendix A. We focused 
on four main areas with each official: their voting system, election preparation 
procedures, experiences in 2020, and an overall takeaway about the security of 
their election system. All interviewees signed a consent form and clarified whether 
they wished to remain anonymous.
4 Case Study: Bexar County
With San Antonio as the county seat, Bexar County is the fourth most populated 
county in Texas and the 16th most populated in the United States. The county’s 
election department is led by Elections Administrator Jacquelyn F. Callanen, a 
non-partisan candidate appointed by the election commission, including county 
judge, clerk, and more. Like other counties, “[t]he Bexar County Elections 
Department is responsible for voter registration activities and election operations 
throughout Bexar County.”
We interviewed a Bexar County official who answered questions regarding 
election security and voting systems used in the County. During the interview 
with the County official, we asked questions about the voting processes and 
procedures. Below we provide a summary of the information provided to us by 
the official, along with quotes where relevant.
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Voting equipment Prior to the 2020 election, Bexar County used Direct-
Recording Electronic (DRE) as its voting system for 17 years. In November 2019,
Bexar County finally decided to upgrade its voting system to what they now
call blended or hybrid system purchased from ES&S. While a “hybrid” system
has colloquially become known as a ballot marking and tabulation all-in-one
device [37], Bexar County’s system is a separate BMD and scanner for most
voters. Texas also supports “curbside” voting, where voters who cannot enter a
polling place due to a disability vote on a machine brought to the vehicle that
transported them to the polling location. Bexar County’s new system includes
paperless DREs for curbside voters [35].
Election preparation Bexar County’s election preparation process differs from
the other counties because it services the three military bases. Voters who are in
the military or overseas fall under a different set of regulations than most voters:
the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA) [32].
Forty-five days before the election, UOCAVA requires thatthe County elections
department to send all the military ballots to the bases, in addition to sending
absentee ballots to UOCAVA voters overseas. Failure to do so on time results in
the county covering the ballots’ delivery and returning costs.
Because of this early deadline, the interviewee indicated that preparations
for the election begin six months before election day. Early preparation includes
equipment testing and inspection of other systems like voter registration. During
this period, the election administrator holds weekly meetings with staff to brief
on all critical functions that must be completed before the election.
Experiences in 2020 Despite all of the changes incurred by rolling out a new
voting system, dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic, and rampant misinforma-
tion campaigns led by foreign adversaries [22], the official we spoke with in Bexar
County felt that the election overall went smoothly:
I am unbelievably proud of my team and how well we worked in
November. . . CISA made us essential workers which means that we spent
over 90 hours in the office together. . . [we witnessed] the most voters,
mail-in ballots, the governor extended early voting which helped. The
County paid for all election officials to test for COVID-19. . . spent about
half-million dollars to ensure everyone is protected.
The official alleged that in 2016, the Texas Secretary of State’s (SOS) system
was hacked. However, the then-Secretary of State denied that the state was a
victim of the Russian hacks, asking the DHS to make corrections of the list they
published [21]. Nevertheless, Bexar county opted to develop new protocols to
provide better defense against cyberattacks.
We have written protocols to protect ourselves in case the SOS gets 
hacked. We now have a complete shadow election set up that is moved
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offsite and double locked. Should something happen, we will still be able
to get elections results. Prior to 2016, we never thought of this. The
climate changed a little bit.
The interviewee also indicated that better communication was a boon to
preparing for this election, citing both CISA’s role in the 2020 election as well as
Texas’s emergency operations center, statingt that they “[w]ork hand-in-hand
with them and see if we can remediate anything from the back-end.”
Despite these changes, Bexar County experienced an unexpected problem
during the 2020 election that left voters confused and contributed to misinforma-
tion spreading across the jurisdiction. In contrast with their old DRE system the
new system sees voters handling paper ballots and placing them in the tabulator;
however, no one was aware that those boxes could only hold 2,000 ballots. Elec-
tion workers at the precincts were under the assumption that the tabulator was
jammed when the tabulators filled up and they could not push through ballots.
Voters began thinking that the tabulators were not working, and misinformation
circulated rapidly within the county, to the extent that voters started leaving
the polling locations without having voted. The official we interviewed explained
that “everybody focused on hardware and software. No one informed us of the
number of ballots held by the tabulator.”
As the administrator only had five election technology specialists working
to cover 45 polling locations, they had to bring extra technicians from other
departments to change the tabulators. Fortunately this issue was mitigated
slightly be the changes to early voting rules to accommodated the pandemic, as
during early voting voters can go to any polling location. This spread out the
load on individual locations and resulted in tabulators filling up less frequently.
Takeaways Overall, the official we spoke with agreed that Bexar County is well-
equipped to defend the voting systems and voter information from cyberattacks.
The official cited their newly adopted policies, annual voting systems inspection
by the vendor, the ability to tabulate absentee ballots earlier than election day,
the use of electronic pollbooks; as well as in-house databases, VPNs, and password
policies, and that “the voting system is encrypted” with an “encryption method
signed off by [the] federal government and State of Texas.”1
5 Case Study: Cameron County
Cameron County is located in the southernmost part of Texas, bordered to the
south by Mexico and to the east by the Gulf of Mexico, with Brownsville as the
county seat. Cameron County has approximately 218,910 registered voters in
approximately 102 precincts.
1 As ES&S has never submitted their systems for independent review, and the standards
used to certify the system used in Bexar county only requires encryption for electronic
transmission [31], we could not verify these claims about encryption.
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Voting equipment Cameron County uses hand-marked paper ballots with 
ballot marking devices for accessibility, and an optical scanner for tabulation. 
They follow a precinct count voting system where the ballots are tabulated at the 
polling location [35]. Our interviewee indicated that the county uses two backup 
methods for voting counts and results to avoid data loss, including utilizing a 
USB drive and an internal record. The presiding judge brings the copy of the 
counts to the central location, and if an issue arises, an individual is sent to 
collect a copy of the USB drive and machines.
Election preparation Expounding on procedures around the voting equipment, 
the official explained that there is ongoing security surveillance of the County IT 
system. When setting up a machine for the next election, the machine’s state is 
verified to ensure that nothing has changed while the machine was in storage. 
Then, machines are programmed with data for the upcoming election over an 
Internet-connected virtual private network, and security patches are installed.
(This manner of connection adds risk of compromise due to Internet exposure.) 
A week before the start of early voting, the public is invited to view logic and 
accuracy testing, where machines are tested to ensure the election programming 
is correct.
For other election-related procedures, like communication, transferring voter 
data, and aggregating tabulation results, the interviewee reported the use of 
VPNs, FTP, and software access controls for all software that is used. Additionally, 
the official indicated that the elections warehouse was physically secured. While 
they reported not using encryption on their office systems, they encrypt data 
transferred to locations with no additional security layer.
Experiences in 2020 After 2016, the interviewee reported that there were 
significant concerns regarding the security of Cameron County elections and 
voting systems, including a past data breach. However, they noted significant 
improvements to their security posture. Funding from the state and grant money 
from two outside entities allowed for better security of their voting equipment. 
They also noted a precipitous increase in cybersecurity training and awareness, 
and established processes for handling phishing attacks and other suspicious 
incidences. The interviewee also cited better communication between federal, 
state, and local officials, “ with the [cybersecurity] training, we all started speaking 
the same language and understand each other.”
Takeaways When asked how prepared Cameron County was to face cyber 
threats, the official responded by stating, “[e]very election offers its challenges. 
COVID-19 was a challenge for us, and the machines did not have any problems. 
Using the paper-based system, COVID did not have as much impact.” Overall, 
the interviewee expressed confidence that Cameron County did provide adequate 
security for its voting systems, but identified misinformation as a major threat:
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[We will] try our best to make sure that information [that we share
with the public] is legitimate. After 2020, misinformation is becoming a
danger to our elections and we need to provide additional training [to
the public and staff] to recognize it. The awareness of the threat has
increased since 2016. The more information we have, the better we can
protect ourselves and our democracy.
6 Case Study: Harris County
Harris County is the largest county in Texas, with an estimated population of over 
4,713,325. The County’s election department is under the leadership of County 
Judge Lina Hidalgo and elections administrator Isabel Longoria. According to 
VerifiedVoting, Harris County had over 2,480,522 registered voters as of November 
2020, with an estimate of 1,012 precincts [35].
We interviewed Michael Winn, the Harris County Chief Deputy Administrator, 
who has over 25 years of experience working in the government. Mr.Winn agreed 
to be identified in our paper. He has worked in Bexar, Travis, and Harris Counties 
in the elections department and is on the Election Assistance Commission Board 
of Advisors. He was also one of the election officials who contributed to the 
development of STAR-Vote, an end-to-end cryptographic voting system [5].
Voting equipment Harris County has used DREs as their primary voting 
system since 2001, including during the 2020 general election, although they are 
currently transitioning to an all-BMD system for in-person voters.
Election preparation When preparing for elections, Mr.Winn identified three 
preparation windows, which include 45, 60, and 90 days before elections. During 
these periods, they conduct hash code testing to verify whether the code matches 
a hash code that was previously taken. If they do not, they choose to replace 
the system due to the possibility of the system being tampered with. They also 
perform the logic and accuracy testing to ensure that machines are programmed 
correctly for the upcoming election.
Forty-five days before the elections is known as the “lockdown period”, where 
the system is air-gapped. During the preparation period, the county involves its 
partners to check that their information such as addresses, contact and more is 
correct, including schools, political parties, and polling places. Per Mr.Winn, this 
process, known as entity proofing, is a vital means of ensuring the correctness of 
public information.
During the interview, we asked Mr.Winn how the County deals with equipment 
security. He explained that “if there are updates [to the voting system software], 
we do communicate with vendors. . . we do get the updates and when completed, 
there is a file, a record that shows that there has been an update and it outlines 
the details of it including dates and times. Record is sent to the state [the 
Secretary of State], and they have a version of the last update.” He reported
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that the county uses encryption to protect their systems and voter information. 
To backup votes or results, Harris County performs audits during tabulation; 
with the old DRE system, this involved printing periodic results tapes from the 
machines to compare with other data collected during the election.
According to Mr. Winn, Harris County has a team of information technol-
ogy (IT) specialists who provide the election officials updated on their voting 
equipment status and any critical information they need to know daily. The 
county also ensures that education and training are provided for every employee 
and encourages them to become certified in election security. They also have 
a program such as the automatic shutdown of programs when the computers 
experience inactivity, mitigating insider threat.
Experiences in 2020 When we asked Mr. Winn how the 2020 presidential 
elections differed from 2016, he responded, saying that ”there was more commu-
nication between CISA, DHS, FBI. Continuation efforts to make sure that county 
officials become a part of the decision-making of elections. The government was 
keeping information to themselves [in 2016]; part was to avoid vulnerability. In 
2020, there was the inclusion of all officials.”
Takeaways As Harris County is Texas’s largest county, one might assume that 
they have all the necessary tools and are well equipped to secure elections and 
electoral infrastructure. However, when posed with the question of whether Harris 
County is well equipped to protect the voting systems and voter information 
from cyberattacks, Mr.Winn’s response was no different from the other officials 
we interviewed: “nothing is guaranteed, our county does a good job of making 
sure that we stay current and make sure we have the best system in place. We 
just purchased a new voting system that will be used for the first time in May 
2021.”
7 Conclusion
We set out to understand two incongruous facts: the 2020 election overall appears 
to have run smoothly and largely without incident, and yet it has led to some 
of the most tumultuous political discourse in recent memory in the U.S. We 
provided some context for elections in the United States, and then performed 
interviews with three election officials in the state of Texas to get a better picture 
on the ground. All three of our interviewees echoed that the election went well, 
and all three also indicated that the elections could have gone better from a 
security stand point.
What went well All three interviewees noted that there was significantly 
better communication at all levels of government about cyberthreats. Even in 
the presence of active threats [22], officials were able to move quickly to shore up 
defenses and quash any issues that might affect voters. Significant policy changes
123
and an increase in resourcing at all levels of government post-2016 also enabled a 
much more nimble response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Voters in Texas voted in 
unprecedented numbers in 2020, including a nearly 10-point increase in turnout 
and record high numbers of absentee and early voting [10, 36].
Improved communication at all levels of government played a key role in 
making the 2020 elections some of the smoothest and most secure in history, 
according to our interviewees. Federal initiatives like the founding of CISA and 
the EI-ISAC opened channels of communication between elections officials and 
intelligence officials that was pinpointed as a major problem in 2016 [17].
What went poorly Despite the major improvements, the 2020 election was not 
without its flaws. Issues ranging from delays in results reporting [15] to rampant 
misinformation campaigns still hindered public confidence in the election out-
come [24]. Misinformation about results reporting flourished even despite serious 
efforts to communicate about the expected delays [26]. One of our interviewees 
saw firsthand how a run-of-the-mill problem in an election, like their scanners 
filling up with ballots, could lead to misinformation that ultimately led people to 
walk away from voting. All three of our interviewees noted that misinformation 
is one of the tallest hurdles to U.S. elections moving forward.
Unfortunately, misinformation is already having a significant impact on 
elections in Texas and the U.S. at large. The Texas Senate recently proposed 
more restrictive voting laws that would dramatically change the voting landscape 
in Texas [33], largely in response to misinformation that has spread after the 
election [2]. Many other states are considering similar laws, as well as withstanding 
partisan efforts to attempt to overturn the 2020 election outcome [1].
Takeaways The U.S. has made significant strides to improve its election secu-
rity post-2016. Improved training and resources to election officials, improved 
communication between government entities, and improved processes all made 
2020 a much smoother election than 2016. Practices long heralded by the election 
security community, like risk-limiting audits [18] and paper ballots [27], are seeing 
widespread adoption [20].
Despite these successes, misinformation continue to run wild, spurring leg-
islative action [33], partisan campaigns to undermine elections [1], and leading 
to violence [4]. Research in combating misinformation is in its relative infancy, 
but our key takeaway from our discussions with election officials is that it is the 
single most important election security issue right now. Prior election security 
efforts have focused on providing voters with evidence, ranging from end-to-end 
encrypted voting systems to plain paper ballots and transparent counting [7]. 
However, it appears that merely providing this evidence is not enough: we need 
to be proactive in using it to convince voters that the election outcomes are 
secure.
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– Can you please tell me a little bit about yourself and your responsibilities at
Bexar County?
– What are the sources for voting processes and procedures do you have for
your region?
– What type of voting system is used in your precinct?
– When does your precinct start preparing the elections? Finding and taking
care of vulnerabilities?
– What process does or did your county take to prepare for the 2020 elections?
How was your county’s process different from the 2016 election for the 2020
election?
– What steps do you follow to test your equipment prior to elections?
– What methods do you use to backup voting counts or results?
– What is your process to deal with equipment security?
– What procedures do you employ to protect voter information?
– In the 2020 elections, did you encounter any specific problems with your
voting machines? If yes, what were the problems?
• What was done to resolve the problems found in the systems? Is there a
procedure in place for this?
• After resolving the problems, what did you learn from this? What should
have or needs to be done better?
– Do you have a special organization that deals with election security? Can
you tell me about it?
– Overall, would you say that your county is well equipped to secure the voting
systems and voter information from cyberattacks?
• Please explain.
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Abstract. Accurately determining the outcome of an election is a com-
plex task with many potential sources of error, ranging from software
glitches in voting machines to procedural lapses to outright fraud. Risk-
limiting audits (RLA) are statistically principled “incremental” hand
counts that provide statistical assurance that reported outcomes ac-
curately reflect the validly cast votes. We present a suite of tools for
conducting RLAs using confidence sequences — sequences of confidence
sets which uniformly capture an electoral parameter of interest from
the start of an audit to the point of an exhaustive recount with high
probability. Adopting the SHANGRLA [13] framework, we design nonneg-
ative martingales which yield computationally and statistically efficient
confidence sequences and RLAs for a wide variety of election types.
Keywords: Martingales · sequential hypothesis tests · SHANGRLA
1 Introduction
The reported outcome of an election may not match the validly cast votes for
a variety of reasons, including software configuration errors, bugs, human error,
and deliberate malfeasance. Trustworthy elections start with a trustworthy paper
record of the validly cast votes. Given access to a trustworthy paper trail of votes,
a risk-limiting audit (RLA) can provide a rigorous probabilistic guarantee:
1. If an initially announced assertion A about an election is false, this will be
corrected by the audit with high probability;
2. If the aforementioned assertion A is true, then A will be confirmed (with
probability one).
Here, an electoral assertion A is simply a claim about the aggregated votes
cast (e.g. “Alice received more votes than Bob”). An auditor may wish to audit
several claims: for example, whether the reported winner is correct or whether
the margin of victory is as large as announced.
From a statistical point of view, efficient risk-limiting audits can be imple-
mented as sequential hypothesis tests. Namely, one tests the null hypothesis H0:
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“the assertion A is false,” versus the alternative H1: “the assertion A is true”.
Imagine then observing a random sequence of voter-cast ballots X1, X2, . . . , XN ,
where N is the total number of ballots. A sequential hypothesis test is represented
by a sequence (φt)Nt=1 of binary-valued functions:
φt := φ(X1, . . . , Xt) 7→ {0, 1},
where φt = 1 represents rejecting H0 (typically in favor of H1), and φt = 0 means
that H0 has not yet been rejected. The sequential test (and thus the RLA) stops
as soon as φt = 1 or once all N ballots are observed, whichever comes first. The
“risk-limiting” property of RLAs states that if the assertion is false (in other
words, if H0 holds), then
PH0 (∃t ∈ {1, . . . , N} : φt = 1) ≤ α,
which is equivalent to type-I error control of the sequential test. Another way of
interpreting the above statement is as follows: if the assertion is incorrect, then
with probability at least (1− α), φt = 0 for every t ∈ {1, . . . , N} and hence all
N ballots will eventually be inspected, at which point the “true” outcome (which
is the result of the full hand count) will be known with certainty.
1.1 SHANGRLA Reduces Election Auditing to Sequential Testing
Designing the sequential hypothesis test (φt)Nt=1 depends on the type of vote,
the aggregation method, or the social choice function for the election, and
thus past works have constructed a variety of tests. Some works have designed
(φt)
N
t=1 in the context of a particular type of election [6,7,9]. On the other hand,
the “SHANGRLA” (Sets of Half-Average Nulls Generate RLAs) framework
unifies many common election types including plurality elections, approval voting,
ranked-choice voting, and more by reducing each of these to a simple hypothesis
test of whether a finite collection of finite lists of bounded numbers has mean µ?
at most 1/2 [13,1]. Let us give an illustrative example to show how SHANGRLA
can be used in practice.
Suppose we have an election with two candidates, Alice and Bob. A ballot
may contain a vote for Alice or for Bob, or it may contain no valid vote, e.g.,
because there was no selection or an overvote. It is reported that Alice and Bob
received NA and NB votes respectively with NA > NB and that there were a
total of NI invalid ballots for a total of N = NA +NB +NI voters. We encode
votes for Alice as “1”, votes for Bob as “0” and invalid votes as “1/2”, to obtain
a set of numbers {x1, x2, . . . , xN}. Crucially, Alice indeed received more votes
than Bob if and only if µ? := 1N
∑N
i=1 xi > 1/2. In other words, the report that
Alice beat Bob can be translated into the assertion that µ∗ ∈ (1/2, 1].
SHANGRLA proposes to audit an assertion by testing its complement: reject-
ing that “complementary null” is affirmative evidence that the assertion is indeed
true. In other words, if one can ensure that X1, X2, . . . , XN is a random per-
mutation of {x1, . . . , xN} by sampling ballots without replacement (each ballot
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is chosen uniformly amongst remaining ballots), then we can concern ourselves
with designing a hypothesis test (φt)Nt=1 to test the null H0 : µ? ≤ 1/2 against
the alternative H1 : µ? > 1/2.
One of the major benefits of SHANGRLA is the ability to reduce a wide range
of election types to a testing problem of the above form. This permits the use of
powerful statistical techniques which were designed specifically for such testing
problems (but may not have been designed with RLAs in mind). Throughout
this paper, we adopt the SHANGRLA framework, and while we return to the
example of plurality elections for illustrative purposes, all of our methods can
be applied to any election audit which has a SHANGRLA-like testing reduction
[13].
1.2 Confidence Sequences
In the fixed-time (i.e. non-sequential) hypothesis testing regime, there is a well-
known duality between hypothesis tests and confidence intervals for a parameter
µ? of interest. We describe this briefly for µ? ∈ [0, 1] for simplicity. For each
µ ∈ [0, 1], suppose that φµ ≡ φµ(X1, . . . , Xn) 7→ {0, 1} is a level-α nonsequential,
fixed-sample test for the hypothesis H0 : µ? = µ versus H1 : µ? 6= µ. Then, a
nonsequential, fixed-sample (1− α) confidence interval for µ? is given by the set
of all µ ∈ [0, 1] for which φµ does not reject, that is {µ ∈ [0, 1] : φµ = 0}.
As we discuss further in Section 2, an analogous duality holds for sequential
hypothesis tests and time-uniform confidence sequences (here and throughout
the paper, “time” is used to refer to the number of samples so far, and need not
correspond to any particular units such as hours or seconds). We first give a
brief preview of the results to come. Consider a family of sequential hypothesis




t=1 is a sequential test for µ.
Then, the set of all µ for which φµt = 0,
Ct := {µ ∈ [0, 1] : φµt = 0}
forms a (1− α) confidence sequence for µ?, meaning that
P(∃t ∈ [N ] : µ? /∈ Ct) ≤ α,
where [N ] is used to denote the set {1, 2, . . . , N}. In other words, Ct will cover
µ? at every single time t, except with some small probability ≤ α. Since Ct
is typically an interval [Lt, Ut], we call the lower endpoint (Lt)Nt=1 as a lower
confidence sequence (and similarly for upper).
In particular, given the sequential hypothesis testing problem that arises in
SHANGRLA, we can cast the RLA as a sequential estimation problem that can
be solved by developing confidence sequences (see Figure 1).3 As we will see in
Section 2, our confidence sequences provide added flexibility and an intuitive
visualizable interpretation for SHANGRLA-compatible election audits, without
sacrificing any statistical efficiency.
3 Code to reproduce all plots can be found at github.com/wannabesmith/RiLACS.
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Fig. 1. 95% Lower confidence sequences for the margin of a plurality election between
Alice and Bob for three different auditing methods. Votes for Alice are encoded by “1”
and those for Bob are encoded by “0”. The parameter of interest is then the average of
these votes, which in this particular example is 54% (given by the horizontal grey line).
The outcome is verified once the lower confidence sequence exceeds 1/2. The time at
which this happens is given by the vertical blue, green, and pink lines.
1.3 Contributions and Outline
The contributions of this work are twofold. First, we introduce confidence se-
quences to the election auditing literature as intuitive and flexible ways of
interpreting and visualizing risk-limiting audits. Second, we present algorithms
for performing RLAs based on confidence sequences by deriving statistically and
computationally efficient nonnegative martingales. At the risk of oversimplify-
ing the issue, modern RLAs face a computational-statistical efficiency tradeoff.
Methods such as BRAVO are easy to compute, but potentially less statistically
efficient than the current state-of-the-art, KMart [13], but KMart can be pro-
hibitively expensive to compute for large elections. The methods presented in
this paper resolve this tradeoff: they typically match or outperform both BRAVO
and KMart, while remaining practical to compute in large elections.
In Section 2, we show how confidence sequences generate risk-limiting audits,
how they relate to more familiar RLAs based on sequentially valid p-values,
and how they can be used to audit multiple contests. Section 3 derives novel
confidence sequence-based RLAs and compares them to past RLA methods via
simulation. Finally, Section 4 discusses how all of the aforementioned results
apply to risk-limiting tallies for coercion-resistant voting schemes.
2 Confidence Sequences are Risk-Limiting
Consider an election consisting of N ballots. Following SHANGRLA [13], suppose
that these can be transformed to a set of [0, u]-bounded real numbers x1, . . . , xN ∈
[0, u] with mean µ? := 1N
∑N
i=1 xi for some known u > 0. Suppose that electoral
assertions can be made purely in terms of µ?. A classical (1 − α) confidence
interval CIn for µ? is an interval computed from data X1, X2, . . . , Xn with the
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guarantee that
∀n ∈ [N ], P(µ? ∈ CIn) ≥ 1− α.
In contrast, a (1 − α) confidence sequence for µ? is a sequence of confidence
sets, C1, C2, . . . , CN which all simultaneously capture µ? with probability at least
(1− α). That is,
P(∀t ∈ [N ], µ? ∈ Ct) ≥ 1− α︸ ︷︷ ︸
simultaneous coverage probability
, or equivalently P(∃t ∈ [N ] : µ? /∈ Ct) ≤ α︸ ︷︷ ︸
error probability
.
The two probabilistic statements above are equivalent, but provide a different
way of interpreting α and the corresponding guarantee.
If we have access to a (1− α) confidence sequence for µ?, we can audit any
assertion about the election outcome made in terms of µ? with risk limit α. Here,
we use A ⊆ [0, u] to denote an assertion. For example, SHANGRLA typically
uses assertions of the form “µ? is greater than 1/2”, in which case A = (1/2, u].
Algorithm 1.1: Risk limiting audits via confidence sequences (RiLACS)
Input: Assertion A ⊆ [0, u], risk limit α ∈ (0, 1).
for t ∈ [N ] do
Randomly sample and remove Xt from the remaining ballots.
Compute Ct ≡ C(X1, . . . , Xt) at level α.
if A ⊆ Ct then
Certify the assertion A and stop if desired.
end if
end for
If the goal is to finish the audit as soon as possible above all else, then one
can ignore the “if desired” condition. However, continued sampling can provide
added assurance in A, and maintains the risk limit at α. The following theorem
summarizes the risk-limiting guarantee of the above algorithm.
Theorem 1. Let (Ct)Nt=1 be a (1−α) confidence sequence for µ?. Let A ⊆ [0, u]
be an assertion about the electoral outcome (in terms of µ?). The audit mechanism
that certifies A as soon as Ct ⊆ A has risk limit α.
Proof. We need to prove that if µ? /∈ A, then P(∃t ∈ [N ] : Ct ⊆ A) ≤ α. First,
notice that if Ct ⊆ A, then we must have that µ? /∈ Ct since µ? /∈ A. Then,
P(∃t ∈ [N ] : Ct ⊆ A) ≤ P(∃t ∈ [N ] : µ? /∈ Ct)
≤ α,
where the second inequality follows from the definition of a confidence sequence.
This completes the proof.
Let us see how this theorem can be used in an example. Consider an election
with two candidates, Alice and Bob, and a total ofN cast ballots. Let {x1, . . . , xN}
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be the list of numbers that result from encoding votes for Alice as 1, votes for
Bob as 0, and ballots that do not contain a valid vote as 1/2. Let (Ct)Nt=1 be a
(1−α) confidence sequence for µ? := 1N
∑N
i=1 xi. If we wish to audit the assertion
that “Alice beat Bob”, then u = 1 and A = (1/2, 1]. We can sequentially sample
X1, X2, . . . , XN without replacement, certifying the assertion once Ct ⊆ A. By
Theorem 1, this limits the risk to level α.
2.1 Relationship to Sequential Hypothesis Testing
The earliest work on RLAs did not use anytime p-values [10,11], but since about
2009, most RLA methods have used anytime p-values to conduct sequential
hypothesis tests [12,8,7,13,3]. An anytime p-value is a sequence of p-values (pt)Nt=1
with the property that under some null hypothesis H0,
PH0(∃t ∈ [N ] : pt ≤ α) ≤ α. (1)
The anytime p-values pt ≡ pt(µ) are typically defined implicitly for each null
hypothesis H0 : µ? = µ and yield a sequential hypothesis test φ
µ
t := 1(pt(µ) ≤ α).
As alluded to in Section 1.2, this immediately recovers a confidence sequence:
Ct := {µ ∈ [0, u] : φµt = 0}.
Notice in Figure 2 that the times at which nulls are rejected (or “stopping times”)
are the same for both confidence sequences and the associated p-values. Thus,
nothing is lost by basing the RLA on confidence sequences rather than anytime
p-values. Confidence sequences benefit from being visually intuitive and are
arguably easier to interpret than anytime p-values.
For example, consider conducting an RLA for a simple two-candidate election
between Alice and Bob with no invalid votes. Suppose that it is reported that
Alice won, i.e., µ? := 1N
∑N
i=1 xi > 1/2 where xi = 1 if the ith ballot is for
Alice, 0 if for Bob, and 1/2 if the ballot does not contain a valid vote for either
candidate. A sequential RLA in the SHANGRLA framework would posit a null
hypothesis H0 : µ? ≤ 1/2 (the complement of the announced result: Bob actually
won or the outcome is a tie), sample random ballots sequentially, and stop the
audit (confirming the announced result) if and when H0 is rejected at significance
level α. If H0 is not rejected before all ballots have been inspected, the true
outcome is known.4
On the other hand, a ballot-polling RLA [6] based on confidence sequences
proceeds by computing a lower 1 − α confidence bound for the fraction µ? of
votes for Alice. The audit stops, confirming the outcome, if and when this lower
bound is larger than 1/2. If that does not occur before the last ballot has been
examined, the true outcome is known. In this formulation, there is no need to
4 At any point during the sampling, an election official can choose to abort the sampling
and perform a full hand count for any reason. This cannot increase the risk limit:
the chance of failing to correct an incorrect reported outcome does not increase.
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H0 : 0.45 H0 : 0.48 H0 : 0.5
Fig. 2. The duality between anytime p-values and confidence sequences for three nulls:
H0 : µ
? ≤ µ0 for µ0 ∈ {0.45, 0.48, 0.5}. The p-value for H0 : µ? ≤ 0.45 (pink dash-dotted
line) drops below 5% after 975 samples, exactly when the 95% lower confidence sequence
exceeds 0.45. However, the p-value for H0 : µ? ≤ 0.5 never reaches 0.05 and the 95%
confidence sequence never excludes 0.5, the true value of µ?.
define a null hypothesis as the complement of the announced result and interpret
the resulting p-value, and so on. The approach also works for comparison audits
using the “overstatement assorter” approach developed in [13], which transforms
the problem into the same canonical form: testing whether the mean of any list
in a collection of nonnegative, bounded lists is less than 1/2.
2.2 Auditing Multiple Contests
It is known that RLAs of multi-candidate, multi-winner elections can be reduced
to several pairwise contests without adjusting for multiplicity [6]. This is accom-
plished by testing whether every single reported winner beat every single reported
loser, and stopping once each of these tests rejects their respective nulls at level
α ∈ (0, 1). For example, suppose it is reported that a set of candidates W beat
a set of candidates L in a k-winner plurality contest with K candidates in all
(that is, |W| = k and |L| = K − k). For each reported winner w ∈ W and each
reported loser ` ∈ L, encode votes for candidate w as “1”, votes for ` as “0” and
ballots with no valid vote in the contest or with a vote for any other candidate
as “1/2” to obtain the population {xw,`1 , . . . , x
w,`
N }. Then as before, candidate w






i > 1/2. In a two-candidate
plurality election we would have proceeded by testing the null Hw,`0 : µ
?
w,` ≤ 1/2
against the alternative Hw,`1 : µ
?
w,` > 1/2. To use the decomposition of a single
winner or multi-winner plurality contest into a set of pairwise contests, we test
each null Hw,`0 : µ
?
w,` ≤ 1/2 for w ∈ W and ` ∈ L. The audit stops if and when
all k(K − k) null hypotheses are rejected. Crucially, if candidate w ∈ W did not
win (i.e. µ?w,` ≤ 1/2 for some ` ∈ L), then
P(reject all H0,w,` : w ∈ W, ` ∈ L) ≤ min
w∈W,`∈L
P(reject H0,w,`) ≤ α.
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The same technique applies when auditing with confidence sequences. Let
{(Cw,`t )Nt=1} be (1 − α) confidence sequences for {µ∗w,`}, w ∈ W, ` ∈ L. We
verify the electoral outcome of every contest once Cw,`t ⊆ (1/2, u] for all w ∈ W,
` ∈ L. Again, if µ?w,` ≤ 1/2 for some w ∈ W, and ` ∈ L, then
P(∀w ∈ W,∀` ∈ L, Cw,`t ⊆ (1/2, u]) ≤ min
w∈W,`∈L
P(Cw,`t ⊆ (1/2, u]) ≤ α.
This technique can be generalized to handle audits of any number of contests
from the same audit sample, as explained in [13]. For the sake of brevity, we omit
the derivation, but it is a straightforward extension of the above.
3 Designing Powerful Confidence Sequences for RLAs
So far we have discussed how to conduct RLAs from confidence sequences for the
parameter µ?. In this section, we will discuss how to derive powerful confidence
sequences for the purposes of conducting RLAs as efficiently as possible. For
mathematical and notational convenience in the following derivations, we consider
the case where u = 1. Note that nothing is lost in this setup since any population
of [0, u]-bounded numbers can be scaled to the unit interval [0, 1] by dividing
each element by u (thereby scaling the population’s mean as well).
As discussed in Section 2.1, we can construct confidence sequences by “invert-
ing” sequential hypothesis tests. In particular, given a sequential hypothesis test
(φµt )
N
t=1, the sequence of sets,
Ct := {µ ∈ [0, 1] : φµt = 0}
forms a (1−α) confidence sequence for µ?. Consequently, in order to develop pow-
erful RLAs via confidence sequences, we can simply focus on carefully designing
sequential tests (φµt )Nt=1.5
To design sequential hypothesis tests, we start by finding martingales that
translate to powerful tests. To this end, define M0(µ) := 1 and consider the














N − i+ 1
5 Notice that it is not always feasible to compute the set of all µ ∈ [0, 1] such that
φµt = 0 since [0, 1] is uncountably infinite. However, all confidence sequences we will
derive in this section are intervals (i.e. convex), and thus we can find the endpoints
using a simple grid search or standard root-finding algorithms.
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is the conditional mean of Xi | X1, . . . , Xi−1 if the mean of {x1, . . . , xN} were µ.
Following [15, Section 6], the process (Mt(µ?))Nt=0 is a nonnegative martingale
starting at one. Formally, this means that M0(µ?) = 1, Mt(µ?) ≥ 0, and
E(Mt(µ∗) | X1, . . . , Xt−1) =Mt−1(µ∗)
for each t ∈ [N ]. Importantly for our purposes, nonnegative martingales are
unlikely to ever become very large. This fact is known as Ville’s inequality
[14,2], which serves as a generalization of Markov’s inequality to nonnegative
(super)martingales, and can be stated formally as
P (∃t ∈ [N ] :Mt(µ?) ≥ 1/α) ≤ αM0(µ?) = α, (3)
where α ∈ (0, 1), and the equality follows from the fact that M0(µ?) = 1. As









which matches the probabilistic guarantee in (1). As a direct consequence of
Ville’s inequality, if we define the test φµt := 1(Mt(µ) ≥ 1/α), then
P(∃t ∈ [N ] : φµ
?
t = 1) ≤ α,
and thus (φµt )Nt=1 is a level-α sequential hypothesis test. We can then invert
(φµt )
N
t=1 and apply Theorem 1 to obtain confidence sequence-based RLAs with
risk limit α.
3.1 Designing Martingales and Tests from Reported Vote Totals
So far, we have found a process (Mt(µ))Nt=0 that is a nonnegative martingale when
µ = µ?, but what happens when µ 6= µ?? This is where the tuning parameters
(λt)
N
t=1 come into the picture. Recall that an electoral assertion A is certified
once Ct ⊆ A. Therefore, to audit assertions quickly, we want Ct to be as tight
as possible. Since Ct is defined as the set of µ ∈ [0, 1] such that Mt(µ) < 1/α,
we can make Ct tight by making Mt(µ) as large as possible. To do so, we must
carefully choose (λt)Nt=1. This choice will depend on the type of election as well
as the amount of information provided prior to the audit. First consider the case
where reported vote totals are given (in addition to the announced winner).
For example, recall the election between Alice and Bob of Section 2, and
suppose that {x1, . . . , xN} is the list of numbers encoding votes for Alice as 1,
votes for Bob as 0, and ballots with no valid vote for either candidate as 1/2. Recall
that Alice beat Bob if and only if µ? := 1N
∑N
i=1 xi > 1/2, so we are interested in
testing the null hypothesis H0 : µ? ≤ 1/2 against the alternative H1 : µ? > 1/2.
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Fig. 3. Ballot-polling audit workload distributions under four possible outcomes of a
two-candidate plurality election. Workload is defined as the number of distinct ballots
examined before completing the audit. The first example considers an outcome where
Alice and Bob received 2750 and 2250 votes respectively, and no ballots were invalid,
for a margin of 0.1. The second, third, and fourth examples have the same margin, but
with increasing numbers of invalid or “nuisance” ballots represented by N?U . Notice that
in the case with no nuisance ballots, a priori Kelly and BRAVO have an edge, while
in the setting with many nuisance ballots, a priori Kelly vastly outperforms BRAVO.
On the other hand, neither SqKelly nor dKelly require tuning based on the reported
outcomes, but SqKelly outperforms dKelly in all four scenarios.
and N ′U nuisance votes (i.e. either invalid or for another party). If the reported
outcome is correct, then for any fixed λ, we know the exact value of
N∏
i=1
(1 + λ(xi − 1/2)), (4)
which is an inexact but reasonable proxy for MN (1/2), the final value of the
process (Mt(1/2))Nt=0. We can then choose the value of λ′ that maximizes (4).
Some algebra reveals that the maximizer of (4) is given by
λ′ := 2














ensuring that it lies in the allowable range [0, 1/Ct(µ)]. We call this choice of λapKt
a priori Kelly due to its connections to Kelly’s criterion [5,15] for maximizing
products of the form (4). This choice of λapKt also has the desirable property of
yielding convex confidence sequences, which we summarize below.
Proposition 1. Let X1, . . . , XN be a sequential random sample from {x1, . . . , xN}
with µ? := 1N
∑N









i (Xi − Ci(µ))) for any µ ∈ [0, 1]. Then the confidence set
CapKt := {µ ∈ [0, 1] :Mt(µ) < 1/α}
is an interval with probability one.
Proof. Notice that since λ′ ≥ 0, Ct(µ) ≥ 0, and Xi ≥ 0, we have that
λapKt (Xi − Ct(µ)) = min{λ′Xi, Xi/Ct(µ)} −min{λ′Ct(µ), 1}
is a nonincreasing function of µ for each t ∈ [N ]. Consequently, Mt(µ) is a
nonincreasing and quasiconvex function of µ, so its sublevel sets are convex.
Note that any sequence (λt)Nt=1 such that λt ∈ [0, 1/Ct(µ)] would have yielded
a valid nonnegative martingale, but we chose that which maximizes (4) so that
the resulting hypothesis test φt := 1(Mt(1/2) > 1/α) is powerful. In situations
more complex than two-candidate plurality contests, the maximizer of (4) can
still be found efficiently via standard root-finding algorithms. All of these methods
are implemented in our Python package.6
While audits based on a priori Kelly display excellent empirical performance
(see Figure 3), their efficiency may be hurt when vote totals are erroneously
reported. Small errors in reported vote totals seem to have minor adverse effects
on stopping times (and in some cases can be slightly beneficial), but larger errors
can significantly affect stopping time distributions (see Figure 4). If we wish to
audit the reported winner of an election but prefer not to rely on (or do not have
access to) exact reported vote totals, we need an alternative to a priori Kelly. In
the following section, we describe a family of such alternatives.
3.2 Designing Martingales and Tests without Vote Totals
If the exact vote totals are not known, but we still wish to audit an assertion
(e.g. that Alice beat Bob), we need to design a slightly different martingale
that does not depend on maximizing (4) directly. Instead of finding an optimal
6 github.com/wannabesmith/RiLACS
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(Median=1188.5)
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(Median=7334.5)
Fig. 4. Stopping times for a priori Kelly under various degrees of error in reported
outcomes. In the above legends, N?A refers to the true number of votes for Alice,
while N ′A refers to the incorrectly reported number of votes. Notice that empirical
performance is relatively strong for N ′A −N?A ∈ {0, 300} but is adversely affected when
N ′A −N?A ∈ {−100, 800}, especially in the right-hand side plot with a narrower margin.
λ′, we will take D ≥ 2 points evenly-spaced on the allowable range [0, 1/Ct(µ)]
and “hedge our bets” among all of these. Making this more precise, note that a
convex combination of martingales (with respect to the same filtration) is itself a
martingale [15], and thus for any (θ1, . . . , θD) such that θd ≥ 0 and
∑D
















forms a nonnegative martingale starting at one. Notice that we no longer have to
depend on the reported vote totals to begin an audit. Furthermore, confidence
sequences generated using sublevel sets of MDt (µ) are intervals with probability
one [15, Proposition 4]. Nevertheless, choosing (θ1, . . . , θD) is a nontrivial task.
A natural — but as we will see, suboptimal — choice is to set θd = 1/D for each
d ∈ [D]. Previous works [15] call this dKelly (for “diversified Kelly”), a name
we adopt here. In fact, this choice of (θ1, . . . , θD) gives an arbitrarily close and
computationally efficient approximation to the Kaplan martingale (KMart) [13]
which can otherwise be prohibitively expensive to compute for large N .
Better choices of (θd)Dd=1 exist for the types of elections one might encounter
in practice. Recall that near-optimal values of λ are given by (5). However, setting
θd = 1/D for each d ∈ [D] implicitly treats all d/((D + 1)Ci(µ?)) as equally
reasonable values of λ. Elections with large values of µ? (e.g. closer to 1) are
“easier” to audit, and the interesting or “difficult” regime is when µ? is close to
(but strictly larger than) 1/2. Therefore, we recommend designing (θ1, . . . , θD)
so that (MDt (1/2))Nt=0 upweights optimal values of λ for margins close to 0,
and downweights those for margins close to 1. Consider the following concrete
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Fig. 5. Various values of the convex weights (θ1, . . . , θD), which can be used in the
construction of the diversified martingale (7). Notice that the linear and square weights
are largest for d near 0, and decrease as d approaches 1/4, finally remaining at 0 for
all large d. Smaller values of d are upweighted since they correspond to those values of
λ in MDt (µ?) that are optimal for smaller (i.e. interesting) electoral margins. This is
in contrast to the constant weight function, which sets θd = 1/D for each d ∈ [D]. We
find that square weights perform well in practice (see Figure 3) but these can be tuned
and tailored based on prior knowledge and the particular problem at hand.






, where γsquared := (1/3− x)
21d≤1/3.




d to ensure that
∑
d θd = 1. Another sensible
choice is given by the truncated-linear weights, where we simply replace γsquared
by γlineard := max{0, 1 − 2d}. These values of θlineard and θ
square
d are large for
d ≈ 0 and small for d  0, and hence the summands in the martingale given
by (7) are upweighted for implicit values of λ which are optimal for “interesting”
margins close to 0, and downweighted for simple margins much larger than 0 (see
Figure 5).
When MDt is combined with θ
square
d , we refer to the resulting martingales and
confidence sequences as SqKelly. We compare their empirical workload against
that of a priori Kelly, dKelly, and BRAVO in Figure 3. A hybrid approach is also
possible: suppose we want to use reported outcomes or prior knowledge alongside
these convex-weighted martingales. We can simply choose (θ1, . . . , θD) so that
MDt upweights values in a neighborhood of λ′ (or some other value chosen based
on prior knowledge7).
4 Risk-Limiting Tallies via Confidence Sequences
Rather than audit an already-announced electoral outcome, it may be of interest
to determine (for the purposes of making a first announcement) the election
7 The use of the word “prior” here should not be interpreted in a Bayesian sense. No
matter what values of (θ1, . . . , θD) are chosen, the resulting tests and confidence
sequences have frequentist risk-limiting guarantees.
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winner with high probability, without counting all N ballots. Such procedures are
known as risk-limiting tallies (RLTs), which were developed for coercion-resistant,
end-to-end verifiable voting schemes [4]. For example, suppose a voter is being
coerced to vote for Bob. If the final vote tally reveals that Bob received few or no
votes, then the coercer will suspect that the voter did not comply with instructions.
RLTs provide a way to mitigate this issue by providing high-probability guarantees
that the reported winner truly won, leaving a large proportion of votes shrouded.
In such cases, the voter is guaranteed plausible deniability, as they can claim to
the coercer that their ballot is simply among the unrevealed ones.
While the motivations for RLTs are quite different from those for RLAs, the
underlying techniques are similar. The same is true for confidence sequence-based
RLTs. All methods introduced in this paper can be applied to RLTs (with the
exception of “a priori Kelly” since it depends on the reported outcome) but with















where (θ1, . . . , θD) are convex weights. Recall that our confidence sequences at a
given time t were defined as those µ ∈ [0, 1] for which MDt (µ) < 1/α. In other
words, a given value µ is only excluded from the confidence set if MDt (µ) is
large. However, notice that MDt (µ) will become large if the conditional mean
Ct(µ?) ≡ E(Xt | X1, . . . , Xt−1) is larger than the null conditional mean Ct(µ),
but the same cannot be said if Ct(µ?) < Ct(µ). As a consequence, the resulting
confidence sequences are all one-sided lower confidence sequences. To ensure that
our bounds have non-trivial two-sided power, we can simply combine (8) with a
martingale that also grows when Ct(µ?) < Ct(µ).





















Fig. 6. Confidence sequence-based risk-limiting tally for a two-candidate election. Unlike
RLAs, RLTs require two-sided confidence sequences so that the true winner can be
determined (with high probability) without access to an announced result. Notice that
testing the same null H0 : µ? ≤ 0.5 is less efficient in an RLT than in an RLA. This is
a necessary sacrifice for having nontrivial power against other alternatives.
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Next, for β ∈ [0, 1], define their mixture
MD±t (µ) := βM
D+
t (µ) + (1− β)MD−t (µ).
Then, MD±t (µ?) is a nonnegative martingale starting at one. Consequently,
C±t := {µ ∈ [0, 1] :MD±t (µ) < 1/α}
forms a (1− α) confidence sequence for µ?.




are martingales with respect to the same filtration, and that convex combinations
of such martingales are also martingales.
With this setup and notation in mind, MDt as defined in Section 3.2 is a
special case of MD±t with β = 1. As noted by [4], RLTs involving multiple
assertions do require correction for multiple testing, unlike RLAs. The same is
true for confidence sequence-based RLTs (and hence the tricks of Section 2.2 do
not apply). It suffices to perform a simple Bonferroni correction by constructing
(1− α/K) confidence sequences to establish K simultaneous assertions.
5 Summary
This paper presented a general framework for conducting risk-limiting audits
based on confidence sequences, and derived computationally and statistically
efficient martingales for computing them. We showed how a priori Kelly takes
advantage of the reported vote totals (if available) to stop ballot-polling audits
significantly earlier than extant ballot-polling methods, and how alternative
martingales such as SqKelly also provide strong empirical performance in the
absence of reported outcomes. Finally, we demonstrated how a simple tweak to
the aforementioned algorithms provides two-sided confidence sequences, which
can be used to perform risk-limiting tallies. Confidence sequences and these
martingales can be applied to ballot-level comparison audits and batch-level
comparison audits as well, using “overstatement assorters” [13], which reduce
comparison audits to the same canonical statistical problem: testing whether the
mean of any list in a collection of non-negative bounded lists is at most 1/2. We
hope that this new perspective on RLAs and its associated software will aid in
making election audits simpler, faster, and more transparent.
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Abstract. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs), an ingredient in evidence-based
elections, are increasingly common. They are a rigorous statistical means
of ensuring that electoral results are correct, usually without having to
perform an expensive full recount—at the cost of some controlled prob-
ability of error. A recently developed approach for conducting RLAs,
SHANGRLA, provides a flexible framework that can encompass a wide
variety of social choice functions and audit strategies. Its flexibility comes
from reducing sufficient conditions for outcomes to be correct to canon-
ical ‘assertions’ that have a simple mathematical form.
Assertions have been developed for auditing various social choice func-
tions including plurality, multi-winner plurality, super-majority, Hamil-
tonian methods, and instant runoff voting. However, there is no system-
atic approach to building assertions. Here, we show that assertions with
linear dependence on transformations of the votes can easily be trans-
formed to canonical form for SHANGRLA. We illustrate the approach
by constructing assertions for party-list elections such as Hamiltonian
free list elections and elections using the D’Hondt method, expanding
the set of social choice functions to which SHANGRLA applies directly.
Keywords: Risk-limiting audits · Party-list proportional elections · Hamil-
tonian methods · D’Hondt method
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1 Introduction
Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) test reported election outcomes statistically by man-
ually inspecting random samples of paper ballots. An RLA terminates either by
endorsing the reported outcome or by proceeding to a full manual count if the
evidence is inconclusive. The outcome according to the full count corrects the
reported outcome if they differ. The risk limit is an upper bound on the proba-
bility that a wrong election outcome will not be corrected—this is set in advance,
typically between 1% and 10%.
SHANGRLA [4] is a general framework for conducting RLAs of a wide variety
of social choice functions.9 SHANGRLA involves reducing the correctness of a
reported outcome to the truth of a set A of quantitative assertions about the
set of validly cast ballots, which can then be tested using statistical methods.
The assertions are either true or false depending on the votes on the ballots. If
all the assertions are true, the reported outcome is correct.
This paper shows how to use the SHANGRLA RLA method to audit some
complex social choice functions not addressed in the SHANGRLA paper. We give
a recipe for translating sufficient conditions for a reported outcome to be correct
into canonical form for SHANGRLA, when those conditions are the intersection
of a set of linear inequalities involving transformations of the votes on each ballot.
We focus on European-style party-list proportional representation elections, with
the German state of Hesse as a case study.
1.1 Assertion-based auditing: Properties and challenges
For some social choice functions, the reduction to assertions is obvious. For in-
stance, in plurality (first-past-the-post) elections, common in the United States,
Alice won the election if and only if Alice’s tally was higher than that of each
of the other n− 1 candidates (where n is the total number of candidates). That
set of n− 1 assertions is clearly a set of linear inequalities among the vote totals
for the n candidates.
In general, assertions involve not only the votes but also the reported results—
the reported outcome and possibly the voting system’s interpretation of individ-
ual ballots (CVRs) or tallies of groups of ballots.
SHANGRLA [4, Sec 2.5] shows how to make assorters for any ‘scoring rule’
(e.g. Borda, STAR-voting, and any weighted scheme). For more complex social
choice functions, constructing sufficient sets of assertions may be much less ob-
vious. Blom et al. [2] use a heuristic method, RAIRE, to derive assertions for
Instant Runoff Voting (IRV) from the CVRs. RAIRE allows the RLA to test an
IRV outcome—the claim that Alice won—without checking the entire IRV elim-
ination. RAIRE’s assertions are sufficient : if all of the assertions in A are true,
9 Any social choice function that is a scoring rule—that assigns ‘points’ to candidates
on each ballot, sums the points across ballots, and declares the winner(s) to be the
candidate(s) with the most ‘points’—can be audited using SHANGRLA, as can some
social choice functions that are not scoring rules, such as super-majority and IRV.
147
then the announced election outcome is correct. However, the set of assertions
might not be necessary—even if one of the assertions in A is false, Alice may
still have won, but for reasons not checked by the audit.
A social choice function might be expensive to audit for two different reasons:
it might require a very large sample for reasonable confidence, even when there
are no errors (for instance, if it tends to produce small margins in practice);
alternatively, it might be so complex that it is difficult to generate assertions
that are sufficient to prove the reported election outcome is correct. Pilots and
simulations suggest that IRV elections do not have small margins any more often
than first-past-the-post elections. Hence IRV is feasible to audit in both senses.
Below, the sets of assertions we consider are conjunctive: the election outcome
is correct if all the assertions in A are true. Although it is possible to imagine
an audit method that tests more complex logical structures (for example, the
announced outcome is correct if either all the assertions inA1 or all the assertions
in A2 are true), this is not currently part of the SHANGRLA framework.
Summary: An audit designer must devise a set A of assertions.
– A generally depends on the social choice function and the reported electoral
outcome, and may also depend on the CVRs, vote subtotals, or other data
generated by the voting system.
– If every assertion in A is true, then the announced electoral result is correct.
– The announced electoral result may be correct even if not every assertion in
A is true.
SHANGRLA relies on expressing assertions in terms of assorters.
1.2 Assorters
The statistical part of SHANGRLA is agnostic about the social choice function.
It simply takes a collection of sets of numbers that are zero or greater (with
a known upper bound), and decides whether to reject the hypothesis that the
mean of each set is less than or equal to 1/2—this is the assorter null hypothesis.
An assorter for some assertion A ∈ A assigns a nonnegative value to each
ballot, depending on the selections the voter made on the ballot and possibly
other information (e.g. reported vote totals or CVRs). The assertion is true iff
the mean of the assorter (over all ballots) is greater than 1/2. Generally, ballots
that support the assertion score higher than 1/2, ballots that cast doubt on
it score less than 1/2, and neutral ballots score exactly 1/2. For example, in a
simple first-past-the-post contest, A might assert that Alice’s tally is higher than
Bob’s. The corresponding assorter would assign 1 to a ballot if it has a vote for
Alice, 0 if it has a vote for Bob, and 1/2 if it has a no valid vote or a vote for
some other candidate.
The audit designer’s first job is to generate a set A of assertions which, if
all true, imply that the announced electoral outcome (the winner or winners) is
correct. Then they need to express each A ∈ A as an assorter. Finally, they need
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to test the hypothesis that any assorter mean is less than or equal to 1/2. If all
those hypotheses are rejected, the audit concludes that the reported outcome is
correct. The chance this conclusion is erroneous is at most the risk limit.
Section 2 gives a more precise definition of an assorter and a general technique
for transforming linear assertions into assorters.
1.3 Risk-limiting audits using SHANGRLA: Pulling it all together
An overview of the workflow for a sequential SHANGRLA RLA is:
1. Generate a set of assertions.
2. Express the assertions as assorters.
3. Test every assertion in A, in parallel:
(a) Retrieve a ballot or set of ballots selected at random.
(b) Apply each assorter to every retrieved ballot.
(c) For each assertion in A, test its corresponding assorter null hypothesis
(i.e. that the assorter mean is 6 1/2) using a sequentially valid test.10
(d) If the assorter null is rejected for A ∈ A, remove A from A.
(e) If A is empty (i.e. all of the null hypotheses have been rejected), stop
the audit and certify the electoral outcome.
(f) Otherwise, continue to sample more ballots.
(g) At any time, the auditor can decide to ‘cut to the chase’ and conduct a
full hand count: anything that increases the chance of conducting a full
hand count cannot increase the risk.
As with any RLA, the audit may not confirm the reported result (for example,
that Alice’s tally is the highest) even if all assertions are true (Alice’s tally may
actually be higher than Bob’s, but the audit may not gather enough evidence
to conclude so). This may happen because there are many tabulation errors or
because one or more margins are small. When the audit proceeds to a full hand
count, its result replaces the reported outcome if the two differ.
Conversely, the audit may mistakenly confirm the result even if the an-
nounced result is wrong. The probability of this kind of failure is not more
than the risk limit. This is a parameter to SHANGRLA; setting it to a smaller
value generally entails examining more ballots.
1.4 Party-list proportional representation contests
Party-list proportional representation contests allocate seats in a parliament
(or delegates to an assembly) in proportion to the entities’ popularity within
the electorate. The first step is (usually) rounding the party’s fraction down
to the nearest integer number of seats. Complexity arises from rounding, when
the fractions determined by voters do not exactly match integer numbers of
seats. Largest Remainder Methods, also called Hamiltonian methods, successively
10 It can be more efficient to sample ballots in ‘rounds’ rather than singly; SHANGRLA
can accommodate any valid test of the assorter nulls.
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allocate leftover seats to the entities with the largest fractional parts until all
seats are allocated. Highest Averages Methods, such as the D’Hondt method (also
called Jefferson’s method), weight this extra allocation by divisors involving a
fraction of the seats already allocated to that party—they are hence more likely
to allocate the leftover seats to small parties. The Sainte-Laguë method (also
called Webster’s method) is mathematically similar but its divisors penalise large
parties even more.11
1.5 Related work and our contribution
Blom et al. [1] showed how to construct a SHANGRLA RLA for preferential
Hamiltonian elections with a viability threshold, applicable to many US pri-
maries. Stark and Teague [5] showed how to construct an RLA for highest av-
erages party-list proportional representation elections. Their method was not
directly based on assertions and assorters, but it reduces the correctness of the
reported seat allocation to a collection of two-entity plurality contests, for which
it is straightforward to construct assorters, as we show below.
This paper shows how to extend SHANGRLA to additional social choice
functions. We use party-list proportional representation elections as an example,
showing how the assorter from [1] can be derived as a special case of the solution
for more general Hamiltonian elections. We have simulated the audit on election
data from the German state of Hesse; results are shown in Section 4. Auditing the
allocation of integer portions of seats involves inspecting a reasonable number of
ballots, but the correctness of the allocations based on the fractional remainders
and the correctness of the particular candidates who receive seats within each
party generally involve very small margins, which in turn require large audit
sample sizes. We also show how to apply the construction to highest averages
methods such as D’Hondt and Sainte-Laguë. Our contributions are:
– A guide to developing assertions and their corresponding SHANGRLA as-
sorters, so that audits for contest types that are not already supplied can
be derived, when correctness can be expressed as the intersection of a set of
linear inequalities (Section 3).
– New SHANGRLA-based methods for auditing largest remainder methods
that allow individual candidate selection (no audit method was previously
known for this variant of largest remainder method) (Section 3.1).
– Simulations to estimate the average sample sizes of these new methods in
the German state of Hesse (Section 4).
– SHANGRLA assorters for highest averages methods (RLAs for these meth-
ods were already known, but had not been expressed as assorters). (Sec-
tion 5).
11 Another source of complexity is the opportunity for voters to select, exclude, or
prioritise individual candidates within the party.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Nomenclature and notation for assertion-based election audits
An election contest is decided by a set of ‘ground truth’ ballots L (of cardinality
|L|). Many social choice functions are used in political elections. Some yield a
single winner; others multiple winners. Some only allow voters to express a single
preference; others allow voters to select or rank multiple candidates or parties.
Here, we focus on elections that allow voters to select (but not rank) one or
more ‘entities,’ which could be candidates or parties.12
Let S be the number of ‘seats’ (positions) to be filled in the contest, of which
ae were awarded to entity e. Each ballot might represent a single vote for an
entity, or multiple votes for multiple entities. Important quantities for individual
ballots b ∈ L include:
– m, the maximum permitted number of votes for any entity.
– mL, the maximum permitted number of votes in total (across all entities).
– be, the total number of (valid) votes for entity e on the the ballot.
– bT :=
∑
e∈E be, the total number of (valid) votes on the ballot.
Any of these may be greater than one, depending on the social choice function.
Validity requires be 6 m and bT 6 mL. If ballot b does not contain the contest
in question or is deemed invalid, be := 0 for all entities E, and bT := 0.
Important quantities for the set L of ballots include:
– Te =
∑
b∈L be, the tally of votes for entity e.
– TL =
∑
e∈E Te, the total number of valid votes in the contest.
– pe = Te/TL, the proportion of votes for entity e.
2.2 Assertion-based auditing: Definitions
Here we formalize assertion-based auditing sketched in Section 1 and introduce
the relevant mathematical notation. An assorter h is a function that assigns a
non-negative number to each ballot depending on the votes reflected on the ballot
and other election data (e.g. the reported outcome, the set of CVRs, or the CVR
for that ballot). Each assertion in the audit is equivalent to ‘the average value of
the assorter for all the cast ballots is greater than 1/2.’ In turn, each assertion
is checked by testing the complementary null hypothesis that the average is less
than or equal to 1/2. If all the complementary null hypotheses are false, the
reported outcome of every contest under audit is correct.
Definition 1. An assertion is a statement A about the set of paper ballots L of
the contest. An assorter for assertion A is a function hA that maps selections
on a ballot b to [0,M ] for some known constant M > 0, such that assertion A
holds for L iff h̄A > 1/2 where h̄A is the average value of hA over all b ∈ L.
A set A of assertions is sufficient if their conjunction implies that the reported
electoral outcome is correct.
12 Below, in discussing assorters, we use the term ‘entity’ more abstractly. For instance,
when voters may rank a subset of entities, the assorters may translate ranks into
scoring functions in a nonlinear manner, as in [2]—we do not detail that case here.
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2.3 Example assertions and assorters
Example 1. First-past-the-post voting. Consider a simple first-past-the-post con-
test, where the winner w is the candidate with the most votes and each valid
ballot records a vote for a single candidate. The result is correct if the assertions
pw > p` for each losing candidate ` all hold.
We can build an assorter h for the assertion pw > p` as follows:
h(b) =

1 bw = 1 and b` = 0,
0 bw = 0 and b` = 1,
1
2 otherwise.
Example 2. Majority contests. Consider a simple majority contest, where the
winner is the candidate w achieving over 50% of the votes, assuming again each
valid ballot holds a single vote (if there is no winner, a runoff election is held).
The result can be verified by the assertion pw > 1/2.




2t bw = 1 and b` = 0,∀` 6= w,
0 bw = 0 and b` = 1 for exactly one ` 6= w,
1
2 invalid ballot.
3 Creating assorters from assertions





e∈E aebe > c, into canonical assertions using assorters as
required by SHANGRLA. There are three steps:
1. Construct a set of linear assertions that imply the correctness of the out-
come.13
2. Determine a ‘proto-assorter’ based on this assertion.
3. Construct an assorter from the proto-assorter via an affine transformation.
We work with social choice functions where each valid ballot can contribute a
non-negative (zero or more) number of ‘votes’ or ‘points’ to various tallies (we
refer to these as votes henceforth). For example, in plurality voting we have a
tally for each candidate and each ballot contributes a vote of 1 to the tally of a
single candidate and a vote of 0 to all other candidates’ tallies. The tallies can
represent candidates, groups of candidates, political parties, or possibly some
more abstract groupings of candidates as might be necessary to describe an
assertion (see below); we refer to them generically as entities.
Let the various tallies of interest be T1, T2, . . . , Tm for m different entities.
These represent the total count of the votes across all valid ballots.
13 Constructing such a set is outside the scope of this paper; we suspect there is no
general method. Moreover, there may be social choice functions for which there is
no such set.
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A linear assertion is a statement of the form
a1T1 + a2T2 + · · ·+ amTm > 0
for some constants a1, . . . , am.
Each assertion makes a claim about the ballots, to be tested by the audit. For
most social choice functions, the assertions are about proportions rather than
tallies. Typically these proportions are of the total number of valid votes, TL, in
which case we can restate the assertion in terms of tallies by multiplying through
by TL.
For example, a pairwise majority assertion is usually written as pA > pB ,
stating that candidate A got a larger proportion of the valid votes than candidate
B. We can write this in linear form as follows. Let TA and TB be the tallies of








TA − TB > 0.
Another example is a super/sub-majority assertion, pA > t, for some thresh-






TA − t TL > 0.
For a given linear assertion, we define the following function on ballots, which
we call a proto-assorter :
g(b) = a1b1 + a2b2 + · · ·+ ambm,
where b is a given ballot, and b1, b2, . . . , bm are the votes contributed by that
ballot to the tallies T1, T2, . . . , Tm respectively.
14
Summing this function across all ballots,
∑
b g(b), gives the left-hand side
of the linear assertion. Thus, the linear assertion is true iff
∑
g(b) > 0. The
same property holds for the average across ballots, ḡ = 1/|L|
∑
g(b); the linear
assertion is true iff ḡ > 0.
To obtain an assorter in canonical form, we apply an affine transformation to
g such that it never takes negative values and also so that comparing its average
value to 1/2 determines the truth of the assertion. One such transformation is
h(b) = c · g(b) + 1/2 (1)
14 Note that g(b) = 0 for any invalid ballot b, based on previous definitions.
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for some constant c.15 There are many ways to choose c. We present two here.
First, we determine a lower bound for the proto-assorter, a value a such that
g(b) > a for all b.16 Note that a < 0 in all interesting cases: if not, the assertion
would be trivially true (ḡ > 0) or trivially false (ḡ ≡ 0, with aj = 0 for all j).
If a > −1/2, simply setting c = 1 produces an assorter: we have h > 0, and





(See [4, Sec. 2.5].) To see that h(b) is an assorter, first note that h(b) > 0 since
the numerator is always non-negative and the denominator is positive. Also, the
sum and mean across all ballots are, respectively:∑
b













Therefore, h̄ > 1/2 iff ḡ > 0.
3.1 Example: Pairwise difference assorter
To illustrate the approach, we will now create an assorter for a fairly complex
assertion for quite complicated ballots. We consider a contest where each ballot
can have multiple votes for multiple entities; the votes are simple—not ranks or
scores. Let mL be the maximum number of votes a single ballot can contain for
that contest. We can use the above general technique to derive an assorter for
the assertion pA > pB +d. In Section 4 we will use this for auditing Hamiltonian
free list contests, where A and B will be parties. This assertion checks that the
proportion of votes A has is greater than that of B plus a constant, d. This
constant may be negative.
We start with the assertion pA > pB + d. We can rewrite this in terms of
tallies as we did in the previous examples, giving the following linear form:







TA > TB + d TL
TA − TB − d TL > 0.
15 Note that h(b) = 1/2 if ballot b has no valid vote in the contest.
16 If the votes bj are bounded above by s and below by zero, then a bound (not
necessarily the sharpest) on g is given by taking just the votes that contribute






The corresponding proto-assorter is
g(b) = bA − bB − d · bT .
If the votes are bounded above by mL then this has lower bound given by
g(b) > −mL − dmL = −mL · (1 + d).
Therefore, an assorter is given by
h(b) =
bA − bB − d · bT +mL · (1 + d)
2mL · (1 + d)
.
When mL = 1 this reduces to the pairwise difference assorter for ‘simple’ Hamil-
tonian contests, where each ballot can only cast a single vote [1]. When d = 0
this reduces to the pairwise majority assorter in the more general context where
we can have multiple votes per ballot.
4 Case study: 2016 Hesse local elections
In the local elections in Hesse, Germany, each ballot allows the voter to cast
S direct votes, where S is the number of seats in the region. Each party can
have at most S candidates on the ballot. Voters can assign up to three votes
to individual candidates; they can spread these votes amongst candidates from
different parties as they like. Voters can cross out candidates, meaning none of
their votes will flow to such candidates. Finally a voter can select a single party.
The effect of this selection is that remaining votes not assigned to individual
candidates are given to the party. At the low level these votes are then spread
amongst the candidates of the party (that have not been crossed out) by assign-
ing one vote to the next (uncrossed out) candidate in the selected party, starting
from the top, and wrapping around to the top once we hit the bottom, until all
the remaining votes are assigned. Budurushi [3] provides a detailed description
of the vote casting and vote tallying rules.17
Example 3. Consider a contest in a region with 12 seats, and a ballot with 4
parties. The Greens have five candidates appearing in the order Arnold, Beatrix,
Charles, Debra, and Emma. Consider a ballot that has 3 votes assigned directly
to Beatrix, Charles crossed out, three votes assigned directly to Fox (a candidate
for another party), and the Greens party selected.
Since 6 votes are directly assigned, the Greens receive the remaining 6 votes.
We start by assigning one vote of the 6 to the top candidate, Arnold, then one
to Beatrix, none to Charles, one to Debra, one to Emma, another to Arnold, and
another to Beatrix. In total, the ballot assigns 2 votes to Arnold, 5 to Beatrix,
1 to Debra, 1 to Emma, and 3 to Fox. ut




The social choice function involves two stages. In the first stage, the entities
we consider are the parties. This stage determines how many seats are awarded
to each party. Each party is awarded the total votes assigned on a ballot to that
party via individual candidates votes and the party selection remainder. There is
a Hamiltonian election to determine the number of seats awarded to each party.
Given S seats in the region, we award se = bSpec to each party e ∈ E. The
remaining k = S −
∑
e∈E se seats are awarded to the k parties with greatest
remainders re = Spe − se. Let ae be the total number of seats awarded to party
e (which is either se or se + 1).
In the second stage, seats are awarded to individual candidates. For each
party e awarded ae seats, those ae candidates in the party receiving the most
votes are awarded a seat.
Performing a risk-limiting audit on a Hesse local election involves a number
of assertions. The first stage is a Hamiltonian election. The assertions required
to verify the result are described by Blom et al. [1]. For each pair of parties
m 6= n we need to test the assertion
pm > pn +
am − an − 1
S
, n,m ∈ E,n 6= m. (3)
While Blom et al. [1] define an assorter for this assertion, it is made under the
assumption that each ballot contains a vote for at most one entity. The assorter
defined in Section 3.1—with A = m, B = n and d = (am − an − 1)/S—is more
general and allows for multiple votes per ballot.
These (All-Seats) assertions may require large samples to verify. We can verify
a simpler assertion—that each party e deserved to obtain at least se seats—using
the assertion pe > se/S. We check this with an ‘All-But-Remainder’ audit.
The second stage of the election is a multi-winner first-past-the-post contest
within each party: party e’s ae seats are allocated to the ae individual candidates
with highest tallies. An audit would require comparing each winner’s tally to each
loser’s. The margins are often very small—the example data includes margins of
only one vote—so these allocations are likely to require a full recount, and we
have not included them in our simulations.
For experiments we consider a collection of 21 local district-based elections
held in Hesse, Germany, on March 6, 2016. An ‘All-But-Remainder’ audit checks
that each party e deserved the seats awarded to it in the first phase of distribution
(se), excluding those assigned to parties on the basis of their ‘remainder’. An
‘All-Seats’ audit checks ae, i.e. all of the seats awarded to party e, including their
last seat awarded on the basis of their remainder (if applicable).
Across the 21 district contests in our case study, the number of seats available
varied from 51 to 87, the number of parties from 6 to 11, and the number of
voters from 39,839 to 157,100. For each assertion, we estimate the number of
ballot checks required to audit it, assuming no errors are present between each
paper ballot and its electronic record. Table 1 shows the number of ballot checks
required to audit the most difficult assertion in each of these contests as the
contest’s ASN (average sample number) for the two levels of auditing (All-But-
Remainder and All-Seats). An ASN of ∞ indicates that a full manual recount
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would be required. We record the ASN for risk limits, of 5% and 10%. The
Kaplan–Kolmogorov risk function (with g = 0.1) was used to compute ASNs,
given the margin for an assertion, following the process outlined in Section 4.1.
Table 1 shows that an All-Seats audit can be challenging in terms of the
sample size required, but that an All-But-Remainder audit is usually quite prac-
tical. The estimated sample size required in an audit depends on the margin
of each assertion being checked. Where these margins are small—for example,
where two parties receive a similar remainder—the average sample size is likely
to be large. This is an inherent property of the auditing, not a failure of our
method. For example, the All-Seats audit for Limburg-Weilburg has an infinite
ASN. The vote data shows why: the lowest remainder to earn an extra seat is
the CDU Party’s, with a remainder of 24,267 votes; the highest remainder not
to earn an extra seat is the FW Party’s, with 24,205 votes. An audit would need
to check that the FW did not, in fact, gain a higher remainder than the CDU.
However, a single ballot can contain up to 71 votes, so this comparison (and
hence the electoral outcome) could be altered by a single misrecorded ballot. An
electoral outcome that can be altered by the votes on one ballot requires a full
manual count in any election system, regardless of the auditing method.
Even the All-Seats audit is quite practical when the margins represent a
relatively large fraction of ballots. This is consistent with prior work ([1]) on US
primaries, showing that an All-Seats audit is quite practical in that context.
4.1 Estimating an initial sample size using a risk function
We use the margin of the assorter for each assertion to estimate the number of
ballot checks required to confirm that an assertion holds in an audit. As defined
in [4], the margin for assertion A is 2 times its assorter mean, h̄A, minus 1.
Let V the total number of valid ballots and I be the total number of invalid
ballots cast in the contest. Note that the sum V + I may differ from the total
number of votes, TL, since there may be multiple votes expressed on each ballot.
For an All-But-Remainder assertion indicating that party e received more
















where Te is the total number of votes for all candidates in party e. We compute













For an All-Seats comparative difference assertion between two parties, A and B,
we need to test a pairwise difference assertion where the difference is given by
d =









TA − TB − TLd+ V S · (1 + d)






Once we have computed the assorter mean for an assertion, we use func-
tionality from the SHANGRLA software implementation,18 using the Kaplan–
Kolmogorov risk function with g = 0.1, and an error rate of 0.
Table 1. Estimates of audit sample sizes for each local district election held in Hesse
on March 6th, 2016. We record the number of assertions to be checked in an All-
But-Remainder and All-Seats audit, alongside the estimated number of ballot checks
required to complete these audits for risk limits of 5% and 10%, assuming no discrep-
ancies are found between paper ballots and their electronic records. S is the number
of seats, |L| is the total number of ballots cast, |E| is the total number of parties, and
V is the total number of valid ballots. |L| and V are recorded to the nearest thousand.
All-But-Rem. All-Seats
District S |L| |E| V RL 5% RL 10% RL 5% RL 10%
|A| ASN ASN |A| ASN ASN
Marburg-Biedenkopf 81 92k 8 88k 8 128 99 56 2,004 1,544
Fulder 81 95k 8 91k 8 27 20 56 34,769 28,142
Wetterau 81 122k 11 115k 11 26 20 110 12,570 9,790
Groß Gerau 71 85k 11 80k 11 291 224 110 7,844 6,101
Limburg-Weilburg 71 67k 7 64k 7 879 677 42 ∞ ∞
Kassel 81 100k 7 95k 7 1,180 909 42 4,580 3,540
Darmstadt-Dieburg 71 113k 8 107k 8 39 30 56 86,480 76,879
Bergstrasse 71 101k 9 96k 9 19 14 72 5,329 4,123
Werra-Meißner 61 45k 6 42k 6 8 6 30 3,252 2,522
Hersfeld-Rotenburg 61 52k 7 50k 7 29 23 42 5,173 4,026
Offenbach 87 119k 9 113k 9 35 27 72 25,691 20,323
Rheingau Taunus 81 78k 7 74k 7 27 21 42 4,382 3,392
Lahn-Dill 81 88k 8 83k 8 50 38 56 2,752 2,124
Waldeck-Frankenberg 71 65k 8 62k 8 234 180 56 1,508 1,162
Main-Taunus 81 95k 8 91k 8 66 51 56 23,669 18,808
Schwalm-Eder 71 82k 8 78k 8 24 18 56 35,724 29,301
Odenwald 51 40k 7 38k 7 74 57 42 933 719
Main-Kinzig 87 157k 10 148k 10 15 12 90 4,105 3,165
Landkreis Gießen 81 103k 8 98k 8 41 24 56 8,324 6,464
Hochtaunus 71 94k 8 90k 8 83 64 56 36,978 30,069
Vogelsberg 61 50k 7 47k 7 10 8 42 9,668 7,624
18 TestNonnegMean.initial sample size() from https://github.com/pbstark/
SHANGRLA/blob/main/Code/assertion audit utils.py, last accessed 24.07.2021.
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5 Example: Assorters for D’Hondt and related methods
Risk-limiting audits for D’Hondt and other highest averages methods were de-
veloped by Stark and Teague [5]. In this section we show how to express those
audits in the form of assertions, and develop the appropriate assorters.
5.1 Background on highest averages methods
Highest averages methods are used by many parliamentary democracies in Eu-
rope, as well as elections for the European Parliament (which uses D’Hondt).19
Highest averages methods are similar to Hamiltonian methods in that they
allocate seats to parties in approximate proportion to the fraction of the overall
vote they won. They differ in how they allocate the last few seats when the
voting fractions do not match an integer number of seats.
A highest averages method is parameterized by a set of divisors d(1), d(2), . . .
d(S) where S is the number of seats. The seats are allocated by forming a table
in which each party’s votes are divided by each of the divisors, then choosing
the S largest numbers in the whole table—the number of selected entries in a
party’s row is the number of seats that party wins. The divisors for D’Hondt are
d(i) = i, i = 1, 2, . . . S. Sainte-Laguë has divisors d(i) = 2i− 1, for i = 1, 2, . . . S.
Let fe,s = Te/d(s) for entity e and seat s. The Winning Set W is
W = {(e, s) : fe,s is one of the S largest}.
This can be visualised in a table by writing out, for each entity e, the sequence of
numbers Te/d(1), Te/d(2), Te/d(3), . . ., and then selecting the S largest numbers
in the table. Each party receives a number of seats equal to the number of
selected values in its row.
Like Hamiltonian methods, highest averages methods can be used in a simple
form in which voters choose only their favourite party, or in a variety of more
complex forms in which voters can express approval or disapproval of individual
candidates. We deal with the simple case first.
5.2 Simple D’Hondt: Party-only voting
In the simplest form of highest averages methods, seats are allocated to each
entity (party) based on individual entity tallies. Let We be the number of seats
won and Le the number of the first seat lost by entity e. That is:
We = max{s : (e, s) ∈ W};⊥ if e has no winners.
Le = min{s : (e, s) /∈ W};⊥ if e won all the seats.
If e won some, but not all, seats, then Le = We + 1.
19 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2019/637966/
EPRS BRI(2019)637966 EN.pdf, last accessed 24.07.2021.
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The inequalities that define the winners are, for all parties A with at least
one winner, for all parties B (different from A) with at least one loser, as follows:
fA,WA > fB,LB . (4)
Converting this into the notation of Section 3, expressing Equation 4 as an linear
assertion gives us, ∀A s.t. WA 6=⊥,∀B 6= A s.t. LB 6=⊥,
TA/d(WA)− TB/d(LB) > 0.
From this, we define the proto-assorter for any ballot b as
gA,B(b) =

1/d(WA) if b is a vote for party A,
−1/d(LB) if b is a vote for party B,
0 otherwise,
or equivalently gA,B(b) = bA/d(WA)− bB/d(LB)
where bA (resp. bB) is 1 if there is a vote for party A (resp. B), 0 otherwise.
The lower bound is clearly a = −1/d(LB). Substituting into Equation 2 gives
hA,B(b) =

1/2 [d(LB)/d(WA) + 1] if b is a vote for party A,
0 if b is a vote for party B,
1/2 otherwise.
Note that order matters: in general, both hA,B and hB,A are necessary—the first
checks that party A’s lowest winner beat party B’s highest loser; the second
checks that party B’s lowest winner beat party A’s highest loser.
5.3 More complex methods: Multi-candidate voting
Like some Hamiltonian elections, many highest averages elections also allow
voters to select individual candidates. A party’s tally is the total of its candidates’
votes. Then, within each party, the won seats are allocated to the candidates with
the highest individual tallies. The main entities are still parties, allocated seats
according to Equation 4, but the assorter must be generalised to allow one ballot
to contain multiple votes for various candidates.
The proto-assorter for entities (parties) A 6= B s.t. WA 6=⊥, and LB 6=⊥, is
very similar to the single-party case, but votes for each party (bA and bB) count
the total, over all that entity’s candidates, and may be larger than one.
gA,B(b) = bA/d(WA)− bB/d(LB).





Note this reduces to the single-vote assorter when m = 1 (bA, bB ∈ {0, 1}).
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6 Conclusion & future work
SHANGRLA reduces RLAs for many social choice functions to a canonical form
involving ‘assorters.’ This paper shows how to translate general linear assertions
into canonical assorter form for SHANGRLA, illustrated by developing the first
RLA method for Hamiltonian free list elections and the first assertion-based
approach for D’Hondt style elections.
We show that party-list proportional representation systems can be audited
using simple assertions that are both necessary and sufficient for the reported
outcome to be correct. In some settings, including in Hesse, elections are in-
herently expensive to audit because margins are frequently small, both between
parties vying for the seats allocated by remainder, and between candidates in
the same party.
There are social choice functions for which no set of linear assertions guar-
antees the reported winner really won, for instance, social choice functions in
which the order of in which the votes are tabulated matters or that involve a
random element. Some variants of Single Transferable Vote (STV) have one or
the other of those properties.
Other variants of STV might be amenable to RLAs and to SHANGRLA in
particular: the question is open. We conjecture that STV is inherently hard to
audit. Although a sufficient set of conditions is easy to generate—simply check
every step of the elimination and seat-allocation sequence—this is highly likely
to have very small margins and hence to require impractical sample sizes. We
conjecture that it is hard to find a set of conditions that imply an STV outcome
is correct and that requires reasonable sample sizes to audit. Of course, this was
also conjectured for IRV and turns out to be false.
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Risk-limiting Audits:
A Practical Systematization of Knowledge
Matthew Bernhard
VotingWorks
Abstract. Risk-limiting audits (RLAs) are broadly accepted as the gold
standard for tabulation audits: when I count ballots using software, an
RLA provides software-independent evidence that tabulation declared
the correct winner. While there have been many advances in RLAs over
the last 14 years, many of the underlying assumptions and practical
applications of RLAs have gone unexamined. In this paper, I present a
review of existing RLA techniques, providing a concise definition of an
RLA, examining its underlying assumptions, and discussing how RLAs
work in practice, all from the perspective of the maintainer of a popular
RLA tool. I present several attacks which can cause RLAs to fail to
provide evidence of the correctness of an election outcome. Finally, I
provide discussion on the RLA’s place in the landscape of election security
and observations about the value proposition RLAs present.
1 Introduction
Post-election audits have long been a tool to evaluate election processes. They
serve as an opportunity for election officials to check their work and provide
transparency into election processes for voters. Additionally, post-election audits
have long been a point of emphasis for election security, as they often provide
robust means of achieving important properties like software independence [38].
In the wake of the 2016 presidential election in the United States, post-election
audits, and risk-limiting audits in particular, have become widely adopted as a
means of securing and improving the election process [13,20,27,31,35].
Much work has been conducted on post-election audits as a means of building
evidence-based elections [52]. Stark produced the concept of a risk-limiting audit
(RLA), a post-election tabulation audit which can provide a desired level of
confidence in the election outcome with an amount of work that depends on the
desired level of confidence [46].
Interwoven in much of the work around post-election audits are subtle as-
sumptions and an implicit threat model. Most early efforts focused largely on the
threat model of the election itself, with audits as a defense. While efficiency is a
common theme, it is usually framed as pragmatism, not a feature of the audit to
be safeguarded. Stark and Wagner contemplate ways in which the audit can be
compromised, if, e.g., the paper trail is not properly maintained [52]; however
they do not formally consider how a compliance audit can factor into the critical
functions of an RLA.
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In this paper I explore the assumptions underlying risk-limiting audits, discuss 
how they are conducted in practice, and what these things mean for the threat 
model for RLAs. I start by defining what an RLA is and its capabilities in the 
next section. I then examine how RLAs are performed in practice in Section 3. 
In Section 4 I describe attacks against RLAs that defeat their primary functions 
before concluding in Section 5.
2 What is a risk-limiting audit?
Broadly speaking, the goal of an RLA is to provide some degree of confidence 
in the outcome of an election while doing some amount of work. The trade-off 
is centrally between the level of confidence (framed as the “risk limit”) and the 
amount of work required to reach it (usually in terms of the number of ballots 
that need to be counted by hand). However, there are numerous assumptions 
baked into RLAs that are often not explicitly stated, though works like [8, 19, 52] 
have attempted to make these assumptions more concrete.
The core of an RLA lies with the generation and preservation of evidence 
for an election outcome [19, 28, 52]. If an election outcome is produced by the 
automatic tabulation of ballots, the tabulators may be compromised in such a 
way that is not obvious (e.g. they may flip a few votes in a close race to change 
the outcome). Absent efforts to check the tallies, this process does not provide 
sufficiently verifiable evidence that the election’s outcome is correct. This is the 
problem that RLAs attempt to address.
RLAs assume that there exists a “true” election outcome. Ideally the true 
election outcome would be produced by a social choice function based on the 
preferences of the voters. For instance, if first-past-the-post is the social choice 
function, and most voters prefer Alice over Bob, then the “true” outcome is that 
Alice wins. Unfortunately, political preferences are often inconsistent even within 
individuals [3], so elections must force people to commit to their preferences. This 
can be done in a variety of ways, but the most common form is via a secret ballot 
onto which voters imprint their preferences, typically by selecting from a provided 
list of choices (though occasionally something more complex). Since the voter’s 
choices on the ballot are assumed to align with their preferences, the ballot is 
the record of the voter’s intent, considered the “true” expression of each voter’s 
preferences. While some voting systems allow voters to mark ballots in a purely 
mechanical or electronic way, as on a direct-recording electronic voting machine 
(DRE), these methods do not as of yet produce a durable record of the vote that 
can be independently verified [10] (i.e. they aren’t software-independent [38]). 
Therefore, RLAs rely on paper ballots as the source of true preferences for an 
election outcome.
Assumption 1. Paper ballots reflect voters’ true preferences.
This assumption means that RLAs do not attempt to characterize mistakes 
voters may make when marking their ballots, even though mistakes may be 
prevalent enough to change the outcome [12, 41]. Nor do they account for any
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other mechanism that can cause the paper record of the vote to not reflect the
voters’ preferences (or the choices voters make to reflect those preferences), like
malicious software on ballot marking devices [1, 11,24].
Another assumption that RLAs make is that the set of ballots being examined
is complete. If the ballots examined in the RLA do not comprise of all of the
valid ballots used to tabulate the election results, then an RLA’s output is largely
meaningless. This also means that RLAs require stringent chain-of-custody
records to provide verifiable evidence that the paper trail is well maintained [52].1
Assumption 2. The paper trail examined by the RLA is complete and correct.
To make an election process evidence-based and independently verifiable,
RLAs rely on a means of tabulation that does not rely on software: hand count-
ing. While research has found that humans do make mistakes when counting
ballots [21], RLAs implicitly trust that hand counts are accurate. This assumption
may be reasonable, as audits have a much greater degree of transparency and pub-
lic visibility than software running on scanners, but has largely been unexamined
in the literature. In summary, RLAs treat the result of hand counts as ground
truth for the “real” election outcome. Since hand counts do not rely on software
(or do not rely on software in a way that violates software independence; see
Section 3), they are a software-independent mechanism for evidence evaluation.
In other words, RLAs assume that a hand count of all the ballots in an election
always produces the correct outcome [46].
Assumption 3. Full hand counts always produce “true” election outcomes.
Even though we now have a definition of what a true evidence-based election
process would look like, RLAs rely on one more key assumption. If hand counts
were truly the best method of conducting elections, then surely they would be
the most widely adopted means of tabulating votes. However, this is obviously
not the case in countries all over the world [2,42,57]. Therefore there must be
benefits to software tabulation that outweigh its costs.2 RLAs thus seeks to gain
confidence that an election outcome is correct while not doing a full hand count,
if possible.3
Assumption 4. Hand counting is undesirable and should be minimized.
We now have a clearly defined problem statement for RLAs:
Definition 1. Risk-limiting audits are an evidence-based process to provide
a specified level of confidence in an election outcome while minimizing hand
counting.
1 This is not a given, as Enguehard et al. have documented, among others [17].
2 Namely, cost, accuracy, speed, and repeatability of tabulation, though see, e.g., [53].
3 Though RLAs may also be performed on hand-tabulated elections as well [40].
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3 Logistics of RLAs
Now that I have established what an RLA is attempting to accomplish, I can set 
about describing how it does so. There are several dimensions to performing an 
RLA that each introduce unique challenges to the threat model.
3.1 Hypothesis testing
RLAs draw a sample of ballots (typically uniformly at random [29] though 
occasionally not [5, 46]), hand count the sample, and then use the data produced 
by the hand count to evaluate the election result produced by software tabulation. 
There are numerous details here that I will discuss later on in this section, but 
this description suffices for now.
Given software-produced tabulation and our hand count data, an RLA seeks 
to assert or reject the hypothesis that the election outcome is correct. Specifically, 
RLAs usually take the software-produced outcome as an alternative hypothesis 
(though other alternatives are possible; see [23, 58]), and that the outcome is 
wrong as the null hypothesis. In this case, “the outcome is wrong” is formalized 
as the true outcome either preferring a candidate that did not win or a tie. These 
two hypotheses are mutually exclusive (though it may take some massaging 
depending on the social choice function) and exhaustive (by definition), so if the 
null hypothesis is rejected, then one can conclude to a degree of confidence that 
the alternative is true.
As this is a hypothesis test, the test can have four outputs depending on the 
underlying “true” hypothesis and the efficacy of the test. A true positive results 
when the null hypothesis is correctly rejected, i.e. the reported outcome is correct 
and the audit found evidence to support that to the specified risk limit. A true 
negative results when the reported election outcome disagrees with the outcome 
that would be produced by a full hand-tally. In this case, RLAs are designed to 
escalate to a full hand-tally before concluding that the reported election result 
is wrong. This feature makes a false positive effectively impossible: a correct 
reported outcome can never be overturned by an RLA [46], as outcomes can only 
be overturned by a full recount, at which point the true outcome will be known. 
A false negative results when the election outcome should be overturned, but 
the audit incorrectly terminates after fewer than all of the ballots have been 
audited. False negatives can occur by bad luck: if the sample data just happens 
to strongly favor the reported winner, the audit may conclude that the reported 
winner really did win even if that is not the case. The largest chance of this 
occurring is the risk limit.
The output of a hypothesis test is a p-value (occasionally called the risk 
measurement), an estimation of how likely the data would have occurred by 
random chance. If this value is below the risk-limit, the audit stops. If not, it 
draws more ballots and generates another p-value until all of the ballots have 
been counted or the p-value is below the risk-limit.
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3.2 Evaluating hypotheses
In order to test the hypothesis that the reported election outcome is correct, RLAs 
require a means of evaluating evidence. There are two primary ways paper ballots 
are used to evaluate the reported outcome: polling audits and comparison 
audits [29]. There are also two units that audits can operate over: individual 
ballots or batches of ballots.
In a polling audit, a sample of ballots is drawn, and the social choice function 
is computed over the sample. The resulting tally is then used to evaluate the 
null and alternative hypotheses [26, 33, 51, 58]. Polling audits typically require 
dramatically larger sample sizes than comparison audits, as the evaluation being 
done tends to be less sensitive. However, polling audits require significantly less 
infrastructure to perform than comparison audits [29, 58].
Comparison audits, rather than relying on the social choice function to 
evaluate hypotheses, directly evaluates the evidence generated by the election. 
Each ballot (or batch) is audited, and the result of the audit is compared to the 
record of how that ballot (or batch) was tabulated. If discrepancies are found 
between the audited ballot and the reported tabulation, this indicates that an 
outcome-changing event may have occurred [22, 46, 48–51].
Finally, there are also hybrid auditing methods, most notably SUITE [34] 
and SHANGRLA [51]. These audits break the set of ballots into separate strata, 
where different types of evaluation (polling and comparison), different units of 
auditing (ballot or batch), or both, are used in each stratum.
3.3 Collecting evidence
In order to collect evidence to support or refute a hypothesis, RLAs must draw a 
sample from a population of ballots. We may not trust a reported election result, 
but at a minimum we must know how many paper ballots there are (i.e. how 
large the population is) and where they are (i.e. how can a specific ballot be 
found) in a software independent way.
The first piece of data, the population size, can be determined several ways, 
for example examining the voter check-in data to see how many voters checked in 
to vote (though this data must be verified against the chain of custody of paper 
ballots). The latter requires a bit more work depending on the storage procedures 
for the ballots. We can imagine a warehouse containing all of the ballots in a 
contest, where ballots are stored in boxes. In order to audit ballot n, then, we 
need to know which box it is contained in. This data is called a ballot manifest, 
and includes a software-independent accounting of ballot storage [29, 52]. As we 
shall see in Section 4, errors in the ballot manifest can cause the RLA to fail to 
achieve its goals.
Now that we have established what our population is, we can sample from 
it. There are a variety of sampling techniques available. The simplest and most 
common is sampling uniformly at random after the results have been fully 
tabulated and reported. However, Ottoboni et al. examined sampling uniformly 
before the results have been fully tabulated [33]. Sampling especially in batch
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audits may be done with respect to the amount of possible “error” that can be
found in a unit [5, 47].
To generate a sample, the manifest is used to create a “master list” of ballots
(or batches), where each ballot gets a sequential number (e.g. if the last ballot in
the first box is ballot n, then the first ballot in the next box is n + 1 and so on).
In principle, ballots can be sampled at random by merely rolling enough dice to
cover the range of ballot indices, modulo the population size [15]. In practice, this
is far too laborious, so pseudo-random number generating programs (PRNGs)
are often used to generate a list of ballots to sample [15,33].
Once a ballot is sampled, the manifest is used to figure out which container
that ballot is stored in, and a variety of methods can be used to find the specific
ballot in question (counting down in the stack of ballots or using a counting scale,
for example [36]). Sridhar et al. proposed an alternative method for sampling an
individual ballot from a batch, called k-cut: cutting the stack of ballots like a
deck of cards. They demonstrated that cutting the stack of ballots six times in
randomly generated places was sufficient to get a uniformly sampled ballot [43].4
Batch-level audits do not require these techniques, as once a batch is sampled all
of the ballots it contains are part of the sample and are hand counted.
3.4 Examining the evidence
Once the ballots to be examined have been drawn, RLAs require a means of
evaluating the evidence. The nature of this evaluation depends heavily on the
specific hypothesis being tested. BRAVO ballot polling audits examine hypotheses
about how the margin is distributed proportionally to each candidate [26,33,34,58],
while the type of ballot polling described in [34, 51] looks at the margin in terms
of integer votes. In both cases, ballot polling audits test the hypothesis that the
winner actually won by examining the margin in the sample against the null
hypothesis (the winner didn’t win; in most cases the margin under the null is
0, i.e. a tie) and an alternative hypothesis (typically the reported margin, but
occasionally not [23]). Most extant ballot polling audits examine the likelihood
ratios of the null and the alternative given the tally of a sample [26,29,32,37,55,58],
though methods like [39,51] use other test statistics. In any case, these audits
require very little information to evaluate their hypotheses: the null margin,
alternative margin, and a hand tally of the sampled ballots. If their test-statistic
outputs a p-value below the risk limit, the audit stops. Otherwise, more ballots
are sampled.
Comparison style audits also examine the margin in votes, but rather than
examine a tally of the votes in the sample, comparison audits directly compare
the sampled units against their reported counterparts. If a ballot’s audited record
differs from its reported record, this is deemed an error. Errors can work in multiple
4 K-cut may not be suitable for ballot comparison audits, since they need the ability
to look up a sampled ballot’s cast vote record (see below). If the ballots do not have
an identifier (imprinted on the ballot at the time of scanning), the ballots must be
kept in the order they were scanned.
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ways: overstatements are errors which cause the margin to be overstated, i.e. 
the winner didn’t win by as much as was reported. Understatements are errors 
which indicate that the winner actually won by more than originally reported. 
If the number of overstatements is larger than the margin of victory, then the 
reported outcome is wrong.
In a ballot comparison audit, if a ballot is sampled, it is examined and the votes 
it contains are directly compared to how it was originally tabulated [46, 50, 51]. 
These audits need an additional input: a record of how each individual ballot was 
tabulated (called a cast vote record or CVR) that can be compared against 
an examination of the corresponding paper ballot.
For batch comparison audits, the hand-tallied batch totals are compared to 
the tabulator results for each batch. Rather than a CVR, batch comparison 
audits require a batch totals file that contains how each batch was tabulated by 
software, which is then compared to hand tallies. It should be noted that ballot 
comparison audits are just special cases of batch comparison audits where each 
batch contains only one ballot [22, 48].
3.5 Tools for performing an RLA
Much of the logistical support and calculation in RLAs can in principle be done 
without reliance on any software. However, this is practically infeasible in most 
contexts (e.g. if an RLA needs to draw 5,000 ballots, rolling enough dice to draw 
a sample would take an inordinate amount of time). Moreover, election officials 
(or other auditors) may not have the expertise in statistics required to perform 
the calculations necessary to evaluate evidence. Finally, coordinating an audit in 
a large jurisdiction, like a state, becomes intractable when dozens or hundreds of 
ballot manifests, CVRs, and other election information must be collated.
To address these problems, numerous software tools have been developed to 
support the logistics of an audit. In order to preserve software-independence, 
the inputs and outputs of the software need to be made available. Publishing 
this data enables anyone to independently verify that the software conducted 
the audit correctly (either by working it through by hand or by using different, 
trusted software). To my knowledge, all existing RLA software is open source, 
which aids in the verifiability of the software’s correctness and also supports 
independent evaluation of audits.
Tools for performing ballot polling audits have been made available by 
Stark [44] and VotingWorks [56]. Additional ballot polling software has been 
made available by Ottoboni et al. [33], Stark [51], and Zagorski et al. [58]. Tools 
for performing comparison audits have been made available by Stark [45, 51], 
VotingWorks [56], and Free and Fair [18]. McBurnett also has a tool for older 
batch comparison audits including SAFE [30], NEGEXP [5], and PPEB [47]. 
Finally, tools for performing hybrid audits have been provided by Ottoboni et 
al. [34] and VotingWorks [56].
As we shall see in the next section, these tools encompass a variety of 
communications channels between participants in the audit, and can present risk.
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3.6 How does an RLA actually work?
We have covered much of the inputs and outputs of RLAs so far, but I have not
described the process in full nor identified the stakeholders.
Stakeholders RLAs are fundamentally transactions between evidence havers
and evidence seekers. Election officials are in charge of the software that does
the tabulation as well as the paper trail. For large audits, there are often two
types of election official: audit administrators, in charge of coordinating the
data collection and entry procedures, and local election officials who have
custody of the paper trail and do the work of pulling and examining ballots.
The election officials rely on audit software to conduct the audit. The public
observes the audit and seeks to be convinced that the paper ballots match the
reported election outcome. Finally, attackers seek to disrupt this process.
Process The RLA process is sequential, and is described as follows (and
depicted in Figure 1):
1. The election ends, a final tally is produced, and an outcome is declared.
2. Audit administrators initialize the audit with information about the contest
to be audited (the contest name, number of winners, candidates, tally of votes
for each candidates, and outcome), as well as a list of authorized participants
if the audit is happening in multiple places and involves distributed access to
the tool (local election officials who possess the paper ballots).
3. Local election officials collect and submit all necessary inputs, including a
ballot manifest and, if performing a comparison audit, batch totals or CVRs.
4. A ceremony for initializing a PRNG is conducted, where some physical
randomness (e.g. dice) is used to seed the PRNG.
5. Based on the contest information (the margin of victory) and previous samples
(if not in the first round of the audit), a sample size is estimated (i.e. the
number of ballots or batches to audit is determined).
6. The ballots to be sampled are identified by the PRNG, and information
about which ballots or batches are to be examined (called a retrieval list) is
distributed to local election officials.
7. Local election officials retrieve the ballots in their jurisdiction, examine them,
and submit the information to the audit administrators (either out of band
or through the audit software).
8. Once all information about the sample is entered, the audit administrator
computes a p-value for sample based on the evidence. If the p-value is greater
than the risk limit, go back to step 5, generate a new sample and collect more
evidence. If all ballots have been sampled, stop and announce the outcome
of the sampled data as the new outcome. If the p-value is less than or equal
to the risk limit, halt the audit and announce that the outcome is confirmed.
9. At the conclusion of the audit, all information about the audit is published,
including the manifests, CVRs, the random seed and PRNG algorithm, and






















Additional rounds (if necessary)
Audit
ends Audit results
*Other data includes CVRs or batch totals per candidate, if necessary
Fig. 1. A process diagram of an RLA—Each column represents a stakeholder.
Arrows between stakeholders indicate communication of some sort between two stake-
holders. At the start of each round, the audit tool computes a sample size and draws a
sample of ballots, which are distributed to local election officials. Having received their
retrieval lists, LEOs sample ballots as indicated by the retrieval list and enter the audit
data into the audit software. After all ballots in round have been entered, the software
computes a p-value for the audit so far, and notifies the audit administrator whether
the audit has met the risk limit, or if more ballots need to be sampled. Note that the
depicted protocol is an insecure strawman, and the communication channels must be
secured and the data must be made public for the audit to be successfully verifiable
(see Section 4.5).
4 Attacks and Defenses
An overview of the audit process and relevant communication channels can be
seen in Figure 1. As we shall see shortly, the way the process is laid out presents
several opportunities for an attacker to compromise the audit. Revisiting our
assumptions about RLAs from Section 2, we can define a major and a minor
goal for our attacker:
– Major goal: Cause an RLA to stop early even though a full hand count
would indicate a different result more frequently than the risk limit allows. 
– Minor goal: Force the RLA to a full hand count.
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Recall from Section 3.1 that the hypothesis testing at the core of an RLA can 
indicate four distinct outcomes. The “true” outcomes are where an RLA does 
what it is supposed to: either correctly stop after seeing sufficient evidence or 
correctly escalating to a full recount and overturning an election. An attacker 
seeks to cause a “false” outcome: either incorrectly concluding that the reported 
outcome was correct or overturning a correct result. As we discussed earlier, the 
latter outcome (a false positive) is impossible if the paper trail is preserved, so 
an attacker can at best cause a false negative (accepting an incorrect result).
This last point is our attacker’s major goal: cause a false negative with 
probability greater than the risk limit. This might occur if the attacker had also 
compromised the tabulator and wished to remain undetected.
Additionally, recall that RLAs also assume that hand counting all of the 
ballots are undesirable. Therefore a minor goal for an attacker is to cause a full 
recount every time an RLA is performed (intended to waste resources).
In general, an attacker who can accomplish the major goal can also accomplish 
the minor goal, but not the other way around. Additional goals like sowing public 
distrust are considered out of scope for now. With these goals in mind, we present 
several attack scenarios.
4.1 An active network attacker
In this scenario, the attacker is able to intercept, alter, and transmit messages 
to any stakeholders. This attacker cannot alter the paper trail, audit tool, or 
PRNG generation ceremony. However, they can impersonate all parties and use 
the audit tool to generate expected output.
Forged sample sizes This attacker can forge the expected sample sizes and 
cause them to be larger or smaller than required. This achieves the minor goal, 
as they could indicate that the audit needs to examine all of the ballots.
Forged retrieval lists This attacker can issue forged retrieval lists directly to 
local elections officials (LEOs). In doing so, they can bias the sample by selecting 
ballots from jurisdictions that lean more towards the declared winner. If the audit 
samples these ballots, it can falsely conclude that the declared result was correct.
Forged audit results This attacker can similarly forge messages from the 
LEOs to the audit tool and input fake audit data that causes the software to 
convince that the audit can terminate.
Forged messages from the audit administrator This attacker can an-
nounce audit results to the public early or otherwise in a way that sows doubt 
about the correctness of the election process.
This attacker’s power largely comes from the lack of out-of-band communi-
cation between stakeholders. To mitigate this attack, an authenticated channel 
should be established between all parties to ensure that only authenticated parties 
are submitting and generating audit data. Standard authentication techniques, 
like TLS, and the use of restricted domains and authenticated email accounts [54] 
apply here. Furthermore, independent verification of the audit would catch many
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of these attacks, as the sample sizes, retrieval lists, and results are deterministic 
and can be checked.
4.2 Compromised audit software
An attacker can still gain full control over the audit if they compromise the audit 
software, even without actively attacking the RLA’s communication channels. All 
of the forgery possibilities above apply, except announcing the result. However, 
presuming an honest audit administrator, if the tool provides an incorrect audit 
result the audit administrator may just announce the audit result provided by 
the tool without verification.
In order to defend against a compromised audit tool, software-independent 
bookkeeping is critical. The random seed, PRNG algorithm, ballot manifests, 
and audit results must be published through a channel that doesn’t rely on the 
tabulator or the audit software (e.g. by scans of paper documents uploaded to 
the audit administrator’s website) [19,25,52]. With this data (and CVRs or batch 
totals files), in principle anyone in the public can verify the audit results by hand 
or by using different, trusted software.
4.3 Compromised audit administrator
In this case, the audit administrator is compromised, either because they them-
selves wish to confirm an incorrect outcome or because malware resident on the 
device they’re using to interact with the audit software does. The defenses from 
Section 4.2 protect against this except for one attack on comparison audits.
If the audit administrator announces wrong election results and tampers with 
the data provided to the auditing software, it is possible for the audit to reject 
the null hypothesis when it shouldn’t. By entering incorrect contest totals but 
providing the correct tabulation data needed for comparison audits, the audit will 
confirm the outcome even though the paper ballots, if counted by hand, would 
result in a different outcome. This is because comparison audits assume that the 
contest data is correctly entered, and that any discrepancies between the audited 
ballots and the tabulation data will catch incorrect contest data. By declaring 
the wrong result and entering the wrong vote totals, but using uncompromised 
CVRs or batch totals files, the comparison audit will terminate without seeing 
discrepancies, “confirming” that the announced outcome indeed corresponds to 
the paper ballots. However, this will not be the case.
In order to prevent this attack, the contest data and the CVRs or batch 
totals must be made public so that the contest data can be verified against the 
CVRs or batch totals. However, in ballot comparison audits, published CVRs 
can enable coercion (the so-called Sicillian attack, for example [10]). For this 
reason, states like Colorado explicitly forbid publishing CVRs in plain text [14]. 
Therefore, CVR values need to be hidden (except for audited ballots). To achieve 
this, methods like [8] split up CVRs per-contest and produced commitments, 
while [9] homomorphically encrypts CVRs and publishes the encrypted CVRs 
and a decryption key for the CVR totals before the audit starts. Anyone can
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then sum the encrypted CVRs and decrypt the result to verify that the contest
data entered by the audit administrator matches the files to be compared. The
ballots which are audited also have their plaintext CVR published, which allows
the public to verify that the audit performed as expected.5
4.4 Compromised local election official
A compromised local election official represents the greatest threat to an RLA.
LEOs are the custodians of the paper trail, so if they desire to subvert the audit,
they can do so trivially by tampering with paper ballots. However, RLAs assume
that sufficient compliance auditing [52] is performed (see Section 2). Still, LEOs
(or malware on their behalf, below LEO refers to both cases) may subvert the
audit in a few other ways.
Forged manifests If an LEO or collection of LEOs misrepresents how many
ballots they have in their custody, they can influence the result of the RLA. For
instance, an LEO in a jurisdiction that votes more for the winner can claim
more ballots than they actually have. In a comparison audit, this would cause
the audit to recount all of the ballots, as ballots claimed to exist but not found
are counted as the worst kind of error [6]. In a ballot polling audit using k-cut,
things are even worse, as unless the number of ballots is counted ahead of time
and found to be too small, samples can be drawn without noticing anything is
wrong. This is why it is critical for LEOs to produce software independent ballot
manifests that can be published out of band and independently verified.
Forged audit data LEOs may also enter incorrect data about the audited
ballots (as in the network attacker above). This can cause the audit to finish
early. Ideally, public observation would prevent this, and paper records about
the audit can be made available for verification.
4.5 Summary of defenses
I have detailed a wide variety of attacks, and mentioned some defenses in passing:
– Authenticated communication channels between all parties, including authen-
ticated access to the audit tool
– Publication of all audit data through an authenticated channel, like the audit
administrator’s website
– Commitment to audit data before use (e.g. the contest information should
be known before the audit starts and verifiably not changed afterwards)
– Use of CVR encryption, where applicable [9]
– Software independent record keeping of audit data [19]
– Public observation of all audit processes
– Compliance audits that enforce chain of custody for the paper trail [52]
– External verification of all audit inputs and outputs using a trusted audit
tool
5 An implementation of [9] can be found here: [4].
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5 Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed the theoretical and practical facets of risk-limiting
audits. I have examined the underlying assumptions made by RLAs and identified
how those play out in practice. I have shown that numerous attacks against RLAs
exist which can cause an RLA to fail to accomplish its primary goals, and also
presented several defenses which mitigate these attacks.
Despite my analysis, I have largely deferred a critical consideration. RLAs
exist to provide trust in election outcomes. They rely on a durable evidence trail,
large-scale transparency processes, and at times complex statistics to provide
proof that a reported outcome really does match all available evidence. However,
it might be worth considering whether they succeed. Absent any attack, even if
a risk-limiting audit is carried out faithfully and correctly, does it make voters
more confident in election outcomes? Future research is needed on this point,
as after the 2020 election, more U.S. states performed risk-limiting audits than
ever before, all of which found significant evidence that the election outcome
was correct. Yet, a significant fraction of the population still maintains that the
reported outcome was wrong [7]. If RLAs don’t provide confidence, is there value
in them at all?
Recent events in the U.S. state of Georgia may provide some clarity on the
issue. Georgia is a historically Republican state, with all executive offices held
by Republicans, including the chief elections officer Brad Raffensperger. In an
environment where much of the Republican party refused to accept the election
result, going so far as to vote against certifying it in the U.S. federal legislative
bodies, the Republican executives in Georgia stood by their election results,
in which a Democratic presidential candidate won the state of Georgia for the
first time in 28 years. Secretary Raffensperger repeatedly cited Georgia’s risk-
limiting audit as a major reason for his confidence [20]. Even if RLAs may not be
intelligible or convincing to the public at large, there is significant value in the
fact that they provide election officials (and interested members of the public)
confidence in the election results. In a time where misinformation is wreaking
havoc the world over [16], RLAs bolster the bastion of democracy.
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Abstract. This paper summarizes the countless ways many election administra-
tors have been attacked during the 2020 U.S. presidential election and its after-
math and lays out ten specific recommendations for how state and local govern-
ments can better protect and, consequently, retain these administrators to ensure 
the security of future elections.   
Keywords: election integrity, election security, human resources, critical infra-
structure, employee retention, state government, local government 
1 Introduction 
The 2020 presidential election was called the most secure in U.S. history, largely due 
to efforts to protect the nation’s different physical and cyber infrastructure.1 This was a 
triumph considering the physical, cyber, and even human assets that make up the elec-
tion infrastructure have been and continue to be susceptible to threats.2 In 2020, many 
states adopted measures to mitigate threats to physical and cyber election assets like 
voting equipment, ballots, and facilities, as well as computer services and databases 
that store voter information. For example, states with close results in the 2020 presi-
dential race had paper records of each vote, which gave them the ability to go back and 
count each ballot if necessary.3 Other measures such as pre-election testing, state and 
federal certification of voting equipment, and increased collaboration between election 
1  Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the Elec-
tion Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees. Cybersecurity and Infrastruc-
ture Security Agency, (November 12 2020). https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/joint-
statement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election. Last accessed 
8 July 2021.  
2  DHS Plans Are Urgently Needed to Address Identified Challenges Before the 2020 Elections. 
Government Accountability Office, (Feb 2020). https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-20-267.pdf. 
Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
3  Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & the Elec-
tion Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees. 
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officials and their security partners helped provide additional assurance that the 2020 
election results were legitimate.4 
Unfortunately, analogous measures were not in place to protect many of the peo-
ple—from state and local election administrators to poll workers and vendor staff—
who administered the elections. Due in large part to the incendiary rhetoric from former 
President Donald Trump and his followers, many election officials were threatened and 
harassed, and such behavior shows no signs of abating.5,6,7 Instead of taking steps to 
address this problem, many states have passed or are considering passing laws that 
could make this problem worse.8 Georgia’s new law removed the Georgia’s secretary 
of state—who rejected Donald Trump’s effort’s to overturn the state’s 2020 results—
from decision-making power on the state election board and turned control of the board 
over to a politicized, less knowledgeable body: the state legislature.9,10 Iowa’s new law 
threatens election officials with criminal prosecution for failing to follow new voting 
rules.11  And Florida recently adopted a rule that subjects its local election officials to 
a civil penalty of $25,000 if a drop box at an early voting site is left accessible for the 
return of ballots outside of early voting hours.12  
4  Ropek, L.: The ‘Most Secure’ U.S. Election Was Not Without Problems. Government Tech-
nology, (November 16, 2020). https://www.govtech.com/elections/the-most-secure-us-elec-
tion-was-not-without-problems.html. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
5  Wines, M.: Here Are the Threats Terrorizing Election Workers. New York Times, (December 
3, 2020). https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/us/election-officials-threats-trump.html. Last 
accessed 8 July 2021. 
6  Douglas, J.: Republicans aren’t just making it harder to vote. They’re going after election 
officials, too. Washington Post, (May 9, 2021). https://www.washingtonpost.com/opin-
ions/2021/05/09/republicans-arent-just-making-it-harder-vote-theyre-going-after-election-
officials-too/. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
7  Resnik, B. [@brahmresnik]. NOW Arizona Gov. Doug Ducey's office has assigned state 
troopers to provide round-the-clock protection to @SecretaryHobbs after report of death 
threats. Second time in 6 months that AZ's top elections officer has received law-enforcement 
protection. [Tweet]. Twitter, (May 7, 2021). https://twitter.com/brahmresnik/sta-
tus/1390764118051745794?s=20. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
8  Douglas, J. 
9  Hasen, R.: Republicans Aren’t Done Messing with Elections. New York Times, (April 23, 
2021). https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/23/opinion/republicans-voting-us-elections.html. 
Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
10  Gardner, A.: ‘I just want to find 11,780 votes’: In extraordinary hour-long call, Trump pres-
sures Georgia secretary of state to recalculate the vote in his favor. Washington Post, (January 
3, 2021). https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-raffensperger-call-georgia-
vote/2021/01/03/d45acb92-4dc4-11eb-bda4-615aaefd0555_story.html. Last accessed 8 July 
2021. 
11  Norden, L.: Protecting American Democracy Is No Crime. Foreign Affairs, (April 7, 2021). 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-07/protecting-american-de-
mocracy-no-crime. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
12  Douglas, J. 
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The unrelenting targeting of administrators—along with unfunded election man-
dates, threats, burn out, and fatigue—has pushed many election officials to leave or 
consider leaving their positions.13,14,15,16 According to a recent Democracy Fund/Reed 
College Survey of Local Election Officials, approximately one-third of chief local elec-
tion officials will be eligible to retire before the 2024 election, including more than half 
of those in the largest jurisdictions,  each of which serve more than 250,000 registered 
voters.17 Considering what many of these election officials and their staffs endured dur-
ing the 2020 election cycle, and continue to experience, it would be unwise to simply 
wait and hope that they decide to hang on. Instead, every effort should be made to create 
an environment that is as conducive as possible for retaining these unsung heroes of the 
2020 elections. The ability of the United States to conduct future secure elections may 
well depend on it.  
This paper focuses on measures state and local governments can take in concert with 
their election offices to help retain as many of their high-performing election officials 
as possible. State and local governments should have support from the federal govern-
ment and Congress to help address this national security issue, but if the fight over 
funding the 2020 election is any indication, they should begin taking steps to address 
this problem now. Below are ten suggestions for how state and local governments can 
retain their high-performing election officials.18 None is a “silver bullet,” not all of them 
will be relevant for each state and local government unit, and some governments have 
already taken many of these steps. But in addressing election official retention solu-
tions, these suggestions provide remedies for some of the thorniest problems that elec-
tion officials encounter. 
13  Myers, J.: Political Road Map: Here’s why California counties can ignore a half-dozen elec-
tion laws. Los Angeles Times, (April 2, 2017). https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-ca-
road-map-election-funding-california-20170402-story.html. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
14  Wines, M. 
15  Albiges, M., Lisi, T.: Pa. election officials are burnt out and leaving their jobs after 2020 
‘nightmare’. WHYY, (December 22, 2020). https://whyy.org/articles/pa-election-officials-
are-burnt-out-and-leaving-their-jobs-after-2020-nightmare/. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
16  Democracy Fund and Early Voting Information Center: Local Election Official Interview Re-
port. Fors Marsh Group, (December 15, 2020). https://evic.reed.edu/wp-content/up-
loads/2021/04/leo2020_idi_report.pdf. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
17  Gronke, P., Manson, P., Lee, J., Creek, H.: Amplifying the Perspectives of Officials at the 
Front Lines of Elections. Democracy Fund, (April 19, 2021). https://democra-
cyfund.org/idea/amplifying-the-perspectives-of-officials-at-the-front-lines-of-elections/. 
Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
18  Scheck, T., Hing, G., Robinson, S., Stockton, G.: How Private Money From Facebook's CEO 
Saved The 2020 Election. All Things Considered. National Public Radio, (December 8, 2020). 
https://www.npr.org/2020/12/08/943242106/how-private-money-from-facebooks-ceo-
saved-the-2020-election. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
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2 Recommendations 
2.1 Ask your election officials what can be done to support them further. 
During 2020, election officials had to administer elections while there was an ongoing 
threat from foreign adversaries coupled with a pandemic, civil unrest, and widespread, 
unjustified suspicion about their work. Just as election officials sought to understand 
what their voters needed, governments should seek to understand what their election 
officials need most to succeed. Asking officials questions is a good first step. 
As part of this process, it could also be useful to ask election officials what skills 
they’re most comfortable with and which they would like to develop.19 Inquire about 
areas that feel especially challenging. This can be done by discussing the parts of the 
jobs they feel are the most interesting and rewarding, the areas that are the most chal-
lenging, what they are doing to reach short- and long-term career goals, and what other 
projects, committees, or additional issues they would like to explore. Asking such ques-
tions not only shows empathy and understanding, but could lead to information that 
creates more effective training and development programs, which are critical to increas-
ing employee retention.20 
2.2 If there was turnover among your election officials, ask why. 
Examine turnover rates from the 2020 election cycle to the present for both election 
management and front-line staff and see how they compare to previous similar election 
cycles. Often, the reasons management and front-line staff provide for leaving a job, 
including elections, can be very different.21 This information should help inform the 
degree to which the unique circumstances surrounding the 2020 elections have affected 
the retention of your own election officials. These rates, combined with feedback from 
election officials, should give governments a better sense of how retention could be 
affected by future elections that are as contentious as 2020.  
2.3 Consider the cost of election official employee turnover, or the “total cost” 
of losing an employee. 
If governments and their election officials can help show the costs that employee turn-
over from accumulated strain caused by contentious elections—like the 2020 presiden-
tial election—is having on their workforces, that could make it easier to seek additional 
funding for retaining high performing election administrators and addressing other 
19  Rogers, M.: A Better Way to Develop and Retain Top Talent. Harvard Business Review, 
(January 20, 2020). https://hbr.org/2020/01/a-better-way-to-develop-and-retain-top-talent. 
Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Katzenbach, J., Santamaria, J.: Firing Up the Front Line. Harvard Business Review, (May–
June 1999). https://hbr.org/1999/05/firing-up-the-front-line. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
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priorities.22 Since the exact costs of employee turnover vary, it is something all employ-
ers, including election offices, need to monitor. One study found that the average costs 
to replace those earning under $30,000 a year was 16 percent of their annual salary; the 
average costs to replace those earning $30,000–$50,000 a year was 20 percent of their 
annual salary; and the cost to replace executive positions could cost up to 213 percent.23 
If officials do not already have systems in place to track such costs, they should reach 
out to colleagues in relevant departments, such as human resources, finance, and oper-
ations to develop tools to measures these costs and reporting mechanisms to track them. 
The costs of election turnover should include: 1) computing the cost of hiring a new 
employee including the advertising, interviewing, screening and hiring;24 2) determin-
ing the cost of onboarding a new person, including training and management time; 3) 
accounting for lost productivity – due to the different kinds of elections that occur in 
each state over a four year period and the wide array of skills needed to perform the job 
well, it can often take a new election official up to four years to reach the productivity 
of an existing person;25 4) factoring in lost engagement—other employees who see high 
turnover tend to disengage and lose productivity; 5) adjusting for customer service and 
errors—new employees generally take longer and are often less adept at solving prob-
lems; and 6) accounting for training—during a new election official’s first few years, 
the office is often likely to invest more of the employee’s salary in training. 
2.4 Compare the compensation of your election administrators to other 
government employees with similar responsibilities and adjust 
appropriately. 
According to a recent survey, the top reason workers quit their jobs for new ones is so 
they can make more money.26 Currently, the typical local election official makes about 
$50,000 annually, which appears to be more on par with administrative support posi-
tions than positions with commensurate skills.27 In short, election administrators are 
underpaid. 
22  Bersin, J.: Employee Retention Now a Big Issue: Why the Tide has Turned. LinkedIn, (August 
16, 2013). https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/20130816200159-131079-employee-retention-
now-a-big-issue-why-the-tide-has-turned/. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
23  Boushey, H., Glynn, S.: There Are Significant Business Costs to Replacing Employees. Cen-
ter for American Progress, (November 16, 2012). https://www.americanprogress.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2012/11/CostofTurnover.pdf. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
24  Bersin, J. 
25  Gronke, P., Manson, P., Lee, J., Creek, H. 
26  Why They ‘Quit You.’ Payscale, (2019). https://www.payscale.com/data/why-people-quit-
their-jobs. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
27  Adona, N., Gronke, P., Manson, P., Cole, S.: Stewards of Democracy: The Views of American 
Local Election Officials. Democracy Fund, (2018). https://democracyfund.org/wp-con-




Election officials’ jobs were once clerical in nature and more akin to record-keeping, 
but those days are long gone.28,29 Today, they’re often expected to be in experts in nu-
merous disciplines, including cybersecurity, communications, logistics, finance, elec-
tion law, public administration, public health, and human resources.30 State election 
administrators often rely on information from many of these disciplines to make deci-
sions about the rules of elections.31 Local elections officials must flawlessly fulfill many 
of these roles to successfully administer an election.32 This includes finding polling 
places, recruiting workers, and running the day-to-day operations of voter registration 
and voting, as well as preserving the integrity of elections by protecting against intru-
sions into voter rolls and local election official websites, and working closely with fed-
eral and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.33 If key election 
administrators are not paid comparably to other government employees with similar 
responsibilities, retaining them is likely to be a greater challenge. 
2.5 Establish a Government Resource Group. 
One strategy used for helping keep talent in many industries, including elections, is to 
establish a resource group.34 An employee resource group is a network within an em-
ployer where employees get together based on shared characteristics, experiences, or 
goals. Such a group offers a chance to network and socialize, work on professional 
development, and raise awareness of relevant issues. While many election officials 
have groups with other election officials elsewhere, the governments that they work for 
should strongly consider forming such groups if they have not already.  
28  Report of the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission on Compensation Of General 
Registrars to the Governor and the General Assembly of Virginia. Senate Document 5. Com-
monwealth of Virginia, (1992). http://jlarc.virginia.gov/pdfs/reports/Rpt130.pdf. Last ac-
cessed 8 July 2021. 
29  Levine, D.: The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard 
America’s election system. Alliance for Securing Democracy. German Marshall Fund, (Feb-
ruary 13, 2020). https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/The-
Election-Officials-Handbook.pdf. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
30  Howard, E.: 5 Things You May Not Know About Local Election Officials. Brennen Center 
for Justice, (October 26, 2020). https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/5-
things-you-may-not-know-about-local-election-officials. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
31  The State and Local Role in Election Administration: Duties and Structures. Congressional 
Research Service, (March 4, 2019). https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45549.pdf. Last accessed 8 
July 2021. 
32  Election Administration at State and Local Levels. National Conference of State Legislatures, 
(February 3, 2020). https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/election-admin-
istration-at-state-and-local-levels.aspx. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
33  Chase, M.: Letter on FY 2020 Elections Appropriations. National Association of Counties, 
(December 10, 2019). https://naco.sharefile.com/share/view/s8aabb5333a74ce8b. Last ac-
cessed 8 July 2021. 
34  3 Simple Ways to Recruit and Retain Top Military Talent. Yello. https://yello.co/blog/3-sim-
ple-ways-to-recruit-and-retain-top-military-talent/. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
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Many of the challenges election officials faced in the 2020 election cycle are an 
unfortunate outgrowth of decreasing trust in government and increasing amounts of 
mis- and disinformation, challenges that employees throughout government are con-
fronting, not just in elections.35 Election officials often depend on large numbers of 
fellow government employees, particularly around election time, to serve as poll work-
ers, process voter registration applications, and help conduct their elections. A govern-
ment resource group, particularly one geared towards how to address abusive members 
of the public, could go a long way towards strengthening this collaboration by enabling 
election and non-election employees to get to know one another better. Such groups 
can help employees form friendships across departments, which can supercharge an 
employee’s engagement. They also enable employees to act together to address com-
mon issues and spread awareness, and contribute to higher retention rates.36 
2.6 Offer election administrators flexible working conditions when possible. 
Flexible working conditions are not always in possible in elections, particularly as elec-
tion day gets closer and the demands on election officials from candidates, voters, ob-
servers, and others increase.37 However, the pandemic provided an opportunity for 
many election officials to learn how to conduct more of their work remotely and with 
flexible work hours, and thousands of election officials responded by taking security 
training that made it easier for them to work remotely yet securely during the first 
Covid-19 peak in the spring and summer of 2020.38,39 For example, many election of-
fices can input and validate voter registration and mail ballot application requests re-
motely after the hardcopy originals are scanned and securely shared with necessary 
employees. And nearly all elections officials can do a good deal of their phone-based 
work, such as the recruitment and confirmation of poll workers and polling places, out-
side the workplace as well.40 
35  Aguilera, J.: 'An Epidemic of Misinformation.' New Report Finds Trust in Social Institutions 
Diminished Further in 2020. Time Magazine, (January 13, 2021). 
https://time.com/5929252/edelman-trust-barometer-2021/. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
36  Asare, J.: How to Retain Diverse Talent. Forbes, (September 26, 2018). 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/janicegassam/2018/09/26/how-to-retain-diverse-ta-
lent/?sh=261deb322d33. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
37  Election Administration at State and Local Levels. National Conference of State Legislatures. 
38  Freed, B.: Annual election security tabletop drill put officials through 'Armageddon-like' test. 
StateScoop, (July 31, 2020). https://statescoop.com/dhs-election-tabletop-exercise-2020/. 
Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
39  Norden, L., Ramachandran, G.: Election Officials Spent Four Years Beefing Up Voting Se-
curity. It Paid Off. Slate, (November 12, 2020). https://slate.com/technology/2020/11/elec-
tion-security-2020-pandemic.html. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
40  Safeguarding Staff and Work Environment from Covid-19. Election Infrastructure Govern-
ment Coordinating Council, (May 28, 2020). https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/election-




While many election processes—such as voting equipment preparation, mail ballot 
signature validation, and provisional ballot adjudication—will continue to occur at the 
workplace, the successes achieved from working remotely should be built upon because 
they can be a win-win situation for both election officials and their governments.41 
Election administrators can save time and money to commute, have improved work-
life balance and fewer distractions and, be more productive.42 Governments may be 
able to save on some infrastructure costs and overhead costs, and reduce absenteeism.43 
Organizations that provide the option for remote work have 25 percent lower employee 
turnover; state and local governments would be wise to heed this warning if they hope 
to retain their best election officials.44 
2.7 Advocate for consolidating elections to no more than three per year. 
Election officials know firsthand the cost, administrative burden, and job stress caused 
by the near constancy of elections in some states and localities, which can increase the 
likelihood of significant mistakes being made and make retaining election officials 
harder. Others in state and local governments may not feel the administrative burden 
and job stress as acutely, but they are certainly aware of the cost. Consolidating elec-
tions to no more than three per year would enable election officials to keep their skills 
sharp while also lessening costs and reducing election officials’ stress. It could also 
help increase turnout in both local and national elections.45 
Consolidated elections admittedly are not perfect, and they require a good deal of 
change. For example, consolidated elections often lead to longer ballots, which can 
increase wait times at polling places.46 However, other measures such as expanded pre-
election day voting and a more efficient allocation of staff and voting machines at 
41  Ibid. 
42  Choudhury, P.: Our Work-from-Anywhere Future. Harvard Business Review, (November–
December 2020). https://hbr.org/2020/11/our-work-from-anywhere-future. Last accessed 8 
July 2021. 
43  Edwards, K., Zaber, M., Girven, R.: Should the Federal Workforce Stay Remote? Planning 
for After the Crisis. The RAND Blog, (April 3, 2020). 
https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/04/should-the-federal-workforce-stay-remote-planning-
for.html. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
44  Top 26 Employee Retention Strategies for the “New” Work World! The Vantage Circle, (July 
7, 2021). https://blog.vantagecircle.com/employee-retention-strategies/. Last accessed 8 July 
2021. 
45  Phillips, C.: The Effect of Election Consolidation on Turnout: Evidence from California. 
Presentation to the Election Sciences, Reform, and Administration Conference in Philadel-
phia, Pennsylvania, (July 2, 2019). https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/web.sas.up-
enn.edu/dist/7/538/files/2019/07/Connor-Phillips-ESRA-Paper.pdf. Last accessed 8 July 
2021. 
46  The American Voting Experience: Report and Recommendations of the Presidential Com-
mission on Election Administration. Presidential Commission on Election Administration, 
(January 2014). http://web.mit.edu/supportthevoter/www/files/2014/01/Amer-Voting-Exper-
final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
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polling places can help offset such an increase, and most local election officials support 
consolidating local, state, and federal elections so that they occur at the same time.47 
2.8 Make sure election officials are aware of all current security protections in 
place. 
This includes any arrangements with law enforcement, office and worktime security 
measures, and tools available to help ensure their personal physical security. A meeting 
between election officials and local law enforcement can help confirm existing protec-
tions and identify any potential gaps. Such efforts can also be aided by your local Cy-
bersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) protective security advisor 
(PSA).48 PSAs are trained critical infrastructure protection and vulnerability mitigation 
subject matter experts whose expertise protecting cyber, physical, and human compo-
nents of critical infrastructure, like elections, makes them both an advisor and a natural 
go-between for election officials and law enforcement. 
2.9 Develop a plan to provide more enhanced protection for election officials 
going forward. 
During the 2020 election cycle, state and local election administrators across the coun-
try received violent threats at work, at home, and elsewhere.49,50,51 Some of these offi-
cials feared simply administering an election in which a defeated candidate’s most ar-
dent followers could refuse to accept the results. Retaining many of them will be diffi-
cult unless more can be done to ensure they feel safe. One place to look for developing 
a more robust security plan for election officials is federal judges, who are often subject 
to threats well beyond the courtroom due to the availability of personal information 
online.52 In the same way that election administrators can represent or personify the 
election system, judges and other judicial officials can represent or personify the justice 
47  Gronke, P., Manson, P., Lee, J., Creek, H. 
48  Running Elections Without Fear: Ensuring Physical Safety for Election Personnel. The Elec-
tions Group, (2020). https://electionsgroup.com/assets/Running%20Elections%20With-
out%20Fear.pdf. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
49  Marks, J.: The Cybersecurity 202: Violent threats only make elections more vulnerable, ex-
perts fear. Washington Post, (December 3, 2020). https://www.washingtonpost.com/poli-
tics/2020/12/03/cybersecurity-202-violent-threats-only-make-elections-more-vulnerable/.  
50  Huseman, J.: For Election Administrators, Death Threats Have Become Part of the Job. 
ProPublica, (August 21, 2020). https://www.propublica.org/article/for-election-administra-
tors-death-threats-have-become-part-of-the-job. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
51  Running Elections Without Fear: Ensuring Physical Safety for Election Personnel. The Elec-
tions Group. 
52  Judicial Security: Safeguarding Courts and Protecting Judges. Judicature 104(3), (Fall–Winter 
2020-21). https://judicature.duke.edu/articles/judicial-security-safeguarding-courts-and-pro-
tecting-judges/. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
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system; in both cases, the motive for an attack can arise out of anger at the respective 
systems or simply a desire for revenge.53 
Like federal judges, all election officials should have access to safety education pro-
grams that offer trainings on a wide range of threats and how to reduce exposure to 
them.54 And like federal judges, state and local governments could also consider more 
expensive actions as their budgets allow, such as installing and/or updating security 
systems in their election officials’ offices; installing security systems at election offi-
cials’ homes on an as needed basis; hiring additional security in response to a potential 
threat; and/or monitoring the public availability of election officials’ personally identi-
fiable information and referring suspicious posts to the appropriate law enforcement 
authorities.55 Governments should also consult with their legal counsel to see if they 
can devise a legal strategy for helping deter untoward behavior by election officials. 
This could include conducting a public messaging campaign that describes how best to 
interact with election administrators for optimal results, while also noting the conse-
quences for abusive behavior and harassment. It could also include designating a legal 
liaison to the elections office to help ensure that any potential illicit conduct towards 
elections officials is quickly reported and addressed. 
2.10 Form a task force made up of government employees to advocate for 
legislative measures that support your government’s work, including your 
election officials.   
Over the past several months, many states have either adopted or introduced legislation 
that penalizes election administrators and workers.56 Georgia’s new law gives the leg-
islature the power to pick an official who could vote on the state election board for a 
temporary takeover of up to four county election boards during the time when an elec-
tion is being administered.57 Iowa makes it a crime if election workers violate its new 
rules.58 And Florida has enacted a law that says, “If any drop box at an early voting site 
is left accessible for the return of ballots outside of early voting hours, the supervisor is 
subject to a civil penalty of $25,000.”59 
Election administration often requires making decisions in the heat of closely con-
tested elections. As a former election administrator myself, I regularly made many such 
decisions to both protect an individual’s right to vote and ensure the integrity of the 
53  Reynolds, M.: An attack on a judge's family is putting judicial security center stage. ABA 
Journal, (October 1, 2020). https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/attack-on-judges-family-
puts-judicial-security-center-stage. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
54  Judicial Security: Safeguarding Courts and Protecting Judges. Judicature. 
55  Reynolds, M. 
56  Norden, L. 
57  Hasen, R. 
58  Douglas, J. 
59  Senate Bill 90. Florida State Senate, (2021). https://www.flsenate.gov/Ses-
sion/Bill/2021/90/BillText/e1/PDF. Last accessed 8 July 2021. 
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election, knowing there were robust laws in place to hold me accountable if I acted 
inappropriately. Exposing election officials to additional, unnecessary civil or criminal 
liability for such actions could make them afraid to act in such situations and less likely 
to want to stay in the field. 
3 Conclusion 
Election administrators have taken oaths to support the Constitution, which forms the 
basis of the rule of law. Elections must be administered in a genuine and democratic 
manner. Election administrators that are concerned for their safety or burnt out from 
the stress of the job are more likely to perform poorly or even leave the profession. 
Every citizen, regardless of political affiliation, should want to make sure these defend-
ers of democracy are comfortable performing their legal obligations and administering 
safe, secure, and transparent elections. Governments that adopt more of this reports’ 
suggestions could go a long way towards making this goal a reality, which in turn could 
make it easier to retain our best defenders of democracy. 
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Abstract. The principle of secrecy is one of the most important tools
to guarantee a voting process without undue influence to the voter. How-
ever, the concepts of the secret ballot and secret vote have strong ties to
voting in a controlled environment in the polling station, and remote vot-
ing methods like postal voting or Internet voting need to employ special
measures and approaches to achieve similar results. At the same time,
limited options of observing the tallying process remotely potentially un-
dermines the trust in remote voting. This paper looks at possible ways
of giving the voter some feedback and assurance in the integrity of their
vote, at the same time adhering to the freedom of voting principle. The
Estonian Internet voting system is used as a model case for evaluation
of a possible feedback channel architecture.
Keywords: Voting feedback, freedom of voting, secrecy of vote, Internet
voting, remote voting
1 Introduction
Freedom of voting – the principle where the voter is able to cast his or her vote
without undue influence – is one of the cornerstones of the democratic process.
Secrecy of the vote is one of the most important tools to achieve this goal.
However, the way we understand vote secrecy is closely related to the concept of
traditional voting – the ballot is filled in privately in the voting booth, and then
deposited into the ballot box. However, many voting methods also deviate from
this scheme. One example is postal voting, where there is no control whether the
ballot is filled in privately, and no solid guarantees can be given that the ballot
sent through mail is not lost, opened, or tampered with.
In general, once the paper vote is cast in the ballot box (or the envelope
with a ballot posted in mail) the voter has no way of verifying how their vote
is processed and counted. Observation of voting and vote counting procedures
are meant to ensure the integrity of the tally. While the voter’s participation is
recorded in the the voter list and the data of the voter lists can be compared
to the final tally, the path of the vote itself – anonymous ballot – is untraceable
by the voter. This is usually not a problem if the trust towards the election
management is high enough. However, it can be a problem if the trust is low,
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especially if there are doubts about the elections being conducted in a free and
fair way.
Internet voting (i-voting) provides new challenges when implementing ballot
secrecy. A well-implemented i-voting system can use cryptography to guarantee
that the ballot is sent and received as intended, with its integrity untouched.
An observer or an auditor can make sure that all the votes cast are accounted
for, that the votes included in the tally are the same as cast, and that the votes
were tabulated correctly. However, voters themselves cannot fully verify i-voting
results and people need to have absolute faith in the accuracy, honesty and
security of the whole electoral system [38]. The path of their vote is something
voters cannot trace or observe directly, and this can undermine the trust in
the i-voting system. Trustworthiness of i-voting is more and more connected
to additional confirmations given to the voter about the vote being handled
correctly and processed as required by law.
However, the more information we give to the voter about their vote, the
more the secrecy of the vote is undermined. In order to ensure freedom of the
vote, it should not be possible to use this information against the voter. Secrecy
of the vote should remain intact and voters should not find themselves in a
weaker position against possible malefactors because their voting information is
revealed.
Another problem in regards to i-voting and vote secrecy is the voting environ-
ment, which should ensure voter privacy. This cannot be guaranteed by election
administration when the voter is voting from the location of their choice using
a personal computer. Hence there are inherent risks present, like a possibility of
malware tampering with the vote, or taking over the electronic identity used to
authenticate the voter and sign the encrypted ballot. The worst-case scenario
is that a malicious actor casts the vote using voter’s electronic identity without
the voter even knowing it. The observers and auditors cannot review how the
vote was cast at the location of the voter. This presents a need for additional
checks available to the voter. Merely the confirmation that the i-voting tally is
verifiably correct doesn’t address this concern. This concern is not limited to
i-voting either.
Therefore it would be beneficial to give voters further confirmation about
how their vote is handled with a goal to increase the trust in voting in general.
Another issue to consider is that such measures should not make voting arrange-
ments too complex for the voter, as not to restrict access to voting. In this paper
we will examine whether this can be achieved without significantly weakening
vote secrecy.
In order to have a more concrete treatment of the topic, we will be using
Estonian Internet voting as the example case study throughout this paper. In
the Parliamentary and European Parliament elections of 2019, the share of i-
votes cast was 43.8% and 46,7% of participating voters, respectively [14]. Thus
legitimacy of elections in Estonia very much hinges on the perceived trust of
i-voting. Estonian i-voting system features both individual verification (intro-
duced in 2013 [32]) and server-side auditing (introduced in 2017 [29]). Swiss and
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Norwegian i-voting solutions have implemented individual and universal verifica-
tion solutions as well. The Swiss Post e-voting solution uses verification of votes
cast both individually by voters and universally by the electoral commission [17].
The Norwegian i-voting system used return codes for individual verification and
server side auditing [26]. Individual verification is limited to confirming that the
voter’s vote was received as intended by the vote collecting service. Server-side
auditing, on the other hand, allows to certify that the votes as a complete set
have been tallied correctly. However, the popularity of i-voting in Estonia has
initiated debate over 1) how freedom of vote and vote secrecy are guaranteed
for Internet voting, and 2) what measures would increase general trust in the
system [13]. Contributing to this discussion is the main motivation behind the
current paper.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a discussion on the
concept of secret ballot that has been traditionally used to guarantee voting
freedom. We also take a broader look at remote voting environments to under-
stand how far is it reasonable to go with the vote secrecy requirement in this
setting. Section 3 studies a possible additional feedback channel notifying the
voter on the fact that a vote has been cast on their behalf. We analyse possible
implementations of such a channel together with their impact on voting freedom.
Finally, Section 4 presents some conclusions and sets directions for future work.
2 Concept of the secret ballot
2.1 Secrecy of the vote
Vote secrecy hasn’t always been a requirement when conducting elections. Before
mid-19th century it was rather a standard to vote openly, e.g. via stating one’s
preference out loud, or using visually distinguishable ballot sheets. Of course this
also encouraged various coercive practices. To counter these, voting by secret
ballot was introduced, with Australia being one of the first countries where it
was systematically implemented [22, 41].
Today the requirement of vote secrecy has been stated in the highest level
of international legislative acts. The United Nations International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (UN CCPR) [3, Art 25], United Nations Universal
Declaration of Human Rights [1, Art 21] as well as the European Convention
of Human Rights (ECHR) [2, Art 3 of Prot I] state that voting shall be held
by secret ballot. UN CCPR’s General Comment 25 [4] adds that states should
take measures to guarantee the requirement of the secrecy of the vote during
elections, implying that voters should be protected from any form of coercion or
compulsion to disclose how they intend to vote or how they voted, and from any
unlawful or arbitrary interference with the voting process.
On electronic voting, Article 3.2 (iv) of the Council of Europe (CoE) Venice
Commission’s Code of Good Practice In Electoral Matters states that that the
(electronic) voters should be able to obtain a confirmation of their votes and
to correct them, if necessary, respecting secret suffrage [6]. The CoE recommen-
dation CM/Rec(2017)5 [12] on standards for e-voting makes several suggestions
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towards maintaining vote secrecy. Article 23 of the Appendix to CM/Rec(2017)5
states that an e-voting system shall not provide the voter with proof of the con-
tent of the vote cast for use by third parties. Article 24 states that e-voting shall
ensure that the secrecy of previous choices recorded and erased by the voter
before issuing his or her final vote is respected.
The Code of Good Practice in Electoral Matters elaborates on the concept
of secret suffrage on the voter’s side as well. It states that for the voter, secrecy
of voting is not only a right, but a duty as well. It also requires that voting
must be individual, and that the list of persons actually voting should not be
published [6, Art 4]. In the explanatory report, the Venice Commission explains
that the purpose of the secrecy of the ballot is to shield voters from pressures
they might face if others learned how they had voted [6, Par 52]. Moreover, since
abstention may indicate a political choice, list of persons voting should not be
published [6, Par 54].
From the voter’s point of view, perceived vote secrecy is not necessarily equal
to formal vote secrecy interpreted and implemented by the Electoral Manage-
ment Body (EMB). The voters must also believe that the election administration
operates in a way that their choices are kept secret (psychologically secret bal-
lot) [27]. I-voting adds another dimension here, since the voters must additionally
believe that other voters respect privacy and secrecy of the vote. Additionally,
voters might feel socially obligated to reveal their votes, or they can believe that
other voters might do so (social secrecy of the ballot) [27].
In the jurisprudence of the model case of Estonia, the current thinking regard-
ing secrecy and Internet voting is based on the teleological approach, meaning
that constitutional principles should be understood through the problems these
principles were meant to solve [24]. It was first noted in 2004 as the underlying
motivation for the draft legislation allowing for Internet voting [24]. In addition
to that, the second source of the current approach is the liberal idea of trusting
the voter [24, 36]. The principle of secrecy would protect an individual from any
pressure or influence against her or his free expression of a political preference.
Thus, the principle of secrecy is a means, not an end goal [24, 37]. Influence
resistance in the Estonian i-voting system is guaranteed by the possibility of
re-voting, thus the principle of secrecy, the end goal, is actually achieved [36].
This approach has now been generally accepted and expanded on [35, 37, 38] as
not just the reasoning behind the original draft legislation, but as the actual
explanation to how Internet voting conforms to the principle of secret ballot.
There remains a question whether the second part of reasoning – that the
voter should be trusted – is applicable to the principle of secrecy. Vote secrecy
cannot be understood as just optional, i.e. it’s not just up to the voter to de-
cide [19], but remote internet voting requires rethinking of the privacy princi-
ple [36, 37]. In support of a more traditional approach, Buchstein in 2004 (before
the first i-enabled Estonian elections in 2005) argued for the sanctity of the
secret ballot, while admitting that Drechsler’s and Madise’s interpretation and
Estonian constitutional debate comes in as a possible starting point for a paradig-
matic change [23]. There were also concerns that the transition towards voting
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more from home, the concept of election may change without a real discussion on
how that may weaken the voters’ consciousness of a secret and personal vote [40].
This paradigmatic change has occurred, to an extent, when considering i-voting
initiatives in Estonia, Switzerland and Norway, but also the raise in popularity
of postal voting in general. The aforementioned countries have developed their
i-voting system in line with the international standards and recommendations,
while monitoring the experiences of other countries [21]. The updated CoE rec-
ommendation on i-voting CM/Rec(2017), now at its second iteration, reflects
this change as well.
In practice vote secrecy on voter’s side has been difficult to enforce, as many
voters do not care about secrecy or do want to make their choice known, because
of the social secrecy of the ballot as described by Gerber et al. [27].
2.2 Secrecy of participation in voting
Additional consideration should be given to how the principle of secrecy relates
to voter’s participation in voting. The Venice Commission has explained that
voter lists with information on who voted shouldn’t be published and abstention
is a from of political choice [6, Par 54].
At the same time, when we look at voting as a general process, full participa-
tion secrecy is impossible to implement as voting in the polling station is public
by nature. In regards to social secrecy of the vote, voters are often encouraged
to participate and make their participation known by election stakeholders. This
can possibly lead to problems in maintaining vote secrecy as well. For example,
in Sweden, where ballots are printed separately for each party, party activists
hand out ballots in front of the polling place to their voters. If the voter takes
just one ballot, the content of the ballot is then known to bystanders [25].
The act of voting and content of the ballot are not approached the same way
by voters and election stakeholders. As a result, voter lists (at least individual
data of a voter) do not really fall under the umbrella of maintaining vote se-
crecy. In the past, personalised data on Internet voters has even been studied by
researchers [35].
As for our model case of the Estonian Internet voting system, the current
regulations stipulate that all data on Internet voters shared for scientific pur-
poses must be made anonymous (including voting logs) [8, Par 77-1 (2)]. As for
polling station voter lists that have been traditionally on paper, access to them
is limited to the voters (personal information only) and parties; candidates and
their representatives must justify why they need access (e.g in case of an elec-
tions dispute) [8, Par 23 (2)]. Additionally, the data can be used for scientific
purposes. Thus the data concerning the voter is always available to the person
without limitations, but the voter list data cannot be published or released to
third parties except in cases stipulated by the law.
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2.3 Challenges of keeping vote secrecy while increasing voter trust
in the modern voting environment
A modern voting environment can include several methods of voting that differ
in how much direct control the EMB has over it. Voting in a polling station
takes place in a standardized environment, under control of the polling station
staff. At the same time, the ballot box voting arrangements at home, overseas
or at hospitals can be less convenient for the voter. On the other side of the
spectrum are off-site voting methods like postal voting and Internet voting, be-
ing conducted without any supervision of the election administration. The vote
delivery channel (mail or Internet) is in such cases not controlled by the EMB
either.
If we accept that:
1. maintaining vote secrecy is not just the task of the EMB, but also of the
voter,
2. not all ballots are cast under the direct supervision of election administra-
tion,
3. vote secrecy is just means to achieve the principle goal of free elections,
voters should also have the appropriate tools to be able to achieve that goal.
There are already a few measures at the disposal of the voter (with the
implementation details varying across jurisdictions), e.g.:
– The voter can vote on the election day at a polling station and then observe
the election procedures up to the end of vote counting. This gives a certain
level of confidence that the voter’s personal ballot (among other ballots) was
not tampered with. Here the voter has to trust their own observation.
– Voters can check their data in the voter list, which includes information
on whether they have voted, and possibly also the voting method that was
used (i.e. Internet voting, voting outside the territory of their municipality
or constituency). However, if the voter must personally access the voter list
(or request the information from the EMB) then this requires action on
voter’s part and the voters must also be aware of the possibility. Therefore
it is unlikely to provide any statistically significant amount of verifiability to
increase trust in elections in general.
– An Internet voter could verify that the vote cast was received and stored as
intended. There are several ways to implement this. For example, in Esto-
nia, a smart device application is used for verification [32], but it does not
help in the case when the voter is unaware that someone has cast a vote on
their behalf. Since this method requires action on the voter’s side, it hasn’t
achieved wide usage. The share of i-votes verified by the voters has remained
between 4-5 per cent of all i-votes since 2014 [14]. It can be used to detect
certain mass attacks against i-voting (e.g. when malware is trying to manip-
ulate active voting sessions), but not all of them (e.g. when malware itself
initiates the sessions without voter participation).
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– In case of postal voting in Finland, the postal voter and the voting procedure
have to be accompanied by two independent witnesses who could attest in
writing that the freedom of vote and vote secrecy have been adhered to in
this process [33, 39].
None of these measures undermine vote secrecy, but the problem is that these
methods are limited in scope and they presume significant extra actions from
the voters.
In order to certify one’s vote, there are also other methods that are either
discouraged by EMBs or not supported by legislation.
– Voters can take a photo of their ballots in the polling booth, or screen capture
their choices in the Internet voting app or verification app. The voter can
also live broadcast their voting from the polling booth [20]. This provides
some (although quite a weak form of) proof that the vote has been cast
correctly. This also lets the voter publish the image of the ballot taking,
thus conflicting the vote secrecy principle.
– Voters can also mark their paper ballots in a way that it would be recogniz-
able during the vote counting. If the voter (or some other informed party)
then observes the count, they can make notice whether and how their vote
was counted [42]. This is also possible for Internet voting, for example mod-
ifying the choice on the ballot in a way that the i-vote will be counted as
invalid. As an example, there have been actual cases of sending in invalid
votes in case of Estonian i-voting [30, 31].
The two above channels are violating the vote secrecy requirement, presenting
proof of the contents of the ballot, thus making the voter more vulnerable to
undue coercion. However, neither of the methods is something the EMB can
directly block. In such cases it should be up to the legislation and EMB to
determine if the act of vote is impermissible or the vote invalid.
In Finland, for example, the votes that contain extra markings on them are
declared invalid by law [5, Par 85 (6)]. However, in Estonia, such a regulation
does not exist. In fact the law stipulates that if the ballot is not filled correctly
(e.g. the number of the candidate is not written on the correct spot), but the
choice of the voter is otherwise understood (e.g. the name of the candidate was
written on the ballot), the ballot is considered valid [8, Par 57 (6) 8)]. This
presents an opportunity for the voters to get creative, enabling tracking of their
votes. As for taking pictures of ballots (and publishing them), restricting these
activities is even more complicated.
In the case of stemfies (ballot selfies), it is also apparent that the legislation
and our general understanding of the secrecy have not kept up with the tech-
nological advancements [20]. It is unclear, whether and how such voter-initiated
deviation from secrecy should be blocked and enforced by law, especially for
remote voting. The consensus in this hasn’t been reached yet. For example Sec-
tion 56 (6) 5a of German Federal Electoral Regulations states that the Electoral
Board must turn away any voter whom they find taking photos or videos in the
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voting booth [7]. At the same time, in The Netherlands taking ballot selfies is al-
lowed, although not encouraged [11]. Stemfies can also spark debate about other
human rights and freedoms. European Court of Human Rights has ruled [15]
that forbidding to use a mobile app to publish voter’s ballot was in conflict with
the Art 10 (Freedom of Expression) of the European Convention on Human
Rights [2].
In summary, to improve voter’s control over how voting is handled, we should
be looking for a solution that wouldn’t interfere with vote secrecy, give voters
a way to verify their vote was handled correctly, and that would be universal
enough to achieve statistically significant amount of checks.
A possible way to achieve the latter goal is to require as little action from the
voter as possible. As we saw above, one of the main attack vectors not detected
by the current verification mechanisms is malware that casts votes without the
voter knowing about it. A similar problem occurs if the voter’s eID is taken over
physically. To detect such attacks, the system can be augmented with a feedback
channel that gets triggered every time a vote is cast on voter’s behalf. Next we
will be studying the options of establishing such a channel.
3 Establishing a feedback channel
3.1 Feedback on the fact of casting a vote
When introducing a feedback channel, our goal is to give i-voters additional
assurance that they have (or have not!) voted. On the other hand, we do not
want to publish the proof in a way that it would render re-voting as a measure
to maintain voting freedom inefficient.
Currently, the Estonian system allows to get feedback on several levels.
– Confirmation that the vote collecting service has received the i-vote and
received it as intended. In Estonia this is currently implemented by the
smart device verification app.
– Confirmation that the i-vote was included in the set of i-votes that are going
to be tallied. Since the list of i-voters is created by the Internet voting system,
a voter can check if their i-vote is included in this list, but this action is very
inconvenient to the voters (see Section 2.3).
– Confirmation that the i-vote was amongst the i-votes tallied. Currently no
feedback for the voter exists here, but the integrity of the i-vote set is verified
by the EMB and auditors.
– Confirmation that the vote was counted as intended. Currently no feedback
for the voter exists here, but the result can be verified by the tallying proof by
the EMB, auditors and by anyone who has created an auditing application.
What is missing from this list is a passive method for getting information
about the vote being received by the system. If such a feedback on voting par-
ticipation only reveals the fact that the voter has voted at some point, then the
clash with the principle of vote secrecy is minimal. It would, however, imply that
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the voter has not abstained from voting. In such a way, giving a notification that
a person has i-voted would be similar to situation when someone would take a
photo of a voter leaving a polling station.
Introducing a voting fact feedback channel would benefit the voter in two
main ways:
1. the voter would get assurance that the vote has been received and stored;
and
2. even if the voter did not vote, absence of the voting notification would con-
firm that no-one else has not voted for them.
Both confirmations would be useful to both i-voters and paper ballot voters.
The assurance for the voter that no-one has cast a vote on their behalf can
hopefully increase trust in the elections, including Internet voting.
Recall, however, that the ability to withstand coercion attacks relies on the
possibility to cast re-votes in the Estonian system. Thus, assurance about which
vote was processed (tallied) would potentially weaken the position of the i-voter,
since this would reveal whether the coerced vote was later changed or not.
In conclusion, the feedback notification should just acknowledge the fact of
receiving a vote by the system, but not much else (including the exact time,
or the information whether it was a re-vote or not; see Section 3.3 for further
discussion). Such a confirmation would be the most in line with the current
legislation, not requiring to rethink how vote secrecy should be understood and
protected.
In Estonia, such a system would be relatively easy to implement, since from
2021, electronic voter lists will be deployed. Amongst other features, it would
enable the possibility to give voters automatic feedback whether they have voted,
since this information is entered in the electronic voter list in real time.
Electronic voter lists make it possible for all (i.e. both paper and electronic)
voters to receive such notifications. This is a positive outcome, since equal treat-
ment of paper ballot and Internet voters has been a source of disagreement in
Estonia before [9].
3.2 Setting up the feedback channel and automation
The method of giving feedback should be considered as well. The feedback chan-
nel should be set up in a way that the information is easily accessible only to the
voter. At the same time, it should be universal enough so that as many voters
as possible are able to get this confirmation. An example would be an e-mail
or SMS sent to the voter. The message can contain just the notification on the
fact of voting, or an access link requiring further identification (eID in Estonia’s
case).
The biggest advantage of using automated feedback is that it would notify
the voters if their credentials have been used to cast the vote. So if the voter’s
electronic ID has been compromised and a vote has been cast on the voter’s
behalf, the voter would be notified immediately and would be able to take action.
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In Estonia, one logical solution would be to use State Portal eesti.ee to store
and send receipts, as already suggested in the 2020 study on feasibility of mobile
voting [16]. This is accessible to every voter using eID, and every ID-card user
gets automatically an e-mail address at eesti.ee. Eesti.ee also includes a mail
forwarding service which residents can set up to forward this information their
main e-mail address. Other government services and the Population Registry
share the data about residents’ contacts with eesti.ee portal, making the voter
contact database fairly accurate and up-to-date [10].3 An example of a current
voting related service that uses eesti.ee portal is the possibility to order electronic
voter cards instead of voter cards sent on paper by post.
Eesti.ee contact information enables to send messages to most of the voters,
and the voters would get this information using their eID ( recall that ID-cards
in Estonia are mandatory). Hence, such a feedback method would be both rela-
tively easy to implement and the message (“I voted”) easy to understand. Since
coercion-resistance measures can be difficult to implement or, indeed, difficult
for the voters to understand [34], this is suitable as the next step towards giving
voters more assurance about how their votes are handled. Using eesti.ee service
as a gateway would also mitigate the problem that an attacker can send out fake
notifications en masse [28].
3.3 Information provided by the feedback
As noted above, the Estonian re-voting scheme relies, amongst other features,
on the element of uncertainty, assuming the malefactor has no way of knowing
which was the last vote cast by the voter or whether the voter re-voted. This
holds equally for both small- and large-scale coercion attacks (e.g. vote buying).
Thus, it is important to give as much information as necessary and as little as
possible in the feedback.
The electronic list of voters includes information on the date and time of
voting, voting method used (including i-voting) and of course the fact of voting
itself. Additionally, the voting system logs more data on the voter, including the
age, the operating system used, IP-address etc. [18]. However, since we view the
feedback channel as similar to checking voter’s information in the list of voters,
we restrict our interest to the types of information provided through this list
only.
The minimal information included in the voting receipt would be the fact of
voting, i.e. confirming that the person has been recorded as having cast a vote.
The method of voting used is another bit of information that is available in
the list of voters, the most important distinction here being whether the voter
voted over Internet or with a paper ballot. If we would provide this information,
3 The COVID-19 pandemic had a positive side effect in this regard, forcing the govern-
ment agencies to update people’s contact information in order to send out vaccination
calls. As of May 2021, 1,260,203 people in the Estonian Population Registry had a
valid e-mail address, and 238,162 did not. This means that about 84% of Estonian
residents can be reached by email.
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it could reveal when the person re-voted with a paper vote, thus weakening the
coercion resistance property. On the other hand, this information would give the
voter assurance that their (i-)vote has not been changed.
It is also possible to send another confirmation after the voting period has
ended, confirming that the voter’s i-vote was entered into the count. This differs
from checking one’s data in the list of voters, since that information can be re-
trieved only from the Internet voting system before the votes are anonymized.
Such information is unavailable at all for paper ballots, which become anony-
mous once inside the ballot box. This wouldn’t reveal more information to the
malefactor besides the method of voting, but would give the voter assurance
that the i-vote was actually tallied (and not misplaced), which in turn would
hopefully increase the trustworthiness of Internet voting to some extent.
Since our goal is to just give confirmation on participating in voting, precise
date and time of the vote should not be necessary, although the benefit of giving
the voter assurance that their last vote was the one tallied is significant. However,
the precise time of the cast of vote might be construed as proof of casting a
specific vote which would be advantageous to the malefactor.
3.4 Timing of the feedback
If the feedback is given during the voting period, this would give the malefactor
a slight advantage, enabling them to coerce the voter to cast the vote again. If
we do not include the date and time of voting in the receipt, the advantage for
the malefactor is insignificant, essentially amounting to knowing that the person
has voted at some point. Revealing the method used to vote or, for example,
the date of voting (without the exact time) gives some additional information,
showing possibly that an i-voter has re-voted in the polling station.
If the voting receipt is given after the voting period, then this would give
the malefactor even less advantage, since the voter cannot re-cast the vote any
more.
However, the advantage of giving feedback during the voting period is that it
enables the voter to either re-vote if necessary, or file a complaint with a chance
that the complaint will be resolved during the voting period. Instant feedback
would also notify the voter if a vote has been cast using their credentials, thus ex-
posing malicious takeovers of voters’ electronic ID. If the complaint is filed after
the end of the voting period, the voter has essentially no recovery mechanisms
available. Even if the National Election Committee and/or the Supreme Court
accept that the electoral law has been violated, the voter cannot cast a new vote
after the voting has ended. The existing individual vote verification mechanism
can be easily extended so that it would also provide a partial integrity check [28].
4 Conclusions and future work
The debate on the secrecy of vote has often concentrated on the fact of secrecy
of vote itself, as if the secrecy is the definitive measure to guarantee free and
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fair elections. This is certainly commendable, but one should not forget that the
concept of secret ballot does not exist in a vacuum. ”Old” Western countries
take some justified pride in how the understanding of vote secrecy is ingrained
in their society. However, this concept works well only for on-site voting, but
the modern voting environment encompasses different popular voting solutions
for off-site voting as well. We agree with the interpretation suggested by Madise
et al. that vote secrecy is not the ultimate goal, rather than a necessary means
to achieve free and fair elections. Vote secrecy is just one part of the equation.
We need to maintain trust in the voting system by addressing other possible
issues as well. Voters are more and more moving away from the polling places
and off-site voting methods like postal voting, voting at home and i-voting gain
more and more traction. It is inevitable that some conflict is built in here, but
even so we must try to seek for a good balance in regards to vote secrecy and
transparency.
One of the weak points is the voters’ and observers’ inability to observe and
track the path of their ballot. In a way, i-voting has opened a Pandora’s Box
which made voters question voting methods and trustworthiness of elections
in general. Whether aforementioned inability is real or perceived doesn’t even
matter, since trust is ultimately based on what people think, not what they
are told by the election authority. Recent debates in Estonia (but also surely in
many other countries) have shown the need to consider voter’s trust in the system
as a whole and to address these concerns. Therefore we propose to augment the
system with a feedback channel allowing the voter to detect misuses of the voting
credentials.
We recommend giving automatic feedback to voters on their voting: the
method they used to vote as well as the day (but not the time) they voted. This
would enable the voters to get assurance that their vote was cast and received
as intended, that their vote was not changed later and, in case of abstention, no
one voted using the voter’s credentials. Making this feedback automatic (e.g. in
Estonia through state portal eesti.ee) guarantees that most of the electorate will
receive this notification, creating a new layer of verifiability for the system. The
ballot count will still remain anonymous and a voter cannot link their vote to a
counted vote, a necessary concession to support secrecy and coercion-resistance
of the vote.
Establishing such an automated personal feedback channel to voters is not
necessarily in conflict with the principle of secret suffrage when restricted just
to the fact of voting. It is similar to a voter accessing one’s data in the voter list,
although the final verdict depends on the amount of data revealed. Determining
a good balance between secrecy and transparency is a subject for further discus-
sion. It would also seem that a feedback channel requires some amendments to
the legislation, since it concerns processing voting data. Working out the exact
nature of such amendments remains the subject for future research as well. We
also hope that the debate over secrecy of the vote, what this entails and on how
to handle this in a modern voting environment, will continue.
201
Acknowledgements This paper has been supported by the Estonian Research
Council under the grant number PRG920. The authors are grateful to the Esto-
nian Information System Authority and State Electoral Office for their support
to the research process.
References
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), https://www.un.org/en/about-
us/universal-declaration-of-human-rights, united Nations
2. European Convention on Human Rights (1950), https://www.echr.coe.int/
documents/convention_eng.pdf, European Court of Human Rights
3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), https://www.ohchr.
org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx, united Nations
4. CCPR General Comment No. 25: Article 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the
Right to Vote), The Right to Participate in Public Affairs, Voting Rights and the
Right of Equal Access to Public Service (1996), https://ccprcentre.org/page/
view/general_comments/28883, united Nations Committee on Human Rights
5. Vaalilaki, last amended 1.01.2021 (1998), https://finlex.fi/fi/laki/ajantasa/
1998/19980714, parliament of Finland
6. Code of Good Practice In Electoral Matters: Guidelines and Explanatory Re-
port (2002), https://rm.coe.int/090000168092af01, European Commission for
Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission)
7. Federal electoral regulations (2002), https://www.bundeswahlleiter.de/en/dam/
jcr/e146a529-fd3b-4131-9588-8242c283537a/bundeswahlordnung_engl.pdf,
bundestag
8. Riigikogu Election Act, RT I 2002, 57, 355; RT I, 03.01.2020, 2 (2002), https://
www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/514122020002/consolide, parliament of Estonia
9. Constitutional judgment 3-4-1-13-05: Petition of the President of the Republic to
declare the Local Government Council Election Act Amendment Act, passed by
the Riigikogu on 28 June 2005, unconstitutional (2005), https://www.riigikohus.
ee/en/constitutional-judgment-3-4-1-13-05, supreme Court of Estonia
10. Vabariigi Valitsuse määrus Eesti teabevärava eesti.ee haldamise, teabe
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Abstract. The Australian Senate is one of the two houses of the Australian 
Federal Parliament and uses a Single Transferable Vote with Proportional Rep-
resentation count method to elect its 76 members. The election of senators is 
done by state and overseen by the Australian Electoral Commission’s (AEC) 
state managers. The election count is complex with a contest having up to 5 
million ballots. The count currently is completed by using a computer to both 
capture paper ballot preferences and distribute vote preferences. The current 
election scrutiny process only allows scrutiny to be done by electors appointed 
by candidates for a given contest. The scrutineers can only view ballots as they 
are scanned or keyed into the ballot capture system and then view scanned im-
ages of the ballots as they are manually keyed or checked. Current scrutiny does 
not allow for a systematic audit of the ballot capture system or independent val-
idation of the ballots scanned against ballots captured, nor does it allow valida-
tion of the final distribution of preferences. This paper proposes reforms to elec-
tion laws to create a new independent body to undertake specialised election 
audits to confirm the ballots cast are reflective of the ballots captured in the 
count system and also undertake an independent check of the preference distri-
bution process. 
Keywords: Australian Senate, Scrutiny, Audit, proportional representation. 
1 Australian Senate Elections 
1.1 Senate Election History 
The Australian Senate is one of the two houses of the Australian Federal Parliament. 
The Senate currently consists of 76 senators, twelve from each of the six states and 
two from the two mainland territories. Each state and territory elect senators in sepa-
rate contests run at general elections. The returning officer for each state’s election 
are the state managers of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC). The election 
count is complex and can be large, with the New South Wales (NSW) state contest 
having up to 5 million ballots. Typically, only half the senate is elected at a given 
general election event resulting in senators typically having two terms. However oc-
casionally when there is a parliamentary deadlock a double dissolution election is 
called and all 76 Senators are elected at one time. 
The system for electing senators has changed several times since Federation in 
1901. Initially a ‘first-past-the-post’ voting method was used, then in 1919 it was 
replaced with a preferential block voting method [1]. In 1948 electing senators was 
changed to a Single Transferable Vote with Proportional Representation (STV-PR) 
method with contests on a state-by-state basis [2]. Then, in 1983 Group Voting Ticket 
(GVT) were introduced to the STV-PR method to address high rates of informal vot-
ing. 
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1.2 Group Voting Tickets (GVT) 
The use of GVT had the anticipated effect of simplifying the voting process by al-
lowing voters to vote formally by simply marking a single preference for one Above 
the Line (ATL) group (see Annexure 1 in reference [3] for example ballot paper). 
Voting for single preference ATL had the effect of marking preferences in accordance 
with the registered GVT for that group. 
Each group was required at time of candidate nomination to list all the BTL votes 
they wanted marked as a result of an ATL vote for their group. This meant that an 
elector that made an ATL vote for a group effectively was voting for all the BTL 
votes previously nominated by that group at the time of nomination. The main prob-
lem with GVT voting was that many voters did not know most of the BTL candidates 
they actually voted for beyond those in the ATL group for which they voted. This is 
because electors rarely knew what was on the GVT for the given group for which they 
had voted.  
Notwithstanding the introduction of the GVT feature voters were still able to vote 
directly for individual candidates BTL. This was done by giving every BTL candidate 
a sequential preferences number starting at 1. The challenge for voters was to number 
every BTL box with a sequential number without a break or repeat [4]. It was found 
for elections between 1984 to 2013 only about 3% [5] of voters actually voted suc-
cessfully BTL. Interestingly, there was a very high rate of informality for BTL ballots 
due to the challenge of marking preferences for all BTL candidates sequentially when 
potentially hundreds of candidates could be on a ballot. 
Given the lack of BTL votes for elections between 1984 to 2013 the counting of 
these ballots was largely a manual process. The 97% of ATL ballots were marked as a 
single preference only vote and could be manually checked for formality and tallied 
by ATL group. These manually tallied ballots were then entered into the EasyCount 
computer system as one bulk figure for each ATL group. The remaining 3% of BTL 
votes were captured by keying all their BTL preferences directly into EasyCount bal-
lot by ballot. 
EasyCount would then combine these BTL votes with expanded ATL group votes 
using their associated GVT. The expansion was done by applying the GVT to the 
ATL vote to give each ballot’s BTL candidate preferences. Once all the ATL and 
BTL vote preferences were available by candidate in EasyCount, EasyCount was used 
to perform the STV-PR distribution of preferences (DoP) and identified the candi-
dates the Returning Officer would declare elected. 
1.3 Gaming the System 
GVTs were first used in the 1984 election. Initially its introduction was considered 
a great success as informal voting decreased. However, it gradually started to produce 
perverse election results. The main problem with the use of GVTs was that micro 
parties (Groups) could collectively ‘game’ the system by participating in ‘preference 
harvesting’ arrangements. Preference harvesting relies on disaffected or poorly in-
formed voters, voting for parties (groups) which have popularist names like ‘Fishing 
and Lifestyle’ and ‘Smokers Rights’. These voters believed they were making a 
statement for these causes but in effect their vote was harvested to potentially elect a 
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candidate for a collaborating party they may have no interest in supporting e.g. ‘Mo-
toring Enthusiast Party’ [6]. 
This perverse outcome was achieved by several micro parties (which had group 
voting squares ATL) banding together and agreeing to cross preference each other’s 
GVTs. The effect of this collaboration was to keep their vote preferences within the 
collaborating parties, allowing these group’s votes to accumulate significantly more 
preferences than they would have individually. This meant that one of the candidates 
from the collaborating parties may be elected by the accumulated preferences of these 
parties, exceeding the residual preferences held by any of the major party candidates 
still in the count. 
This type of ‘gaming’ was in part responsible for the 2013 Western Australian 
(WA) senate election being rerun. The WA 2013 election had a large number of popu-
larist minor and micro parties with ATL voting squares participating in ‘preference 
harvesting’ arrangements. This practice resulted in a ballot paper where micro parties 
engineered their GVTs in such a way that they won seats initially in the senate even 
though the elected candidate had very few first preference votes [4]. 
The second issue was that the DoP result was close for the last candidate elected 
and the next candidate, as a result the Electoral Commissioner decided to undertake a 
recount [7]. During the recount of the 2013 WA senate election some 1375 ballots out 
of 1.31 million ballots were lost in transport between the initial count centre and the 
recount centre. The recount found that when 14 of these 1375 missing ballots were 
omitted from the count two of the six candidates elected in the initial count changed 
in the recount [8].  
Obviously, the proportionally of the change in candidates elected (2 out of 6) com-
pared with the number of lost ballots (1375 vs 1.31M) highlighted the intrinsic insta-
bility of the STV-PR when combined with GVTs. The AEC then lodged a petition 
with the High Court which sought an order to declare the WA Senate election void, 
thus requiring a rerun election. 
As a result of the debacle with the 2013 WA senate election, the parliament re-
moved the use of GVT from the STV-PR method to elect senators. The subsequent 
election in 2016 replaced GVT with optional preferential voting for both above and 
below the line [2]. The result of these changes allowed electors to assign their prefer-
ences to a minimum number of groups above the line, or a minimum number of can-
didates below the line, and were not required to fill all of the ATL or BTL boxes.  
This change effectively resolved the intrinsic instability of the previous STV-PR 
system when combined with GVT. However, this change also resulted in 100% of 
ballots needing to be captured by computer, because the manual counting of single 
ATL preferences associated with a GVT was no longer effective. Computer capturing 
of 100% of ballots was a significant change from the 3% captured by computer prior 
to 2016. 
1.4 Senate Ballot 
The Senate election comprises a paper-based vote which is captured and counted in a 
computer. Contests are state-based so each State runs its own senate election inde-
pendently. Figure 1 below shows a template of a ballot paper for a current typical 
senate election i.e. elections held in 2016 and 2019 used this ballot layout. This new 
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ballot has two parts, electors could choose to either vote ATL or BTL, but not both. 
The ballot in Figure 1 is for a state-based half Senate election so the elector only 
needs to number a minimum of 6 preferences above the line or 12 below. That means 
that even for a half senate election there will be a minimum of 36 million preferences 
to capture and count when dealing with 5 million ballots, which could be expected in 
a New South Wales senate election. 
Figure 1. Typical Senate Ballot Paper for all elections held after 2013. 
1.5 Senate Counting by Computer 
The use of computers for capturing and distributing senate preferences is not new. 
Given the heavy computational nature of STV-PR election counting, computers were 
used from the middle of the 1990s to count elections. Below is an extract from a letter 
provided by the AEC to the Inquiry into the 2013 federal election[9]. 
In 1995-1996 the AEC developed the EasyCount software used for Senate 
vote counting as in-house software. This had been precipitated by the 
JSCEM's Report of the Inquiry into the Conduct of the 1993 Election 
which recommended that the Electoral Act be amended to permit the 
Senate scrutiny to be performed either by the existing manual processes 
or by computerisation. 
When the EasyCount system was introduced 97% of ballots were single preference 
ATL and could be counted manually with their results ‘bulk data entered’ into 
EasyCount for distribution. This meant that scrutineers could watch 97% of ballots 
being manually counted in much the same way they had since 1984 when STV-PR 
when GVT was introduced. However, the remaining 3% of BTL ballots needed to 
have their preference markings captured into the EasyCount system. Given these bal-
lots typically had little impact on the outcome of elections there was no need to im-
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prove scrutiny of the preference capture process as it was of little electoral signifi-
cance. 
However, a significant change to ballot counting happened at the 2016 election 
when all ballot papers had to have their preferences captured individually into a com-
puter system for distribution. The AEC had to develop this new system in a very short 
time.  This system would have to be able to capture every preference on every ballot 
regardless of whether the elector voted ATL or BTL. 
This change to voting meant that 100% of ballot preference markings would have 
to be processed in a computer system. Therefore, a computer was trusted to determine 
the electoral outcome from the time of ballot capture to the point where candidates 
were declared elected. Previously 97% of the senate votes were counted manually in 
regional counting centres with oversight from scrutineers. This manual counting 
meant all elected candidates could be identified from raw bulk entry data (with rea-
sonable certainty) prior to the final computer-based DoP. 
To deal with the need to capture and count all senate ballots using a computer, the 
AEC developed a new system in partnership with Fuji Xerox Document Management 
Solutions. This system scanned every ballot and automatically recognised each pref-
erence mark using optical character recognition technology. The system was devel-
oped in a very short period of time by outsourcing partner Fuji Xerox. A flow dia-
gram for the new system is provided in IDM article “New Senate Count Solution in 
12 Weeks” [11] and Figure 4.1: Simplified diagram of Senate scanning system of the 
“ANAO report Australian Electoral Commission’s Procurement of Services for the 
Conduct of the 2016 Federal Election” [12]. 
EasyCount was still the software used at the 2016 election to perform DoP. 
EasyCount was modified to cope with the removal of GVT from the process but es-
sentially was the same unscrutinised system it had been since its creation [10]. 
2 Senate Scrutiny Practices 
2.1 Appointment of Scrutineers 
In Australia candidates are not allowed to scrutinise their own election contest, so 
candidates rely exclusively on appointed scrutineers to provide independent scrutiny 
of parliamentary elections. Scrutineers are appointed by candidates with one scruti-
neer allowed per candidate per venue. Appointment is done by completion of an ap-
plication form [14]. Scrutineers are typically family and friends of candidates or for 
candidates of major parties they may be party members. Details of the current scruti-
ny process are defined in the AEC’s scrutineer’s handbook [13]. Typically, family 
and friend scrutineers have little knowledge of the electoral process, while party scru-
tineers typically have more knowledge of electoral process but only tend to look at a 
limited number of individual ballot marks not the integrity of the overall end to end 
electoral process and typically have no experience in auditing complex computer 
systems. 
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2.2 Scrutiny in Polling Places 
A polling place is a voting venue which takes attendance votes on election day and 
undertakes a provisional count on election night. At a federal election there are over 
10,000 Polling Places on election day open for voting between 8am to 6pm across 
Australia. Over 60% of votes taken at federal elections are taken at Polling Places on 
election day. 
Scrutineers at polling places are typically party workers for given candidates. 
These people during the course of election day work at the polling place and hand out 
‘how to vote’ pamphlets to voters as they attend to vote. Each candidate can appoint 
one of these party workers to be their scrutineer at each polling place. 
On election day a scrutineer may perform several functions at a polling place. 
These include: 
• Inspect and confirm the ballot box is empty before it is sealed closed in the
morning before 8am;
• Observe voting inside the polling place;
• Assist disabled voters vote when requested;
• Observe when the ballot box is being opened after 6pm;
• Observe the unfolding and counting of ballots;
• Keep a tally of votes counted to try and determine who may win; and
• Observe the sealing of counted ballots into bundles ready for transport for sub-
sequent final counting.
Unfortunately, most scrutiny in polling places is done for the lower house ballots 
which are counted first on the night. The independent scrutiny of senate ballots is 
negligible as most scrutineers leave before the Senate provisional count is finished. 
This is because the election of government in Australia is determined by control of 
the lower house hence once the provisional count is done for the lower house there is 
little interest on election night, for volunteers after a long day, to stay to scrutinise the 
upper house.  
Notwithstanding this practice of scrutineers leaving before the senate is provision-
ally counted, the nature of staffing of polling places is such that, the staff themselves 
are in effect a relatively independent pool of observers of the election process and as 
such provide a level of independent scrutiny to the senate count process. 
Given the above I suggest that the current partisan scrutiny processes used by the 
AEC for federal elections is an efficient and effective process in Polling Places and 
should not be changed. However, it may be appropriate to provide some incentive for 
scrutineers to stay on election night until the Senate provisional count is completed 
and securely bundled. 
2.3 Scrutiny in Regional Count Centres 
After election day all ballots are taken to regional count centres for further sorting and 
counting. The Senate Polling Place ballots are only checked to ensure no ballots have 
been lost in transit and that they are correctly packed for processing at the state Cen-
tral Senate Scrutiny (CSS) centre. 
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Other senate ballots from early voting centres and declaration votes (e.g. postal, 
absent and other provisional votes) are provisionally counted in these regional count 
centres. The counting process used is the same process used in Polling Places on elec-
tion night.  Once counted the senate ballots are bundled ready for transport to the CSS 
in the same way ballots from Polling Places are bundled. 
The count centres are often large warehouses with hundreds of people performing 
tasks on piles of ballots. Scrutineers can attend and observe operations at Regional 
Count Centres, however there is little opportunity to perform any effective scrutiny of 
the processes. The size of the count centres is such that effective scrutiny of the count 
process by an individual scrutineer is virtually impossible. It is difficult for a scruti-
neer to identify any failures in the process or lost ballots due to the lack of meaningful 
data about the overall process. Effective scrutiny of these types of operations could 
only be undertaken by someone who is skilled in auditing large manual operations 
and had access to adequate count data and significant analytical capability. Scrutiny in 
these centres needs to be upgraded if it is to be effective. 
2.4 Central Senate Scrutiny (CSS) 
Once senate ballots are bundled at the Regional Count Centres they are forwarded to 
the state based CSS for scanning of all preferences. The scanning process is outlined 
in Figure 2 and uses scanning equipment and management system provided by the 
AEC’s contractor Fuji Xerox. Figure 2 clearly shows that most of the work done in 
CSS is under Fuji Xerox control. 
Scrutiny of the CSS is currently ineffective as scrutineers are only allowed to 
watch ballots being scanned from a distance, then view individual ballots being keyed 
and/or validated by Fuji Xerox or AEC operators. The AEC does not provide any 
statistical information about the process nor does it perform any cross checking of 
ballots entered against ballots captured. 
The author was appointed to be a NSW Senate scrutineer for a minor party candi-
date at the 2019 federal election and requested the information below to allow an 
audit of the scanning process at the CSS [15]. 
1. What percentage of ballots scanned are streamed to “Data Entry #1”, “Perfect
Capture” and “Unmarked”?
2. Please confirm all ballot’s preferences are captured by keying in “Data Entry #2”?
3. What percentage of the ballots that pass through the “Compare data entry” process
are found to be “Mismatched”?
4. What percentage of the “Mismatched” ballots are passed to the “Exception
Check” process”?
5. What percentage of the “Exception Check” ballots are escalated to the “AEC Ad-
judication” queue?
6. I understand that the “AEC Adjudication” queue is also fed from ballots that have
a “shield” which cannot be detected or are blank but have been placed in a formal
batch and these ballots are assessed only by an AEC staff member without further
scrutiny. Is this correct and if so what percentage of all ballots processed are as-
sessed in this manner?
7. What is the variance threshold between the total number of HoR and senate ballots
counted for a given polling place or dec vote type (for a given division) which
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head office requires before CSS staff and/or DRO staff are requested to recount 
ballots or search for missing ballots? 
8. Where discrepancy between HoR and senate are outside tolerance and the discrep-
ancies can be attributed to ballots being moved between polling places, are these
discrepancies addressed by ballots being moved between polling places and batch-
es rescanned?
9. Will the AEC be undertaking cross checking of a statistically significant sample of
paper ballots against the corresponding preference data in the CSS’s output file? If
so will this happen before the declaration of the poll and will scrutineers be able to
witness this process?
The AEC did not provide any of the requested information above which would in the 
author’s view be the minimum amount of information required to allow even the most 
superficial assessment of the 2019 CSS operations. The AEC justified their action by 
relying on the Electoral Act which did not specifically require this information to be 
provided. The AEC’s position was that unless they are specifically required to provide 
information under their legislation, they will not provide it. 
A similar request for information was made to the AEC at the 2016 senate election. 
Again, this request was effectively ignored by the AEC. The author and colleagues 
made several submissions to JSCEM for the 2016 election which are listed in refer-
ences [16] [17]. 
3 Current Scrutiny Risks 
3.1 National Audit Office Report 
The Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) reported on the integrity of the AEC’s 
senate count processes in their report “Australian Electoral Commission’s Procure-
ment of Services for the Conduct of the 2016 Federal Election” in January 2018 [12]. 
In this report the ANAO concluded: 
7. The AEC addressed risks to the security and integrity of ballot paper data
through the design and testing of the Senate scanning system. The AEC accepted
IT security risk above its usual tolerance. Insufficient attention was paid to ensur-
ing the AEC could identify whether the system had been compromised.
8. The Senate scanning and transport suppliers delivered the services as con-
tracted. The AEC had limited insight into whether its contractual and procedural
risk treatments were effective. Going forward, the AEC needs to be better able to
verify and demonstrate the integrity of its electoral data.
The ANAO audit found: 
5.46 The feedback to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters indicated 
that scrutineers generally found it more difficult to confirm the integrity of the 
Senate count when conducted by the semi-automated system than by the previous 
manual process. 
This resulted in Recommendation no. 4 of the report (Paragraph 5.47): 
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When the Australian Electoral Commission uses computer assisted scrutiny1 in fu-
ture federal electoral events, the integrity of the data is verified and the findings of 
the verification activities are reported. 
The Australian Electoral Commission’s response was to agree with the recommenda-
tion with qualification. They said:  
5.48 The AEC remains confident that the range of measures put in place for the 
2016 federal election ensured the integrity of the Senate count. For future events, 
the AEC will continue to evaluate and if appropriate, implement additional verifi-
cation mechanisms to maintain the integrity of the count. The results of verification 
activities undertaken at future electoral events may be reported in support of the 
scrutineering process. 
Notwithstanding the AEC’s undertakings above, there did not appear to be any appre-
ciable change in its approach to the issues raised at the subsequent 2019 election. 
3.2 Ballot Capture Risks 
One of the main challenges facing any electoral body which captures ballot prefer-
ence using a computer system is to ensure the system faithfully captures and holds 
ballot preferences for the DoP process. This may sound a simple task but it is actually 
very hard to guarantee. No process can be applied to the development and/or opera-
tion of a ballot capture system which would guarantee that the ballots as presented to 
the captured system will be faithfully represented digitally to the count system. 
The NSW Electoral Commission (NSWEC) discovered developing an error free 
capture system was hard when they developed a new proportional representation 
count system (PRCC) for the 2011 State General Election (SGE). The new system 
was designed to capture and count both the NSW upper house votes for state elections 
and local government Council elections. Both these elections used a similar propor-
tional representation count method and captured directly about 20% of the election 
ballots using a double keying approach. The system in many respects is similar in 
operation and complexity to the senate count system used by the AEC at their CSS. 
The PRCC system was a complete redevelopment of the previous LCLG system 
and incorporated many new ballot capture features to improve count centre operations 
and reduce DoP system code complexity. Notwithstanding these improvements the 
system is complex and like all such systems had a potential for software “bugs” which 
could impact the election result. 
The system was first used at the 2011 state general election. Typically, in these 
elections, about 80% of ballots are single preference ATL votes. These single prefer-
ence ATL ballots can be counted manually with appropriate scrutiny supervision and 
entered as a bulk figure e.g. Group A single preference ATL ballots entered as one 
figure for a given polling place or District and declaration vote type. 
The remaining ballots either had multiple ATL preferences or only had BTL pref-
erences. These ballots required all their preferences to be data entered (keyed) in 
batches of 50 ballots. The data entry method used double blind keying where two 
independent operators keyed the same batch and then it was cross checked by PRCC 
1 The use of the word ‘scrutiny’ in this quote refers to the capture and counting of ballots by the 
AEC not the oversight by independent scrutineers. 
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to determine if the two entries matched. If they did not match an independent verifica-
tion operator adjusted the entered batches until they both matched the ballot paper. 
To ensure the system capturing the ballot preferences were keyed correctly, a man-
ual cross- check process was established which involved printing a report from the 
database to be used by the count. This report showed the preferences for each ballot in 
a given batch of ballots. Election staff would then work in pairs with one reading out 
loud the ballot preferences from the report and the other checking it against the pref-
erences on the actual ballot keyed. The objective of this cross-check was to ensure 
that the data was captured faithfully and was not corrupted by human error/corruption 
or computer fault. 
As it turned out at the 2011 SGE, discrepancies were found during cross-checking 
of ballots. These discrepancies were found to be due to a “bug” in PRCC program 
which performed the batch reconciliation process. The errant batches were relatively 
rare and as such cross-checking took several days to identify them and the code fix 
took a further few more days to implement and test. The impact of this delay was that 
the data entry process had keyed hundreds of batches which had erroneous prefer-
ences captured. 
Fortunately, the NSWEC could determine which batches had errors because they 
knew the nature of the programming error and could search the database to find which 
batches had a preference pattern which would be impacted by this coding error. They 
therefore could make a list of batches which had to be rekeyed. This list was used to 
retrieve erroneous batches from storage for rekeying. Batch retrieval and rekeying 
was done in the count centre right in front of the scrutineers. 
Interestingly, none of the scrutineers in the count centre questioned why the 
NSWEC were rekeying batches or even appeared to notice the rekeying was happen-
ing. This is because scrutineers were only looking at data entry operators keying indi-
vidual ballots not the overall integrity of the data capture process. This lack of aware-
ness demonstrated that the current scrutiny processes for capture of ballots into PRCC 
at large count centres simply does not deal with all potential preference capture is-
sues. 
It is generally acknowledged by academics working in this area [20][21] that the 
only viable way to provide a level of certainty that the ballots captured for the senate 
are the same as those being counted is for independent scrutineers to cross-check a 
sample of the processed ballots against the same ballots captured digitally. Figure 2 
shows how this process would work relative to the current senate ballot capture sys-
tem. 
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Figure 2. Senate vote capture process (recommended additional steps shown with dashes) [20] 
One of the challenges in implementing a cross-check process for a STV-PR system is 
to determine the size of the sample needed to ensure an acceptable level of confidence 
in the election outcome. There has been some research in this area which has shown 
how complex this problem can be, and the research has provided some guidance on 
how to arrive at a suitable sample size [21]. It is fair to say however, that any level of 
cross-check would be better than the current AEC senate CSS practice which is to do 
no cross-checking! 
3.3 Preference Distribution Risks 
The STV-PR distribution of preference (counting) algorithm by its nature is complex 
and difficult to test. This is particularly true for the STV-PR system used by the 
NSWEC for local government and state elections up to 2016. This algorithm used a 
random sampling technique for applying the transfer of surplus votes [23]. The ran-
dom aspect of this count meant that any computer system which undertakes such a 
count would potentially get a different answer every time it was run. This randomness 
made testing using standard test cases and outcomes impractical. 
Notwithstanding these challenges, the NSWEC took great care in developing and 
testing the PRCC system. However, the counting code was found in 2016 to have a 
very subtle “bug”. This “bug” was revealed when several researchers developed their 
own counting system using the specification provided by the NSWEC [26]. They ran 
this program with the 2012 election preference data provided by the NSWEC. The 
outcome of this count was cross-checked against NSWEC results revealing the dis-
crepancies in at least one election contest [22]. 
Ultimately the NSWEC acknowledged that there was a coding error. This error 
was fixed for subsequent elections. It should also be noted that this work also identi-
fied that the random sampling approached used to pick ballots transferred in the STV-
PR count gave unreliable election outcomes and as such also changed.  A new system 
for transferring ballots was implemented for elections after 2016, which made the 
count more deterministic and helped testing of code used for STV-PR in these elec-
tions. 
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The problems experienced by the NSWEC could be experienced by any election 
body that uses computers to capture and count votes. The AEC EasyCount system is a 
similar program to PRCC and equally susceptible to having “bugs”. 
There are two actions which can be taken to improve the reliability of the computer 
based STV-PR count system. The first is making the source-code available for re-
view. The second is encouraging a count system to be developed and operated inde-
pendent of the AEC to validate the count. 
Several researchers have argued that EasyCount code base should be made open-
sourced to allow it to be publicly scrutinised. This request was denied by the AEC for 
a range of reasons [10]. The author’s view is that although open-source code would 
appear to be desirable from a transparency perspective, it would not in itself neces-
sarily achieve a more reliable system but could consume a lot of valuable AEC re-
sources answering questions asked by people who just have an interest in the area but 
no real technical expertise or knowledge of the STV-PR method. As such, these peo-
ple would not be able to add value to the integrity of the system. 
I do however believe that providing the code to select expert groups who have 
agreed to use responsible disclosure could improve system integrity. These groups 
would have to have suitable technical qualifications to understand the code and be 
able to build and run the system. They would also need to be provided appropriate 
support from the AEC when reviewing the code.  
In addition to code review, the AEC could provide publicly detailed specifications 
for the system such that independent groups could build a system which could be run 
in parallel using the current election preference data. This approach would allow an 
independent validation of the DoP process and the candidates elected against AEC 
results. This type of independent check-count could be included into the election scru-
tiny process and reported to the AEC before declaring candidates elected and subse-
quently to the Electoral Matters Committee after the election. 
To support this type of checking process the NSWEC publishes ballot/preference 
input data, in a form which is suitable for counting by an independently developed 
count system. The AEC currently publishes senate preference data, but the format of 
this data is difficult to use for counting votes and is missing some information such as 
ballot formality which is needed to run an independent DoP. 
4 Recommended Scrutiny Changes 
As a result of the general inability to scrutinise the 2016 federal election senate count, 
submissions were made to the Joint Standing Committee on Electoral Matters 
(JSCEM) which resulted in their report [18] making the following specific recom-
mendation: 
Recommendation 3 - The Committee recommends that a non-partisan in-
dependent expert scrutineer be appointed to each Central Senate Scrutiny 
Centre in each state and territory and be responsible for: 
─ auditing the computer systems and processes used to capture and 
count votes; 
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─ undertaking randomised checks between captured data and physical 
ballot papers throughout the count at a level that provides surety as to 
the accuracy of the system; and 
─ providing reports to candidate scrutineers about their findings on a 
regular basis during the count. 
At the time of writing the government had not provided a response to this report [19]. 
Notwithstanding that a senior Government member had chaired JSCEM and had pro-
duced the report. Also, it should be noted that parliament has a standing order which 
requires governments to respond to a committee report within six months of it being 
tabled in parliament. As advised above, no response had been provided to the JSCEM 
report, even after two years. Note the above JSCEM recommendation is still in the 
view of the author appropriate and should be implemented for all future elections. 
The above recommendation could be achieved by implementing an independent 
Election Technology Review Board to scrutinise systems used to capture and count 
votes. This board should be selected before an election is called and comprise suitably 
qualified people i.e. people with a security engineering and/or technology manage-
ment and/or election background. These appointments should be made by an organi-
sation at arm’s length from the AEC. A suitable entity may be JSCEM with the sup-
port of the ANAO.  Members could be drawn from academia, professional bodies that 
have skilled members in system audit. 
Should the government consider amendments to legislation to establish an inde-
pendent board the following issues should be addressed; 
• The Board should be able to request and be provided sufficient information
about the underlying technology and processes to be able to assess information
regarding the adequacy of the system’s design, implementation, configuration
and testing.
• The Board should be permitted to scrutinise the operation of the system to allow
them to determine with appropriate confidence that the system is performing as
required.
• The Board should be able to investigate and witness verification of a cross-
check process demonstrating that the intent of the voter has been processed in
accordance with the legislation and the accuracy of the process is sufficient to
be confident the correct candidates have been elected.
• The Board should report on the adequacy of technological processes and digital
information produced.
• The Board should provide a publicly available report to the electoral matters
committee after each election.
• The Board should have appropriate investigative powers and access to enable it
to carry out its functions.
The use of specialist Boards to deal with technology issues in election processes has 
been implemented in other jurisdictions. In particular, Norway implemented an Inter-
net Election Committee (IEC) for their internet voting election trials in 2013 which 
had oversight of the trials with a particular focus on security. More information about 
the committee’s work can be found in The Carter Centre’s report [24].  Also, Canada 
has an independent body to oversee elections [25]. Some aspects of this entity’s struc-
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ture and function may also be applicable in the Australian environment to address the 
increased complexity of the electoral processes. 
To ensure that the Review Board attracts competent people, there is an argument 
they should receive nominal compensation for their effort (in line with normal gov-
ernment board fees). They also need to be provided adequate secretarial support to 
assist in writing reports and analysing data. 
5 Conclusion 
The only viable way to ensure effective senate election scrutiny is for the scrutiny 
process currently being used in polling places and count centres to be augmented in 
count centres with a more holistic scrutiny process which examines the efficacy of 
end-to-end senate election process. This type of scrutiny should be provided by ex-
perts who have the skills and resources to perform an effective systems-oriented scru-
tiny process not the current candidate appointed partisan scrutineers. 
This solution would involve a body independent of the AEC to both cross-check 
ballots captured and to supervise a check of the final DoP. This count-check should be 
run at about the same time as the AEC runs their count and be used to validate the 
AEC count. Additionally, the body should be able to review all preliminary count 
results against final results to determine if any ballots are missing. 
Unfortunately changes of this nature require political appetite for electoral reform. 
The last legislative change of significance was to address the debacle caused by lost 
ballots and use of GVTs at the 2013 WA senate election. This resulted in an expen-
sive rerun election and GVTs being abolished which resulted in the need to scan all 
senate ballots. 
Notwithstanding this change, there was no associated change in the scrutiny pro-
cesses. The current scrutiny situation is much like it was in the early 1900s when all 
the ballot counting was done manually. Unfortunately, the legislative change associ-
ated with the removal of GVTs and introduction of computer capture and DoP did not 
also come with any changes to improve scrutiny. This lack of change to the scrutiny 
process is, in the author’s view, an oversight and should be addressed by a legislative 
amendment. 
At present there does not appear to be sufficient political will for election reform in 
this area. Therefore, the real challenge to get this type of election reform is to create a 
political environment for reform. The Australian public has a very high level of trust 
in the AEC and does not believe it would do anything intentionally to distort election 
outcomes. 
I personally agree that the current AEC is a trustworthy organisation. However, I 
do not know what the AEC of the future will be like and as such, controls need to be 
put in place now to protect our democracy against future problems. 
Regrettably, history shows that the appetite for change only appears after some 
type of electoral debacle or public disquiet occurs due to election irregularities. Let us 
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Abstract. Cybersecurity awareness and cyber hygiene trainings are be-
coming standard practice for employees of election administrations. Elec-
tion Management Bodies (EMBs) have specific needs: elections are cyclic
with regards to the tasks and their associate risks, they are high value
targets during a short time window, and they suffer from high turnover of
staff making sustainable training difficult. With lots of training method-
ologies and training programs targeting election observers, officials, etc.,
there are limited quantifiable measures for the efficiency of this type of
training. Evaluating the adequacy of the training objectives and method-
ologies to the specific needs of election administration is becoming a
necessity. We propose to use constructive alignment for designing and
evaluating cybersecurity awareness trainings.
1 Introduction
Elections worldwide have become the battlefield between national and foreign
actors and cyber-criminals on one side, and election management bodies and po-
litical parties on the other. The objectives of threat actors vary from financially
motivated extortion schemes to destructive attacks as proxies to delegitimize
the electoral process. This trend has increased in frequency, with an intensifica-
tion of cyber activities towards the date of the actual election. Most incidents
are triggered by human behavior [dbir20], foremost successful phishing attacks,
with victims neglecting simple rules as the primary factor paving the way. It is
now acknowledged that minimizing humans errors through cybersecurity aware-
ness training is paramount for achieving any reasonable level of cybersecurity
in election administration. What is not so clear, however, is how to design and
evaluate training programs that are specifically tailored for election officials.
As cybersecurity awareness and cyber hygiene trainings are becoming more
readily available, it has also become standard practice for employees of election
management and temporary staff hired for election administration to partake
in such trainings. To this end, many organizations rely on third-party providers
for delivering cyber-hygiene training through online platforms to large customer
bases. Cybersecurity experts and consultancies do have the inside knowledge to
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keep training materials up to date with respect to the latest threats. Overall, it is
acknowledged that cybersecurity training has to be offered on a regular basis to
ensure that the employees’ cybersecurity understanding and knowledge is always
up to date. Elections are cyclic events with regards to tasks and their associated
risks, they are high value targets for a limited amount of time, they typically
suffer from high turnover of staff making sustainable training difficult, and they
are critical to preserve public confidence in the quality of the democratic process.
To assess the quality of cybersecurity awareness and cyber hygiene training
and to measure their effectiveness in addressing theses challenges, we develop in
this paper a framework for evaluating existing and designing new courses based
on the principle of constructive alignment [biggs03]. Cyber hygiene refers to
the ability of election administrators (1) to understand that their respective
behaviors, online and also in relation with other persons has a direct effect on
the security and credibility of the electoral process, (2) to learn to identify and
react to common threats and therefore minimize their respective damage, and
(3) to be prepared to respond to not-yet identified and future cyber threats.
Inspired by the Structure of Observed Learning Outcome (SOLO) taxon-
omy [biggs1], we define four levels of understanding which encompass awareness,
understanding of risks, comprehension of threats, and defense skills, empower-
ing course participants to deal with future and yet unknown cyber threats. Our
frameworks suggests that trainings should be assessed based on (1) the con-
sistency of course prerequisites and how they accommodate participants with
varying pre-existing knowledge, (2) the quality of the intended learning out-
comes (ILOs) for each module and assess their consistency across several mod-
ules, (3) the intended retention policies, for each module, (4) the impact on
the participants’ cybersecurity behavior and understanding, and (5) expectation
management.
When applying our framework, there are several insights to be gained how
to design cybersecurity awareness training curricula. First, course participants
usually work harder the more closely learning objectives are aligned with their
assigned working tasks. Hence it is beneficial to distinguish between learning ob-
jectives that are general in nature and require additional mechanisms to capture
the course participants’ attention and those that are specific and targeted to
a particular task. The latter can be aligned with particular threats anticipated
by the EMB, and prepare the participant with the knowledge necessary to pre-
vail in their professional role. Highly specialized curricula covering topics critical
to running a credible election can be targeted to small selected audiences, the
ILOs should be carefully aligned with the participants professional responsibili-
ties. Curricula covering the basics of cyber hygiene training are usually designed
for broader audiences with more diverse backgrounds and less consistent pre-
existing knowledge and the ILOs need to be designed accordingly, especially if
there are participants that have undergone similar trainings in preparation for
earlier elections.
Second, online education can reach a much broader audience than facilitative-
based teaching ever could. This is of particular interest for the electoral domain,
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where many election officials need to be educated prior to an election. It is pos-
sible to require election officials to have passed cybersecurity training before
becoming an election official, for example, by presenting a certificate of the suc-
cessful completion of his/her cyber-hygiene course. Online cybersecurity training
can also be organized in alternative modules suitable for different backgrounds.
A total beginner module on social engineering, for example, would spend effort
to explain the motivation of an attacker to the course participant, whereas a
module for the advanced participants could go more in detail about the differ-
ent techniques used by a social engineer attacker. Another example would be a
module highlighting privacy, data security, and integrity as well as protection
against disclosure of confidential data for operators working on voter registra-
tion activities. Accidental disclosure [comelecleak] of voter lists [maltaleak]
are not uncommon and have been reported numerous times [usaleak].
In this paper, we propose an evaluation and design methodology for cyber-
security awareness training in Section ?? that is adapted to the specificities of
electoral administrations. Using two existing training programs, as examples,we
demonstrate how the methodology can be used to identify areas of improvement
and to structure mature cybersecurity awareness trainings in Section ??. Finally,
we assess results and conclude in Section ??.
2 Methodology
Cybersecurity awareness training has a bad reputation for being ineffective
and boring. This, however, is not necessarily true, as demonstrated in prior
work [schurmann1], which argues that if the training is tailored to the right
audience with the right content, it is possible to measure the effectiveness of the
training by relating pre-tests with post-tests. In this section, we push this point
further and relate it to the theory of constructive alignment, which is a princi-
ple used for devising teaching and learning activities, and assessment tasks that
directly address the intended learning outcomes (ILOs) in a way not typically
achieved in traditional lectures, tutorial classes, and examinations [biggs03].
Constructive alignment applies to in-person training as well as online training
and the literature is extensive [Brabrand2008, Trigwell14, Walsh07]. It is a
modern teaching philosophy based on cognitive psychology that is increasingly
used at universities to guarantee a pleasant and effective learning experience for
each and every student. The central idea of constructive alignment is that the
course content is organized in such way that enables the teacher to make a delib-
erate alignment between the planned learning activity and the ILOs. We believe
that this observation is central for designing effective cybersecurity awareness
training programs, and it provides guidance for evaluating existing programs.
Compared to higher-education, cybersecurity training for election officials
and poll-workers brings along additional challenges, such as the body of course
participants is usually extremely diverse with different academic backgrounds,
different skills, and different expectations. In practice, this heterogeneity presents
quite a challenge and the solution requires a well-thought out and principled
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methodology that we structure according to five dimensions that we describe
next.
2.1 Pre-existing knowledge
To guarantee the effectiveness of cybersecurity training requires the organizers
of the training to control the heterogeneity of the course participants. If the
backgrounds of the participants are too diverse, some will be bored while oth-
ers struggle to keep up. Skilled facilitators and trainers can accommodate the
curriculum depth to the individual participant’s needs by making it more im-
mediate and more closely relatable. In self-paced online training programs, on
the other hand, the participant can adjust the pace, for example by quickly
skimming through content he is already familiar with, but will not be able to
change the depth of the content. Through effectively understanding the pre-
existing knowledge of each student allows the grouping of students with similar
baselines. Suitable content can then be tailored for each group, for example, by
identifying and presenting relevant modules of the training program. The group
can then proceed at a comfortable pace. This also takes care of the challenge of
course participants already having taken earlier editions of the same course for
past elections. The design of the training should therefore be modular, which
means that in can be reorganized into a personalized learning experience that
engages effective participation.
Thus, a first dimension to assess quality of cyber-hygiene awareness training
on is to evaluate if pre-existing knowledge is collected and used to adapt the
training experiences to individual needs.
2.2 The relevance and specificity of the learning objectives.
Intended learning objectives (ILOs) that accompany constructive alignment [biggs1]
serve two goals. First, every course participant is given the opportunity to iden-
tify with the learning objectives before training commences, which makes learn-
ing effective and allows expectations between facilitator and participant to be
aligned. Second, learning objectives define the structure of entire training pro-
gram, they specify in a way, how one module builds upon another. In fact, ILOs
guarantee a satisfactory progression with respect to the participants’ level of
understanding from awareness to skills [beyer1].
In Figure ??, we propose a simple taxonomy that distinguishes four levels
of understanding, (1) awareness, which means the course participants are able
to learn to identify and describe individual topics that are central to cyber-
hygiene, (2) understanding of risks, which refers to participants being able iden-
tify cyber-risks rendering cyber-hygiene necessary, (3) comprehension of threats,
which means that course participants should learn to understand intent and
objectives of an adversary, and lastly (4) defense skills, which allows course par-
ticipants to recognize cyberattacks, take counter measures, and adopt personal
behavior to minimize the risk of cyberattacks specific to electoral operations,
























Thus, a second dimension to evaluate cybersecurity awareness training is to
evaluate if the learning objectives for the individual modules are clearly stated,
consistent with respect to the level of understanding, and aligned with the needs
of the participants with regards to their profession/role.
2.3 Retention Period
One of the challenges of cybersecurity awareness training is that topics can vary
significantly in abstraction and relevance. Some threats and good practices seem
intuitive, while others seem remote and unlikely. To cope with this enormous
spread between the concrete and the abstract, each module should define an
expected retention period that presupposes for how long the knowledge gained
through the training should be actively applicable for the course participant.
Being explicit about the retention period has several advantages, including
what topics and which materials can and should be covered in a module, and
what mechanisms should be used to guarantee retention. When the expected
retention period is shorter, emphasis should be given to materials that are im-
mediately relevant to the participants learning experience. The very fact that
interesting and relevant topics are covered is then usually enough to motivate
the participants to perform well [schurmann1]. Longer expected retention peri-
ods will allow to engage with more general knowledge and good practices, which
means that participants may require additional incentives, such as practical sim-
ulations, additional tests, etc. to ensure that the longer retention period can be
guaranteed.
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Thus, the third dimension to evaluate cybersecurity awareness training along
is to verify that the expectations regarding retention have been set and made
explicit, that the course content is compatible with the prescribed retention
periods, and that the choice of mechanisms to boost retention are in line with
the overall module design. Ideally, one should also conduct user studies with the
course participants, to collect statistical evidence indicating the training was
effective.
2.4 Measuring Behavioral Change
Establishing good cyber-hygiene requires not only awareness and knowledge, but
users most likely will also have to adapt their behavior and adjust their attitudes
towards technology and security. The challenge is that new practices learned
during a training are often difficult for participants to retain for extended periods
of time, as participants often tend to relapse and revert to insecure practices
with time if they ever adopted secure ones in the first place, because “it’s just
easier”. The goal of cyber-hygiene trainings is to provide knowledge, tools, and
incentive to adopt sustainable secure practices. Changes in the users’ attitude are
difficult to measure. In a controlled corporate environment, it might be possible
to use technology to measure behavioral change, by tracking the number of
successful phishing attacks, for example. But in the larger context, one must rely
on self-reported questionnaires to understand whether knowledge translated into
improved behavior. These questionnaires, in which respondents select a response
by themselves without interference, are inherently biased. Acknowledging this
limitation, mechanisms to measure the adoption of a limited and pre-defined
set of safe behavior is a fourth dimension through which the effectiveness of
cyber-hygiene training should be evaluated.
2.5 Expectations Management
When election officials and poll workers are asked to participate in cybersecurity
awareness training, there might be different expectations in play, which need to
considered. Poll-workers and election official usually are assigned different tasks,
and serve in different roles. This requires that the training program can cater
to different needs, and be adaptive to different expectations. It is prudent, that
the expectations of the participants are properly managed, which leads to the
fifth and final dimension of our evaluation methodology, which is to what extent
does the training program provide mechanisms to identify and integrate different
expectations?
In summary, we propose an evaluation methodology for cyber hygiene train-
ing based on five dimensions, (1) the consistency of the course prerequisites and
how they accommodate participants with varying pre-existing knowledge (2)
the quality of the ILOs for each module and assessing their consistency across
several modules, (3) the intended knowledge retention policies for each module,
(4) the impact on the participants’ cybersecurity behavior and understanding,
and (5) expectation management. This methodology can also be used as a guide
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when developing new modules and courses, or when restructuring existing cyber-
hygiene training into either several courses, or one course with several modules,
so that returning participants will find a tailored and exciting curriculum to
partake in.
3 Practical application: evaluating cyber-hygiene
trainings
To test our evaluation and design framework, we have applied our methodology
to two training programs that have been provided to electoral administrations:
IFES cybersecurity awareness training for EMBs (Regional Election Adminis-
tration and Political Process Strengthening – REAPPS) and Cyber-hygiene for
the Danish Election administration.
3.1 The IFES Cybersecurity Awareness Training
IFES’ cybersecurity awareness training was developed in late 2018, it has been
conducted with several hundreds of officials in Eastern Europe and Balkan
States.
Pre-existing knowledge. The course was developed for election staff with little
to no exposure to cybersecurity. It does not test or categorize participants ac-
cording to their pre-existing knowledge but aims to offer general awareness and
an introduction to cybersecurity concepts as they apply to the electoral context.
This means that no mechanism is provided to identify participants who have
already taken this course in the past. As this training was specifically designed
for participants with no prior exposure to cybersecurity concepts, this criteria
does not directly apply, but would need to be integrated as the training reaches
an audience with more mature cybersecurity awareness and skills.
The relevance and specificity of the ILOs. The content of the training can
be classified in modules with different expected levels of understanding, as indi-
cated in the table below. This classification of the topics highlights the priorities
set forth during the training: identifying phishing and measures to protect ac-
counts (passwords and multi-factor authentication in particular). These ILOs
are aligned with global threats faced by EMBs.















Retention period. This training does not explicitly state an expected retention
period. It has usually been conducted as an introductory course disconnected
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from the electoral cycle, or ahead of an election operation, for which the training
is well suited as the defensive skills are aligned with types of attacks election
staff must be ready to detect and respond to during the election period. The
expected retention period can be derived from the mapping of the ILOs: password
management and phishing detection are expected to be of immediate use to
the participants, for these topics, the training goes in more depth and deliver
practical and engaging learning exercises.
Measuring behavioral change. Pre-tests and post-tests measure the retention
and understanding of the course material, improvement on the behaviors and
practices of the participants is not measured over time. Reminders are sent to
the participants on a regular basis and are used to reinforce key messages and
good practices learned during the course.
Expectation management. The course was designed to provide an introduc-
tory course to cyber hygiene and cybersecurity awareness. It is not specifically
tailored to a particular group of participants and to specific classes of risks.
It does align with participants expectations who had low previous exposure to
cybersecurity concepts.
Overall evaluation: IFES’ cybersecurity awareness training has been devel-
oped with a dual purpose as clearly visible from the table of ILOs. It offers a
generic, low level awareness of threats, risks and security good practices on the
one hand, and more advanced ILOs with practical defense skills for threats that
are considered global and highest risk. This clear distinction could provide a
roadmap for future trainings, as several topics could be elevated from awareness
to practical defense skills based on the risk environment, period of the electoral
cycle, and specific needs of the EMB related to the adoption of new technologies
for example.
3.2 Training Denmark’s Digital Election Secretaries
Moving to Denmark, the cybersecurity training for digital election secretaries [schurmann1]
was organized in a principled fashion follow a particular methodology for train-
ing design. By catering to a very narrow and homogeneous target group, the
content of the training was defined by the role that the participants play during
the election: the digital election secretaries were responsible for the voter regis-
tration technology deployed in polling stations. In the case of a cyberattack, it
is the digital election secretary who decides to abandon the use of technology
and move to the paper backup system. Attack trees were used to explore the
threat space and then course modules were derived in response to the overall
ILO that the participants should be able to recognize threats and to defend
against them. The resulting course consists of three modules, (1) an introduc-
tory module to create a joint level of understanding among the participants, (2)
an introduction to man-in-the middle attacks against election technologies, and
(3) a module dedicated to spotting and mitigating social engineering attacks.
All three modules were tailored to the particular role of the course participants.
Pre-existing knowledge. This course was organized as a pilot study that does
not make any assumptions about pre-existing knowledge of the course partic-
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ipants although all participants are public servants who work for the city of
Copenhagen, and most like had already been exposed to cybersecurity aware-
ness training. As this was the first time the course was offered, no attention
was paid to the fact that some of the course participants might have taken this
training in the past.
The relevance and specificity of the ILOs. No ILOs were explicitly mentioned
in the course descriptions, but because the modules are directly derived from the
role that the participants play during the election, they can be easily inferred.
The training materials can be organized into the four classes of understanding.
As this training is targeted to the practitioners, it aim to achieve a high level
of understanding when addressing the ability of the digital election secretary to
react efficiently in the case an attack is noticed.






















Retention period. Although the training does not explicitly state an expected
retention period, it is clear that the course is designed to be taken a few days
before election day activities commence and it is expected that the participants
will remember the content until after the election. Since the course is offered
online, it is easily possible to retake the course in preparation for another election.
Measuring behavioral change. This training requires the participants to take
two tests, one before the training commences, and the other right after. These
tests are organized to measure if new knowledge was acquired while taken the
training of not. Improvement on the behaviors and practices of the participants
is not measured over time.
Expectation management. Since the course participants will play a similar
role in the election, their expectations are closely aligned, and also their interest
is heightened, because it is considered important to take such a training in
preparation for assuming the role.
Overall evaluation: The Danish course for training digital election secretaries
has clear ILOs on a rather high level of understanding. The course will only work
for its intended audience, and should not be mistaken for a general-purpose
cybersecurity awareness training. The course could be improved by taking into
account the pre-existing knowledge of the participants, possibly by integrating
the course into a larger election official training program, where assumptions
about pre-existing knowledge and prerequisites has been made explicit.
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4 Conclusions
While cybersecurity awareness trainings are becoming standard practice for
EMBs, there has been little study of how they answer the specific needs and
unique threats during the election cycle. As election operations are increasingly
digitalized (with a steep increase following the 2020 Covid pandemic), EMBs are
adapting their stance with regards to cybersecurity.
Election administrations are unique in their threat model, with different risks
inherent to different activities during different phases of the electoral cycle, and
they are also unique in terms of providing verifiable results. As elections are
becoming increasingly a battleground for cyber-attacks and disinformation cam-
paigns, EMBs must rely on effective training methodologies with well-defined
intended learning objectives (ILOs), and move rapidly to mature training and
education programs that are consistently organized and well-defined along the
dimensions that we have presented in this paper. We believe that evaluating
cybersecurity awareness programs this way can not only ensure the adequation
of the training content with the specific needs of election administration, it can
also help trainers develop mature training programs in which content and ob-
jectives are quickly adjusted in terms of content and depth (from awareness to
defensive skills). We believe that the evaluation strategy presented here applies
to most elections and electoral systems, in developed as well as developing and
post-conflict countries.
We conclude that trainings need to incorporate the participants’ profiles and
their respective backgrounds and identify and respond to their specific needs
and risks. This will be a requirement for trainings targeting users with prior
knowledge and exposure to cybersecurity issues.
Furthermore, evolving learning objectives that range from awareness and in-
formation to higher levels of skills and know-how will become key to main-
tain sustained users’ engagement on cybersecurity issues. Cybersecurity evolves
rapidly, new threats emerge, such as supply chain attacks, and new tools are
being developed to mitigate these new risks. Cyber-hygiene is a long-term en-
gagement and trainings should be conducted continuously upon entering new
phases of the election cycle. Learning objectives should evolve and be refined to
maintain ongoing engagement for users who have already received a training in
the past.
In the case of heterogeneous groups of participants and roles, questionnaire
and tests prior to the training should influence the curriculum. Collecting the
necessary information regarding pre-existing knowledge of the participants could
be done via a pre-training questionnaire using behavioral questions (what can
participants do wrong on scenario-based questions). Knowledge based questions
seem to remain the best method to measure success of the training.
Cyber-hygiene courses in general need to be conducted periodically to re-
engage users and update them on the latest threats and techniques to mitigate
cybersecurity risks. We believe that the frequency of trainings should be aligned
with the expected retention period and the electoral cycle. Good practice in many
industries put the periodicity of re-engaging users with cyber-hygiene practices
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around one year. However, election administration is cyclic, and subject to differ-
ent types of threats. To increase the efficiency of the cyber-hygiene training and
establish cybersecurity as a strategic objective of secure election preparation,
planning of training periods should be based on the election cycle. Reminders
in the forms of newsletter, posters, calendars are very important and should be
ongoing, they support the training but do not provide new information.
Election officials are often under the pressure of an incoming electoral op-
eration, without strong involvement of the management, cyber-hygiene training
often receives little attention. A strong management support is a pre-requisite to
any successful cyber-hygiene training. Therefore, cyber-hygiene should be part of
an overall security strategy. Furthermore, a culture of trust is needed to ensure
that election officials receive proper training and support rather than be blamed
for cybersecurity incidents. Each EMB faces different threats, has a different
risk acceptance level, and cybersecurity maturity, EMBs need to understand
and formalize their needs and determine clear training course objectives.
Academic study and international good practice have also demonstrated that
awareness and trainings can only go so far if they are not backed up by organiza-
tional policies. Cyber-hygiene cannot happen in a vacuum, election management
administration need to ensure that the training aligns with the cybersecurity ob-
jectives and that recommendations are backed back appropriate administrative
controls. They way to manage cyber risks due to the human factor is by high
quality trainings and these are best designed and analyzed following the theory
of constructive alignment.
232
And Paper-Based is Better? Towards
Comparability of Classic and Cryptographic
Voting Schemes?
Marc Nemes2, Rebecca Schwerdt1, Dirk Achenbach2, Bernhard Löwe, Jörn
Müller-Quade1
1 Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
2 FZI Research Center for Information Technology
In today’s real-world elections the choice of the voting scheme is often more
subject to tradition than the result of an objective selection process. As a conse-
quence, it is left to intuition whether the chosen scheme satisfies desired security
properties. Employing a scientific selection process to decide on a specific vot-
ing scheme is currently infeasibly cumbersome. Even those few schemes which
have been thouroughly analyzed do not provide easily comparable analysis re-
sults. Hence there is a strong need to increase meaningful comparability, allowing
democracies to choose the voting scheme that is best suited for their setting.
Contrary to common conception there is not the classic paper-based vot-
ing scheme. We highlight examples of significant differences between systems in
key areas. Possibilities for authentication are identification via ID-card (manda-
tory3, 4 or by request only5, 6, 7) or handing in specially issued voting documents5,6
which are compared to the eligible voters lists. Ballots are often marked with a
pen by crosses3,6,8 but in order to prevent recognizably marked ballots, ballots
with additional markings are often declared invalid.6,7,8,9 Alternatively, choices
may be indicated by handing in preprinted voting ballots which only contain
the selected choice and do not have to be marked at all.10 On the other hand,
there are countries where write-in candidates are allowed or ballots with individ-
ual markings are still valid.3 Sometimes everyone is allowed to watch the whole
voting process in any polling station,3,5,8 giving voters some form of verifiabil-
ity. In other cases only eligible voters are admitted into the polling station and
they have to leave again as soon as they are done casting their vote.6,7 In these
systems usually only very specific observers are allowed—like representatives of
the parties nominated for election.3,4,7,9,10 Mostly, ballot boxes are opened and
tallied directly within the individual polling stations3,4,5,6,7,9 with partial results
? The full version of this paper is available at https://eprint.iacr.org/2021/1122.pdf
3 Elections Commission of the Maldives: The Presidential Election Regulation
4 India: The Representation of the People Act, Act No. 43
5 German Federal Election Regulations, BGBl. I S. 1769 (ber. 258), 1328, 1329
6 Folketing (Parliamentary) Elections Act of Denmark, Consolidated Act No. 369
7 The Constitution of the Republic of Ghana (Amendment) Act, 526th Act
8 German Federal Election Law, BGBl. I S. 1288, 1594, 2395
9 UK: Representation of the People Act (Consolidated Version), Schedule 1
10 Israel: Knesset Elections Law (Consolidated Version), No. 40 (5729-1969)
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being announced there.3,5,6,7 This exchanges the need to transport ballot boxes
in a secure way for the need to securely communicate partial results. Other sys-
tems tally in one or multiple central locations6 or explicitly require ballots from
one ballot box to be mixed with those of others.9 Note that these are merely
illustrating examples. A detailed comparison of individual schemes would show
even more differences—not only in the processes, but also the resulting prop-
erties. We do not claim this to be a drawback of the current voting landscape.
The scientific and political voting community should, however, be aware how
heterogeneous the landscape of classic paper-based voting system is and refrain
from comparisons to just “classic paper-based voting”.
This heterogeneous field of paper-based voting systems does not preclude
meaningful comparisons, as long as the exact system something is compared to
is specified. Unfortunately, comparing another voting system to current solutions
is impeded by several other factors. Some building blocks are used with clear
and known (security) intentions: a list of voters is essential to allow at most
one vote per eligible voter, the voting booth supports the privacy of the ballot
and the ballot box helps that ballots cannot be removed or linked to the voter.
Unfortunately, this level of reasoning is commonly the extent of any “security
analysis” of classic paper-based voting schemes. The first problem we encounter
is lack of specification. Even though election legislation is often very complex
and detailed, most countries lack precise (publicly known) instructions. If we do
not fully know a scheme, we can not analyse it. In addition, knowing and un-
derstanding every aspect of such a protocol not only exceeds the comprehension
of numerous voters but is not possible at all if not every detail of the process is
specified and publicly known. Secondly, regarding properties, constitutions and
international agreements on voting rights give only broad goals like freedom of
voting choice or secrecy and equality of votes —but leave it to courts to decide
whether they are fulfilled or not. As long as clear definitions are lacking, it is
impossible to rigorously analyze whether a voting scheme satisfies the required
properties. Thirdly, we find a lack of security analyses and even security inten-
tions. Most schemes were developed a long time ago and modified often, making
it unnecessarily infeasible to get a comprehensive documentation of the reason-
ing behind some design decisions. While some fundamental ideas of the protocols
are clear, legislation on the voting process only states what is to be done with-
out any explanation on why certain provisions are taken, let alone what they
actually achieve. Not knowing the reason and consequences of design decisions
does not only encumber security analyses but allows for much easier coercion as
voters are less sure about the information an adversary may plausibly obtain.
We have seen that meaningful comparison between newly proposed voting
schemes and classical paper-based voting is currently infeasible because of the
largely ignored fact that the field of currently employed paper-based solutions is
very heterogeneous. More importantly we found that, as of yet, classical paper-
based schemes lack the necessary rigorous and thorough specification as well as
formal security and privacy analysis to serve as a basis for comparison. We think
it is an important societal goal to close these gaps.
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Abstract. Most U.S. voters cast hand-marked paper ballots that are
counted by optical scanners. Deployed ballot scanners typically utilize
simplistic mark-detection methods, based on comparing the measured
intensity of target areas to preset thresholds, but this technique is known
to sometimes misread “marginal” marks that deviate from ballot instruc-
tions. We investigate the feasibility of improving scanner accuracy using
supervised learning. We train a convolutional neural network to classify
various styles of marks extracted from a large corpus of voted ballots.
This approach achieves higher accuracy than a naive intensity threshold
while requiring far fewer ballots to undergo manual adjudication. It is
robust to imperfect feature extraction, as may be experienced in ballots
that lack timing marks, and efficient enough to be performed in real time
using contemporary central-count scanner hardware.
1 Introduction
Hand-marked paper ballots counted by optical scanners are the most popular
voting method in the United States, used by jurisdictions home to about 70% of
registered voters [29], and they are becoming even more prominent due to the
rapid expansion of postal voting spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic [13]. Despite
its importance, optical scan voting faces two significant integrity challenges. First,
deployed scanners suffer from a host of well-documented vulnerabilities (e.g., [11,
14, 2, 15, 18]). Second, and the focus of this study, even in the absence of an
attack, traditional scanning techniques sometimes fail to accurately count some
voter marks [12]. In principle, risk-limiting audits can address both problems by
ensuring that any fraud or error sufficient to change the outcome of a contest is
likely to be detected [24, 17], but widespread adoption of RLAs, even for Federal
contests, may be a decade or more in the future. Given that many major contests
will not be subject to rigorous audits anytime soon, it is important to ensure
that scanners themselves count ballots as accurately as practically possible.
Today’s ballot scanners typically employ variations of a relatively simplistic
technique [12, 27]. After creating a digital image of the ballot, they identify the
voting targets and calculate the average shading within each target area, si. For
a predefined threshold α, target i is treated as marked whenever si ≥ α. Some
modern scanners make use of a second threshold, β. If β ≤ si < α, the target is
treated as an ambiguous or marginal mark, and the ballot is set aside for officials
to manually determine the voter’s intent, in a process known as adjudication.
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Fig. 1: Voted targets from Humboldt (top) and Pueblo (bottom) datasets. These
scans originate from Hart InterCivic and Dominion scanners, respectively. This
difference is reflected in the style of the targets and the quality of the scans.
This technique performs well on ballots that have been properly marked, but
it sometimes falls short when handling ballots where the voter has not followed
the instructions precisely [12], as in many of the samples in Figure 1. Often,
voters disregard ballot instructions and use other marks such as X-marks or check
marks to indicate their intent. As discussed in Section 3.1, we found that roughly
8.5% of marks in one large corpus of voted ballots were not filled as directed.
While humans can easily identify these “marginal” marks and typically interpret
them correctly, they may be challenging for current optical scanning systems
to process accurately. If marks are not dark enough, they may not meet either
threshold will therefore be ignored by current systems. Even in the case where
marks fall within the adjudication range, tabulating them imposes increased
labor costs for resource-constrained voting jurisdictions.
We investigate the feasibility of improving scanner accuracy and reducing
adjudication costs by applying supervised learning techniques. Using real voted
ballots, we train a convolutional neural network to classify a variety of mark
styles, including both properly marked targets and common marginal marks.
Compared to a generic implementation of mark recognition based on intensity
thresholds, our model achieves more accurate classification and lower rates of
adjudication. We further validate our technique using a second real-world ballot
corpus for which we have the results of scanning and adjudication reported in
the election, and achieve identical results in every case. These findings suggest
that our approach could improve scanner accuracy while reducing election costs.
2 Related Work
The challenging nature of ballot mark recognition has long been recognized and
is discussed at length by Jones [12] and Toledo et al. [27].
A number of previous studies have investigated methods for improving ballot
scanning. Several groups have approached the problem by combining computer
vision for feature extraction with human judgement for checking the interpretation
of marks. In 2010, Cordero et al. proposed a method for efficiently verifying
the scanner’s mark interpretations by having humans review batches of ballot
images automatically superimposed on each other [6]. Wang et al. later developed
OpenCount, a system that similarly automated feature extraction and provided
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interactive tools for classifying voter marks [30]. Although our goal is to improve
automatic mark recognition and reduce reliance on operator input, these earlier
works could complement our techniques and result in further efficiency gains, if
applied to the ballots that our approach determines require manual adjudication.
More closely related to our approach, other prior work has applied supervised
learning to mark recognition. In 2009, Xiu et al. briefly investigated a classification
approach generally similar to ours, but based on modified quadratic discrimi-
nant functions (MQDFs) instead of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) [31].
Although they reported strong performance, their dataset consisted of only a
few hundred ballots, making comparisons with real-world scanner performance
difficult. A 2015 NIST study further benchmarked several ML-based approaches
for categorizing marginal marks [1], but their primary goal was to improve testing
of optical scanners rather than to surpass intensity-based mark detection.
3 Methods
In recent years, convolutional neural networks (CNNs) have become the industry
standard for image classification [26]. CNNs use a divide and conquer strategy
to classify images, attempting to gain a localized understanding of an image’s
structure to identify key characteristics which are then used to classify the image
as a whole. For instance, in classifying marks on a ballot, one feature a CNN might
identify is lines at a 45-degree angle, corresponding to X-marks. We chose to use
a two-dimensional CNN, since it allows for the detection of multidimensional
structures, in contrast to a one-dimensional fully-connected network which would
immediately flatten the image, losing the ability for the network to extract this
type of structural feature from the data. Another advantage of CNNs is that they
use comparatively fewer parameters than fully connected networks, since they
reuse their parameters several times. This means that the model is easier to train
because it requires less data to achieve a higher accuracy and takes less time.
We developed our own CNN model and then tested it on ballot scans collected
from actual elections, evaluating its performance relative to a simple threshold-
based approach. It was not possible to obtain a currently marketed optical scanner
to use as a baseline for comparison, so we wrote our own implementation closely
modeled on the Dominion ImageCast scanner system, as described in patents
and court documents [22, 7]. The Dominion system, which is used in parts of
28 states [29], defaults to α = 35% and β = 12%, which we adopted for our
implementation. One advantage of using this baseline model rather than an
actual optical scanner was that both models used the same extracted features,
allowing for a truer comparison of their mark detection methods.
We decided to build a model that would classify individual targets as features
rather than examining entire pages. This way our model generalizes well across
different contests and page types, so long as the targets are the same shape and
size. Since the two datasets we used (described below) had differently shaped
targets, we used a separate model for each. Both models used the same CNN
architecture, but each was trained on different data.
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3.1 Data
The ballot scans we used came from two datasets: the November 2009 election in
Humboldt County, California and the November 2020 election in Pueblo County,
Colorado [23]. Initially, we used a representative subset of the Humboldt data,
consisting of 23,846 out of the 28,383 non-blank pages, which contained 149,394
voting targets. Later, to validate our approach, we used a subset of the Pueblo
dataset, which provided ballot scans as well as the official interpretation of each
target resulting from the real scanners and adjudication process. This allowed us
to directly compare the CNN model’s output to real election practice. From the
89,098 Pueblo County ballots, we used a representative subset of 1,719 ballots
that contained 147,121 voting targets. Each ballot consisted of multiple contests.
Some Humboldt contests allowed for only one vote while others allowed multiple
choices to be selected. Additionally, the ballots in both datasets did not have a
straight-ticket option, so most contests contained marked targets.
Labeling To provide ground truth for the Humboldt data, we manually labeled
all of the targets in our subset. We started by labeling each ballot page type; for
purposes of this study, a page type is defined as a set of scans that contain the
same contests in the same relative locations on each page. We then labeled the
individual targets in two passes, according to two labeling schemes. In the first
pass, we labeled targets by the mark type, and in the second, by perceived voter
intent (0 for no vote, 1 for vote). The first schema is presented in Figure 2, along
with a summary of the first pass of labeling. Approximately 69% of targets were
unmarked, 29% were properly marked, and 2.7% contained a marginal mark.
We verified our labels by comparing the election results published by Humboldt
County [10]. There was near perfect agreement for contests that had been labeled
completely, with the maximum difference being 15 out of 6529 votes (or 0.2%).
Most contests were either in complete agreement or differed by only 1 or 2 votes.
In all the contests where there was a mismatch, our vote totals were less than
the official counts. Upon investigation, most of the discrepancies were due to mal-
formed or flipped scans, which we did not label. The small residual disagreement
could be due to inaccuracies in the original count or our own human error.
Unlike the Humboldt scans, which were stored as grayscale images, the Pueblo
scans were 1-bit black and white. There may have been some faint marginal marks
on ballots that were undetected by the optical scanners and were also missed by
our manual labeling. In this case, all models would have misclassified this type of
mark, since it was lost at the scanning stage rather than the interpretation stage.
Feature Extraction The ballots in the Humboldt dataset lack timing marks,
and we found that the position and orientation of the ballot relative to the
scanned image was inconsistent across scans. To overcome this, we created a
template for each page type that indicated the location of each voting target
relative to the top-left corner of a rectangular printed border that surrounds
the ballot. We used OpenCV’s contour detection algorithm [3] to obtain the










Marked and Crossed Out 316
Bad Scan / Wrong contest 2,242
Other 72
Total 149,394
Fig. 2: Number of marks of different types in Humboldt dataset, as determined
by manual classification. 8.5% of the marks in this dataset were marginal marks.
template to extract all of the voting targets. This method accounted for the
common case of vertical and horizontal shifts of the ballot within the scans.
However, this method is not able to account for other kinds of scanning artifacts,
including ballots with nonlinear distortions due to misfeeding.
For the Pueblo dataset, the ballots contained timing marks, which provided
four points of reference for each individual target, giving us an extremely accurate
position for extraction. For each page type, we used OpenCV to identify the
timing marks corresponding to each target and used them to extract the target
regions. This was highly resilient to rotations and other scanner distortions.
Partitioning Into Training and Test Data We used a subset of the labeled
targets from each dataset for training and the remainder for testing. Of labeled
targets from the Humboldt dataset, 54% (corresponding to 12 out of 17 page types)
were used for training. For the Pueblo dataset, 75% were used for training. These
differing splits were a matter of convenience. Both models exhibited excellent
performance, but we note that the larger amount of training data may have
benefited the performance of the Pueblo model relative to the Humboldt model.
3.2 Baseline Model
We sought to compare our methods to the commonly used intensity-threshold
technique. Since we did not have access to a deployed ballot scanner, we created
our own implementation modeled after the Dominion system described in Sec-
tion 2. For each ballot, our baseline model considers all the extracted targets in
a given contest and predicts each target as either no vote, vote, or adjudicate.
In practice, a single adjudicated mark will result in the entire contest on that
ballot being reviewed by humans, so if any mark was predicted as adjudicate, we
labeled all the targets in that contest the same way.
Dominion’s scanners create 1-bit-per-pixel bitmaps, as shown in Figure 1. In
order to replicate this behavior using the grayscale Humboldt scans, we applied
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Floyd–Steinberg dithering (a common graphics algorithm provided by the imaging
library we used [4]) to reduce the grayscale images to black and white while
approximately maintaining the average intensity within local regions.
The next step was to calculate the number of marked pixels inside the target
area. However, each feature consisted of not only the voter’s mark (inside the
target), but also the pre-printed target border and the area immediately outside
it. To account for this, we first converted our thresholds into raw pixel counts,
leveraging the fact that all targets had the same dimensions. Then we subtracted
the average number of black pixels occupied by the unmarked target border.
To allow for imperfect feature extraction, our baseline implementation con-
sidered a target area that is somewhat larger than the printed targets. Some
fielded scanners are known to do so as well, but to our knowledge the specifics of
this behavior are not well documented by any manufacturer. We note this as a
limitation of our baseline model. It is possible that real scanners differ in such
aspects and so would sometimes produce different results; however, we expect
variations based on marks outside the printed target to be uncommon. In our
datasets, such marks rarely occurred except in cases where the shading within
the printed target alone would have clearly been an intended mark.
3.3 CNN Model
Preprocessing Before we could train our model, we needed to transform our
dataset. In order to decrease computational costs, we resized the cropped target
areas to 28 × 28 pixels with 8-bits-per-pixel of depth. We then stored them in
a three-dimensional array, X, parallel to their associated labels, y. Finally, we
normalized the pixel values in X to a 0–1 scale.
Our manual classification rubric included “lightly,” “partially,” and “properly”
marked labels, but we later realized that the distinction between these classes
varied depending on who was assigning the label. Due to the subjectivity, we
merged these classes prior to training. All three labels indicated that the voter
intended a mark; we reviewed the entire contest when making these classifications,
and in each case the voter’s intent was clear.
Finally, we made a second partition of the targets from those that were set
aside for training, reserving 85% for training and a standard 15% for validation.
This allowed us to train our model using various parameter combinations and
determine which were best by examining performance on the validation set. We
followed this process for both datasets independently.
Model Structure The model we chose consisted of a single convolutional layer
with 25 filters of kernel size 3×3, stride 1, and no padding. The output was passed
through a ReLU nonlinearity, followed by a fully connected layer with ReLU,
and finally a second fully connected layer that culminated in seven neurons. We
used the softmax function to create a probability distribution from the final layer
weights and outputted our prediction as the class with the highest probability.
A primary consideration while designing the model was the number of convolu-
tional layers. Models today can have upwards of 50 layers [9], but excess layers can
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Fig. 3: The CNN architecture we used. Pictured layers appear from left to right
in the order they were applied. (Image generated using [16].)
cause overfitting. Our dataset was relatively uncomplicated, with X-marks, check
marks, and marked and crossed-out marks being the most complicated structures.
We wanted a model capable of learning these structures but also general enough
to categorize all X-marks, regardless of their shape, size or orientation, as an
X-mark. We initially made the assumption that more layers would result in
higher accuracy, but in evaluating our model, we noticed that our training loss
was significantly lower than testing loss, and our validation accuracy was low,
which suggested that the design was overfitting. This led us to use a shallower
model, reduced to one convolutional layer and with an increased number of
convolutional filters. We observed that this approach reduced overfitting and
significantly increased validation accuracy.
Before trying a shallower model, we experimented with hyperparameter tuning,
as well as regularization methods such as dropout. We also attempted to add
a pooling layer, to downsample, and to reduce the number of parameters, but
found that these features were unnecessary due to the already low spatial size of
our images. The shallower model we settled on also had the side benefit of faster
training, allowing more iteration in our model development process.
We implemented our model using Keras and TensorFlow. We were able to
take advantage of the built-in convolutional and fully-connected layers while
having the flexibility to write our own evaluation metrics.
Hyperparameter Selection One important hyperparameter was the evalua-
tion metric. Our ultimate goal is to produce a vote tally that comes as close as
possible to the collective will of the voters, and our model also should be intelli-
gible to voters, allowing people to understand how their votes are counted. With
these criteria in mind, accuracy is the most logical evaluation metric. For training
the model, however, simply trying to optimize for accuracy has its drawbacks.
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Fig. 4: Using 17 epochs optimizes validation F1 score while retaining low loss.
Since marginal marks account for such a small percentage of the data relative to
properly marked and blank marks, a model trained for accuracy would not learn
to classify these marks as well as their more prevalent counterparts. To address
this, we chose to use a model that optimizes F1 score, the harmonic mean of pre-
cision and recall, which puts more weight on correctly classifying these marginal
marks. By optimizing for F1 score, we were able to produce a model that had
a higher overall accuracy compared to one that optimized for accuracy directly.
The other traditional hyperparameters we selected were batch size and the
number of epochs. Based on a number of trial runs, we expect that a fairly wide
range of batch sizes would be appropriate; we chose 32. For the number of epochs,
we chose 17, which testing determined was past the point of diminishing marginal
returns for the F1 score while maintaining low loss, as shown in Figure 4.
The final important hyperparameter was a threshold for confidence, which
we used to apply our trained model to an entire contest rather than individual
targets. That is, how confident did we need to be that all the targets in a contest
were classified correctly in order to not designate that ballot for adjudication? To
utilize this threshold, we first obtained the product of the label probabilities for
each of those targets, and then compared that value to the threshold. Similarly
to the baseline model, if this value was lower than the threshold then we would
send the entire contest for adjudication. We tested several threshold values and
obtained the best results with a threshold of 0.95 combined with adjudicating
any contest in which the classifier found three or more different types of marks.
3.4 Differences for Pueblo Dataset
Although the model structure for the Pueblo dataset was broadly similar to the
Humboldt model, we did not use the baseline model to evaluate it since we had
the scanner’s actual interpretation as ground truth. Each ballot in the dataset
included the officially counted votes (and the results of adjudication, if applicable)
as a final page in the scan, a feature that Dominion calls AuditMark [8]. We
extracted these results using the Pytesseract optical character recognition library.
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Fig. 5: For Pueblo ballots, we used timing marks to extract targets, manually
labeled them, and passed these features to our CNN model.
Through manual and automated inspections of the Pueblo dataset, we estab-
lished that it contains far fewer marginal marks than the Humboldt data. This
may be due in part to Pueblo County acting to protect voter privacy by removing
ballots with unusual styles of marks that were flagged for adjudication. For this
reason, we used the Pueblo dataset to test how a CNN model would perform
compared to current scanning systems under “ideal” ballot conditions—i.e., post
adjudication, limited marginal marks, and clear ballot instructions. Our goal
was to establish whether a CNN-based system would perform as well as current
systems even under the circumstances where current systems are most accurate.
4 Evaluation and Results
To compare ballot scanning models, there are three distinct metrics to consider:
classification accuracy, number of ballots that require adjudication, and computa-
tional cost. First, it is important that a model is as accurate as possible because
it is vital that the tabulated results match the intent of the voters. Second,
it is important to minimize ballots that require adjudication. In many states
such as Colorado, where the Pueblo dataset originated, ballots that are “kicked”
by scanners must be adjudicated by a bipartisan team of election judges who
determine how the vote should be counted by a set of criteria [5]. This process
is slow and potentially subjective. If a ballot scanner kicks too many ballots,
counting will be cost prohibitive. Finally, if the model is too slow, using it in
practice (such as in real-time as ballots are scanned) may be difficult.
Before accuracy could be computed, we needed to determine how targets
labeled as adjudicated should be handled when calculating accuracy. Our models
assigned each target one of three labels—vote, no vote, or adjudicate. By contrast,
each target in the dataset was labeled as either a vote or a no vote. When
computing accuracy, we assumed all adjudicated ballots would be correctly
classified by the adjudication process. We separately evaluated the number of
ballots that required adjudication. We show results for these metrics in Figure 6.
4.1 Baseline Model Performance
The baseline model performed better than we anticipated; however, it still strug-
gled where we expected. First, it sometimes classified targets with small or light
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Model Targets Accurately Classified Flagged for Adjudication
Baseline 68,540 (99.895%) 2,181 (3.179%)
CNN 68,588 (99.965%) 1,465 (2.135%)
Hybrid #1 68,597 (99.978%) 3,242 (4.725%)
Hybrid #2 68,557 (99.920%) 430 (0.627%)
Fig. 6: Performance of each model on the Humboldt dataset. The CNN misclassifies
67% fewer targets and flags 33% fewer ballots for adjudication versus the baseline.
marks as no votes because these marks did not contain enough dark pixels to pass
either threshold and be classified as a vote or flagged for adjudication. Second,
the model often classified targets with marks that were filled in and crossed
out as votes, because these targets contained a higher percent than the second
threshold of dark pixels. Figure 7 shows examples of misclassified targets.
4.2 CNN Model Performance
By comparison, the CNN model outperformed the baseline model in both overall
accuracy and number of ballots sent to a human. It had 66.7% fewer misclassifi-
cations and 32.8% fewer ballots flagged for adjudication versus the baseline.
The cases where the CNN model produced inaccurate classifications fell into
a few categories. First, it appeared to be more sensitive than the baseline model
to poor feature extraction and struggled off center targets. Fortunately, there
exist more sophisticated techniques for ballot feature extraction than was used in
this study [19]. Second, our model struggled with some of the X-marked targets.
The CNN model occasionally labeled these targets as empty, causing it to predict
no vote where a vote should have been. Figure 7 shows examples where the CNN
model failed, but we emphasize that its overall performance was clearly superior
to the baseline’s when comparing accuracy or adjudications.
Figure 8 shows how each model performed on targets the other classified
correctly, incorrectly, or adjudicated. Notably, all marks that the CNN model mis-
classified were also misclassified or flagged for adjudication by the baseline model.
(a) Baseline (b) CNN (c) Both
Fig. 7: Examples of misclassified targets from Humboldt ballots. The CNN per-





Correct 65,355 1,742 26
Adjudicate 1,004 430 31
Incorrect 0 9 15
Fig. 8: Overlapping performance of each model on 68,612 Humboldt targets.
4.3 Computational Costs
An additional metric to consider is computational cost. For the CNN, the most
computationally expensive step was training the model. However, training need
only be done once for each type of scanner hardware and style of voting target.
Ideally, a pre-trained model can predict labels for ballots at least as fast as
they are scanned in, ensuring that the model is not a limiting component of the
device as a whole. Today, a typical speed rating for a high-speed central-count
optical scanner is on the order of 300 ballots per minute [28]. Different ballots
contain vastly different numbers of targets, but an upper bound estimate for a
traditional-style ballot might be 128 targets per page. With double-sided ballots,
the high-speed scanner would need to process 1280 targets per second to keep up.
Both the pre-fitted CNN and the baseline model far exceeded this rate, taking less
than a second on a mid-line laptop to label the extracted, preprocessed features
from the 68,612 targets in our test dataset. (Although feature extraction adds
additional costs, these are the same with both models.) This indicates that the
CNN approach can outperform the baseline in both accuracy and adjudication
frequency while performing fast enough to keep pace with modern scanners.
4.4 Hybrid Models
After examining the results from the baseline and CNN models, we considered
additional models that involved combining the two. We optimized the first of
these hybrid models for accuracy. In this model, we flagged a contest’s targets for
adjudication if either the baseline model or the CNN model labeled any of that
contest’s targets as adjudicate, or if the two models disagreed on their predictions.
This hybrid achieved a higher overall accuracy than either model alone. However,
it also required adjudicating significantly more targets than either model alone
did. Since this model was better than the CNN model by accuracy but worse by
number of ballots adjudicated, it is not clearly an improvement. It is also worth
noting that similar results might be possible from the CNN alone by increasing
the confidence threshold at which the CNN model flags ballots for adjudication.
The second combined model we considered strove to maintain accuracy while
reducing the number of ballots adjudicated. In this hybrid, we used the CNN
model as a primary classifier, and when the CNN model chose to adjudicate, we
used the baseline model to try to classify the target first. By accuracy, this model
was still better than the baseline model but not as good as the CNN alone. By
number of adjudications, this method was highly effective. It would be interesting
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to investigate if one could increase the accuracy of this type of hybrid model by
increasing the confidence threshold of the CNN. Like the first hybrid model, since
this model was better than the CNN in one aspect but worse in the other, we
cannot conclude which is decisively better. Figure 6 shows results for both hybrids.
4.5 Optimized Baseline Model
In addition to the performances of combined CNN and baseline models, we also
investigated how a baseline model with different thresholds would have performed
compared to the CNN. By starting with the Humboldt voting results and working
backwards, it was possible to use a brute force approach to calculate which
thresholds would produce the optimal results for this specific dataset given either
a minimum accuracy or maximum adjudication rate condition.
If we insist that the baseline model achieves a lower adjudication rate than
the CNN, α = 13.2% and β = 8.1% maximized accuracy. This modified baseline
achieved an accuracy of 99.862%—worse than even the original baseline model—
and an adjudication rate of 2.035%. Likewise, if we modify the baseline model
to have an accuracy higher than the CNN model, α = 99.8% and β = 1.7%
minimized adjudication. While this model had an accuracy of 99.968%, it would
be virtually pointless as 97.042% of all contests required adjudication. This
strongly suggests that there are types of marks, such as those marked and then
crossed out, that simply cannot be correctly identified by a model that only looks
at the shading of the target area.
4.6 Pueblo Test Results
We used the Pueblo dataset to more directly compare the CNN model to a
deployed election system and to address concerns about whether a CNN could
sometimes harm results. That is, in elections where current scanners perform
well, would a CNN achieve a comparable accuracy? Once we had determined
the efficacy of a CNN for the relatively messy Humboldt dataset, we retrained
our model on the comparatively clean Pueblo dataset. Retraining was necessary,
because the datasets use different styles of voting targets, and the raw scans,
which were captured on different types of hardware, have vastly different intensity
response characteristics. We used the same model architecture, only changing
input/output sizes for the model layers. This model achieved similar training
accuracy and loss to the Humboldt CNN model.
The Pueblo CNN model found 36 contests on 24 ballots with an overvote.
When combined with 161 targets where feature extraction failed, this amounted to
0.0067% of the targets in the test dataset, and after accounting for the overvotes,
the Pueblo model agreed with the post-adjudication ballot interpretations from
the real election for every target in the test dataset of about 35,000 targets. This
suggests that a CNN can produce accuracy as good as state-of-the-art deployed
systems, while potentially requiring fewer ballots to be adjudicated.
Since the Pueblo dataset had extremely few marginal marks, the baseline also
had a very high accuracy and made almost no mistakes, leaving little room to
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improve upon the accuracy. However, our previous experiments showed that on
datasets with a larger variety of marks, such as the Humboldt ballots, our CNN
approach can achieve significant improvements to accuracy.
5 Discussion
We trained CNN models on the Humboldt dataset and the Pueblo dataset and
found that they match or outperform the baseline threshold-intensity approach
in terms of the number of correctly labeled targets and the number of ballots that
require adjudication by election officials. A similar approach could be implemented
in future elections. Scanner manufacturers could each train a model once on
ballots that reflect their particular style of voting targets (e.g., ovals or rectangles)
and hardware imaging characteristics (e.g., grayscale or one-bit black and white),
then implement the model in a software update for their machines. This would
potentially benefit future elections in multiple ways.
The benefits to increased labeling accuracy are clear. Better target classifica-
tions mean election results will better match voter intent. Demonstrated accuracy
improvements may also increase public trust in the election process. Additionally,
despite the expert consensus regarding the importance of rigorous post-election
audits as a defense against both fraud and error [20], many states still do not re-
quire any form of tabulation audit, and very few perform risk-limiting audits [21].
As a result, the outcomes of the vast majority of contests currently depend on the
accuracy of ballot scanners. Even when audits or manual recounts are applied, it
is important for initial machine counts to be accurate, because if the audit or
recount shows different counts, public confidence is likely to be eroded.
One of the biggest benefits of adjudicating fewer ballots is the time saved.
When an absentee ballot is sent for review, election officials need to analyze it in
the presence of multiple observers, determine voter intent, and then (for manual
adjudication processes) copy the voter intent onto a new ballot and scan it. Re-
ducing adjudication will save administrative costs and improve the speed at which
election results are tabulated—which may help further increase voter confidence.
Moreover, reducing the number of times voter intent needs to be determined by
humans will reduce the potential for bias, subjectivity, and disputes.
5.1 Future Work
Our results suggest that application of machine learning techniques can achieve
substantial improvements for the ballot scanning process, but we emphasize that
far more work is possible. While our model was able classify targets correctly
with greater than 99.9% accuracy, outperforming the baseline model, there are
numerous improvements that can be made to further enhance the performance
of supervised learning techniques and better understand voter intent.
First, although our CNN model matched the performance of an actual scanner
for the Pueblo dataset, which had very few marginal marks, further work is
needed to more rigorously quantify the gains from CNN techniques against actual
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deployed scanners when marginal marks are more common. The baseline model we
implemented may be more capable towards marginal marks than some currently
deployed tabulators, since it considers intensity within a fairly large region around
the voting target, and so may underestimate the potential improvements.
Second, performance can very likely be enhanced by improving on the rather
basic feature extraction methods that we used in the bulk of our experiments.
Most of the mistakes in the Humboldt model originated from our target crops not
being centered. A model trained on more structurally uniform, less variable data
should better classify targets. In the Pueblo dataset, our feature extraction used
timing marks and was more accurate than the Humboldt extraction. However,
not all ballots utilize timing marks, and those that do not would benefit from the
application of more sophisticated existing target extraction techniques (e.g., [30]).
Third, the performance of the CNN model can likely be greatly improved
by training on a larger corpus of marginal marks, particular X-marks, check
marks, and marked-and-crossed-out marks. With more data from these classes,
models will be even better equipped to correctly classify these less common marks.
Election officials could help accelerate this process by making larger and more
complete datasets of scanned ballots available for research.
Fourth, more research is needed to investigate how ML techniques might
provide even greater flexibility in understanding voter intent, such as by recog-
nizing and processing marks that are not in the voting targets or in the small
area around them. We found several examples of voters making marks and even
writing in the margins of the ballots. These marks get ignored by both the current
system and by our model. Scanners could potentially make better use of these
marks for deciphering voter intent, whether by intelligently processing them or
merely recognizing when they call for adjudication.
Finally, there is some evidence that demographic disparities exist in the rate
of voter error when using existing ballot scanners [25, p. 19]. Since CNN models
perform better when interpreting marginal marks, they might help reduce this
bias. Research is needed to fully understand the causes and extent of bias in
existing systems and to test how adopting a CNN model would affect it.
6 Conclusion
Marginal marks are a common feature on hand marked paper ballots, and current
ballot scanning systems do not adequately account for them. In one dataset,
we found that 8.5% of marked targets were not filled in completely, but rather
consisted of X-marks, check marks, lightly filled targets, partially filled targets,
and various forms of crossed-out targets. While traditional intensity-threshold
methods are often able to classify such marginal marks correctly, we identified
numerous cases where they either fail or require unnecessary human intervention.
By accounting for different kinds of marks and using a CNN trained to identify
them, we were able to make ballot scanning more accurate. Compared to the
baseline, we found that our model correctly classifies more targets and reduces
the number of ballots sent to humans for review. While additional work is needed,
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our research indicates that supervised learning has the potential to make ballot
scanning smarter by counting ballots both faster and more accurately.
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Abstract. We consider elections that publish anonymised voted ballots
or anonymised cast-vote records for transparency or verification purposes,
investigating the implications for privacy, coercion, and vote selling and
exploring how partially masking the ballots can alleviate these issues.
Risk Limiting Tallies (RLT), which reveal only a random sample of ballots,
were previously proposed to mitigate some coercion threats. Masking
some ballots provides coerced voters with plausible deniability, while
risk-limiting techniques ensure that the required confidence level in the
election result is achieved. Risk-Limiting Verification (RLV) extended
this approach to masking a random subset of receipts or trackers.
Here we show how these ideas can be generalised and made more flexible
and effective by masking at a finer level of granularity: at the level of
the components of ballots. In particular, we consider elections involving
complex ballots, where RLT may be vulnerable to pattern-based vote buy-
ing. We propose various measures of verifiability and coercion-resistance
and investigate how several sampling/masking strategies perform against
these measures. Using methods from coding theory, we analyse signature
attacks, bounding the number of voters who can be coerced. We also
define new quantitative measures for the level of coercion-resistance with-
out plausible deniability and the level of vote-buying-resistance without
“free lunch” vote sellers.
These results and the different strategies for masking ballots are of general
interest for elections that publish ballots for auditing, verification, or
transparency purposes.
1 Introduction
Some voting systems, including many end-to-end verifiable systems and some
conventional elections, publish the (plaintext) ballots. If these ballots are suitably
anonymised, by for example verifiable mixes published on a bulletin board, then
this is typically quite safe. But in some contexts, revealing such information may
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be problematic: certain corner cases, such as unanimous votes or absence of any
votes for a candidate and coercion threats, such as signature attacks.
In [4] the idea of Risk-Limiting Tallies (RLT) and Risk-Limiting Verification
(RLV) was proposed to mitigate such threats. The idea is to shroud a proportion
of the (anonymised) votes so voters can plausibly claim to have complied with the
coercer, even though no votes appear for the candidate demanded by the coercer
or no ballot with the pattern demanded by the coercer shows up in the tally. The
proportion left shrouded can be adjusted using risk-limiting techniques to ensure
that the confidence in the announced outcome achieves the required threshold,
e.g, 99%. The idea extends to the verification aspects: shrouding some proportion
of receipts or trackers. This proves particularly effective in for example the Selene
scheme to counter the “sting in the tail”: the coercer claiming that the voter’s
fake tracker is his own.
In this paper we note that, despite the pleasing features of the constructions of
[4] there are still some drawbacks, in particular if the ballots are rather complex.
While RLT may disincentivize coercion, there may still be an incentive for vote
buying : the voter might still cast the required pattern vote in the hope that it will
be revealed. Further, it has been suggested that RLT is arguably undemocratic in
that some voters’ ballots do not contribute to the final tally. The second objection
can be countered by arguing that every vote has an equal probability of being
included in the count and that the outcome will be, with whatever confidence
level required, a correct reflection of all votes cast. Nonetheless, it is an aspect
that some people find troubling. A pleasing side effect of our construction is that
all ballots are treated on an equal footing.
These observations suggest exploring different ways to apply RLT and RLV
when ballots are complex: rather than shrouding entire ballots at random, we
shroud, at random, some preferences on each ballot. In effect we are filtering the
tally horizontally rather than vertically. This hits both of the issues above: the
chance any given pattern remains identifiable after the filtering is reduced, and
every ballot contributes to the outcome, albeit not necessarily to every contest. In
the full tally construction below, every ballot contributes fully to the announced
outcome, but we shroud the link between the tracker and some components of
the ballots. For tracker-based schemes, the voters can verify some but not all of
their selections. This paper seeks to quantify these effects and explore trade-offs
among them.
Our techniques allow us to state and prove bounds on the number of voters
an adversary is able to attack using pattern-based or “signature” attacks. Note
that assigning the same, or similar, complex ballot pattern to many voters is
counterproductive for the adversary: if even a few voters comply, the rest can
point to the signature ballots that already appear and claim compliance. Thus,
an adversary who wants to influence many voters with a signature attack must be
able to produce many distinguishable ballot patterns. This observation motivates
us to prove lower and upper bounds on the number of distinguishable patterns
an adversary can construct. We prove these bounds using a connection to a
well-studied problem in the theory of error-correcting codes.
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This ballot-masking method and its privacy implications are interesting not
only in for RLT and RLV but for all schemes where all or some ballots are
published for auditing, verification, or transparency. As an example, Colorado
is currently redacting cast-vote records (CVRs) by removing entire CVRs, e.g.,
for rare ballot styles; partial masking has been considered as an alternative. We
note, however, that masking parts of the ballot might make it hard to detect
ill-formed, e.g., over-votes etc.
We also note that this idea has similarities to the SOBA constructions
for Risk-Limiting-Audits (RLAs), [1], which also publishes each audited ballot
“disassembled” into different contests, whereas the auditors will see the intact
ballot. The VAULT approach [2] also uses homomorphic encryption of the cast-
vote records to achieve the SOBA goals more easily. (VAULT was used for the first
time in a risk-limiting audit in Inyo County, California, in 2020.) The purpose and
the underlying cryptographic constructions are quite different, but our analysis
applies to these cases as well.
For some tally algorithms, we can separate ballots into their atomic parts and
reveal these independently after anonymising them, which effectively counters
signature attacks. However, that reduces public transparency and may reduce
public confidence in the election result. For Selene, where voters verify their
votes via trackers, this separation provides a method to verify without revealing
individual ballots: we simply assign a distinct tracker to each element of the ballot.
Voters can then verify some or all components of their ballot using those trackers.
A coerced voter could use the Selene tracker-faking mechanism to assemble a
ballot that matches the coercer’s instructions. Technically this is straightforward
but from a usability standpoint seems problematic. Moreover, even if the voter
were prepared to go the effort of concocting such a fake ballot, the necessary
ingredients might not be available, so coercion threats will remain, and the
probability that one of atomic trackers is the same as the coercer’s increases.
Thus it makes sense to look for alternatives.
Below, we present the main ideas and analyse differences in privacy, coercion-
resistance, and receipt-freeness for the different methods. Section 2 introduces the
idea of partially masking ballots. Section 3 describes how it can be used in masked
RLT and RLV. Section 4 defines a distinguishing distance between randomly
masked ballots, establishes a connection to the Hamming distance, characterizes
the class of masking strategies for which this connection holds, and proves bounds
on the number of voters that can be approached with a pattern-based attack. It
provides another application of the distinguishing distance: to quantify the effect
of masking on individual verifiability. Section 5 considers quantitative game-based
notions of privacy, coercion-resistance, and receipt-freeness. Section 6 concludes.
2 Masking Complex Ballots
Many elections use simple plurality voting: the voter selects at most one candidate
from a set, in the simplest case, a referendum, a choice between “yes” and “no.”
The next level of complexity is single-winner plurality, aka “first past the post.”
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More complex social choice functions and correspondingly more complex ballots
are common. Perhaps the next level in complexity are approval voting in which
the voter can cast votes for several candidates for a single office, and multi-winner
plurality, in which a voter can vote for up to k candidates for k offices. In some
cases voters may have a quota of votes and is allowed to cast more than one vote
for a given candidate, up to some limit. Some methods allow voters to give a
preference ranking to the candidates.
Common to all of these social choice functions, if the ballots are published, is
that they are vulnerable to signature attacks (also known as “Italian” attacks),
i.e. a coercer chooses a particular, unlikely, pattern, instructs the victim to mark
a ballot with that pattern and checks whether a ballot with that pattern appears
in the tally.
Let us assume that the ballots are of the form (v1, v2, . . . , vk) with k the
number of candidates and vi taking values from a specified set V. V might for
example just be {0, 1} or a set of integers plus a blank: {1, ...., s}
⋃
{blank} etc.
In many types of elections, these ballot-level selections, or subsets thereof,
will reappear as part of the tally procedure (e.g. in electronic mixnet tallies), as
part of an audit trail or for transparency (electronic scans of paper ballots), in
Risk-Limiting Audits using samples of votes, or verification procedures (e.g. in
tracker-based schemes such as Selene). In order to preserve privacy, the mapping
between the published votes and the voter is normally anonymised.
As mentioned above, revealing these ballots may endanger the receipt-freeness






2 ), . . . ,maskik(v
(i)
k ) ) for i = 1, . . . , n.
The functions maskij are either the identity, displaying the component of the
vote, or a constant, .e.g. ∗ (/∈ V), masking the component. n is the number of
ballots cast.
Risk-Limiting Tallies [4], involved unmasking only as many randomly selected
ballots as are needed to determine the election result with a chosen risk limit. The
remaining ballots were kept completely masked. Here we suggest a generalization,
allowing partial masking of the ballots, and we will discuss the impact on risk
limits, privacy, coercion-resistance, and resistance to vote-buying.
3 Partially Masked RLTs and RLVs
We reprise risk-limiting tallies and verification, RLT and RLV [4], before extending
these to general masks. First we recapitulate the idea of tracker-based verification
in terms of Selene.
Outline of Selene Selene [8] enables verification by posting the votes in the
clear on the BB along with private tracking numbers. Voters are only notified of
their tracker some time after the vote/tracker pairs have been publicly posted,
giving a coerced voter the opportunity to choose an alternative tracker to placate
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the coercer. The voter is able to fake the tracker and related cryptographic data
using a secret trapdoor key. The notification of the trackers is carefully designed
to provide assurance to the voter that it is their correctly assigned tracker, i.e.
unique to them, while being deniable to any third party.
Assuming that votes are encrypted component-wise, at the end of the mixing
we will have encrypted votes and trackers on the bulletin board:
({tri}PK , ({v(i)1 }PK , {v
(i)
2 }PK , ......{v
(i)
k }PK))
where {·}PK denotes encryption under the public key PK. These ballots can
now be verifiably decrypted to reveal the vote/tracker pairs that can be checked
by the voters, and anyone can compute the tally directly on the plaintext votes.
Risk-Limiting Tallies and Verification with Partially Masked Ballots
In the original approach to RLT (where ballots are without trackers) and RLV
(with trackers for individual verification), see [4], the idea was to only decrypt
a random subset of the ballots. The number decrypted being controlled by a
risk-limit that bounds the probability that the announced election result will be
wrong.
In the new masked RLV and RLT approach, we instead reveal randomly
selected components of the ballots (and the trackers for RLV). If there is more
than one contest on the ballot, the contests can be treated independently. How
much we reveal will again be governed by a specified risk limit, as in [4]. A
natural choice is to first decrypt m of the k entries in each ballot at random, and
to increase m if necessary to meet the risk limit. This is simplest and will be
used in the analysis below. In practice, it may make sense to dynamically change
the rate of openings per candidate, e.g. if a candidate is popular we might be
able to decrease the rate of unmasking of votes for that candidate, maintaining
the risk limit while improving coercion-resistance.
Using this masked approach for RLV with tracker verification, the masking
means that only parts of the ballot can be verified, but unlike to the original
RLV every voter can verify something. We will quantify how much.
Full Tally with Partial Verification (FTPV) A social choice function is
separable if, for the purposes of tallying, the components of each vote can be
considered separately. Plurality, approval, and Borda count are separable; instant-
runoff voting and single transferrable vote are not. For separable social choice
functions, it is possible to compute the full tally, i.e. achieve 100% confidence
in the outcome while partially masking selections. For each ballot, we randomly
select some components. All selected components for all ballots are gathered in
another part of the BB and subjected to a full, componentwise shuffling before
decryption. Their positions in the original ballots are replaced by ∗. Thus, the
way that these selected components appeared in the original ballots is lost.
The FTPV approach above might still hit corner cases, for instance if no vote
was cast for a particular candidate. This suggests using a hybrid approach in
which we use the approach above but reveal a random subset of the components
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separated out from the ballots. Thus we reveal enough of each ballot linked to
the tracker to make verification meaningful while mitigating coercion threats,
while a larger portion of the ballots is revealed without a link to the trackers to
attain the required risk limit for the tally.
4 Distinguishing distance and applications to signature
attacks and individual verifiability
In this section, we define a metric on the set of complex ballots that characterizes
how well pairs of strings can be distinguished under random masking. We then
observe that in some cases this metric is a monotone transformation of the
Hamming distance used in coding theory. We also precisely characterize the cases
when this occurs. Next, we use the connection to coding theory to answer the
following question: how many simultaneous signature attacks can a coercer and/or
vote-buyer launch? Finally, we give another application of the distinguishing
distance: we use it to quantify the effect of a masking strategy on individual
verifiability.
Throughout this section, we consider complex ballots with k components
taken from the set V; thus, the set of possible ballots is Vk. We ignore here any
constraints on what constitute valid ballots. For x ∈ Vk and S ⊂ {1, . . . , k}, we
denote by xS the substring of x on the positions in S.
4.1 Definition and basic properties of distinguishing distance
How distinguishable are pairs of elements of Vk under masking? For every
probability distribution pS over subsets of {1, . . . , k}, for every x ∈ Vk there is an
induced probability distribution qS,xS of the pair (S, xS), given by qS,xS (s, α) =
pS(s)δxs,α. If we keep pS fixed and consider a pair x, y ∈ Vk, we can define the
distance between x and y as the statistical distance of qS,xS , qS,yS ; thus, we take





|Pr(D(S, xS) = 1)−Pr(D(S, yS) = 1)|, (1)
where the supremum is over distinguishers D. We can obtain the following formula
for dpS :
Proposition 1. For all distributions pS, for all x, y ∈ Vk,






pS(s)I(s ∩ t 6= ∅)
where t is the set of positions on which x, y differ and the operator I transforms
the true/false value of a statement to 1, 0 respectively.
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Proof.
dpS (x, y) =
1
2
‖qS,xS − qS,yS‖1 =
∑
(s,α):qS,xS (s,α)>qS,yS (s,α)











pS(s)I(s ∩ t 6= ∅)
ut
Under the mild assumption that each position is revealed with strictly positive
probability, dpS is a metric on Vk.
Proposition 2. For all pS, dPS is symmetric, satisfies the triangle inequality
and satisfies ∀x, dPS (x, x) = 0. If in addition ∀i,Pr(i ∈ S) > 0, then dpS (x, y) =
0 =⇒ x = y.
Proof. The first three claims follow directly from (1). For the last claim, take
any i, any v ∈ V , any x, y with dpS (x, y) = 0. Consider the distinguisher D given
by “On input s, α, if i is among the revealed positions and the corresponding
entry is v output 1, else output zero.” Then,
Pr(i ∈ S)δxi,v = Pr(D(S, xS) = 1) = Pr(D(S, yS) = 1) = Pr(i ∈ S)δyi,v.
Therefore, ∀i∀v, xi = v ⇐⇒ yi = v, so x = y. ut
Now, we look at another question: how to find an optimal distinguisher
between a pair of strings. For each x ∈ Vk, define distinguisher Dx by “On
input (s, α), if xs = α, output 1, else output 0.” This is optimal regardless of the
particular pS , and regardless of the particular second element y.
Proposition 3. For all distributions pS, for all x, y ∈ Vk,
dpS (x, y) = Pr(Dx(S, xS) = 1)− Pr(Dx(S, yS) = 1)
Proof.











pS(s) = dpS (x, y)
ut
4.2 Distinguishing distance and Hamming distance
From Proposition 1, we see that for any pS , dpS (x, y) does not depend on all
details of the strings x, y, but only on the set of positions where x, y differ. It
turns out that there is a class of distributions pS such that dpS does not even
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depend on all details of the set of positions where x, y differ, but only on the
Hamming distance between x and y, dH(x, y) = |{i : xi 6= yi}|. This class of
probability distributions is precisely those that assign equal weight to subsets of
equal size.
Theorem 1. For all pS, the following are equivalent:
1. There exists a probability vector (r(0), . . . r(k)) such that ∀s, pS(s) = r(|s|)( k|s|)
2. There exists a function fpS such that for all x, y ∈ Vk, dpS (x, y) = fpS (dH(x, y)).
We prove the forward direction of Theorem 1 by computing an explicit formula
for the function fpS .
Theorem 2. Suppose ∃(r(0), . . . r(k))∀s, pS(s) = r(|s|)( k|s|)
Then,
















Proof (Theorem 2). Take any x, y and let t be the subset of positions where x, y
differ. Then,





















To prove the reverse direction of Theorem 1, we think of the 2k−1 dimensional
vector space over C with entries indexed by non-empty subsets of {1, . . . k}, we
think of the subspace
W = {w ∈ C2
k−1 : |s| = |t| =⇒ w(s) = w(t)}
and we also think of the (2k − 1) × (2k − 1) matrix M with entries M(s, t) =
I(s ∩ t 6= ∅) indexed by non-empty subsets of {1, . . . , k}.
From Theorem 2, we see that w ∈W =⇒ Mw ∈W , that is, M leaves the
subspace W invariant. Next, we observe that M is self-adjoint, and that M is
also invertible:
Theorem 3. For all k ∈ N, the matrix Mk with entries Mk(s, t) = I(s ∩ t 6= ∅)
indexed by non-empty subsets of {1, . . . k} is invertible.
a fact that we will prove at the end of this subsection. From this, we see that
M−1 also leaves subspace W invariant.
Now, assume ∃fpS ,∀x, y : dpS (x, y) = fpS (dH(x, y)). Form the vector w ∈
W with entries w(t) = fpS (|t|). The relation dpS (x, y) = fpS (dH(x, y)) and
Proposition 1 imply ∀t, w(t) =
∑
s6=∅M(t, s)pS(s). Then, (pS(s))s6=∅ = M
−1w ∈
W , so pS assigns equal weight to subsets of equal size. This completes the proof
of Theorem 1, assuming Theorem 3 holds.
It remains to prove Theorem 3. The proof is by induction on k. When k = 1,
M1 = (1) is invertible. Assume now Mk is invertible and consider Mk+1. We
order subsets according to the following: a subset corresponds to a string of 0s
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and 1s, and this encodes an integer between 1 and 2k+1 − 1. With this ordering















where the sizes of the blocks are indicated in the superscript, and a 0 or 1 indicates
that all entries of that block are 0 or 1.
Now we consider the following elementary row operations: subtract the middle
row from all the bottom rows, then subtract the top block of rows from the














and this is invertible by the inductive hypothesis. Hence, Mk+1 is also invertible.
4.3 Bounds on the number of simultaneous signature attacks
We consider a coercer and/or vote buyer who wants to launch signature attacks
on multiple voters simultaneously. Thus, the adversary chooses r signatures
x1, . . . , xr ∈ Vk and approaches many voters requiring each to submit one of the
signature ballots.
What is the largest number rmax of different signatures that a coercer can
use subject to the natural constraint that the strings x1, . . . , xr are pairwise
distinguishable under random masking? We use the connection to coding theory
from subsection 4.2 to answer this question.
First, we prove some properties of the function fpS from Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. For every pS that satisfies ∃(r(0), . . . , r(k))∀s, pS(s) = r(|s|)( k|s|)
, the
function fpS is non-decreasing, fpS (0) = 0, and fpS (k) = 1− pS(∅).
Proof. Take any i < j ∈ {0, . . . , k}. Take x, y ∈ Vk that differ in the first i
positions and x′, y′ ∈ Vk that differ in the first j positions. Using Proposi-
tion 1 we get fpS (i) = fpS (dH(x, y)) = dpS (x, y) =
∑
s pS(s)I(s ∩ {1, . . . , i} 6= ∅)
≤
∑
s pS(s)I(s ∩ {1, . . . , j} 6= ∅) = dpS (x′, y′) = fpS (dH(x′, y′)) = fpS (j).
For the other two claims, take z, w ∈ Vk that differ in all positions. Then,
fpS (0) = fpS (dH(z, z)) = dpS (z, z) = 0
fpS (k) = fpS (dH(z, w)) = dpS (z, w) =
∑
s
pS(s)I(s ∩ {1, . . . , k} 6= ∅) = 1− pS(∅) ut
The properties of fpS established in Lemma 1 allow us to define a partial
inverse of fpS . Take gpS : [0, 1− pS(∅)]→ {0, 1, . . . k} given by
gpS (q) = min{d ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k} : fpS (d) ≥ q}
so that we have
fpS (d) ≥ q ⇐⇒ d ≥ gpS (q) (2)
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Now, we are ready to state and prove our bounds on the number of simulta-
neous signature attacks under a pairwise distinguishability constraint.
Theorem 4. For every finite set V, for every k ∈ N, for every probability
distribution pS on subsets of {1, . . . , k} satisfying ∃(r(0), . . . , r(k))∀s, pS(s) =
r(|s|)
( k|s|)
, for every q ∈ [0, 1 − pS(∅)], let rmax(V, k, pS , q) denote the size of the
















Proof. We use the same argument that is used in coding theory to establish the
Gilbert-Varshamov lower bound and the Hamming upper bound on the maximum
number of codewords subject to a pairwise Hamming distance constraint.
First, we observe that a collection {x1, . . . xr} satisfies ∀i 6= j, dpS (xi, xj) ≥ q
if and only if it satisfies ∀i 6= j, dH(xi, xj) ≥ gpS (q). This follows from the relation
dpS (xi, xj) = fpS (dH(xi, xj)) and the property (2) of the partial inverse gpS .
Now, take a collection {x1, . . . xrmax(V,k,pS ,q)} with the maximum number
of elements subject to the constraint ∀i 6= j, dH(xi, xj) ≥ gpS (q). To prove the
upper bound, note that the Hamming balls of radius b(gpS (q)− 1)/2c around








elements, and that the total number of elements in all these balls must not exceed
the size of the whole set Vk.
To prove the lower bound, note that the Hamming balls of radius gpS (q)− 1
around x1, . . . , xrmax must completely cover Vk, or else another element could be
found that has Hamming distance ≥ gpS (q) to all of x1, . . . , xrmax and this would
contradict the choice of {x1, . . . xrmax(V,k,pS ,q)} as having the maximum number








elements each and their total number of elements must exceed |V|k, giving the
lower bound on rmax. ut
These upper and lower bounds are exemplified in Figure 1 for an election with
k = 5 candidates and |V| = 2 (like the student election example in next section).
We have gpS (q) = k −m + 1 when g is applied to a uniform distribution over
m-element subsets (m openings) evaluated at q = 1 (perfect distinguishability).
4.4 Quantifying the effect of masking on individual verifiability
We would like to quantify the effect of a particular masking strategy, specified
by the probability distribution pS , on individual verifiability. We propose the
following quantity:
IV (pS) = inf
x6=y∈Vk
dpS (x, y)
This quantity takes values between 0 and 1, where IV (pS) = 1 means that the
masking strategy pS leaves the individual verifiability of the underlying voting
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protocol invariant, while IV (pS) = 0 means that the masking strategy pS destroys
any individual verifiability that was present in the underlying voting protocol.
The motivation for choosing the quantity IV (pS) is the following: a voter
who has voted x obtains a pair (s, α) where s ⊂ {1, . . . , k} and α ∈ V |s| and
must decide whether this revealed vote was obtained from his submitted vote x
or from some y 6= x. Taking the infimum over x 6= y corresponds to considering
the worst case over voter choices x and modifications of the voter choice y.
One attractive feature of this setup is that an individual voter does not need
to know the distribution pS or the modification y in order to apply the optimal
verification strategy; indeed the optimal strategy for a voter who has chosen x is
to apply the distinguisher Dx considered in Proposition 3.
For distributions pS that satisfy ∃(r(0), . . . , r(k))∀s, pS(s) = r(|s|)( k|s|)
, Theorem
















where we have used the fact that the transformation from Hamming to distin-
guishing distance is non-decreasing (Lemma 1), and so the smallest distinguishing
distance is between x, y such that dH(x, y) = 1.























Fig. 1. Example for |V| = 2 and k = 5
m \ p pcol (1− pcol)n
1 0.16 1.46 · 10−79
2 0.018 8.3 · 10−9
3 0.0005 0.60
4 9.7 · 10−6 0.99
5 1.6 · 10−7 0.9998
Fig. 2. The probability, pcol that a single
(resp. no) honest voter casts a ballot which
after masking equals the mask of vO0 =
(0, 1, 1, 1, 1) for the student election.
5 Quantitative Privacy-Type Properties
We now want to measure and compare privacy-properties for different masked tally
methods. When computing concrete values we will consider approval voting with k
candidates only 0 or 1 is allowed for each candidate, without any overall constraint,
(v1, . . . , vk) ∈ {0, 1}k. For the n honest voters we assume for simplicity that the
probability to vote vi = 1 is pi and these probabilities are independent. As a special
concrete case we consider a student election with n = 1001 voters (one voter is
262
under observation), k = 5 candidates with probabilities (0.6, 0.4, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01),
i.e. two popular candidates and three unpopular.
5.1 Privacy
In order to compare the different approaches we first consider the quantitative
δ-privacy definition from [5]. The main other quantitative privacy definition is
[3], but it is less suited considering signature attacks. The parties are an observer
O, who can use public data, nh honest voters and an additional voter under
observation Vobs, whose vote the observer tries to guess.
Definition 1 (δ-privacy). Let P be a voting protocol and Vobs be the voter
under observation. We say that P achieves δ-privacy if
Pr[(πO||πVobs(vO0 )||πv)(l) → 1]− Pr[(πO||πVobs(vO1 )||πv)(l) → 1]
is δ-bounded as a function of the security parameter ` for all vote choices vO0 and
vO1 of the observed voter. Here πO, πVobs and πv are respectively the programs
run by the observer O, the voter under observation Vobs and all the honest voters.
The value δ will depend on the chosen vote distribution, and we see that it is
especially relevant to penalize signature attacks: if we assume that there is a vote
choice v∗ = (v∗1 , . . . , v
∗
k) which rarely gets selected and has a probability close
to zero, then an unmasked tally which reveals all cast plaintext ballots, even in
anonymised form, will have δ = 1 – the adversary simply checks if v∗ appears.
Full ballot disclosure When we reveal all ballots, we can consider the case
where the observer tries to distinguish a voter casting the most unpopular vote
vs the most popular vote, as in a signature attack. That is, in the definition
we let vO0 = (v1, . . . , vk) with vi = 1 if pi ≤ 1/2 and vi = 0 if pi > 1/2,
and we have vO1 = (1 − v1, . . . , 1 − vk). Denote the corresponding probability
pmin. Now a good strategy is simply to check if at least one (v1, . . . , vk) ap-
pears in the disclosed ballots, and the algorithm then outputs “1”. This means
Pr[(πO||πVobs(vO0 )||πv)(l) → 1] = 1 but (πO||πVobs(vO1 )||πv) will also output “1” if
another voter chooses vO0 . This happens with probability 1− (1− pmin)nh . We
conclude that δ ≥ (1− pmin)nh . For the case of the student election we have that
vO0 = (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) with pmin = 0.4
2 · 0.013 = 1.6 · 10−7. Thus for nh = 1000 we
have δ ≥ (1− pmin)nh ≈ 0.99984, i.e. close to 1.
Result Only We now consider the case where we only reveal the overall result
r = (r1, . . . , rk). In this case we can follow an analysis close to [5,7] for calcu-
lating δ. For every possible result r we calculate the probability that the result
happened if the observed voter cast vO0 or v
O
1 . The algorithm will then output






















r }, R is the set of all possible re-
sults of the election and Avr denotes the probability that the choices of the
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honest voters yield the result r given that Vobs’s choice is v. These proba-
bilities can explicitly be calculated since each candidate count from the hon-
est voters, Xi, is binomially distributed, Xi ∼ BD(nh, pi). We thus have








RLT In the original RLT method we keep a certain fraction, fblind, of the ballots
hidden, that is (1 − fblind)n ballots are published. If we consider the optimal
algorithm from the full ballot disclosure and the corresponding δfull we see that
δ = (1− fblind)δfull since the probability that observed voter’s ballot is hidden
is (1− fblind).
Masked RLT We now consider the case of masked RLTs where the we release
all ballots but with only m out of k components unmasked. A good strategy
to lower bound δ is to count the number Nb of colliding ballots v which satisfy
maskv v = maskv v
O
b for b = 0, 1. We choose v
O
0 as the most unlikely ballot, as
above and take vO1 as the opposite ballot to discriminate optimally between
the two counts. The main distinguishing power comes from N0, and we let the
distinguishing algorithm output “1” if the probability of the honest voters casting
N0−1 colliding votes is higher than getting N0 collisions. The probability for each







1≤i1<i2<...<im≤k pi1 . . . pim and
N0 ∼ BD(nh, p), where pi is the probability of a match in the ith candidate. In
Fig. 2 we have displayed the probabilities for the student election example. The
algorithm above will then simply give the probability at the mode of the binomial
distribution with pcol. For m = 3 we find δ ≥ 0.6 for the student election.
5.2 Coercion-Resistance
In [6] the authors present a definition of quantitative coercion-resistance following
similar ideas as in Definition 1. We will here use their strategy version and not
go into all details. We let S denote the election system with specified number
candidates, honest (nh) and dishonest voters (mostly neglected here) and a ballot
distribution, and attacker, CS , and voter, VS , interactive Turing machine models.
We let γ denote a property defining the goal of the coerced voter, e.g. to vote for
a specified candidate.
Definition 2. S achieves δcr-coercion-resistance if for all dictated coerced strate-
gies πVco ∈ VS there exists a counter-strategy π̃Vco ∈ VS s.t. for all coercer
programs πc ∈ CS:
– Pr[(πc||π̃Vco ||πv)(l) 7→ γ] is overwhelming.
– Pr[(πc||πVco ||πv)(l) 7→ 1]− Pr[(πc||π̃Vco ||πv)(l) 7→ 1] is δcr-bounded.
With bounded and overwhelming defined in the security parameter. The first part
says that the voter is able to achieve her goal (e.g. vote for a specific candidate)
and the second part says that the coercer’s distinguishing power is bounded by
δcr. This level of coercion-resistance depends on several parameters especially
the probability distribution on the candidates.
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Whereas this definition gives a level of coercion-resistance, it does not tell
the full story. To see this let us consider two different election systems. System A
outputs voter names and corresponding votes with probability 1/2, completely
breaking privacy, and otherwise it only outputs the election result. Neglecting
the information from the election result we get δA = 1/2. In system B the voter
secretly gets a signed receipt of her vote with probability 1/2 and otherwise
the protocol works ideally. In this case a coerced voter can always cast her own
choice and claim that no receipt was received. A voter following the coercer’s
instruction will with probability 1/2 give the corresponding receipt, i.e. we again
have δB = 1/2. However, the two systems are very different from the point of view
of the voter: in system A the coerced voter gets caught cheating with probability
1/2, whereas in system B, the voter always has plausible deniability.
Since plausible deniability is an essential factor for the usability of coercion-
resistance mechanisms, we need a new definition to be able to measure this
aspect.
5.3 No Deniability
The level of plausibility of a voter claiming to have followed the coercer, while
actually following the counter strategy, relates to the probability of false posi-
tives when the coercer tries to determine if the voter disregarded the instruc-
tions. In the following we assume without loss of generality that the coercer
outputs 1 when blaming the voter. We now want to define the maximal proba-
bility of getting caught without any deniability, i.e. we consider the case where
Pr[(πc||πVco ||πv)(l) 7→ 1] = 0 or negligible, i.e. the coercer only uses strategies
where he never blames an honest voter.
Definition 3. S achieves δcr,no−d-coercion-resistance if for all dictated coerced
strategies πVco ∈ VS there exists a counter-strategy π̃Vco ∈ VS s.t. for all coercer
programs πc ∈ CS:
– Pr[(πc||π̃Vco ||πv)(l) 7→ γ] is overwhelming.
– Pr[(πc||π̃Vco ||πv)(l) 7→ 1] is δcr,no−d-bounded and Pr[(πc||πVco ||πv)(l) 7→ 1] is
negligible.
Note that the coercer’s optimal strategy to obtain this δcr,no−d and the voter’s
strategy might be different from the ones in Definition 2 but δcr,no−d ≤ δcr.
The no deniability probability clearly separates the RLT approaches. The
original RLT always has plausible deniability if we choose to keep some ratio of
ballots shrouded and the voter can claim her ballot was not revealed. This is
e.g. important for RLV giving deniability against an attack where the coercer
provides a ciphertext to cast and asks for its decrypted vote.
In the case of masked ballots, there can be a chance of getting caught unde-
niably. This will depend strongly on the number of revealed ballot components
m, the vote distribution and the voter’s goal. For the student election analysed
above, the worst case when the goal of the voter is to cast (1, 0, 0, 0, 0). The
coercer’s optimal strategy is then to demand a vote for (0, 1, 1, 1, 1). The coercer
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will blame the voter if there is no matching masked ballot, i.e. if no honest voters
produce a collision which happens with probability (1− pcol)nh+1 computed Fig.
2. The probability of no deniability is then p = 8 · 10−9 for m = 2 but jumps
abruptly to p = 0.6 for m = 3.
An interesting case is when the voter has a relaxed goal allowing to cast a
signature part or not, and when the vote distribution has some ballots strictly
zero probability. Let us consider a three candidate 0/1 election with 1-vote
probabilities (1/2, 1/2, 0). The voter’s goal is to cast a 1 for the first candidate.
The coercer’s optimal strategy is to demand a signature ballot (0, 0, 1). The
voter has two counter-strategies: 1) cast a vote (1, 0, 0) without the 0 probability
signature part or 2) casting a vote (1, 0, 1) with the signature part. For 1) the
there is no deniability if no other voter casts a matching ballot and the coerced
voter’s ballot does not match either. For m = 1 this happens with p = (2/3)nh+1
and for m = 2 with p = (11/12)nh , both are small if we have many voters. For
2) there will always be a matching vote if the first part of the coerced voter’s
ballot is masked. However, if the last part is revealed the coercer can deduce this
ballot comes from the coerced voter since this candidate had probability 0, and
if the 1 vote in the first part is revealed as well then the voter is caught with
no deniability. Thus is no deniability with probability 1/3(2/3)nh for m = 1 and
1/3 + 1/3(11/12)nh for m = 2. Thus for m = 1 strategy 2) is always better, but
for m = 2 strategy 1) is better when we have more than 13 voters. In some cases
the voter strategy thus depends on m, which might not be know beforehand.
Finally, it is also natural to define the level of plausability we can provide.
The average plausability that a voter has e.g. in Definition 2 is a useful quantity
for the voter, but it would be more useful to guarantee that the voter always has
a certain level for coercion-resistance. We leave a precise definition for future
work.
5.4 Receipt-Freeness
Following [6], definition 2 also covers receipt-freeness. However, we again argue
that modelling some variants is useful. The following definition is based on a
swap of πVco and ˜πVco in Definition 3, and models vote buyers who do not want
to pay a “free lunch” to vote sellers who follow their own goal. The voter goal γ
can here be to cast a specified vote or set of votes.
Definition 4 (Weak Vote Buying Resistance). For a given small pfl, S
achieves δwvb-coercion-resistance if for all dictated coerced strategies πVco ∈ VS
there exists a counter-strategy π̃Vco ∈ VS s.t. for all coercer programs πc ∈ CS:
– Pr[(πc||π̃Vco ||πv)(l) 7→ γ] is overwhelming.
– Pr[(πc||πVco ||πv)(l) 7→ 1]− Pr[(πc||π̃Vco ||πv)(l) 7→ 1] is δwvb-bounded and
Pr[(πc||π̃Vco ||πv)(l) 7→ 1] is pfl-bounded.
We here interpret outputting “1” as paying the vote seller and this definition
bounds how often an instruction-following vote seller gets paid by a vote-buyer
(by δwvb + pfl), but under the condition that a voter who casts another vote
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is only paid with a (very) small probability pfl. This is a weakened vote-buyer
model but interesting since a vote buyer should avoid vote sellers going for a
“free lunch”. If the probability of an honest vote seller getting paid is low, it would
help curb vote selling (even though the vote buyer could increase the price and
create a “vote selling lottery”). In this definition, it also makes sense to drop the
quantification over the coercer’s strategies to see the resistance to vote buying
for different vote choices.
RLT In the original RLT a signature ballot will get revealed with probability
1− fblind. If the vote buyer sees this he can pay the vote seller and will only pay
the voter seller wrongly with a small probability pfl equal to the probability that
one of the honest voters cast the signature ballot, i.e. δvb ' 1− fblind which can
be rather high and protects badly against vote buying.
Masked RLT For the masked ballots we can however choose m such that
several ballots will have the same masking as the signature ballot and makes
it hard for the vote buyer to assess if the signature ballot was cast. For the
student election we see from Fig. 2 that the number of matches with the optimal
signature ballot (0, 1, 1, 1, 1) is binomially distributed with an expectation value
of 18.4 colliding ballots and a standard deviation of around 4.
For a more precise example, we can consider the three candidate election
with probabilites (1/2, 1/2, 0) as above and assume that the goal of the voter
is to cast 0 for candidate 1 and pfl = 0. For m = 1 we will have δ
vb = 0, but
for m = 2 the vote-buyer can demand a vote for candidate 1 and 3 and pay
out if he sees (1, ∗, 1). Any counter-strategy with 0 for candidate 1 gives δvb = 1/3.
We note that the new quantitative definitions for no deniability coercion-
resistance (Def. 3), the weak vote buying resistance (Def. 4) and the original δcr-
coercion-resistance (Def. 2) are considering different aspects of coercion-resistance
and stating the three different δ-values gives a more nuanced description of the
security of a given voting protocol. Also note that the δ values are calculated
using potentially different strategies for the coercer and voter, and finding unified
strategies optimising the parameters is an interesting line of future work. Finally,
there are natural, more fine-grained, definitions extending these which should be
also considered in the future.
6 Conclusion
We have shown that the idea of risk-limiting tallies and risk-limiting verification
can be applied effectively to complex ballots. By partially masking each ballot
rather than simply masking a subset of the ballots as in the original RLT and
RLV we gain far greater flexibility in terms of masking strategies. This will be
explored further in order to optimise the trade-offs between the various measures
defined here in future work.
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The approach is more robust against any claims of being undemocratic: all
ballots are counted, and indeed in the full tally/partial verification option, all
are counted fully. The only compromise then is some reduction in the level of
verifiability, but this can be adjusted and is probably acceptable. If we compare
this with ThreeBallot, there the chance of detecting a manipulated ballot is
1/3, assuming that the attacker does not learn which ballot was retained by
the voter. In our case we can achieve a good level of coercion mitigation with
say a shrouding of ±1/2 of each ballot. Finally, we did a preliminary analysis
of the quantitative privacy for the different tally methods, and the coercion-
resistance, in particular, the probability a coerced voter gets undeniably caught.
The new masked tallies however, are more appropriate for receipt-freeness, in
particular with upper bounds on the number of vote sellers, whereas the old RLT
provides good plausible deniability to coerced voters. This suggests combining
both methods when possible, but future work is needed to define the precise level
of vote-buying resistance.
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Abstract. Modern electronic voting systems (e-voting systems) are de-
signed to achieve a variety of security properties, such as verifiability,
accountability, and vote privacy. Some of these systems aim at so-called
tally-hiding : they compute the election result, according to some result
function, like the winner of the election, without revealing any other
information to any party. In particular, if desired, they neither reveal
the full tally consisting of all (aggregated or even individual) votes nor
parts of it, except for the election result, according to the result func-
tion. Tally-hiding systems offer many attractive features, such as strong
privacy guarantees both for voters and for candidates, and protection
against Italian attacks. The Ordinos system is a recent provably se-
cure framework for accountable tally-hiding e-voting that extends Helios
and can be instantiated for various election methods and election result
functions. So far, practical instantiations and implementations for only
rather simple result functions (e.g., computing the k best candidates)
and single/multi-vote elections have been developed for Ordinos.
In this paper, we propose and implement several new Ordinos instan-
tiations in order to support Borda voting, the Hare-Niemeyer method for
proportional representation, multiple Condorcet methods, and Instant-
Runoff Voting. Our instantiations, which are based on suitable secure
multi-party computation (MPC) components, offer the first tally-hiding
implementations for these voting methods. To evaluate the practicality
of our MPC components and the resulting e-voting systems, we provide
extensive benchmarks for all our implementations.
Keywords: E-Voting · Tally-Hiding · MPC · Accountability · Privacy ·
Implementations · Benchmarks.
1 Introduction
There is a multitude of different voting methods ranging from relatively sim-
ple ones, such as plurality/single-choice voting, to more complex ones, such as
? This work was in part funded by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) KU
1434/11-1 and the Center for Integrated Quantum Science and Technology (IQST).
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cumulative voting with multiple votes as well as preferential elections and multi-
round votings. Also, there are many different result functions used in elections.
For example, one might be interested only in the winner of the election (e.g.,
for presidential elections), the number of seats of parties in a parliament, or the
k best or worst candidates (ranked or not ranked), e.g., to fill positions or to
decide who moves on to a runoff election.
Tally-Hiding. A desirable and strong security property that several e-voting
systems try to achieve is tally-hiding [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. A tally-hiding system com-
putes and publishes the election result, according to some result function, e.g.,
the winner of an election, without revealing any other information to any party.
In particular, if desired, except for the election result itself, they neither reveal
the full tally consisting of all (aggregated or even individual) votes nor parts of
it, such as the winner of an election round or the number of votes of a candidate.
Even internal parties, like trustees, should not learn anything besides the result.
In essence, tally-hiding is a strong form of privacy that not just avoids leaking
the content of individual ballots but rather avoids leaking any unnecessary infor-
mation altogether. As discussed, e.g., in [6], tally-hiding is an attractive feature
in many situations: it prevents introducing biases in voters during multi-round
elections, losing candidates are not unnecessarily embarrassed due to a (poten-
tially very low) number of votes, mandates of winning candidates remain strong
even if they won only by a small margin, tally-hiding helps prevent gerrymander-
ing since the exact vote distributions remain hidden, and it also prevents Italian
attacks. To retain trust in the overall result, tally-hiding elections, like other
elections, have to provide verifiability : Each voter must be able to verify that
her vote was counted correctly and that the overall result is correct. Moreover, it
should not only be possible to verify the result, but, if verification fails, it should
be possible to identify misbehaving parties and hold them accountable for the
failure. This stronger form of verifiability is called accountability [8].
There are also several systems that achieve what we call partial tally-hiding,
e.g., [9,10,11,12,13,14]. These systems generally focus on solving specific issues,
most notably Italian attacks, and achieve this by hiding only those parts of the
tally that are critical for the issue at hand, e.g., the individual votes. However,
they still reveal certain information besides the election result, e.g., the losers of
intermediate election rounds. In this work, we focus on (full) tally-hiding where
nothing but the final result is revealed.
Current State. As mentioned, several e-voting systems have been designed
to be tally-hiding. These systems generally follow the same underlying idea,
namely, using a publicly verifiable secure multi-party computation (MPC) pro-
tocol to compute the election result from an encrypted tally. From a theoretical
point of view, it is clear that essentially arbitrary functions, and thus election
results, can be computed in this way. The main challenge lies in constructing
an efficient MPC tallying component. For example, in recent work Cortier et al.
[7] tackles, among others, this challenge by proposing tally-hiding MPC com-
ponents (for single-vote elections, majority judgement, Condorcet-Schulze, and
STV) and studying their asymptotic complexity.
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So far, there are only very few (fully) tally-hiding protocols that have been
implemented, benchmarked, and shown to be viable. Specifically, Canard et.
al. [5] proposed and implemented a tally-hiding protocol for majority judgement
that is shown to achieve practical performance. In [6], Küsters et. al. proposed
the general Ordinos framework for provably secure accountable tally-hiding e-
voting. They also designed and implemented several Ordinos instantiations and
demonstrated their practicality. Specifically, they considered the following highly
relevant but relatively simple result functions for single/multi-vote elections:
computing the k candidates with the highest/lowest number of votes, computing
all candidates that pass a certain threshold of votes, a combination of both,
with or without revealing the ranking among the winners, and with or without
revealing the number of votes the candidates in question have obtained.
Our Goal. In this work, we want to extend the state-of-the-art by implement-
ing and benchmarking MPC components for tally-hiding elections also for many
other voting methods. To this end, we build on the Ordinos system, since, as
mentioned, Ordinos provides a general provably secure framework for account-
able (and hence, verifiable) tally-hiding elections, and because we can base our
work on the practical instantiations of Ordinos that have been proposed before.
Our Contributions. We propose and implement several new instantiations of
Ordinos for complex election types and result functions. Specifically, we propose
MPC components for Borda voting, the Hare-Niemeyer method for proportional
representation, Instant-Runoff Voting, and multiple versions of Condorcet (plain
Condorcet, weak Condorcet, Copeland evaluation, Minimax evaluation, Smith
set, and Schulze evaluation). As we explain, our MPC components for tallying
satisfy the requirements of the Ordinos framework and therefore yield provably
secure e-voting systems, i.e., they inherit the accountability, privacy, and tally-
hiding properties of the Ordinos framework.
Our implementations of the MPC components are available at [15]. We ac-
curately assess the performance and scalability of our MPC components for
practical applications. While our algorithms do not asymptotically improve over
naturally expected baselines (e.g., IRV performs exponentially in the number of
candidates), which was not the main goal of this work anyways, we are indeed
able to show that the concrete performance is practical for real world elections
(in the case of IRV and Schulze only for relatively small numbers of candidates).
Structure. In Section 2 we recall the Ordinos framework. We then, in Section 3,
present and construct important building blocks used in subsequent sections. In
Sections 4 to 7, we present our instantiations, implementations, and evaluations
for the various voting methods we consider. We conclude in Section 8.
2 The Ordinos Framework
We need the following notation and terminology. We write [n] to denote the set
{0, . . . , n−1}. Let nc be the number of candidates/choices on a ballot and let nv
be the (maximal) number of voters. The format of a plain ballot is defined via a
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finite choice space C ⊆ Nnc , i.e., a ballot assigns each candidate/choice a number
subject to constrains defined by C. For example, a single vote election where a
plain ballot contains one vote for a single candidate/choice can be modeled via
the choice space Csingle := {(b0, . . . , bnc−1) ∈ {0, 1}nc |
∑
i bi = 1}. For voter j
we denote her plain ballot by vj := (vji )i∈[nc] ∈ C. Ordinos uses an additively
homomorphic t-out-of-nt threshold
4 public key encryption scheme E = (E,D)
with Epk(a) denoting a ciphertext obtained as an encryption of plaintext a under
the public key pk of the election.
Given this terminology, Ordinos [6] works roughly as follows. The protocol is
run among a voting authority, the voters, nt trustees, an authentication server,
and an append-only bulletin board (BB). In the setup phase, parameters of the
election are generated, including a public key and corresponding secret key shares
for E , one for each trustee, along with a NIZKP πKeyShareGen from each trustee
to prove knowledge of their key share. Additionally, C and the result function
fres of the election (see below) are fixed and published. In the voting phase, the
voters first encrypt their ballots and then publish them on the BB, authenti-
cating themselves as eligible voters with the help of the authentication server.
An encrypted ballot of voter j has the form (Epk(v
j
i ))i∈[nc], i.e., each component
of the plain ballot is encrypted separately. The encrypted ballot also contains a
NIZKP πEnc that proves validity of the plain ballot, i.e., vj = (vji )i∈[nc] ∈ C. The
published encrypted ballots can then be (publicly) homomorphically aggregated





i where vi is the total number of votes/points that candi-
date/choice i obtained in the election. In the tallying phase, the trustees run a
publicly accountable MPC protocol PMPC to compute fres. This protocol takes as
(secret) inputs the secret key shares of the trustees and the (public) encrypted
aggregated tally and outputs fres(v0, . . . , vnc−1). This result, along with any ma-
terial that is needed to verify the MPC computation, is published by the trustees
on the BB. Finally, in the verification phase, voters can check that their ballots
appear on the BB and everyone can verify the result by checking all NIZKPs as
well as the (accountable) MPC computation.
Security of Ordinos (privacy and accountability) was shown independently of
specific instantiations of the mentioned primitives, and hence, security is guaran-
teed by any instantiation fulfilling the necessary requirements. In what follows,
we briefly recall the two generic security results of Ordinos (including the require-
ments for the underlying primitives), which have been formalized and proven in
[6]. The first result states accountability of Ordinos, where accountability was
formalized using the KTV framework [8].
Theorem 1 (Accountability [6], informal). Let E be a correct additively
homomorphic threshold public-key encryption scheme E, πKeyShareGen and πEnc be
secure NIZKPs for E, and PMPC be a publicly accountable MPC protocol, i.e.,
if the result does not correspond to the input, then this can be detected and at
least one misbehaving trustee can be identified; this must hold true even if all
4 I.e., there are nt secret key shares with t ≤ nt secret shares being necessary for
successful decryption.
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trustees running the MPC protocol are malicious. Then (the resulting instance
of) Ordinos is accountable.5
Importantly, Ordinos provides accountability (and hence, by results in [8] also
verifiability) even if all trustees are malicious.
The following theorem (that was formalized and proven in [6]) states privacy
of Ordinos, i.e., the tally-hiding property that no information besides the final
result, according to the result function, is revealed to anyone, including the
trustees. It was proven using the privacy definition given in [16].
Theorem 2 (Privacy/Tally Hiding [6], informal). Let E be an additively
homomorphic IND-CPA-secure t-out-of-nt threshold public-key encryption scheme,
πKeyShareGen and πEnc be secure NIZKPs for E, and let PMPC be an MPC protocol
that securely realizes (in the sense of UC [17,18]) an ideal MPC functionality
which essentially takes as input a vector of ciphertexts and returns ftally eval-
uated on the corresponding plaintexts without leaking any other information if
at most t − 1 trustees are malicious. Then (the resulting instance of) Ordinos
provides privacy/is tally-hiding in presence of up to t− 1 malicious trustees.
Instantiations of Ordinos. As mentioned in the introduction, for practical
instantiations of Ordinos the main challenge lies in finding efficient and suitable
instantiations of the primitives, including the MPC component, that work well
and efficiently together. For certain kinds of elections and result functions this
has been achieved by Küsters et al. in [6]. These instantiations use a threshold
variant of the Paillier encryption scheme [19] to implement E . To design their
MPC protocols PMPC for their result functions, Küsters et al. make use of and
combine NIZKPs and publicly accountable MPC protocols from the literature
that implement the following basic operations:
– Epk(c) = fadd(Epk(a), Epk(b)) s.t. c = a+ b, directly from the additive homo-
morphic property of Paillier encryption; for brevity we write Epk(a)+Epk(b).
Similarly, Epk(c) = fmul(Epk(a), b) s.t. c = a ·b; for brevity we write Epk(a) ·b.
– Epk(c) = fmul(Epk(a), Epk(b)) s.t. c = a ·b, using a publicly accountable MPC
protocol for multiplication [19]; for brevity we write Epk(a) · Epk(b).
– Epk(c) = fgt(Epk(a), Epk(b)) s.t. c = 1 iff a ≥ b and 0 otherwise, using a
publicly accountable MPC protocol for the greater-than test [20].
– Epk(c) = feq(Epk(a), Epk(b)) s.t. c = 1 iff a = b and 0 otherwise, using a
publicly accountable MPC protocol for equality tests from [20].
– c = fdec(Epk(a)) s.t. Epk(a) is an encryption of c, using publicly accountable
distributed Paillier decryption [19].
The above components have been chosen not only because they meet the nec-
essary security requirements but also due to their efficiency, which facilitates
constructing practical instantiations. That is, fadd and multiplication with a
5 We note that the security proof for accountability (and also for privacy) makes
certain standard assumptions, such as honesty of the BB. We refer interested readers
to [6] for full details. We also note that if PMPC provides only public verifiability,
instead of public accountability, then Ordinos provides verifiability.
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publicly known value can be computed locally for the Paillier scheme. Further-
more, both fgt and feq as proposed by [20] run in sublinear time independently
of the actual plaintext space of the encryption scheme if plaintexts contained
within the ciphertexts are upper bounded by some bound bct. Ordinos indeed
has this property, where the bound generally depends on nv and C. Furthermore,
both fgt and feq and Paillier synergize rather well. As discussed in [6], while fgt
and feq can in principle also be used with exponential ElGamal, both functions
use decryption for a (upper-bounded but still) relatively large plaintext space,
and hence, would perform poorly with exponential ElGamal.
We note that the above components have a useful property, namely, they
can be combined to compute more complex functions such that the resulting
protocol is still a secure publicly accountable MPC protocol. In other words,
they allow for building protocols PMPC for Ordinos that meet the requirements
of Theorems 1 and 2.
Our Instantiations and Parameters. In this work, we use Paillier encryp-
tion and the above basic building blocks. The main challenge and indeed a core
contribution of our paper is to show and empirically demonstrate that these
components are not just suitable for constructing protocols PMPC for simple re-
sult functions (e.g., revealing the candidate with the most votes in a single-vote
election), but also for much more complex voting methods and result functions.
To benchmark our implementations, we use the parameters as [6]. That is, we
use a Paillier key of size 2048 bits and for the greater-than and equality proto-
cols we use the range [216], i.e., bct = 2
16, for the (encrypted) plaintext inputs.
This range can be increased if needed, i.e., to account for cases where aggre-
gated ciphertexts might contain plaintexts outside of [216]. Note that, except for
requiring a suitable upper bound bct, the performance of our MPC protocols is
otherwise independent of the exact number of voters nv due to aggregation of the
ballots. The setup for our benchmarks consists of three trustees communicating
over a local network. Each trustee ran on an ESPRIMO Q957 (64bit, i5-7500T
CPU @ 2.70GHz, 16 GB RAM). As in [6], the benchmarks of our MPC protocols
start with an already aggregated tally. Küsters et al. [6] showed for their MPC
protocols that the number of trustees does not influence the benchmarks in a
noticeable way and that, due to the sublinear communication complexity of the
comparison protocols, there is no significant difference between a local network
and the Internet. Both results also hold for our MPC constructions which are
based on the same primitives. Hence, our benchmarks focus on the number of
candidates which is the main factor for the performance of our protocols.
3 Building Blocks
In this section, we describe three MPC building blocks that can be obtained
using the basic operations described in Section 2 and which we use to construct
PMPC for our Ordinos instances, where the first building block is from [6].
Minimum k and Maximum k Values. Often, we have a vector (Epk(ai))i∈[n]
and want to compute ciphertexts (Epk(bi))i∈[n] of a vector (bi)i∈[n] such that
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Floor Division
Input: Epk(a), b, n
Result: Epk(i) with i ∈ [n] such that i · b ≤ a and (i + 1) · b > a
1 for j ∈ [n + 1] do
2 Epk(rj) = fgt(Epk(a), Epk(j · b))
3 for j ∈ [n] do
4 Epk(r̂j) = Epk(rj)− Epk(rj+1)
5 Epk(i) =
∑
j∈[n] Epk(j) · Epk(r̂j)
6 return Epk(i)
Fig. 1: Algorithm for Floor Division.
bi = 1 if ai is one of the k largest (resp. smallest) values in (ai)i∈[n] and bi = 0
otherwise. We do so as described in [6]. That is, we first construct the lower halve
of the comparison matrix M such that Mi,j<i := fgt(Epk(ai), Epk(aj)). From
this matrix, which consists of ciphertexts containing 0 or 1, one can compute a
ciphertext for each ai that contains the number of comparisons that i has won,
i.e., where ai ≥ aj for some j 6= i. We can then use fgt to compare this ciphertext
(containing the results for ai) with a ciphertext on the number n − k − 1 and
obtain Epk(bi).
6 One can proceed similarly in order to find the smallest k values.
Note that this algorithm can also be applied if k is not publicly known but
rather only available as a ciphertext; in this situation, k is also not revealed by
the algorithm. We make use of this property in the context of the Hare-Niemeyer
method, see Section 4. We denote these algorithms for computing the vectors
Epk(bi) by GetBest(), resp. GetWorst(). These algorithms have runtime O(n2).
Maximum. If we are just interested in obtaining a ciphertext Epk(ai) of the
maximum value ai in the vector (Epk(ai))i∈[n], we can do so more efficiently in
linear runtime. That is, we start with the possible maximum m = Epk(a0) and
iterate through all ai’s. For each ai we test whether it is greater than the current
maximum with g = fgt(Epk(ai),m) and adapt the maximum accordingly with
m = g ·Epk(ai)+(Epk(1)−g)·m. The minimum can be computed accordingly. We
denote these algorithms by GetMax() resp. GetMin(). If we are interested in the
indices of the values that are the maximum resp. minimum, we can first compute
the encrypted maximum m and then compute for each index the encrypted
indicator Epk(bi) := feq(Epk(ai),m), bi ∈ {0, 1}. We denote these algorithms for
obtaining the tuple of encrypted indicators with GetMaxIdx() and GetMinIdx().
Floor Division. Given a ciphertext Epk(a) of some a ∈ N and a plain value
b ∈ N>1, this algorithm, described in Figure 1, is used to compute a ciphertext
Epk(i) with i = bab c. The algorithm also requires a value n ∈ N, s.t. n ·b does not
exceed the plaintext space size and i ∈ [n]. The algorithm compares all possible
values. The sequence (rj)j∈[n+1] consists of a sequence of zeros followed by a
sequence of ones, where rj = 0 if a < jb and rj = 1 otherwise. We are interested
in the index i such that ri = 1 and ri+1 = 0. We obtain this index by computing
for each j the value r̂j := rj − rj+1. Then, we can use these r̂j as indicators to
obtain the correct division result.
6 If there are multiple ai with the same value, there might be more than k bi that are
1. In cases where always exactly k such values are required, one can use a tie breaker
mechanism such as the one described in [7].
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4 Hare-Niemeyer Method
The Hare-Niemeyer method is an evaluation method for proportional allocation
of seats that is used for example in Ukraine and Italy, but has also been used
for German federal elections until 2005. The Hare-Niemeyer method is used for
situations where a fixed number of seats needs to be assigned to candidates from
different parties, where a voter typically votes only for the party and not the
candidates themselves. Often, this type of proportional voting is also combined
with some form of plurality or majority voting, such as first-pass-the-post-voting
for electing single representatives for electoral districts, in so-called mixed elec-
toral systems. Such mixed systems are also used for elections in many state
parliaments in Germany, elections for the Scottish and Welsh parliaments and
elections for the New Zealand House of Representatives. More specifically, the
Hare-Niemeyer method for proportional voting works as follows: Assume that
there are ns seats to be assigned among nc parties. Then, if there are a total of
nv valid votes and party ci has received vi votes, the number of seats that ci is




number of seats awarded to each ci is set to be s
′
i := bqic. However, since these
s′i usually do not add up to ns, the remaining nr ∈ [nc] seats are distributed in
the order of the highest remainders of vi·nsnv . That is, the nr parties ci with the
highest remainders di = qi − s′i receive one additional seat each. Note that it
could happen that multiple parties have the same remainders di, and thus, more
than nr additional seats are assigned. If this is not desired, then one would use a
tie-breaking algorithm (cf. Section 5 and Footnote 6). There are many possible
ways to vote in proportional elections. Our algorithm can handle every possible
ballot format, as long as the ballots can be aggregated such that we obtain one
ciphertext per party containing the total number of votes for the party. In the
simplest case, one can use Csingle as choice space with ballot format NIZKPs
πEnc from, for example, [21] and [19].
Our MPC algorithm for computing the Hare-Niemeyer method is presented
in Figure 2. On a high-level, the algorithm follows the above description, i.e., it
first computes the seat distribution without taking the remainder seats into ac-
count. Next, for each party, the remainder of the division (see above) is computed
and the remainder seats are distributed among the parties with the highest re-
mainder values. Importantly, this is achieved without revealing the total number
of remainder seats or the set of parties that have received an additional seat.
We present benchmarks for our MPC tallying protocol in Figure 3. The
runtime of the algorithm is linear in nc · ns. As the figure shows, evaluating the
Hare-Niemeyer method is highly efficient for a practical number of seats (1000)
and (up to) 4 parties. Due to the linear growth, this should still be the case even
if there are more parties than the maximum of 4 that we benchmarked. Also,
recall from Section 2 that these benchmarks are essentially independent of the
number of voters and trustees. In terms of security for our Ordinos instantiation,
we obtain the following.
Theorem 3 (Security of Hare-Niemeyer method with Ordinos). Let E
be an additively homomorphic IND-CPA-secure t-out-of-nt threshold public-key
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Tally-Hiding Hare-Niemeyer Evaluation
Input: Encrypted aggregated votes per party: {Epk(vi)}i∈[nc]
Number of seats in total ns and number of total votes nv
Result: Vector s such that si is the number of seats of party i.
1 for i ∈ [nc] do
2 mi = Epk(vi) · ns
3 Epk(s
′
i) = FloorDivision(mi, nv, ns)





5 for i ∈ [nc] do
6 Epk(di) = Epk(vi) · ns − nv · Epk(s′i).
7 (Epk(d
best
i ))i∈[nc] = GetBest((Epk(d0), . . . , Epk(dnc−1)), Epk(nr))
8 for i ∈ [nc] do





10 si = fdec(Epk(si))
11 return s
Fig. 2: Tally-Hiding Hare-Niemeyer Evaluation
encryption scheme and πKeyShareGen be a secure NIZKP for E such as, e.g., the
primitives used in [6]. Let πEnc be the ballot format NIZKP from above, and let
PMPC be our MPC component for the Hare-Niemeyer method as defined above.
Then, the Ordinos instance using these primitives is an accountable and private
(and hence tally-hiding) voting system for the Hare-Niemeyer method.
Proof Sketch. This theorem is a direct corollary of Theorems 1 and 2 which
were proven in [6]. Observe that the primitives E , πKeyShareGen, and πEnc already
fulfill the requirements of Theorems 1 and 2. The only thing left to show for
Theorems 1 and 2 is that our new tallying protocol PMPC is secure. That is, we
have to show that PMPC is a private and publicly accountable implementation of
the Hare-Niemeyer method.
Both properties follow because our MPC protocol is built from combinations
of the basic components presented in Section 2. As mentioned in that section,
each of these basic components guarantees privacy and public accountability. As
for the connections of these components, the respective inputs and outputs are
all encrypted (except for the final decryption of the election result) and published
on the BB. Due to the encryption, these intermediate results do not leak any
additional information, neither to internal parties nor to external observers. Also,
since the intermediate results are published, external observers can check that
the output of one step is used correctly as the input to the next step. Thus, if
some trustee tries to use a different input, she can be held accountable. ut
5 Instant Runoff Voting (IRV)
Instant-runoff-voting (IRV) is a ranked voting method which can be used in
single-seat elections. It is often used, e.g., in Australia, India, the UK and the
US. In IRV, if a candidate has been ranked first by an absolute majority of
voters, this candidate is the winner of the election. Otherwise, the candidate
ranked first least often is eliminated, i.e., removed from the pool of candidates.
Then, all ballots are adjusted accordingly, i.e., the eliminated candidate is re-






Fig. 3: Benchmarks for the Hare-Niemeyer method (left) and IRV (right).
is repeated until one of the remaining candidates has received the absolute ma-
jority of votes and thus wins the election. An algorithm for evaluating IRV in
a fully tally-hiding way has already been proposed in [3]. However, this algo-
rithm does not support aggregation and therefore scales with the number of
ballots/voters. Hence, instead of building on and providing the first implemen-
tations and benchmarks of this algorithm, we rather follow a different approach:
we propose an algorithm that is compatible with the aggregation approach of
Ordinos. By supporting aggregation, the performance of our solution remains
essentially independent of the number of voters. For our instantiation, we use
Csingle but interpret each choice as a ranking of candidates. For example, for
ncand = 5, we have nc = ncand! = 120 choices, where each choice represents a
permutation of the set of candidates. Observe that this encoding indeed allows
for aggregating IRV ballots to obtain the full (encrypted) tally as usually done in
Ordinos. NIZKPs πEnc for showing the well-formedness of such a ballot are given
in [21] and [19]. Note that the size of this choice space (and thus the runtime
of our algorithm) scales exponentially in the number of candidates. However,
we are able to show that this approach is still practical for a small amount of
candidates (≤ 5) as they have occurred in practice (see benchmarks presented
in Figure 3 and the discussion below).
We present our algorithm to evaluate an IRV election with Ordinos in Fig-
ure 4. The idea of our algorithm is that in round i, i.e. after i candidates have
been eliminated, we have to consider the first k = i+ 1 candidates of each ballot
to find a candidate that has not been eliminated. We can then look at each pos-
sible ordering ri of k candidates and check how many votes every permutation
that starts with ri received. These votes are then assigned to the respective first
non-eliminated candidate in that permutation and the candidate with the least
votes is eliminated. Note that it can happen that two candidates are assigned
the same (lowest) number of votes in a round. Typically, IRV does not eliminate
multiple candidates in the same round, hence in these situations some kind of
tie-breaking algorithm is required. Often, this is done by lot - for example, this
is the default method for IRV elections in Maine [22]. We address this issue, by
letting GetMinIdx() output only the first candidate (i.e., the lower index) with
the least amount of votes. To obtain randomized tie-breaking, one starts with
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Tally-Hiding IRV Evaluation
Input: ncand, (vj)j∈nc , the aggregated single-vote ballots for the choices.
Result: An indicator vector (bi)i∈ncand such that bi = 1 iff i-th candidate is eliminated.
1 X = (Epk(0))i∈[ncand] // Encrypted indicator bits.
2 for i ∈ [ncand − 1] do // perform ncand − 1 elimination rounds
3 (vsj = Epk(0))j∈[ncand] // Votes received in this round.
4 k = i + 1
5 for (ordered) k-tuple ri with entries in [ncand] do // go over ranking prefixes
6 cf = Epk(0), d = Epk(0) // cf will be the winner of prefix, d is a helper bit
7 for c in ri do // find winner in prefix
8 cf = d · cf + (1− d) · c, d = d + (1− d) · (1−Xc)
9 for c in ri do // add points from ballots for current prefix to the winner
10 b = feq(Epk(c), cf )
11 for j ∈ [nc] s.t. j represents a ranking where the top k candidates are ri do
12 vsc = v
s
c + b · vj
13 (ej)j∈[ncand] ← GetMinIdx((v
s




14 for r ∈ [ncand] do // Update/add one eliminated candidate
15 Xr = Xr + (1−Xr) · er
16 return fdec(X)
Fig. 4: Tally-Hiding IRV Evaluation.
a uniformly randomly ordered list of candidates. It is interesting future work to
explore implementations of more sophisticated tie-breaking algorithms.
We provide benchmarks for our IRV algorithm in Figure 3. Due to the encod-
ing of IRV ballots as permutations of [ncand], the algorithm has runtimeO(ncand!).
But as can be seen in Figure 3, for small numbers of candidates the evaluation is
still feasible. Indeed, 5 candidates is already a realistic scenario for real world IRV
elections. E.g., in the 2015 New South Wales state election [23], which, however,
uses a different IRV instance than we consider here, most electoral districts had
5 or less candidates. Using the properties of our basic building blocks described
in Section 2, one can check that our IRV algorithm does not leak information.
By the same reasoning as for Theorem 3 we obtain:
Theorem 4 (Security of Instant-Runoff voting with Ordinos). Let E
and πKeyShareGen be as for Theorem 3. Let πEnc be the NIZKP from above, and let
PMPC be our MPC component for the Instant-Runoff voting voting as defined in
this section. Then, the Ordinos instance using these primitives is an accountable
and private (and hence tally-hiding) voting system for Instant-Runoff voting.
6 Condorcet methods
Condorcet is a ranked voting method that aims to determine a so-called Con-
dorcet winner, i.e., a candidate that would beat all other candidates in a pairwise
runoff election (we will call these pairwise runoff elections comparisons). It might
happen that no candidate exists that wins all comparisons. There are several vari-
ants of (plain) Condorcet that deal with this, i.e., they output the Condorcet
winner if it exists but additionally define mechanisms for obtaining a winner
(or a set of winning candidates) also in some cases where no Condorcet winner
exists. We discuss certain variants and their applications in practice below. We
represent Condorcet ballots (which specify a full ranking of ncand candidates
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Fig. 5: Benchmarks for Condorcet voting (left) and benchmarks for Borda voting
(right). The evaluation of the Schulze method for Condorcet took 135 minutes
for 5 candidates and 9 days, 10 hours and 27 minutes for 20 candidates (not
included in the figure).
without ties7) in Ordinos by interpreting them as a comparison matrix, i.e., an
(ncand × ncand)-matrix M , where Mij ∈ {0, 1} and Mij = 1 means that a voter
V prefers ci over cj . In order to obtain a choice space in the sense of definition
of Section 2, we encode a comparison matrix as a vector of length nc = n
2
cand
as expected way. Combined with some checks that ensure such a matrix indeed




M ∈ {0, 1}ncand×ncand
∣∣∣ ∀i, j, k ∈ [ncand] :
i 6= j =⇒Mij +Mji = 1 ∧Mij = Mjk = 1⇒Mik = 1
}
We can use the NIZKP πEnc presented in [9] for showing the well-formedness
of such ballots. As usual, Ordinos aggregates all the comparison matrices of all
voters, yielding (encryptions of) a matrix containing at entry (i, j) the total
number of comparisons that ci wins versus cj . This is then used as input for the
various Condorcet variants that (try to) compute a winner in different ways.
We have implemented MPC tallying protocols for several such Condorcet
variants, with details provided below. The benchmarks of these algorithms are
presented in Figure 5. Apart from the Schulze method, the runtime of the MPC
components of all Condorcet versions grow quadratically in ncand, as expected
due to the nature of pairwise comparisons, but remain practical for reasonable
numbers of candidates. (We note that the verification of the NIZKPs given in [9]
requires runtime that is asymptotically cubic in the number of candidates but is
not included/shown in the benchmarks.) Plain Condorcet in particular exhibits
runtime that suggests practicality even for very large numbers of candidates.
Also, recall that our benchmarks are essentially independent of nv and nt. With
the same reasoning as for Theorem 3 we obtain:
Theorem 5 (Security of Condorcet voting with Ordinos). Let E and
πKeyShareGen be as for Theorem 3. Let πEnc be the NIZKP from above, and let
7 Often, one allows for ties in Condorcet voting. However, in this work we do not
consider this case.
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PMPC be one of our MPC components for a Condorcet voting method as defined
below. Then, the Ordinos instance using these primitives is an accountable and
private (and hence tally-hiding) voting system for that Condorcet method.
Next, we give details of the individual Condorcet variants and our corresponding
MPC algorithms.
Plain Condorcet. We denote the vanilla Condorcet method, that outputs the
unique Condorcet winner if and only if such a candidate exists, as Plain Con-
dorcet. In Figure 6 (for bit b = 1), we present an algorithm for Plain Condorcet
that is based on the building blocks described in Section 3. Note that, by choosing
the bit b = 0 in Figure 6, the algorithm instead returns (encrypted) intermediate
values, namely N , sg and s′g, which can be used for computing other Condorcet
methods. Here, N denotes the strict comparison matrix that denotes in each
entry Ni,j ∈ {0, 1} whether ci has won the majority of comparisons against cj
(Ni,j = 1) or won the same or less comparisons (Ni,j = 0). Additionally, for each
candidate ci, s
g
i denotes the number of comparisons that she has won or tied,
while s′gi only counts the winning comparisons.
Weak Condorcet. In this method all candidates that did not lose any com-
parisons (but that might be tied with other candidates and thus no Condorcet
winners), i.e. all weak Condorcet winners are output. This method can be ob-
tained via a straightforward extension of Figure 6 for b = 0. That is, for each ci,
compute and check whether fdec(feq(s
g
i , Epk(ncand − 1))) = 1.
Copeland. This method, as opposed to the previous two methods, is guaranteed
to output some winning candidate(s). To do so, it considers the wins and losses
of each candidate in their comparisons and outputs all candidates with the most
Copeland points, that is the highest difference between wins and losses. For b = 0,





i ). We then compute the candidate with the most Copeland
points with the GetMaxIdx() discussed in Section 3 and applying fdec().
Schulze Method. This method is more complicated than the previous ones
and is very commonly used in practice (e.g., [24]). This method defines the
score of candidate ci’s comparison versus cj to be the difference of the number
of comparisons that ci wins versus cj minus the number of comparisons that cj
wins versus ci. The candidates and the comparisons between them are considered
as a directed weighted graph Γ , where the nodes of Γ represent the candidates
and an arrow ci → cj is weighted with the score of ci’s comparison versus cj .
Now, for any path p in Γ , we define the value of p as the lowest weight among
the arrows involved in p. We then consider the path value matrix PathMatrix,
an (ncand × ncand)-matrix with entry PathMatrixij being the highest path value
among paths from ci to cj . The Schulze method then outputs all candidates ci
such that PathMatrixij ≥ PathMatrixji for each j ∈ [ncand]. Note that the Schulze
method is guaranteed to output some candidate(s). And if a unique Condorcet
winner exists, then it will be returned by the Schulze method. The intuitive
and probably most natural way to implement the Schulze method is to simply
compute the standard algorithm while using MPC building blocks to implement
all operations, which, for example, is also done in [7]. The main challenge lies
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Condorcet Evaluation
Input: Encrypted aggregated comparison matrix: A := Epk(M)
b ∈ {0, 1}: indicator whether plain Condorcet should be evaluated.
1 N = 0ncand×ncand , s
g = 0ncand
, s′g = 0ncand
2 for i ∈ [ncand] do
3 for j ∈ [i + 1, ncand] do
4 g = fgt(Ai,j, Aj,i), e = feq(Ai,j, Aj,i), g
′ = g − e
5 Ni,j = g
























+ Epk(1) − g




, Epk(ncand) − 1)) then
9 return i
10 return N, sg, s′g
Fig. 6: Condorcet Evaluation.
Condorcet: Schulze Evaluation
Input: Encrypted aggregated comparison matrix: M
Result: Vector (bi)i∈[ncand]
such that bi = 1 if ci is a Schulze winner and bi = 0 otherwise.
1 PathMatrix = (Epk(0))ncand×ncand
2 for i ∈ [ncand], j ∈ [ncand] \ {i} do
3 PathMatrixi,j = Mi,j −Mj,i
4 for i ∈ [ncand], j ∈ [ncand] \ {i}, k ∈ [ncand] \ {i, j} do
5 m = GetMin(PathMatrixj,i, PathMatrixi,k)
6 PathMatrixj,k = GetMax(Mj,k,m)
7 MSchulze = (Epk(0))[ncand]×[ncand]
8 for i ∈ [ncand], j ∈ [i] do
9 g = fgt(PathMatrixi,j , PathMatrixj,i)
10 e = feq(PathMatrixi,j , PathMatrixj,i)
11 MSchulzei,j = g,M
Schulze
j,i = Epk(1) − g + e
12 b = (Epk(0))ncand





15 bi = fdec(feq(w,Epk(ncand − 1)))
16 return (bi)i∈[ncand]
Fig. 7: Condorcet: Schulze Evaluation.
in choosing suitable MPC building blocks such that the resulting tally-hiding
Schulze algorithm performs well. Here we use the sublinear comparison protocols
from Section 2, with the resulting algorithm presented in Figure 7.
Further Condorcet methods: We have also implemented and benchmarked
the so-called Smith set and Minmax Condorcet methods. Intuitively, the smith
set outputs a set of candidates such that each candidate from this set wins the
comparisons against every candidate outside of the set. Minmax intuitively con-
siders the “worst” comparison of each candidate and then output all candidates
that have the “best” of these worst comparisons. Our algorithms for these Con-
dorcet methods are constructed using the same techniques and building blocks
as for the previous methods. Due to space constraints, we do not present our
algorithms in detail her but rather refer the reader to our implementation [15].
7 Borda
Borda count is a ranked voting method where each assignable rank is associated
with a pre-defined number of points that the corresponding candidate receives.
The winner typically is the candidate who has received the most points in total
(summed over all ballots). A famous application of Borda count is the election
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of the winner of the grand final in the Eurovision Song Contest, but it is also
used for national elections, for example in the Republic of Nauru.
The following choice space can be used to capture Borda, where we interpret
P both as a list and a set: CBorda(P) = {(x1, . . . , xnc) | ∀i : xi ∈ P ∧ ∀i ∈
P∃j : xj = i}. A NIZKP πEnc for the well-formedness of ballots for this choice
space is presented in [21]. By definition of Ordinos, the encrypted aggregated
tally (Epk(pi))i∈[nc] then consists of encryptions of the sum of points pi that
candidate ci received. In principle, one can now use the same MPC tallying
protocols presented in [6] for single-/multi-vote to (i) output the candidate with
the highest points, (ii) output the k candidates with the most points, or (iii)
output all candidates that cleared a certain threshold of points. However, for the
standard case (i) we propose a more efficient way that is not quadratic but linear
in the number of candidates: We use the algorithm GetMaxIdx() (cf. Section 3)
and then apply fdec; the winner is the candidate for whom decryption yields 1.
8
The benchmarks of these algorithms are presented in Figure 5, where the
result functions (ii) and (iii) are implemented using the algorithms by [6]. As
the benchmarks show, our algorithm for (i) and the algorithm for (iii) can be
computed highly efficiently. Due to the linear growth, this should still be the
case even if there are much more candidates than the maximum of 40 that we
benchmarked. Result function (ii) shows, as expected, a quadratic growth in
the number of candidates. However, the runtime for ≤ 40 candidates remains
in a range that is often still reasonable for practical elections. Also, recall that
our benchmarks are essentially independent from nv and nt. With the same
reasoning as for Theorem 3 we obtain:
Theorem 6 (Security of Borda voting with Ordinos). Let E and πKeyShareGen
be as for Theorem 3. Let πEnc be the NIZKP from above, and let PMPC be one
of our MPC components for (one of the result functions for) Borda voting as
defined in this section. Then, the Ordinos instance using these primitives is an
accountable and private (and hence tally-hiding) voting system for Borda (using
that result function).
8 Conclusion
We have proposed, implemented, and benchmarked several new accountable
tally-hiding MPC components for Ordinos. These are the first tally-hiding im-
plementations for the Hare-Niemeyer method, IRV, multiple variants of Con-
dorcet, and Borda. The performance of our MPC components is determined by
the number of candidates while being essentially independent of the number of
trustees and the number of voters, as long as the aggregated ballots still meet
the bound bct. Analogously to [6], due to the comparison protocols with sublin-
ear communication cost, our runtimes are almost independent of the network
(local vs. Internet). Our instantiations achieve reasonable runtimes that allow
8 If always a single winner should be determined, one can use a tie-breaking algorithm
after GetMaxIdx(), similarly to what we describe in Section 5 for GetMinIdx(). Note
that this adds only a small linear overhead.
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for deployment in real-world applications. In future work, it would be interesting
to investigate optimizations for our algorithms and to implement further voting
methods.
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“Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler.”
— A. Einstein
Introduction We present a novel, end-to-end verifiable scheme, Hyperion, in-
spired by the Selene scheme [1], which similarly provides highly transparent
verification: voters check their vote directly in plaintext in the tally. It has a
number of advantages including eliminating the tracker collision threats in Se-
lene, indeed our construction does not need trackers for verification. The new
scheme should give voters a greater sense of privacy.
In the original Selene, vote/tracker pairs are revealed in the tally on the
Bulletin Board. Voters are later notified of their tracker: by providing them with
a private “alpha” term which along with their private, trapdoor key, opens their
commitment to reveal their tracker. As long as the trackers remain private and
deniable ballot privacy is preserved. However, some voters, understandably, find
the public posting of the trackers alongside the votes troubling. Furthermore,
Selene suffers from the possibility of a coercer claiming that the alternate tracker
proffered by a coerced voter is their own.
Hyperion, by contrast, does not publicly reveal trackers, indeed, we can do
away entirely with trackers. Instead, the voter identifies her vote in the tally by
identifying the commitment which, along with her “alpha” term and her trapdoor
key opens to a constant, e.g. the identity 1. This is rather like identifying your
house by finding the door that opens to your key. This is still deniable, but the
mechanism is now different: a coerced voter identifies a commitment paired with
the coercer’s required vote and, if necessary, computes using her trapdoor secret
key, the fake alpha term that opens this to 1.
At first glance this seems to counter the tracker collision threat, but we have
just shifted the problem: now the coercer might claim that the commitment
the voter points to is theirs. To counter this we propose a further innovation:
each voter gets an individual view of Bulletin Board BB. Each view is veifiably
derived from the BB with its own, independent shuffling. Thus the rows and
betas appear in a different form and order for each voter, so even a shoulder-
surfing coercer cannot identify his beta in the voter’s view.
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The Setup Signing keys for the voters, PKi are published on the master bulletin
board, one row per voter. For voter Vi trapdoor keys, xi and hi := g
xi , are
generated by the voter’s app and hi is registered along with the casting of the
vote, along with suitable ZK proofs of knowledge of xi.
Voting Voting is much as in Selene: Vi sends an encryption of her vote with
the associated plaintext awareness and well-formedness proofs, and her public
trapdoor key hi along with ZK proofs of knowledge of xi. We denote the con-
catenation of these proofs by Πi. This is signed and posted to the master BB
against PKi:
PKi, Signi({Votei}, hi, Πi)
Tellers now generate the analogues of the alpha and beta terms of Selene: each
trapdoor public key hi is raised to a fresh, secret random ri. The corresponding
(pre-)alpha term gri is kept secret for the moment by the tellers:
PKi, Signi({Votei}, hi, Πi), hrii
Tallying On the BB, ballots with valid signatures and proofs are identified and




These are now put through verifiable, hybrid, parallel mixes: the vote terms
are subjected to a conventional re-encryption mix, but the commitment terms are
subjected to an “exponentiation” mix: all raised to a common, secret exponent s.
Such mixes can be implemented using Verificatum in suitable modes, [2]. Finally,




The rows are now sorted to group votes for the same candidate together. For
Vi we now create an individual view by applying a further parallel mix, but here
we just permute and re-randomise within the candidate groups. For each voter
there will be a different, independent common exponent si for the exponentiation





The mix tellers keep secret for now the “alpha” terms: αi = g
ri·s·si .
Note that the commitment terms are not opened or decrypted, thus the
plaintext votes appear paired with cryptographic blobs.
At notification time, αi is sent to Vi who raises this to xi and finds the
match among the beta terms in her view, so identifying her vote. In the event of
coercion, Vi identifies a row containing the coercer’s required vote and computes
the alpha which, when raised to xi, matches the beta in this row.
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Discussion We note that the individual views are only necessary if we want to
fully counter the tracker/commitment collision problem and render the scheme
fully coercion resistant. Even without the individual views the scheme provides
the same guarantees as Selene (e.g. receipt-freeness and coercion mitigation). It
is significantly simpler and provides a greater sense of privacy than Selene.
We can in fact retain trackers in our construction, and this may inspire a
greater sense of assurance in the verification. In this case, we assign trackers
in the setup phase, as in Selene. Now a coerced voter computes a fake alpha
that opens the alternative beta to her own tracker, i.e., no need to identify a
fake tracker. Furthermore, the association of trackers with voters can now be
made public! This allows universal verification that all the trackers are distinct.
Note that in this construction each voter only see their own tracker in their own
view. Nowhere are all the trackers displayed alongside the votes, so the privacy
concerns of Selene do not arise.
Conclusions We have outlined Hyperion, a new scheme, with three variants,
that provides voters with a similarly direct, intuitive way to verify that their
votes are correctly included in the tally. It is conceptually much simpler than
Selene and avoids the tracker collision threats, indeed we can do away with
trackers altogether. Furthermore, voters should feel more comfortable with this
scheme as it does not involve the public posting of tracker/vote pairs.
Achieving full coercion resistance comes at the cost of introducing individual
views for each voter, but this should give voters a greater sense of privacy. The
individual boards may be better suited for smaller elections, where the collision
threat is more troublesome. The construction without individual boards, may be
useful for large elections where the collision problem is anyway less important, or
contexts in which coercion threats are deemed mild, e.g. boardroom voting. We
have also described a variant that retains the trackers, but having the remarkable
property that now voters do not need to identify a fake tracker, and indeed the
voter/tracker association can be made public (inter alia demonstrating that each
voter gets a unique tracker).
We stress though that the integrity of the voters’ verification checks relies on
their secret trapdoor key not being compromised. We do not therefore recom-
mend that Hyperion be used for critical, binding elections.
Full details of the constructions and proofs will appear in the full version of
this paper. The authors acknowledge support of the Luxembourg National Re-
search Fund and the Research Council of Norway for the joint project SURCVS.
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Abstract. Transparency and public scrutiny are necessary in order to gain the 
trust of voters and the authorities when it comes to electronic voting. However, 
public scrutiny is a methodical challenge for a company to implement. Swiss Post 
disclosed an earlier version of the source code for its e-voting system in 2019 and 
conducted a public intrusion test. Multiple researchers published attacks, high-
lighted vulnerabilities, and suggested improvements. But the disclosure was also 
met with criticism in the expert community for various reasons.  
This paper presents the insights Swiss Post gained from its experiences regarding 
transparency in 2019 – from the point of view of a vendor and developer. Based 
on those learnings, we explain our new approach to enabling public scrutiny with 
our new system. This approach includes expert, community-friendly terms and 
conditions, closer collaboration with the community, improvement of the sys-
tem’s documentation and auditability, easier opportunities to compile and run the 
system and a permanent bug bounty programme. Public scrutiny of this new sys-
tem with complete verifiability started on a step-by-step basis at the beginning of 
2021. 
Keywords: Online Voting, E-voting, Public Scrutiny, Transparency, Complete 
Verifiability, Bug Bounty, Community. 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Outline of this paper 
This article has two main aims. Firstly, we present from the point of view of a vendor 
and developer of an e-voting solution the conclusions from the transparency experi-
ences we gained in 2019. Secondly, we describe our new public scrutiny approach, 
which we are applying since then. 
The new approach involves amongst other things a step-by-step disclosure, actively 
engaging with academic experts and the hacker community, friendly participation con-
ditions and a permanent bug bounty programme. 
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1.2 E-Voting in Switzerland
Switzerland has a longstanding tradition of direct democracy, allowing Swiss citizens 
to vote approximately four times a year on elections and referendums. In recent years, 
voter turnout hovered below 40 percent1.  
The vast majority of voters in Switzerland fill out their paper ballots at home and 
send them back to the municipality by postal mail, usually days or weeks ahead of the 
actual election date. Remote online voting (referred to as e-voting in this document) is 
the digitalization of the postal voting and would provide voters with additional ad-
vantages. Firstly, it would guarantee the timely arrival of return envelopes at the mu-
nicipality (especially for Swiss citizens living abroad). Secondly, it would improve ac-
cessibility for people with disabilities. Thirdly, it would eliminate invalid ballots when 
inadvertently filling out the ballot incorrectly or doing a formal error with the ballot. 
In Switzerland, the cantons are responsible for the organisation of the elections (also 
at federal level) and for tallying the results at cantonal level. The Confederation defines 
the legal conditions for a valid election that the cantons have to fulfil. This construct 
defined in the constitution is also applied for e-voting. In that sense Swiss Post is a 
provider of the cantons. 
In the past, multiple cantons offered e-voting to a part of their electorate. They have 
been testing e-voting since the beginning of 20002. Over 300 trials in real elections and 
votations have been conducted with different systems since then.  
Many voters would welcome the option to vote online - provided the e-voting system 
protects the integrity and privacy of their vote [2]. State-of-the-art e-voting systems 
alleviate the practical concerns of mail-in voting and, at the same time, provide a high 
level of security. Above all, they must display three properties [6]:  
 Individual verifiability: allow a voter to convince herself that the system cor-
rectly registered her vote
 Universal verifiability: allow an auditor to check that the election outcome
corresponds to the registered votes
 Vote secrecy: do not reveal a voter’s vote to anyone
Following these principles, the Federal Chancellery defined stringent requirements 
for e-voting systems. The current draft of the Ordinance on Electronic Voting (VEleS 
- Verordnung über die elektronische Stimmabgabe) and its technical annex (VEleS an-
nex)[1] describes these requirements.
1. Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA: Swiss Political System
- Direct Democracy. https://www.eda.admin.ch/aboutswitzerland/en/home/dossiers/over-
view.html/content/aboutswitzerland/en/meta/news/politik. Retrieved on 2021-07-10.
2. For the milestones from the point of view of the Federal Government, see
https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/politische-rechte/e-voting/chronik.html
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1.3 New legal basis in CH 
In June 20193, the Federal Council mandated the Federal Chancellery together with the 
cantons on restructuring the trial operation. The redesign is based on the following ob-
jectives:  
 Further development of the systems towards a complete verifiable e-voting
system
 effective control and oversight
 Increasing transparency and trust
 stronger connection with the scientific community
In December 20204, the Federal Council mandated the Federal Chancellery to im-
plement the measures required to achieve the goals in stages. In doing so, it is relying 
on the final report of the Federal Chancellery and the cantons5. This was prepared in 
close cooperation with experts from science and industry. 
In April 20216, the Federal Council began the public consultation procedure7 on the 
new legal basis for the trial operation of e-voting. Groups, companies and individuals 
can express their views on the proposals during the consultation procedure.  
1.4 Swiss Post as a developer 
Swiss Post has been developing an e-voting system for several years. Its former system 
without universal verifiability was used by the cantons Thurgau, Fribourg, Neuchâtel 
and Basel-Stadt from 2016 to 2019. 
By developing an e-voting system, Swiss Post is digitizing what it does best as a 
trustworthy state-owned company: the secure transport of confidential information. 
Swiss Post aims to guarantee the established principle of mail secrecy in the digital 
world. It is building on its extensive experience as a trustworthy carrier of sensitive 
information, providing new digital solutions for companies, authorities and private cit-
izens and enabling them to exchange confidential data via a reliable Swiss provider. 
In 2019 we decided to publish an earlier version of the documentation and the source 
code of the e-voting system to allow public scrutiny. In response to this release, multiple 
3 e-Voting: Federal Council to reframe trial phase and delay introduction as a regular voting 
channel, 27.06.2019 https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/en/home/dokumentation/medienmittei-
lungen.msg-id-75615.html  
4 e-voting: Federal Council launches redesign of trials, 21.12.2020 https://www.bk.ad-
min.ch/bk/en/home/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-81772.html 




6 Redesign of e-voting trials: consultation procedure opened, 28.04.2021 https://www.bk.ad-
min.ch/bk/en/home/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-83257.html  




researchers published attacks, highlighted vulnerabilities, and suggested improvements 
[3, 4, 5, 7]. Swiss Post is thankful to all security researchers for their contributions and 
the opportunity to improve the system’s security guarantees. This experience with 
transparency is the focus of this paper. We discuss our experience and what we have 
learned from it in depth from chapter 2 onwards. 
In the autumn of 2019, Swiss Post decided to continue developing an e-voting sys-
tem for Switzerland independently and acquired all rights that are necessary for the 
independent development of its e-voting system from its former technology partner 
Scytl in spring 20208. This step enables Swiss Post to provide the cantons with a solu-
tion developed in Switzerland for Switzerland. 
In-house development provides numerous advantages: we can better meet the de-
manding security objectives, adapt our solution to Swiss-specific requirements, and 
provide a solution "made in Switzerland.". A system developed in Switzerland was also 
demanded by some politicians.  
Swiss Post believes that transparency is necessary in order to gain the confidence of 
the voters and cantons when it comes to electronic voting. This is why we have started 
in the beginning of 2021 to disclose our new e-voting system with universal verifiability 
in order to enable public scrutiny. 
On a more abstract level, transparency can also been seen as a digital ethics concept. 
Swiss Post is engaged in the field of digital ethics and sustainability for public service 
companies. For example, we are collaborating with academics in order to develop an 
integrated framework for ethical and sustainable digitalization[11]. 
1.5 Swiss Post new System with complete verifiability 
Swiss Post’s new e-voting system enables universal verification of the votes that are 
cast. When counting votes, the cantonal electoral authorities can verify whether votes 
casted in the electronic ballot box have been manipulated. Such a system with universal 
verifiability has never been used in Switzerland before.   
Various requirements set out in the recently published ordinances have been incor-
porated into Swiss Post’s system and approach. The new system largely meets the re-
quirements of the recently published legal framework and any required modifications 
to the already published elements will be made over the coming months, in line with 




2 Public Scrutiny 
2.1 Public scrutiny as a method 
Public scrutiny of an IT system has in our view two aims: 
- Independent experts can critically examine the system and report potential vul-
nerabilities to the system developer.
- Establishing trust
Public Scrutiny requires transparency. At least in Switzerland, it seems that trans-
parency is gaining in importance, especially in the field of e-government services. 
There are also increasing with political demands. A recent example is the SwissCovid 
app9. 
There has recently been discussions among experts how to implement transparency 
methodically in order to reach the goals of public examination. Haines and Roenne[10] 
propose a close collaboration between election management bodies and/or vendors and 
the scientific community: “To ensure e-voting systems are secure it is important the 
vendors and election management bodies engage with researchers in an open, trans-
parent and collaborative process “. 
They draw upon their own experiences scrutinizing e-voting systems worldwide and 
give recommendations to vendors for a better scrutiny: 
1. Clear claims: Make clear claims about the security of the system
2. Thorough documentation: Provide comprehensive, clear, correct and consistent
documentation 
3. Minimality: The source code should be minimal and only contain code relevant
to the system under review 
4. Buildable: The source code should be easily buildable
5. Executable: The built system should be executable
6. Exportable: It should be possible to export test vectors for independent verifica-
tion 
7. Consistent documentation and source: The documentation should correspond to
the source code 
8. Regularly Updated: The open source10 system should be updated regularly to re-
flect the fixes of previously found bugs 
9. Minimal restrictions on disclosure: Avoid long vulnerability disclosure times
In international procedures such as the Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)5 of the 
Council of Europe11 (particularly VI. Transparency and observation), the importance of 
public scrutiny is highlighted: “Conscious, therefore, that only those e-voting systems 
9 https://github.com/SwissCovid/swisscovid-app-android  
10 Haines and Roenne uses the term ‘open source’ here. We interpret it as “openly available”. We 
do not think that an “open source system” in a legal sense is a necessary condition to be able 




which are secure, reliable, efficient, technically robust, open to independent verifica-
tion and easily accessible to voters will build public confidence, which is a prerequisite 
for holding e-elections”. 
Public scrutiny is a methodical challenge to implement for a vendor and developer. 
The first disclosure in 2019 was indeed met with criticism in the expert community for 
various reasons. This experience helped us to define a new approach. 
We will in the following explain what mistakes we, as a vendor, made in 2019 and 
what we learned from then. Then we explain in depth what we changed in the approach 
and how we proceed for this new system scrutiny. 
2.2 Public scrutiny of the system in 2019 
In 2019 took Swiss Post two actions for public scrunity. The source code of an earlier 
version of the system was disclosed and a public intrusion test was conducted as re-
quired by the law12. This disclosed system was never used in real elections. However, 
parts of the system were identical to the system in use. 
During the four-week intrusion test, around 3,200 international IT experts tried to 
inflict targeted attacks on this e-voting system. After the completion of the intrusion 
test, there were no manipulated votes in the electronic ballot box. The hackers did not 
manage to infiltrate the e-voting system. Attempts at overloading the system through a 
DDoS attack was unsuccessful. The hackers submitted a total of 173 findings. The Fed-
eral Chancellery, Cantons and Swiss Post confirmed 16 of them. They all fall under the 
lowest classification level, “Best Practice”, and are thus considered non-critical. The 
entire assessment process for the findings was overseen by representatives of the Con-
federation and the cantons13, 14, 15. 
However, multiple researchers published attacks, highlighted vulnerabilities, and 
suggested improvements in the source code and the documentation [3, 4, 5, 7]. One of 
them concerned the individual verifiability, which was also present in the former sys-
tem in use. As a consequence, Swiss Post decided to suspend its former system imme-
diately16 and later to abandon it completely in order to focus on the new system17.  
12 For a summary of these tests, see chapter. 3 “Public intrusion test and publication of the source 
code” in [9] 
13 For the Federal Chancellery’s final report of the intrusion test see https://www.bk.ad-
min.ch/bk/en/home/politische-rechte/e-voting/oeffentlicher_intrusionstest.html  
14 For Swiss Post’s final report see https://www.post.ch/-/media/post/evoting/dokumente/ab-
schlussbericht-oeffentlicher-intrusionstest-
post.pdf?vs=1&sc_lang=en&hash=49EE456EE4D0B4EBA14BD3F6767E051E  
15 For an analysis from the point of view of the developer Scytl, see Puggiali, 2019, Implementing 
a public security scrutiny of an online voting system: the Swiss experience [8] 
16 Ballot box not hacked, errors in the source code – Swiss Post temporarily suspends its e-voting 
system - Swiss Post https://www.post.ch/en/about-us/media/press-releases/2019/swiss-post-
temporarily-suspends-its-e-voting-system  
17 Swiss Post to focus solely on new system with universal verifiability 
https://www.post.ch/en/about-us/media/press-releases/2019/swiss-post-to-focus-solely-on-
new-system-with-universal-verifiability   
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Of course, this can be seen as a failure of the transparency exercise. But from a me-
thodical point of view, our conclusion is that the transparent system disclosure - with 
the involvement of experts from all over the world for hacking tests – proved to be an 
effective method for quickly identifying and rectifying vulnerabilities. 
2.2.1 Criticism to the public scrutiny 2019 
Participants in the disclosure programme criticized the way in which we published the 
code. The sources of this criticism were academics, IT practitioners, critical tech jour-
nalists and activists affiliated with an anti-e-voting initiative. These criticisms can be 
roughly divided into three categories: scrutiny limitations, code quality, participation 
conditions. 
Scrutiny limitations 
There was criticisms about what could be tested. The source code lacked building in-
structions and failed to compile easily. There was no possibility to simulate an event 
Code quality 
An important aspect of the code quality is how easily it is for external experts to read 
and scrutinize the code. It does not refer to the code’s function. We received criticism 
for poorly readable code and large amounts of dead code, which are obstacles to thor-
ough scrutiny. 
Participation conditions 
The conditions refer to the rules a researcher has to follow in order to get access to the 
published code. Several points were criticized, e.g.: 
- There was an impression that Swiss Post could forbid the publication of find-
ings
- The delay for responsible disclosure was set on 45 days after the last commu-
nication of Swiss Post (and not after the report). There was a fear that Swiss
Post could indefinitely extend this period.
- It was not clear whether researchers may work together and whether a regis-
tered researcher may work with someone who is not registered.
- There was the impression that the conditions prevent the publication of studies
that lack security-critical issues.
This challenge concerning participation conditions was also pointed out by Puiggalí 
(2019) [8]. He identifies in the expert community a “lack of a common consensus of 
which mechanism must be used for reporting issues to the election managers”.  
295
2.2.2 What have we learned 
We drew various conclusions from the experiences we gained and condensed them into 
six recommendations. These are recommendations from the point of view of a devel-
oper and vendor of a complex IT system. There are valuable learnings from other point 
of views which we do not focus on18. 
1. Do not minimize the possible impact of an identified weakness
There is always room for a rational and scientific argument that a weakness is not 
important. However, such an attitude does not help you building up trust in the expert 
community and can backfire when more problems are found later. 
2. Define participation conditions which are accepted by the expert community
The disclosure procedures must be widely accepted. Otherwise, the community will 
not participate or will criticize the approach. This includes especially the ease of par-
ticipation modalities, the rules for reporting and publishing issues (responsible disclo-
sure).  
3. Think of transparency as a process instead of a one-off measure
Transparency is not a one-off measure, but instead requires constant dialogue with 
the expert community. In other words: transparency is not an event, but a process. In-
teraction and an open dialogue with the community are important. Transparency about 
what happens after a weakness is submitted is equally important. In 2019 we did not 
enough focus on that and prepared primarily the initial disclosure. 
4. Be prepared for conflicting expectations to transparency in the public
Public scrutiny is risky. In our opinion, this is because of conflicting expectations of 
transparency: On one hand, the aim of transparency is to identify problems and bugs in 
order to improve the system. On the other hand, bugs can be seen in the eye of the 
public or contradictors considered as a proof for a system to be irremediable insecure. 
This attitude does not take into account the reality of software engineering because any 
defects and weaknesses identified do not mean the end of the system.  
As a vendor and developer, it is important to be able to analyse the consequences of 
the findings, especially in terms of the impact for cantons and voters.  
The publication of a system is a process that is still not widely known by the Swiss 
population and companies. We think that the more the method of public scrutiny is 
established in the future, the less this area of conflict will be a problem. 
18 As e.g. Maurer (2019)[9] points out the experience raises also legal and policy questions about 
the certification process for state authorities and regulators 
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5. Choose the starting point wisely
On the one hand it is useful to start public scrutiny early, on the other side the system 
must have a certain maturity level. E-voting is politically controversial, at least in Swit-
zerland. A group of politicians tried to introduce a ban of e-voting. They stopped their 
attempt after failing collecting enough signatures for a popular vote in 202019. Political 
opponents of e-voting might try to use findings as a proof for their political stance that 
e-voting cannot be trusted. This risk is higher if the starting point of such initiatives is
not chosen wisely.
6. Treat code quality as equal important as code functionality
By quality, we do not mean the quality of the functionalities, but aspects such as 
auditability, readability, maintainability, publishability (e.g. publication format) of the 
code. Missing auditability and readability does not necessarily make a system vulnera-
ble; however, it can make it difficult for experts to scrutinize and understand the code 
and it can increase the likelihood of the system being, or becoming vulnerable. 
Based on these learnings, we defined a new approach for the future system. 
3 Our new approach to public scrutiny 
Since the beginning of 2021, Swiss Post is disclosing its new e-voting system in stages, 
as part of a community programme. The source code and key documents are continu-
ously, iteratively and openly published. This iterative approach is central: we regularly 
update the published artefacts and continuously improve our publication, based on feed-
back and learning from the e-voting community and IT experts. We deliberately started 
at an early stage to give experts enough time to test the system and for us to implement 
the improvements that were reported. 
As mentioned above in chapter [2.1], Haines and Roenne[10] gave nine recommen-
dations to vendors for a better scrutiny. We agree on these nine principles and hope that 
our new publication approach meets them. 
In the following, we deepen and explain the most important aspects of our commu-
nity programme: 
a) Definition and implementation of the new disclosure with the inclusion of can-
tons and experts
b) Simplified access to the code (no registration is required) and a streamlining
of the terms and conditions of use (Code of Conduct)
c) Improvement of the documentation and auditability of the system
d) Key parts of the code under an open source licence
e) Transparent development




g) Opportunities to simulate contests
h) Permanent bug bounty programme
i) Communication
3.1.1 Definition and implementation of the new disclosure with the inclusion 
of cantons and experts (a) 
We started early enough the first activities for the new disclosure, involving experts 
from different horizons as well as the cantons regularly, to be able to define, validate 
and adapt the new disclosure on a step by step approach. 
3.1.2 Simplified access to the code and a streamlining of the terms and 
conditions of use (b) 
For the new disclosure, no registration with acceptation of terms and conditions is re-
quired anymore. 
We took a collaborative approach of defining a Code of Conduct with experts from 
the community. The Code of Conduct governs access to the e-voting material within 
the framework of the Swiss Post e-voting community programme.  
3.1.3 Improvement of the documentation and auditability of the system (c) 
As already introduced, an important aspect of the quality is how easily it is for ex-
ternal experts to scrutinize the system. It is on one side addressed by the concept of 
auditability, on the other side with a comprehensive accompanying documentation. We 
have also rewritten various parts of the code to simplify external verification of the 
specifications and source code.  
Auditability 
The auditability is answering to the following question: which characteristics of the 
codebase lead to increased effort to execute a review or constraints on the pool of pos-
sible reviewers? Leading experts of the industry defined a morel to address this need.  
The source code, test artefacts and documents to be published are analysed and 
checked according to this model. The results of this audit are listed in an auditability 
report, which is published20. 
This process proves to be an efficient measure and ensuring a holistic approach to a 
system with resulting measures and improvements to be applied in order to be ready to 
be assessed by external auditors. 
Key published items 
The published items aims to be a comprehensive set of elements to ensure a clear, cor-
rect a comprehensive description of the system, to sustain public scrutiny and help the 
20 https://gitlab.com/swisspost-evoting/e-voting/e-voting-documentation/-/tree/master/Reports 
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expert understand the system, from the definition of the system to the run itself, ex-
plaining the constraints and the quality principles.  
We are committed to providing transparent information on the operating principles 
and security precautions of the system. We want to foster cooperation with independ-
ent experts and thus facilitate the continuous improvement of the system. 
3.1.4 Open source (d) 
We will not be making the entire system available on an open-source basis. The system 
includes certain patents, which prevent us from releasing it for free commercial use 
worldwide. However, we decided to publish key parts of the code under an open source 
licence: key cryptographic algorithms, known as crypto-primitives, are available in a 
library provided by Swiss Post. The Swiss Post verifier, an open verifier software to 
verify the Swiss Post Voting Protocol, will be as well available under an open source 
licence. This means that we can offer free use and development of relevant parts of the 
source code.   
We have chosen the permissive open-source licence (Apache 2) to facilitate and en-
courage further development and reuse by third parties. This allows Swiss Post to gain 
on the experience of the reuse of this code.  
There is sometimes a confusion between open source and transparency. In our view, 
these two concepts should strictly be separated. Software can be source-available and 
meet all necessary transparency and scrutiny criteria without being open source. Open 
Source is a licence model for the software. In fact, with our approach we try to fulfil 
the demand formulated by Haines and Roenne21.  
3.1.5 Transparent Development (e) 
Transparent development is Swiss Post’s approach to software development for its e-
voting service. The transparent development approach supports disclosure on the fol-
lowing points: 
 Swiss Post permanently discloses software releases.
 Software increments are published between releases and are made available
on a designated branch. An increment is a defined feature/task designed to
make it easier to understand the changes in the source code.
 The commits history for the software increments and releases are published.
For all files, the commit history can be examined either per release or per in-
crement.
 The contributions from the community (e.g. pull requests) are reviewed, and
if accepted, integrated into the e-voting source code. This means that changes
or improvements from the community can be included in the source code.
21 “We highlight that any solution used for significant elections should be well designed, carefully 
analysed, deftly built, accurately documented and expertly maintained. Until e-voting system 
implementations are clear, comprehensible, and open to public scrutiny security standards 
are unlikely to improve.“ [10] 
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3.1.6 Publication of a compilable system (f) 
The building of the whole e-voting system has been made much easier and uses stand-
ard tools only. The maven build can be called in a standard environment with only one 
command. 
3.1.7 Opportunities to simulate contests (g) 
We provide researchers with a docker environment to run the whole e-voting system 
and simulate election events on their own infrastructure – i.e. they can run a ballot with 
productive data and also carry out attacks (including adjustments to the source code). 
3.1.8 Bug Bounty programme (h) 
In order to continuously improve the security of its digital products, Information Secu-
rity at Swiss Post operates a Group-wide bug bounty programme22 and E-Voting is also 
part of it. As with all products, it runs first in a private scope with a limited number of 
hackers. As soon as the programme reach a maturity stage, it will be converted into a 
public bug bounty. The private bug bounty for e-voting started in December 2020. 
For the private bug bounty, we defined a grid combining for the different scopes an 
evaluation based on the industry standard common vulnerability scoring system 
(CVSS), plus specific scenarios taking in consideration the e-voting’s specificities.  
The public programme will cover three aspects: 
- Static tests (Search for errors in the disclosed documentation or source code)
- Dynamic tests (Search for errors by analysing the executable system in a pri-
vate infrastructure)
- Internet tests (Attacks on the provider's infrastructure, fixed term annual test)
We see the bug bounty programme as a programme within the community pro-
gramme. This means that one does not have to register for the bug bounty programme 
in order to be able to scrutinize the system if one does not wish to. All system artefacts 
and documents which are disclosed can be accessed on GitLab without signing up to 
the bug bounty. 
3.1.9 Communication (i) 
Communication tailored to the target audience is important and needs to be addressed 
on an ongoing basis. For the expert audience, we publish a blog23 for each milestone 
(disclosed objects) and send an email with information. In order to explain in depth our 
22 The bug bounty programme makes an important contribution to digital transformation at Swiss 




system and approach, we conduct expert webinars24 on a regular basis. The aim of these 
communication activities is to engage dialog with the expert community. Transparency 
does not reach its goals if there is no one scrutinizing the system. 
We have built a dedicated community website25 where the access to all information 
and to all disclosed system items can be found. The platform is updated step by step 
and is written in a language that also non experts can understand. However, the dialogue 
between Swiss Post’s e-voting team and experts takes place on GitLab where all find-
ings are published. 
When communicating the public scrutiny programme, it must be emphasized that “if 
bugs are found, it is a success”. For big and established companies, this can be a chal-
lenge as it involves to admit publicly that a system does not yet live up to the company’s 
quality standards. 
It is important to prepare communicatively for all kind of scenarios. Obviously, 
weaknesses and bugs can be found in the code or an attack during an intrusion test can 
be successful. Such things might have to be communicated. But there are many other 
scenarios which can happen in the public discussion on social or traditional media and 
which you have to prepare for: 
- Responsible disclosure is not respected
- An expert expresses his disagreement with your analyzis of your finding.
- The methodical approach is criticized (e.g. not enough items are disclosed,
participation conditions)
- The code quality is criticized as it makes it difficult to scrutinize the system
- Fake news about submitted or not submitted findings
Such scenarios should already be anticipated when you define the modalities of pub-
lic scrutiny. By defining the modalities according to the expectations and needs of the 
expert communities, you mitigate the risks of such scenarios. If such scenarios happen, 
it is a huge communicative challenge. As a developer, you are automatically in a posi-
tion of weakness compared to an independent expert when it comes to public trust. 
Finally, companies often communicate a security issue after it is solved. In the e-
voting context, we communicate as soon as we have analyzed it. This makes the com-
munication more complicated regarding to the messages. 
3.2 First learnings from the new approach 
It is obviously too early for an evaluation of the new approach, as we are still in the 
process of disclosing the system. Since January 2021, we have disclosed system arte-
facts such as the cryptographic protocol, the library of cryptographic primitives, the 
system specification, architecture documentation, information about the development 








At the time of writing this article, the bug bounty programme has not yet been 
launched, and the complete code base and open-source verification software have not 
yet been disclosed. This will happen shortly. 
Our first experience is encouraging. We have received findings that we have already 
been able to implement27, and the reactions are mainly positive. So far, we have not 
received any fundamental objections to our approach or to aspects of it. 
We are, however, observing an ongoing discussion about the necessity of an open-
source licence for entire e-voting systems. It seems that our far-reaching system trans-
parency has not yet convinced all experts, even though we try to follow open-source 
principles regarding system transparency and system development, and even though 
part of the system is actually open source. 
Thanks to our step-by-step procedure, we will be able to modify our approach if we 
do not achieve our goals or if we receive well-founded suggestions for improvement 
from the community.  
4 Conclusion 
In early 2021, we began the disclosure of the beta version of the new system as part of 
a community programme. The aim of the programme is that independent experts can 
critically examine the system and report potential vulnerabilities.  
Based on the learnings of the disclosure of an earlier system, we improved our ap-
proach. We have for instance modified the participation conditions so that they are more 
accepted within the expert community. We have put more focus on code quality in order 
to make it easier for external experts to scrutinize it. And we think of transparency as a 
process instead of a one-off measure. As presented, we are using well-established meth-
ods for the public scrutiny such as continual and complete disclosure of the system’s 
source code, transparent development or an optional ongoing bug bounty programme. 
In fact, transparency does not reach its goals if there is no one scrutinizing the sys-
tem. E-voting is a very specialised and still comparatively young field. The existing 
systems on the market/countries are relatively different (comparisons are difficult), 
with a limited amount of productive deployment and therefore few active people being 
able to use such systems. The effort to find and encourage experts to contribute is a 
delicate task. Motivations are diverse, and even with significant rewards, the effort to 
contribute remains high. The different scopes defined allow the system to be analysed 
from different angles, but require on the other side more explanation for the community. 
To address these issues, we try to engage more actively with the expert community. 
In fact, this paper will also serve as a good base for starting a discussion with the 
expert community, with the aim of obtaining feedback and suggestions for improve-
ment. 
Finally, we can say that the publication of a white-box system is still a relatively 
recent topic, at least in Switzerland. We are proud to contribute to it and hope that some 
27 All findings are published on GitLab (https://gitlab.com/groups/swisspost-evoting/-/issues) 
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of our reflection may not only apply to the special e-voting context, but also be useful 
for similar projects of IT companies in other industries. 
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Use of Electronic Voting in the Albanian




Abstract. This paper describes the introduction of electronic voter
identification, voting and tallying in the parliamentary elections on April
25, 2021 in Albania. First, we outline the legal framework regarding the
use of technology in elections. Further, we describe in a chronological
order the most relevant steps that paved the way towards the use of elec-
tronic voter identification, voting and tallying. We report on pre-election
preparation activities, election day and election results. Next, we high-
light challenges of legal, procedural, social, organisational and technical
nature. We conclude our work by suggesting future work directions.
Keywords: Electronic Voter Identification · Electronic Voting & Tally-
ing · Parliamentary Elections · Albania · SMARTMATIC.
1 Introduction
The political agreement between the two major parties in Albania in 2017, and
the consensus of the political council in 2020 led to the use of information tech-
nology in the forthcoming elections. Consequently, in this paper we describe the
introduction of electronic voter identification, voting and tallying in the parlia-
mentary elections on April 25, 2021 in Albania. The extremely short time frame
regarding relevant activities, such as policy writing, procurement, implementa-
tion, testing and independent auditing, not only diminished public discourse
substantively, but also posed various challenges to the electoral process. Note
that while electronic voter identification was deployed in all polling stations
across the country, electronic voting and tallying was deployed only in a limited
number of polling stations.
This paper is structured as follows: In section 2 we outline the relevant parts
of the Albanian Electoral Code, in particular regarding election principles and
voter’s rights, as well as regarding the use of voting technology such as electronic
voter identification, electronic voting, and electronic tallying systems. Section 3
describes in a chronological order the most relevant steps that paved the way
towards the use of technology in elections, including recommendations by well-
known institutions like OSCE/ODIHR, political agreements, electoral commis-
sion’s acts, regulatory decisions, and vendor (system) selection. Section 4 reports
on used devices, pre-election preparation activities, election day and election re-
sults. In section 5 we highlight challenges and classify these in legal, procedural,
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social, organisational and technical challenges. Section 6 concludes the paper by
suggesting future work directions.
2 Electoral Code
In this section we outline the relevant parts of the Albanian Electoral Code
(AEC)1 in particular regarding election principles and voter’s rights, as well as
regarding the use of voting technology such as electronic voter identification,
electronic voting, and electronic tallying systems. Note that the current AEC
has been published with the support of the Organisation for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE).2
2.1 Election Principles and Voter’s Rights
According to Article 3 of AEC, elections shall be free, secret, equal, and direct.
Further, each voter has the right to cast only one vote. In addition, every Alba-
nian citizen who has reached the age of 18, including election day, has the right
to vote and to be elected independent of their race, ethnicity, gender, language,
political conviction, religion, physical ability or economic status. Though not
exhaustive, the voter’s rights are also to be found on the website3 of the Central
Electoral Commission (CEC).
2.2 Technology in Elections
Article 22 is one of the articles in the AEC that mainly addresses the use of
information technology in elections.4 It defines the CEC competences concerning
information technology in elections, while focusing on different aspects:
– Enabling CEC to explore, experiment and decide on the use of informa-
tion technology systems5 in elections for addressing specific aspects and/or
procedures of the electoral process.
– Restricting CEC to implement the use of information technology systems in
elections via pilot projects with at least 10 percent of the number of voters
in each implementation stage.
– Specifying that the use of information technology systems must first ensure
electronic identification of voters and their post-election verification, voting
with and through electronic equipment, and machine assisted counting of
cast ballots. Further, the used systems must be applicable for at least five
consecutive electoral processes.
1 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Electoral-Code-of-Albania-english-
2.pdf, last accessed 18.06.2021
2 https://www.osce.org/presence-in-albania/477547, last accessed 18.06.2021
3 http://kqz.gov.al/te-drejtat-e-votuesit/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
4 The use of information technology in elections was added to the AEC with the
changes on July 23, 2020.
5 Includes both hardware and software equipment.
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– Defining that the identification, selection, and use of information technology
systems must be subject to the principles of legality, transparency, inclusive-
ness, security, efficiency, and sustainability.
– Describing the operational testing procedures for information technology sys-
tems prior to elections. Operational testing must take place in public sessions
by randomly selecting from each electoral administration zone at least three
percent of therein used systems, and with no less than 50 participants.
– Verifying the correctness of information technology systems used to vote or
count ballots by manually counting ballots and comparing the results in at
least 10 percent of the voting centres. The verification process must take
place in public sessions and the voting centres must be selected randomly.
Note that mismatches may become subject of criminal investigation.
Other articles of the AEC do also touch on the use of technology in elections,
but mostly on the sideline. Article 14 appoints the Deputy Commissioner as re-
sponsible regarding voter electronic identification technology. Article 20 defines
competences of the regulator regarding the analysis and examining of draft acts
of normative nature on information technology systems. Article 23 outlines the
procedure for introducing technology in elections and decision-making. Article
25 discusses the use of technology in elections in the context of out-of-country
voting procedures. Article 81 describes the location and preparation of ballot
counting centres, allowing CEC to decide regarding the use of recording cameras
and screens for displaying the ballot papers before their evaluation. Article 179
introduces the procedures with respect to the procurement of information tech-
nology systems and equipment. In addition, Article 179 states that the use of
information technology in elections must be implemented through pilot projects,
where at most 20 percent of the voters shall be included, however electronic voter
identification can include 100 percent of the voters.
3 The Journey towards Electronic Voter Identification,
Voting, and Tallying
In this section we describe in a chronological order the most relevant steps,
including recommendations by well-known institutions like OSCE/ODIHR, po-
litical agreements, electoral commission’s acts, regulatory decisions, and vendor
(system) selection for electronic voter identification, voting, and tallying in the
parliamentary elections on April 25, 2021.
3.1 OSCE/ODIHR Recommendations
As usual, after being invited by the government of the Republic of Albania,
OSCE/ODIHR deployed an Election Observation mission in the previous, par-
liamentary elections on June 25, 2017. The final report6 of this mission does not
contain any explicit recommendation regarding the introduction of electronic
6 https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/4/d/346661.pdf, last accessed 18.06.2021
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voting, i.e. the use of information technology in elections as means for address-
ing any electoral challenges identified in this and prior OSCE/ODIHR reports,
e.g. vote-buying or double-voting. Rather, many of the OSCE/ODIHR EOM
interlocutors emphasised the necessity to involve experts beyond the largest
parliamentary parties to study policy options, including electronic voting, be-
fore future reform. The report only outlines that the introduction of electronic
voting for the next elections stems by a request of the Democratic Party and a
consequent agreement with the Socialist Party reached on May 18, 2017. This
agreement was the first step towards the use of information technology in elec-
tions.
3.2 Commissioner’s Acts
In this section we introduce four relevant Central Electoral Commission (CEC)
Commissioner’s Acts regarding the use of information technology in elections.
Commissioner’s Act No. 82 from October 12, 2020 7
After the political agreement on May 18, 2017, and motivated by the consen-
sus of the political council for using information technology in the forthcoming
elections, reached on June 5, 20208, CEC released on October 12, 2020 an in-
ternal order for creating a working group. The working group, monitored by the
CEC deputy commissioner, consisted of seven participants, four CEC members,
two external IT experts, and the director of the finance directorate. The goal of
the working group was to evaluate information technology systems, and deliver a
report on October 25, 2020. To achieve this goal the following tasks were defined:
– Research and identify information technology systems that can be used in
the forthcoming elections for electronic voter identification and voting.
– Evaluate the use of such technology in the corresponding context.
– Make an overall assessment of financial costs.
– Present, if possible, a number of entities that have developed such technology.
– Prepare a list of legal acts and technical protocols that will enable the im-
plementation and use of such technology.
Commissioner’s Act No. 111 from March 2, 2021 9
With the decision No. 111 on March 2, 2021, CEC determined the electoral
administration zone in the municipality of Tirana for the implementation of
the electronic voting and tallying pilot project. As specified by the Regulatory
Commission the selected zone should not consist of more than 55 polling stations.
Only three zones met this requirement in the municipality of Tirana:
7 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Urdher-nr.-82-per-nritjen-e-grupit-
te-punes-per-pajisjet-e-teknologjise-se-informacionit.pdf, last accessed 18.06.2021
8 http://ata.gov.al/2020/06/05/keshilli-politik-arrin-konsensusin-per-reformen-
zgjedhore/, last accessed 18.06.2021
9 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/dadsit 210301 pv caktimi zaz-
40 votimelektronik.pdf, last accessed 18.06.2021
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– Electoral administration zone No. 33, consisting of 52 polling stations. 
– Electoral administration zone No. 38, consisting of 50 polling stations. 
– Electoral administration zone No. 40, consisting of 32 polling stations.
Based on consultations with the subjects participating in the elections, nomi-
nated parties and independent candidates, CEC decided in favour of the electoral
administration zone No. 40.
Commissioner’s Act No. 239 from April 15, 2021 10
With the decision No. 239 on April 15, 2021, CEC approved the procedural and
technical rules with respect to the management and conduction of the electronic
voting, and tallying processes. CEC defined 35 rules for the electronic voting pro-
cess, and 24 rules for the electronic tallying process. In addition, this document
defines the steps of the voting process. Thereby, it is important to emphasise
that voters are allowed to cast an invalid11 vote intentionally, and verify the
corresponding Paper Audit Trail before casting their vote. However, a voting
session, i.e. the time after a poll worker activates the electronic voting device
until voters confirm their cast vote, can last only six minutes.
Commissioner’s Act No. 206 from April 23, 2021 12
With the internal order from April 23, 2021, CEC approved the operational pro-
cedures for preserving and protecting voters’ personal data stored and processed
in the electronic identification devices. This document consists of the following
sections:
– Description of the voters’ personal data gathered by the CEC.
– Description of the infrastructure of CEC, where voters’ personal data is
stored and processed.
– Definition of the authorised personnel having access to the electronic iden-
tification devices, and the corresponding access policies.
– Listing of the devices containing voters’ personal data, and definition of the
organisational and technical requirements to be fulfilled by these devices
during their usage.
– Definition of the operational procedures for the management in the field of
the electronic identification devices.
3.3 Regulatory Commission Decisions
In this section we introduce four relevant decisions of the Regulatory Commis-
sion (RC)13 of CEC regarding the use of information technology in elections. In
10 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Vendim -
239 210414 Pv rregulla proceduriale votim nr elektronik-3 Komisoneri.pdf, last
accessed 18.06.2021
11 Note that a blank vote is also considered as invalid.
12 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Urdher 206 210425 ruajtja-e-te-
dhenave.pdf, last accessed 18.06.2021
13 According to AEC it is the competent body for approval of acts of normative nature.
308
addition to where and how the pilot project shall be conducted, the RC defines
in these decisions technical characteristics that must be met by the electronic
identification, voting, and tallying devices.
Decision No. 02 from October 31, 2020 14
The objective of this decision is: The type and technical characteristics that
must fulfil the systems and equipment for electronic identification of voters
procured and used in elections in the Republic of Albania. Thereby, RC decided
that voters shall be identified through electronic identification devices in all
polling stations. Further, RC defined a number of technical criteria to be met
by the electronic identification devices. Below we list the most relevant.
– Voter identification shall be based on the voters’ electronic register stored
on the device.
– The device shall contain all eligible voters in all polling stations, but show
only the voters of the polling station for which it is configured.
– It shall be possible to cross-check all used devices whether any voter has
voted twice, including in other polling stations or for other voters.
– The device shall work autonomously without being connected to external
networks.
– The device shall read the Machine Readable Zone of the biometric identity
document to identify voters, but also support manual voter identification.
– The device shall store voters’ biometric fingerprint and confirm the identifi-
cation process by providing a physical trail that contains voters’ information,
including their picture.
Decision No. 04 from November 13, 2020 15
The objective of this decision is: The type and technical characteristics that
must fulfil the systems and equipment for electronic voting and electronic
tallying procured and used in elections in the Republic of Albania. Thereby, RC
decided that the process of voting and tallying shall be conducted electronically,
for at least 10% and at most 20% of the voters. Further, RC defined a number of
technical criteria to be met by the electronic voting and tallying devices. Below
we list the most relevant.
– The devices shall be operated in a closed network, not externally accessible.
– The devices shall be separated and not communicate or exchange information
with the electronic identification devices, in order to preserve voters’ vote
secrecy.
– The voting device shall store cast votes, but without corresponding times-
tamps.
14 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/VendimI-002 DJ Miratimi-
Karakteristikat-teknike-te-Sistemeve-ne-Zgjedhje.pdf, last accessed 18.06.2021
15 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/Vendimi-004 DJ Tek Pajisje-
Vot Num Elek.pdf, last accessed 18.06.2021
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– The voting device shall confirm voters’ selection on the screen and print a
Paper Audit Trail, which is deposited on a box attached to the device.
– The screen of the voting device shall, as much as possible, prevent taking a
picture of the vote.
– The devices shall work autonomously without being connected to external
networks.
– The devices shall be activated by the Commissioner for each voter, and
automatically disable after voting.
– The voting device shall enable voters with disabilities, e.g. voters with vision
loss, to cast their vote.
Decision No. 04 from February 12, 2021 - Changes in the Decision
No. 04 from November 13, 2020 16
The objective of this decision is: The type and technical characteristics that
must fulfil the systems and equipment for electronic voting and electronic
tallying procured and used in elections in the Republic of Albania. Thereby, RC
decided on the following changes:
– The electronic voting and tallying process shall be conducted in one of the
electoral administration zones17 of the municipality of Tirana, but not in
more than 55 polling stations.
– The support for voters with disabilities, e.g. voters with vision loss, is re-
pealed.
Decision No. 17 from April 14, 2021 18
The objective of this decision is: Procedural rules of the electronic voting and
tallying process in the electoral administration zone No. 40 in Tirana. This de-
cision outlines a framework around the electronic voting and tallying process.
It is important to emphasise that through this decision, in accordance to the
concrete situation, CEC can decide to proceed the voting and tallying process
with ballot papers.
3.4 Evaluation and Procurement Process
Note that at the time of writing this article CEC has not published the report by
the respective working group regarding the evaluation of potential information
technology (e-voting) systems. Though the report should have been delivered
on October 25, 2020 to CEC. Instead, CEC has published on their website only
16 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/Vendim Nr.004 210212 Per-disa-
ndryshime-ne-vendimin-nr.04-date-13.11.20....pdf, last accessed 18.06.2021
17 The electoral administration zone was specified by the Commissioner’s Act from
March 2, 2021.
18 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/vendim 17 krr rregulla proceduriale
votim nr elektronik zaz 40.pdf, last accessed 18.06.2021
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corresponding information about the steps and progress of the evaluation and
procurement process.
On November 13, 202019 CEC notified about their request to 20 companies
with international experience in information technology and/or in election pro-
cesses. The companies were requested to estimate the costs for the electronic
voter identification system and devices, based on the type and technical char-
acteristics as specified in the decision No. 02 from October 31, 2020 by the
Regulatory Commission Decisions.
On November 18, 202020 CEC notified about the progress of the market test-
ing process for the implementation of technology in elections. In order to improve
the price indicators CEC had send their request to two additional companies,
however not specifically named. Six out of the 22 contacted companies provided
a price estimation, ranging from approximately 15 million to 28 million USD.
Furthermore, CEC asked the responding companies to estimate the additional
cost for implementing the Electronic Voters Identification and Results Manage-
ment System and the Voting and Counting Electronic Devices, based on the type
and technical characteristics as specified in decision No. 04 from November 11,
2020 by the Regulatory Commission Decisions.
On January 6, 202121 CEC published an update regarding the procurement
procedure for electronic identification of voters. From the six companies, only
SMARTMATIC22 submitted the required documentation and offer (approxi-
mately 20 million USD without VAT) and delivered the required sample equip-
ment.
On January 14, 202123 CEC notified to have completed the evaluation of the
bid and technical solution submitted by SMARTMATIC regarding the informa-
tion technology systems/procedures for electronic identification of voters and
their post election verification. CEC announced that after reviewing the docu-
mentation, the financial bid and technical solution decided to proceed with the
stage of Terms and Contact Negotiation with SMARTMATIC. No further infor-
mation was published by CEC regarding the negotiation or contract signing pro-
cess. However, the Albanian Public Procurement Agency (APPA)24 announced25
SMARTMATIC as a winner with negotiation without publication with an of-
fer of 19.975.77,23 USD (without VAT), on page 229 of the bulletin No. 1126
19 http://kqz.gov.al/2020/11/13/njoftim-per-media-tirane-me-13-nentor-
2020/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
20 http://kqz.gov.al/2020/11/18/njoftim-per-media/?lang=en, last accessed
18.06.2021
21 http://kqz.gov.al/2021/01/06/perditesim-informacioni-lidhur-me-proceduren-
prokuruese-per-identifikimin-biometrik-te-zgjedhesve/, last accessed 18.06.2021
22 https://www.smartmatic.com/, last accessed 18.06.2021
23 http://kqz.gov.al/2021/01/15/update-information-regarding-the-procurement-
procedure-for-electronic-identification-of-voters/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
24 http://www.app.gov.al, last accessed 18.06.2021
25 APPA was notified already on January 15, 2021 about the decision by CEC.
26 http://www.app.gov.al/GetData/DownloadDoc?documentId=870a8751-2cf7-46a2-
be64-4ad2b28c1967, last accessed 18.06.2021
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from January 25, 2021. In addition, APPA announced SMARTMATIC also as
a winner with negotiation without publication with an offer of 960.180 USD
(without VAT) regarding the electronic voting and tallying devices, on page 262
of the bulletin No. 4227 from March 23, 2021. According to the internal APPA
rules, SMARTMATIC had five days after the corresponding announcement to
accept the offer and sign the contract. SMARTMATIC confirmed the reached
agreements implicitly by announcing on their website28 about being selected by
CEC.
4 E-voting supported Elections
In this section we describe the electronically supported parliamentary elections
of April 25, 2021. We introduce the used devices, describe the pre-election prepa-
ration activities, the election day and also the election results.
4.1 Electronic Devices: Voter Identification, Voting and Tallying
SMARTMATIC provided29 their voter verification device VIU-818 30 for elec-
tronic voter identification, and their premium voting device A4-517 31 for elec-
tronic voting and tallying, shown in Figure 1a and 1b respectively.
(a) Voter Identification Device.30
(b) Voting and Tallying Device.31
Fig. 1: SMARTMATIC Devices.
27 http://www.app.gov.al/GetData/DownloadDoc?documentId=0fa380e7-f0e7-4c29-
b4bf-91c2a118f7a6, last accessed 18.06.2021
28 https://www.smartmatic.com/case-studies/article/smartmatic-supports-seven-
elections-in-six-countries-over-five-months/, last accessed 18.06.2021
29 https://www.smartmatic.com/media/article/albania-strengthens-confidence-in-the-
election-process-through-technology/, last accessed 18.06.2021.
30 https://www.smartmatic.com/fileadmin/user upload/VIU Desktop ProductSheet





Recruiting and Training of Electoral Employees
In this section we outline the procedures and steps taken by Central Electoral
Commission (CEC) for recruiting and training electoral employees.
Recruiting Process Recruiting started with a public announcement32 for part-
time employment for a large number of positions by CEC on December 10, 2020.
Further, CEC expressed their interest for hiring trainers to train the electoral
administration on January 733, 2021, on March 534, 2021, and on March 3035,
2021, publicly. It is to be noted that since the first announcement for hiring train-
ers for the electoral administration CEC required the same amount of trainers,
namely 54 for training the commission of the electoral administration zones, 265
for training the polling stations commissions, and 92 for training members of
the ballot tallying teams. In addition, the application deadline for trainers in
the last announcement (March 30, 2021) was on March 31, 2021. Last, but not
least, CEC announced on March 3036, 2021 a one day employment opportunity
as operator of voters’ electronic identification device on election day, publicly.
In addition to a number of strict criteria to be met by the applicants, the appli-
cation deadline was on April 5, 2021, with an incentive of approximately 75e.
Note that neither a public nor an explicit announcement was made by CEC for
recruiting operators for the electronic voting and tallying devices.
Training Process There is a lack of public information regarding the training pro-
cess for both electronic voter identification, and electronic voting and tallying
devices. The only publicly available information is 1) a report by abcnews.al37
about training operators of the electronic voter identification device in the Mu-
nicipality of Shkodra, refer to Figure 2; and 2) a statement38 by SMARTMATIC
about having trained 460 field support technicians who provided support to poll






to-train-the-electoral-administration/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
34 http://kqz.gov.al/2021/03/05/nnouncement-for-expression-of-interest-for-trainers-
to-train-the-electoral-administration/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
35 http://kqz.gov.al/2021/03/30/cec-is-hiring-trainers-to-train-the-electoral-





ne-dispozicion-5500-pajisje/, last accessed 18.06.2021
38 https://www.smartmatic.com/media/article/albania-strengthens-confidence-in-the-
election-process-through-technology/, last accessed 18.06.2021
39 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F8Kah9xVDE4, last accessed 18.06.2021
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Fig. 2: Operator Training for Electronic Identification of Voters.39
Voters’ Education
In order to educate voters about elections in general, CEC provides on their
website40 a voter’s corner, where topics like 1) Where is my polling station?; 2)
How can I vote?; 3) Voter’s Rights; 4) Voters’ List; and 5) FAQs about filling
in the ballot, are addressed. Further, CEC provides also a voter’s education sec-
tion41 on their website, where posters42 and videos43 describing the procedures
of the electronic voters’ identification are published. With respect to educating
voters about the voting procedures through the electronic voting device, CEC
has published a video44, and has also organised a simulated election from April
3 to April 11, 2021.45 Thereby, all the voters of the Election Administration
Zone No. 40 had the opportunity to participate in the simulation. Except for
the number of participants, 547, and that the ballot didn’t match the one used
on election day46, no information about potential challenges and lessons learned
is available. Last, but not least, CEC organised an awareness campaign47 with
first time voters, where students from the Faculty of Medicine in Tirana were
introduced to CEC, its leading bodies and competences. Thereby, the partici-
pants’ interest was focused on topics such as electronic voter identification, the
electronic voting and tallying pilot project, general voting procedures, and the
correct marking of the ballot paper.
Demonstration and Operational Testing
In this section we describe the CEC activities for demonstrating and testing the
functional operation of the electronic identification, voting and tallying devices.
40 http://kqz.gov.al/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
41 http://kqz.gov.al/strategjia-e-edukimit/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
42 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Electronic-identification-1-
scaled.jpg, last accessed 18.06.2021
43 http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/3 IDENTIFIKIMI ELEKTRONIK
.webm, last accessed 18.06.2021
44 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UHNYGSxLOY, last accessed 18.06.2021
45 http://kqz.gov.al/2021/04/02/cec-simulation-of-the-electronic-voting-in-
municipality-unit-no-10/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
46 https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/2/7/484688.pdf, last accessed 18.06.2021
47 http://kqz.gov.al/2021/04/07/cec-awareness-campaign-with-first-time-
voters/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
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Demonstration The functionality of the electronic voters’ identification devices
was demonstrated in three municipalities, in Tirana48, Kukes49 and Fier50, as
shown in Figures 3a, 3b and 3c respectively. During the demonstrations in Kukes
and Fier the Deputy Commissioner made the following statements respectively:
”...identification is simple for the citizens and is completed in a short time.
Electronic identification avoids multiple voting and does not allow the voting in
a centre where the citizen is not registered...”, and ”...one of the primary func-
tions of the device is to identify cases when a voter attempts multiple voting.
Since the device has stored only the voters’ list of that centre where the device
is installed, it becomes impossible to vote for those voters who are not registered
in that voting centre...”. While in Tirana participated more than 200 subjects
selected by the political parties, no information is published about Kukes and
Fier. However, according to CEC the demonstrations showed an efficient func-
tioning of the devices. Note that except for the ”demonstration” in the scope
of voters’ education, aiming to familiarise voters with the electronic voting pro-
cess, no further demonstration of the electronic voting and tallying devices was
conducted.
(a) Tirana on February 22, 2021.48 (b) Kukes on March 4, 2021.49
(c) Fier on March 8, 2021.50
Fig. 3: Demonstration of Electronic Voter Identification Devices.
48 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uF7gHP6APG4, last accessed 18.06.2021
49 http://kqz.gov.al/2021/03/04/electronic-voters-identification-device-demonstrated-
in-kukes/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
50 http://kqz.gov.al/2021/03/08/electronic-voters-identification-device-demonstrated-
in-fier/?lang=en, last accessed 18.06.2021
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Operational Testing In accordance to Article 22, sentence 6, of the Albanian
Electoral Code (AEC), CEC organised and conducted operational tests for the
electronic voter identification devices, and for the electronic voting and tallying
devices. The operational tests for the electronic voter identification, shown in
Figure 4a, took place on April, 16 202151. Thereby, 3% of the devices were
randomly selected and tested against the following test cases:
– Presented voter is registered in the according voting centre.
– Presented voter is registered in another voting centre.
– Multiple voting attempts.
– Acoustic signals released by the devices.
At the end of this operational test a draft report shall confirm the functional-
ity of the devices, and whether these fulfil the criteria specified by the Regulatory
commission with Decision No. 02 from October 31, 2020. It is to be emphasised
that neither this report was published, nor any information about participants.
Further, during the testing the State Election Commissioner stated that ”...the
process of electronic voter identification is easy to use, and that CEC has taken
all the necessary measures in order for the project to be successful...”. The oper-
ational tests for the electronic voting and tallying devices, shown in Figure 4b,
took place on April 23, 202152. According to CEC the operational tests were
conducted in compliance to the AEC, i.e. to identify whether the devices fulfil
the criteria specified by the Regulatory commission with Decision No. 04 from
November 11, 2020. No further information about the test cases or participants
was published.
(a) Electronic Voter Identification.51 (b) Voting and Tallying.
52
Fig. 4: Devices’ Operational Testing.
51 http://kqz.gov.al/2021/04/16/cec-tests-electronic-identification-devices-






In accordance with the Article 11 of the Albanian Electoral Code (AEC), on
election day polling stations were open between 7AM and 7PM. While the elec-
tronic voter identification was deployed in all, 5199 polling stations across the
country, electronic voting and tallying was deployed only in 32 polling stations.46
Electronic Voter Identification
Before opening the voter identification procedure, poll workers configured the
electronic identification device. To configure the device poll workers were re-
quired to enter first the configuration PIN, then the corresponding polling sta-
tion number53, and then activate a smart card. After configuration, to operate
the device poll workers were required to enter the operating PIN, activate the
smart card, and confirm. After confirmation, the device printed an identification
opening protocol, containing the polling station number, the total number of el-
igible voters for the corresponding polling station, and the number of identified
voters (zero in the beginning). For identification voters used their national elec-
tronic identification card. Poll workers swiped the identification card through
the device, which read the corresponding Machine Readable Zone (MRZ). If the
MRZ was not readable, for instance due to a damaged card, poll workers could
search for voters manually. In both cases the device displayed on its screen voters’
personal information and picture. After checking that the displayed information
matches that on the card, poll workers required voters to put their finger on the
biometric scanner. The device stored voters’ biometric fingerprint locally, thus
enabling to identify any attempts of double-voting in the corresponding polling
station. Note that poll workers also marked voters fingers with indelible ink.
After storing the fingerprint successfully the device printed a confirmation, con-
taining the voters’ personal information and picture. Poll workers collected the
printed confirmation within an envelope for later auditing purposes. Next, voters
were able to cast their vote either on a paper ballot or electronically. At the end
of the election day poll workers closed the identification process by inserting the
smart card, entering the operational PIN, and printing the final identification
report. Note that according to the preliminary report46 by the Office for Demo-
cratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) approximately 4% of the polling
stations delayed their opening due to issues with starting-up identification de-
vices. Approximately 3% of elgible voters were registered using paper lists, due
to malfunctioning of devices or absence of technical operators. In some polling
stations, poll workers used both the devices and paper lists. These challenges
were also reflected in various local media, like televisions54 and newspapers55.
53 This enables the device to identify only voters registered in the corresponding polling
station as eligible.





Electronic voting was implemented in 32 polling stations56 in the municipality of
Tirana. A total of 23.597 eligible voters could cast their vote electronically. Af-
ter successfully identifying voters, poll workers activated the stand-alone voting
device. Then, voters entered the voting both and cast their vote by selecting on
the touchscreen either a party or an independent candidate or by casting an in-
valid vote. When selecting a party, voters had also the option to cast one vote to
individual candidates of the selected party. After confirming their selection the
voting device displayed and also printed on a Paper Audit Trail (PAT) voters’
selection. Voters were required to verify that the displayed information and the
PAT matched their selection. After their final confirmation, voters’ selection was
stored on the device locally, the PAT automatically added into a ballot box, and
the device automatically disabled. Note that after the PAT was printed, voters
could change their selection only one time. Further, voters could not touch the
PAT, which was shown behind the glass of the printer, refer to Figure 5. It must
be noted that many voters required assistance to cast their vote electronically.46
Fig. 5: Setup of the Electronic Voting Device.57
4.4 Election Results
While the election results58 are still not finally certified by CEC due to ongoing
evaluations of manipulation allegations59, the preliminary results60 from the
electronic voting were published already a day after election day. According to
CEC, 12.096 out of 23.597 eligible voters participated in the elections and cast
their vote electronically, resulting in 11.976 valid and 120 invalid votes. Note
that no complaints were made regarding the results from the electronic voting.
56 Each polling station was equipped with two electronic voting devices.
57 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1UHNYGSxLOY, last accessed 18.06.2021
58 http://kqz.gov.al/results/results2021.htm, last accessed 18.06.2021
59 A number of active and passive election manipulations are being eval-
uated by CEC and the Special Anti-corruption Structure (SPAK). Re-
fer to http://kqz.gov.al/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Regjistri-i-Njoftimeve-
KAS 210511-1.pdf and https://spak.al/2021/04/27/njoftim-24/ respectively.
60 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g9S6hSvr0t4, last accessed 18.06.2021
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5 Challenges
Despite being rated as a successfully completed project by CEC61, a number of
challenges accompanied the electronically supported elections. These challenges
can be classified as legal, procedural, social, organisational, and technical. Legal
challenges include contradictions to Article 22 of the AEC, e.g. 1) Electronic
voting was implemented with less than 10% of voters; 2) Voters with disabilities
were excluded; 3) No manual ballot verification was conducted; and 4) Lack of
analysis regarding systems’ applicability for the next five consecutive electoral
processes. Procedural challenges include contradicting and non best-practice pro-
cedures, e.g. 1) Invalid votes printed as QR-Codes on PAT, making it difficult for
voters to verify; 2) No manual audit for tallying required; 3) No explicit random
selection of USBs storing votes; 4) No security required during electronic transfer
of results; 5) No message requiring voters to verify the displayed vote and their
PAT; 6) Not clear whether identification devices do or don’t store data on their
internal, persistent memory; 7) Not specified how keys of electronic devices for
data encryption and integrity are generated, stored and accessed; 8) Electronic
devices shall not have external components, however they do use external USBs;
9) Not clear how the display and printer glass shall dis- and allow taking pic-
tures; and 10) No independent audit performed. Social challenges include, e.g.
1) Use of electronic voting motivated politically rather than objectively; 2) Re-
maining vote-buying allegations; and 3) Wrong mental model regarding security
guarantees. Organisational challenges include, e.g. 1) Lack of reports (e.g. exit
questionnaires, cross-checking of biometric data); 2) Partially failed recruiting,
training and educational processes; and 3) Extremely limited time and unrea-
sonable deadlines. Last, but not least, technical challenges include, e.g. 1) Lack
of authenticity verification of ID cards; 2) Lack of trust model regarding vote se-
crecy and privacy for voters’ biometric data; and 3) Lack of implementing design
principles that increase voters’ motivation to verify their PAT.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we described the introduction of electronic voter identification, vot-
ing and tallying in the parliamentary elections on April 25, 2021 in Albania. De-
spite being rated as a successful achievement by the Central Electoral Commis-
sion, various challenges of legal, procedural, social, organisational and technical
nature were identified. In particular, the absence of independent auditing, lack of
transparency, and lack of trust model regarding vote secrecy and integrity poten-
tially compromised the election principles. Therefore, before proceeding further
with the use of technology in elections, it is strongly recommended to conduct a
thorough analysis, whether electronic voting is the adequate solution to electoral
challenges in Albania. In that case, consequently, future work shall focus first on
suggesting adequate improvements to the herein highlighted challenges.
61 http://kqz.gov.al/2021/04/25/deklarata-e-komisionerit-shteteror-te-zgjedhjeve-z-
ilirjan-celibashi-ora-1900/, last accessed 18.06.2021
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Abstract. This paper1 presents an overview of the use of ICT-backed solutions 
in the electoral processes in Armenia and their possible future development. It 
discusses questions that arise in relation to the current use of ICT and to the en-
visaged developments which may be of general interest. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Electoral system 
Armenia is a small country (area – 29,8 km2, population – 2.9 million, of which 
2.5 million have voting rights) geographically located in the South Caucasus and gen-
erally considered geopolitically European. The citizens of Armenia vote in elections 
and referenda, at the state and local self-government level. The Constitution foresees 
the regular and extraordinary election of the National Assembly and elections of local 
self-government bodies (election of Head of Community and Member of Community 
Council of Elders). They are regulated in detail in the Electoral Code (EC). The Con-
stitution further provides for direct participation in the administration of community 
affairs through the local referendum. At the national level, it is possible to vote in a 
referendum to modify the Constitution, on a draft law submitted by popular initiative 
and in a referendum on the membership of the Republic of Armenia in supranational 
or international organisations as well as on changes of territory.  
1 This paper was prepared with permission from UNDP following the Feasibility Study on 
Innovative Technologies for Electoral Processes in Armenia, produced in the framework of 
“Electoral Support Project in Armenia” funded by the Government of Japan and implement-
ed by UNDP. The authors of this paper are the main authors of the feasibility study. The 
views expressed in the paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the 
views of UNDP. 
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The principles of secret ballot and universal, equal, free and direct suffrage apply 
equally to elections and referenda. So do other relevant principles, namely the manda-
tory and periodic nature of elections and the publicity of elections (Articles 1-8 EC).  
Armenia is a parliamentary republic since the 2015 constitutional amendments and 
the election of the National Assembly is the single nationwide election. It is also the 
most sophisticated one. The electoral system, in force from 1 June 2016 until April 
2021, was quite complex.2 The system was changed on 1st April 2021 when the Par-
liament approved amendments to the EC introducing a pure, one-tier proportional 
system, easier to handle also for the voters. The National Assembly that came out of 
the snap election of 20 June 2021 was elected through the new proportional system, 
with one multi-mandate constituency covering the entire territory of the Republic. 
Each party (or alliance of parties) running in the elections nominates one nationwide 
electoral closed list of candidates. The electoral list of the party (alliance of parties) 
includes not less than 80 and not more than 300 candidates. 
1.2 Election administration 
Elections are administered by a three-tier system comprising the Central Electoral 
Commission (CEC), 38 territorial electoral commissions (TECs) and 2,010 Precinct 
Election Commissions (PECs). A distinct governmental agency, the Police Passport 
and Visa Department, manages the State Population Register from which is drawn the 
electoral register. It updates the register and submits it electronically to the CEC for 
posting on the commission's website.3 A search engine is available on the website of 
CEC. The Police Visa and Passport Department is also responsible for eliminating 
any inaccuracies in the register and notifying the applicant either directly or via a 
dedicated website,4 which, technically, is not part of the elections management sys-
tem. 
2 It provided for a minimum of 101 members of parliament (MPs) to be elected through a two-
tier proportional system. In that system, each party (or alliance of parties) participating in 
the elections nominated one electoral list of candidates, which consisted of two parts. The 
party (or alliance of parties) compiled regional electoral lists from the candidates included in 
its national electoral list. A candidate could be included in only one regional electoral list. 
During the National Assembly elections, 13 districts were formed in the Republic of Arme-
nia (4 in Yerevan and 9 in the regions). Half of the seats were assigned through the nation-
wide list and the other half through territorial lists submitted in each of 13 territorial dis-
tricts. According to OSCE/ODIHR EOM Report of 2017 Parliamentary elections, voters had 
difficulties in understanding the then-new voting process which led in some cases to group 





1.3 Current use of ICT in elections 
Use of ICT is envisaged as a mean for ensuring publicity and transparency of or-
ganising and holding elections and should be done in a manner that respects security, 
smooth operation and proper exercise of powers (Article 8§3 EC). Currently, several 
solutions based on so-called information and communication technologies (ICT) are 
used in election administration in Armenia.  
Voter Authentication Devices. Use of ICTs during election day started mainly in 
2016 with the adoption of the new Electoral Code whose main novelty was the intro-
duction of Voter Authentication Devices (VADs). These devices have been used for 
the last three parliamentary elections (2017, 2018 and 2021). Even though the parlia-
mentary elections held in April 2017 were generally well-administered, important 
shortcomings remained, including vote-buying and misuse of administrative resources 
which contributed to an overall lack of public confidence and trust in the election. 
Following the Velvet Revolution and democratic changes in 2018, the following two 
snap elections held respectively in 2018 and 2021 were claimed to be more democrat-
ic and transparent.  
The introduction of VADs is one mechanism that not only assists in the identifica-
tion of a voter but also aims to address the issue of trust in elections. International 
observers of the 2017 election noted that the introduction of the VADs was welcomed 
by most of their interlocutors as a useful tool for building confidence in the integrity 
of election day proceedings, while also recognizing a number of issues, such as the 
late development and delivery of the VADs which led to a limited time for testing of 
equipment and training of the VAD operators.5 In contrast, international observers 
had noted in previous elections a number of serious violations including multiple and 
proxy voting, impersonation and issued recommendations to address them.6 In all 
elections held before 2018, voting rights were allegedly infringed, and so public con-
fidence in the outcome was very low. It was in this context that the Government of 
Armenia decided to implement new ICT-backed solutions to reduce the risks of dou-
ble voting, namely by preventing undue use of credentials/identities of Armenians 
who are either living abroad or out of the region where they are registered and where 
their polling station is located. Additionally, the VADs were intended to also put an 
end to widespread allegations that the Government included names of dead voters on 
the voting lists.  
VADs are considered a means to help preventing multiple voting, impersonation, 
and fraud and, according to observers, have helped instil trust in recent elections.7 
5 See the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report on parliamentary elections 
2 April 2017, p. 10 as well as p. 5, https://res.elections.am/images/doc/osce02.04.18_en.pdf 
6 See the OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report on parliamentary elections 
18 February 2013, page 21, https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/a/d/101314.pdf 
7 See OSCE/ODIHR as well as Council of Europe PACE reports of the parliamentary elections 




They have been successfully used since 2017. Despite the identified shortcomings in 
the 2017 elections, the use of VADs was claimed to be successful: nine cases of at-
tempted multiple voting were identified by the VADs and thus prevented.8 The same 
VADs were also successfully used in the 2018 and the 2021 parliamentary elections, 
without any changes to the procedures. 
The Voter Authentication Devices are used on voting day to authenticate voters 
and to collect fingerprints for post-election controls in case of alleged multiple voting. 
VADs verify the identity of the elector by reading the machine-readable zone (MRZ) 
of the identity document and comparing it with the electronic list of electors. Manual 
registration is foreseen for certain documents. In a next step, the VAD takes the fin-
gerprint. The VAD then prints a voting pass which enables the voter to register as 
voting by signing (on paper) next to his or her data in the column envisaged for it on 
the list of electors.  
It is to be noted at this juncture that the VADs are not connected to the internet. No 
data transfers, neither push nor pull, are done at any point during election day. The 
only data being sent happens after the election, whereby a scanned copy of the voters’ 
list, including voters’ signatures, is published on the CEC website. The possible con-
trol of the fingerprints entered in the system is done after the election, at the TEC 
level, by means of special software, in case of claims or disputes.  
From a technical perspective, the VADs access the voters’ data in the field by 
means of accessing a memory card which is prepopulated with the voters list. These 
memory cards are configured prior to the election and the data residing on the 
memory cards comes from the Central Voter Information System or commonly 
known as the CVIS. The CVIS is a web-based application which makes uses of sever-
al processes to prepare the master data files for each VAD. Once the master data file 
is prepared making use of a replicator the data files are replicated and distributed to 
the TECs and finally to the polling stations according to CEC processes. The CVIS is 
very relevant in this entire cycle as not only does it prepare the master memory cards, 
but also for the consolidation of data collected from polling stations VADs after the 
election. This data is used to analyze voter turnouts and to produce reports as required 
by the CEC. The CVIS is an indispensable component of the voter authentication 
system. Major developments of both VADs and CVIS depend on the provider where-
as the election administration oversees the rest. 
Internet voting. Internet voting is used in a very limited capacity. The small size of 
the country and of its population, and the fact that polling stations are located very 
near each other, may be a reason why there doesn’t seem to be demand for internet 
voting inside the country. The use of internet voting is however of interest to the Ar-
menian broad diaspora. The law on the election of the President of the Republic of 
− https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=23748&lang=en
− https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=25251&lang=en
8 See OSCE/ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report on parliamentary elections of 
Armenia of 2 april 2017, https://res.elections.am/images/doc/osce02.04.18_en.pdf 
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1996 provided for the first time the right of expatriates to vote from abroad.9 Initially 
voting from abroad took place in diplomatic and consular representations: first at the 
1996 election and then at the 1998 snap presidential election. In both cases it was 
considered successful.10 
The 2005 constitutional amendments, which allowed dual citizenship, abolished 
however the voting rights of the large diaspora. The Electoral Code adopted in 2011 
allowed voting from abroad only for citizens working in the diplomatic service in 
representations of Armenia abroad and members of their families residing abroad with 
them and having the right to vote as well as for a few other groups (the military, stu-
dents and employees of certain firms registered in Armenia).  
An internet voting system was introduced first at the parliamentary election of 6 
May 2011 and then at the presidential election of 18 February 2012.11 Noting that 
remote electronic voting is controversial, Venice Commission and OSCE/ODIHR 
have recommended that Armenian authorities carefully examine the need for Internet 
based voting against the alternative of organising polling stations at the consular of-
fices on election day for this small group of voters.12
Whereas the Electoral Code foresees the use of internet voting to enable several 
groups of Armenians living abroad to participate in elections of the National Assem-
bly (diplomatic and consular personal and their families, military, students, employees 
of certain firms registered in Armenia and located abroad, and members of their fami-
ly), in practice internet voting has only been offered to diplomats and their families. 
The organisation and duration of internet voting is regulated by the CEC through a 17 
June 2016 decision which establishes internet voting as an alternative channel, com-
plementary to voting in polling station. It is organised between the 9th and the 7th day 
before election day. According to the EC, the CEC is “obliged to establish such terms 
for electronic voting that would ensure free expression of the will of voters and secre-
cy of voting”. The decision clarifies questions related to the lists of electors and the 
generation, sending and handling of personal codes, in a secure manner. It stipulates 
that the vote should be secret, and the voter has the possibility to vote multiple times, 
the last vote cancelling the precedent one. The system notifies the voter that he/she 
voted. After the vote ends, members of CEC enter their individual codes in alphabeti-
cal order of their surnames and the system produces a protocol of voting results which 
is then signed by the members of CEC. Results are entered in the “Elections” auto-
mated system. Conditions for the invalidity of ballots are foreseen. Recounting is 
foreseen as being a “counting the results of electronic voting for the second time” 
9 Law on the Election of the President of the Republic of Armenia (adopted on April 30, 1996), 
Article 2, www.arlis.am. 
10 Some 15’000 Armenians abroad participated which attested of their great interest in the elec-
tion. See: Hamazasp Danielyan, “Internet voting in Armenia. Invisible Innovation Analysis” 
(in AM), https://www.osf.am/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Hamazasp_Danielyan_PP.pdf  
11 Ibid. Some 195 voters participated at the parliamentary election and 228 did so at the presi-
dential election. 
12 Venice Commission, OSCE/ODIHR, Joint final opinion on the Electoral Code of Arme-
nia, 26 May 2011 (CDL-AD(2011)032), 
https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2011)032-e 
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with the mandatory participation of CEC members and optional participation of ob-
servers, journalists, representatives of parties and the candidates. It should be impos-
sible to link the name of the voter and the vote, at the counting stage. The source code 
of the e-voting program is required to be published on the website of CEC. No infor-
mation is available on past controls of the source code and their conclusions.  
Other ICT-backed solutions used in elections. An automated system called “Elec-
tions” centralises information which feeds into the CEC website. It includes several 
stand-alone systems which “interact” with the CEC. Other ICT-backed solutions that 
aim at ensuring transparency include cameras that film participation as well as count-
ing and a live webcast feed on election day. These were successfully used in 2016 and 
continue to be used. Live feed transmissions are recorded on the central servers for 
the purpose of being used to assist the judiciary with solving possible claims or objec-
tions. Such transparency measures do not apply to some specific groups of voters (e.g. 
the military).  
Additionally, signed voters’ lists are published on the internet after the elections. 
These measures serve the same purpose as VADs: to prevent and detect fraud, multi-
ple voting and impersonation. However, they also raise questions of compliance. 
Namely the filming of participation and publication of handwritten signatures ques-
tion compliance with requirements on confidentiality and protection of personal data.  
E-identification and other e-government developments. In addition to ICT solu-
tions specific to elections, Armenia has been creating an ecosystem of web-based 
solutions for interactions between citizens and the administration.13 The Government 
has an agenda of digitalization of state procedures and public services. A new “Digi-
talization Strategy”, summarizing previous decisions, was adopted by the Government 
on 11 February 2021. Several Government decisions (e.g. 31.08.2015 № 1093-N, 
19.12.2019 № 1849-N, 25.05.2017 № 572-N and 26.12.2013 № 1521-N) introduce 
security, interoperability and other standards and requirements that are relevant for 
electronic information systems and web portals of state agencies.
Solutions for electronic identification have been available to Armenian citizens 
since 2009. The e-ID solution is foreseen for signing referendum demands, for in-
stance. To gain access to the e-ID, citizens need to have an ID card reader and special 
software installed on their PC, which are tedious and costly procedures. As a result, 
digital identification is usually used only if people are obliged to do so. Sometime 
both e-ID and hand signatures are possible. For example, the E-Request portal14 al-
lows people to apply to any state body electronically either by introducing a document 
signed by electronic signature or by providing a scanned copy of a paper document 
which is hand signed. In 2018, a Mobile ID solution was introduced, which makes 
digital identification and signing possible with a special USIM card inserted in the 
mobile phone. Work is ongoing on a smartphone software solution to enable the users 
of Android and iOS smartphones to sign documents, as well as to login and gain ac-
13 Several solutions exist already and can be accessed through the portal www.e-gov.am 
14 www.e-request.am 
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cess to e-services just by downloading an application and passing a registration pro-
cedure. No additional hardware would be needed, and the solution would be compli-
ant with the standards of security of the EU eIDAS regulation.  
Different distributed Armenian e-government public services are interconnected 
and exchange information via the Government Interoperability Platform (GIP) using 
secure means. A Governing Authority (EKENG) coordinates the GIP, creates and 
enforces standardized security policies and provides technical support to members of 
the governmental data exchange. The election management system and other election-
related ICT solutions are not part of the GIP though. 
1.4 Extending the use of ICT in elections 
The Government of the Republic of Armenia has a strong political will to strength-
en democratic processes and enhance the procedure and quality of the organization of 
elections. Both the Government and the Central Electoral Commission look with in-
terest in the possibility of moving more services to a digital technology platform, 
including online spaces, as part of the Government’s strategic planning. The COVID-
19 pandemic has strengthened such interest.  
The future of ICT use in elections is currently being studied. A big package of 
amendments to the Electoral Code was adopted in May 2021 (it did not apply to the 
election held on 20 June 2021). It addresses mainly past recommendations of interna-
tional organizations and observers over the years. Depending on the decisions to be 
taken on the future development of ICT solutions in elections, other important 
amendments of the EC are to be expected. 
The Electoral Code puts the use of ICT in elections under CEC responsibility. The 
EC currently enables the CEC to introduce e-voting and e-counting in small scale 
pilots during local elections. CEC is expressly enabled to organise and hold pilot pro-
jects involving ICT during elections of local self-government bodies (only) and at a 
small scale with no more than 2000 electors per community and no more than ten 
communities annually. Any use of e-voting and e-counting at a larger scale or during 
national elections or referendums, requires a specific legal mandate, which implies 
changes in the EC, whose modification should be endorsed by a qualified majority of 
the Parliament. 
The international community has been assisting Armenia with the strengthening of 
democratic institutions, including election administration and use of ICT in electoral 
processes. For instance, UNDP Armenia has been assisting with the introduction and 
development of ICT solutions for elections since 2016 when Armenia decided to in-
troduce Voter Authentication Devices (VADs) to assist in instilling more trust in the 
voting process. UNDP’s contribution extends to IT infrastructure, hardware compo-
nents, development and maintenance processes, professional trainings including an e-
Learning platform and a Training and Resource Centre as well as to long term strate-
gic planning at the CEC.  
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2 Trends and questions 
Armenia, like other countries, is in the process of expanding its e-governance foot-
print. Its electoral authorities continuously look at streamlining and implementing 
more effective and efficient mechanisms to enhance the various electoral processes 
for the stakeholders involved. Building on the current state of election technology 
systems used in the country, the electoral authorities wish to explore possible technol-
ogy solutions and systems which could be introduced in a structured manner in the 
future, and which would follow international standards and good practice. 
One of the developments envisaged by the authorities is the feasibility of introduc-
ing e-voting in polling stations and/or e-counting. In a first step, the authorities ponder 
the development and transformation of some of the VADs into electronic voting ma-
chines (EVMs). Alternatively, they consider the introduction of totally new EVMs 
and/or of e-counting technology. Additionally, complementing and upgrading the 
elements of the Elections management system is being envisaged. There are no plans 
about extending the use of internet voting.15 
When considering the further development of ICT in elections, several questions 
arise about both the current and the envisaged systems, including their purpose, their 
integration into the current election management system, their security, maintenance, 
development, and, finally, the sustainability of such developments. We present an 
overview of some of these questions which may present a general interest. Any de-
tailed study of the current and future development of ICT in elections requires com-
bined expertise from different fields, including electoral legislation, election admin-
istration, IT, socio-political aspects and international cooperation.  
2.1 VADs 
The Armenian CEC has opted to introduce a voter authentication device at polling 
stations in an attempt to reduce possible double voting as well as to strengthen the 
overall confidence in the elective process. From a purely technical perspective, while 
the idea was very sincere and the approach a step in the right direction, the question of 
what else could be done with this technology to further enhance and strengthen the 
process of voter authentication and ensure that it achieves the objective of reducing 
double voting begs.  
The VAD, in its current form, only scans and saves the voter’s fingerprint, doing 
no fingerprint algorithm validation/verification check on presented fingerprints. It can 
be argued that if biometric data is readily available, it could further be used to verify 
and validate voter data on the spot. This would not only deter people from taking the 
chance of defrauding the process but would certainly enhance the transparency aspect 
15 In the context of recent reflections about a possible extension of use of ICT solutions in elec-
tions, UNDP Armenia conducted a feasibility study “Innovative technologies for the elec-
toral process in Armenia” to assess and evaluate options of e-voting technologies, to identify 
international good practice and to discuss cases involving e-voting and other innovations, 
analyse pros and cons and propose solutions that best suit the needs and existing possibilities 
of the Republic of Armenia (see fn. 1).  
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of the elective process. By implementing a fingerprint analysis process brings to the 
fore the question relating to the possible centralising or de-centralising of voter data 
verifications and management thereof as well as related accuracy and security consid-
erations, among others.  
From a legal perspective, the VAD system is one of those “legacy systems” which 
despite being trusted and used through several elections, is not satisfactorily regulat-
ed. A closer look into the VAD regulation shows that it contains important gaps. It 
does not envisage the case of VAD malfunctioning or of erroneous answers provided 
by the voter authentication software. Legal provisions currently refer to a well-
functioning system, only. How to handle possible misfunctioning is not clear. Such 
gaps are problematic especially in countries like Armenia, where regulation is very 
detailed, and issues are treated in a very formalistic way: if a situation is not foreseen 
and dealt with in the electoral regulation, it may fall beyond the control of authorities. 
A better way of handling these situations could be for the regulation to establish ob-
jectives that a solution should fulfil (instead of attempting to regulate any possible 
issue) and for the competent authority (CEC, judge, etc.) to evaluate whether the solu-
tion fulfils the objectives, and do so most probably in cooperation with academia, 
experts, etc.  
VAD regulation does not address dispute settlement issues either. For instance, it is 
not clear what happens when a voter contests the “decision of the VAD”. This is a 
general preoccupation. Regulation of current and future ICT solutions should pay 
attention to dispute resolution mechanisms and remedies. These are even more im-
portant when the vast majority of people do not understand the technology solutions 
in place. It should be done in the light of the specific ICT solution and of the possi-
bilities of verification offered to voters and other stakeholders. Criminal sanctions 
may need to be further developed to address ICT-related violations. 
Another legal preoccupation with respect to VADs is the lack of a clear definition 
of competences of the various state bodies involved in the collection, storage, and use 
of personal data, including biometric ones like the fingerprints or the voters’ signa-
tures. 
Yet another issue is the publication, at the end, of sensitive data on the web. In this 
case, it’s the lists of voters which includes voters’ hand-written signatures which is 
made public, for transparency purposes. Although such publication is quite specific to 
Armenia, it points to a general tension that exists between requirements of transparen-
cy and publicity on one side and those of confidentiality of participation and of the 
signature on the other. In the case of Armenia, international observers have repeatedly 
noted that the publication of voters’ signatures is at odds with commonly shared prin-
ciples of confidentiality and secrecy. Yet, in Armenia, such publication is considered 
to be an efficient measure for discouraging and discovering potential fraud in partici-
pation.  
2.2 Internet voting 
Internet voting in the context of a parliamentary election in Armenia is only of-
fered to diplomats and their families. Technically, the capabilities to make use of this 
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technology on a larger scale which meets all legal requirements are not available in 
Armenia. The long list of high-risk technical issues surrounding internet voting often 
sees EMB’s shy away from it. There are many technical and nontechnical issues sur-
rounding its use and most of these issues are so high risk that it is not worth deploying 
in fear of systems being compromised. The overall sentiment is that internet voting 
cannot be trusted. The issue of data and system security seems to be the top preoccu-
pation.  
If it were that internet voting was being considered, what are some of the more se-
rious technical points that should be addressed as a minimum? Addressing security by 
adopting a strategy that considers cybersecurity in totality is an important point. En-
suring that the technology meets all legal, operational and system requirements is 
another one. The adoption and implementation of industry accepted failover technol-
ogy systems and strategies, the inclusion of intelligent technology systems to monitor 
integrated internet data, system and services, the inclusion of defined system proto-
cols that ensure good ICT governance and ensuring that ICT in the organisation drives 
the overall internet data, system and services in accordance with all provisioned direc-
tives are other important points to consider. 
From a legal perspective, it is to be noted that the Armenian current regulation of 
the limited use of internet voting remains quite high-level, which is problematic be-
cause it lacks detailed requirements on how the general principles can be implement-
ed and respected by the internet voting system. Additionally, internet voting regula-
tion contains no provision on control of compliance of the system with the require-
ments. The consequences of non-compliance are not discussed either. There is how-
ever a detailed provision on multiple voting which is introduced as a mitigation to 
potential coercion and violation of secrecy as internet voting takes place from an un-
controlled environment. 
Another observation is that the development of internet voting in Armenia illus-
trates the tension between universality and equality on one side and security on the 
other. By enabling a limited group of electors (diplomats) to vote through the internet 
voting channel (the limitation to this small group being a risk management/security 
measure), the competent authorities treat unequally electors who are in the same situa-
tion (military, students, etc. living abroad) but who, unlike diplomats, are offered no 
effective voting channel.  
2.3 Electronic voting and counting machines 
Technology solutions in Armenia are increasingly being architected, designed, and 
implemented into current elective processes and procedures as the authorities realise 
that technology can play a big part in the process, from online training services to 
electronic voting systems.  
The idea of implementing a centralised elections solution with the deployment of 
electronic voting systems has been analysed and documented as part of a feasibility 
study that was conducted by UNDP.16 The CEC and other stakeholders are interested 
16 See fn.1 
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in looking at the viability of transforming VADs into EVMs and at testing e-voting on 
EVMs. A possible ICT roadmap to follow would be one that defines a strategy that 
would see the CEC make use of a redesignated VAD into a EVM, testing the concept 
and then defining a longer terms strategy which could either see a completely differ-
ent technology approach being followed or one that makes use of redesignated VADs.  
The key technical points that must be reviewed when looking at implementing 
electronic voting machines include the following. It is always important to define all 
the technical requirements of the device in line with the legal directives. In the Coun-
cil of Europe region, the acceptance of EVMs is increasingly linked to the level of 
verifiability that they offer. One must ensure that the technology stack of the device 
meets all the technical requirements – including but not limited to system security, 
device security, system and user interaction, ease of use, technical support, and avail-
ability thereof etc. The technology should be sustainable: the EMB must implement a 
technology which can be internally supported after the initial implementation for a 
sustained period. The technology must fit in with the defined technology roadmap (if 
a defined technology roadmap is not available the EMB must define one). The overall 
technology used and that which governs/enables it must be tested and meet the basic 
technology best practices and standards that are globally excepted. A defined techno-
logical methodology (ITIL as an example) must be used to implement the system or 
any system related changes. Upskilling maybe necessary if new technologies are im-
plemented. This is important when knowledge transferring takes place. 
Additionally, the Armenian case shows that authorities should be clear about the 
needs that are being addressed by new ICT. For instance, the use of EVMs alone can-
not control that a person votes only once, which seems to be one of the main preoccu-
pations in Armenia. More generally, technology alone cannot help to solve trust is-
sues: indeed, trust in the electoral authorities is a precondition to introducing and 
developing e-voting solutions; technology is by no means a ‘silver bullet’ Technology 
must be seen in the context of a mechanism which is introduced to solve problems not 
create them. While the use of technology helps to assist in elections, it still needs to 
be governed. 
2.4 Centralised Elections System 
Centralised Elections Systems can range from centralised or clustered systems, 
services or databases. Centralised systems for the most part help when consolidation 
of services, data or overall ICT outputs such as reports need to be done at a central 
level, whether to save costs or to manage resources as an example. In the case of the 
Armenian CEC, all ICT activities and outputs are done at a central level in Yerevan. 
No decentralised ICT activities happen outside of Yerevan as the CEC has limited 
ICT resources available. Should the CEC be looking at centralising systems, what 
should they maintain as a standard? 
When looking at developing or implementing centralised solutions, the EMB must 
be skilled enough to support such solutions. The ICT maturity level within the EMB 
must be high, ensuring that they can support the operational environment without 
compromising any of the processes.  
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Strategic developments must be aligned to the overall strategy of the EMB. Sys-
tems that are developed or implemented must take all aspects of ICT good govern-
ance, security, system failover, networking etc into consideration. All associated sys-
tems which are integrated or are going to be integrated must be compatible, flexible, 
and sustainable. Cross platform friendly base must be identified and developed or 
implemented. 
A clean design methodology must part of any solutions being developed or pur-
chased. The last thing one wants is to develop an entire centralised solution/system 
only to learn afterwards that the database that was chosen is not easily integrated into 
other databases.  
2.5 E-government solutions
Armenia has developed a number of innovative e-gov systems and solutions, which 
have assisted in many different aspects of life in Armenia. The data produced within 
the various civils systems can be and is in some instances consumed by other gov-
ernment institutions. One of these institutions is the CEC. The CEC relies on another 
state institution to provide it with the voters’ roll and associated data.  
Those EMBs that rely on other institutions to provide information or data such as is 
the case with CEC must always ensure that they are acting in line with directives spe-
cific to the EMB. The EMB must have ICT processes and procedures in place to veri-
fy and validate information and data which is provided by other sources. 
The EMB should define a sound ICT good governance structure and ensure that in-
stitutions that are sources of information or data comply with the structures. Struc-
tured processes in the institutions that provide information and data to EMBs must be 
enforced. The EMB should be entitled to be part of all information or data sharing 
between the various institutions. The EMB should have the ability to enforce best 
practices and good ICT governance processes within institutions that deliver services 
to it. This is important when it comes to ensuring transparency of any elective pro-
cess. 
2.6 June 2021 snap elections under COVID 
Use of ICT has been considered in the context of health restrictions related to the 
COVID19 pandemic as the June 2021 snap elections were held under such re-
strictions. However, no changes in technology were introduced and social distancing, 
mask wearing, and hand and surfaces sanitization were privileged. 
At the beginning of the COVID pandemic the state of emergency was declared by 
Decree of the Government on 16 March 2020, initially for the duration of 30 days,17 
subsequently prolonged until 11 September 202018 and validated by the National As-
sembly. In particular, the following restrictions to fundamental rights, relevant for 




and of the press (later repealed). There were also restrictions on economic activities. 
In August and September 2020, restrictions were softened. The National Assembly 
introduced new amendments to the laws on Protection of Population in Emergency 
Situations and Provision of Sanitary-Epidemiological Security of the Population of 
Republic of Armenia which allowed for appropriate measures against COVID-19 
without declaring the state of emergency. On 11 September the state of emergency 
was not prolonged and thus terminated. 
By Decision no. 1514, the Government declared quarantine on 11 September 2020 
for four months, until January 2021 and then extended it to 11 July 2021. The quaran-
tine decision is a prerogative of the Government, which does not have to be approved 
by the National Assembly. Government’s decision no. 1514 was completed by a de-
cree of the Ministry of Health. Government’s decision no. 1514 prescribes the use of 
personal protective equipment (PPE). The exact kind of PPE is foreseen by the De-
cree no. 23 of Minister of Health, adopted on 11 September 2020. Other restrictions 
introduced by Government’s decision no. 1514 relate to travelling to and from Arme-
nia, to some restrictions in penitentiary bodies, schools, army.  
The legal regimes of state of emergency and of quarantine have different conse-
quences on elections. Whereas holding elections or referendums is prohibited during 
the state of emergency or martial law, the quarantine regime allows holding elections 
or referendums. However, it introduces new rules which may affect electoral rights 
such as the wearing of masks in closed places or keeping physical distance of at least 
1.5 meters and wearing masks during assemblies. 
The very detailed nature of the Electoral Code which regulates the tasks of CEC 
and its room for manoeuvre suggests that the CEC’s mandate to ensure the exercise of 
the right of suffrage does not enable the CEC to introduce new modalities that are not 
expressly foreseen in the EC. The application of quarantine related measures to re-
strict electoral rights is subject to a legal basis approved by Parliament. Furthermore, 
any new usage of ICT (e.g. to mitigate COVID related risks) would require the CEC 
to obtain a clear legal mandate for that. 
June 2021 elections were held under COVID. The restrictions were maintained 
during the election process but were largely ignored during the pre-election phase, 
also by the candidates. The situation was different on election day. Entering the poll-
ing station was allowed only with wearing masks and if a voter didn’t have a mask, 
the commission was providing it. The commission, observers, party and candidates’ 
agents and journalists were strictly wearing masks inside the polling station. There 
were sanitizers inside the polling stations. The VAD’s were being cleaned with spe-
cial sanitizers the water content of which was low, to prevent water ingression of the 
scanner. There was no use of pen or other device to write on the ballot because the 
voter was given separate ballots for each nominated party and could vote by putting 
the ballot of the chosen party in the envelope. Eventually, election day activities had 
no significant influence on the pandemic situation, as showed by the statistics pub-
lished by the Ministry of Health of Armenia.19 
19 https://ncdc.am/coronavirus/confirmed-cases-by-days/ 
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3 Final remarks 
We conclude with a few general suggestions for situations where modernisation of 
electoral processes through increased use of ICT-backed solutions is considered. 
The will of the authorities to modernise the electoral system does not remove the 
necessary identification of the actual needs of stakeholders, including of specific 
groups of voters (women, the sight-impaired, the expatriates), of staff, observers, 
parties, etc. The development of ICT should be needs-oriented and not an end. Identi-
fied needs should be carefully considered and addressed already during the design 
phase of the ICT solutions.  
Legal regulation should be the driving force behind the use and development of 
ICT (and of any other solution) in elections. Legislation should dictate the values that 
ICT must respect, not the other way around. However, this is a challenge, in any 
country. Solving it requires, first, clarity about all legal principles that apply to elec-
tions, including but not limited to the right to universal, equal, free, direct and secret 
suffrage, periodic elections and publicity of elections as well as national or local prin-
ciples. Second, it requires detailed requirements that ensure respect for the principles. 
Such requirements represent as many objectives that any solution used in elections, 
including ICT ones, must fulfil. Finally, it requires a good understanding of other 
requirements, coming from “outside” the traditional electoral legislation field, which 
are important when ICT is used. These include data protection, information and sys-
tem security or cybersecurity, or international cooperation in fighting cybercrime 
requirements, among others.  
In order to build a sound regulatory framework that guides the development of ICT 
in elections, recommendations from international bodies may be useful. These include 
the Council of Europe Recommendation CM/Rec(2017)5 on standards for e-voting 
and its accompanying documents, the OSCE/ODIHR Handbook for the observation of 
new voting technologies or the Council of Europe guidance documents on the appli-
cation of the Budapest Convention on cybercrime and of the Convention 108+ on data 
protection to elections as well as European Union guidance documents on the applica-
tion of the GDPR to elections. 
The envisaged extension of use of ICT offers the opportunity to also evaluate and 
improve the regulation of existing “legacy” systems.  
When implementing any new technologies, it is advisable to ensure that the EMB 
is not vendor locked, that knowledge transfer continually takes place and that support 
contracts and any other contracts are well defined. 
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Motivation: A Risk-limiting audit (RLA) [2] is a post-election auditing
technique that is gaining increasing popularity, because it can automatically
correct a wrong election outcome, while being very efficient especially if the
margins are wide. The purpose of RLAs has been to strengthen public confidence
in the election, first, because they can be integrated into existing election processes,
for example, in Denmark, where the result of the first (rough) count can be verified
during the second (fine) count [3]. Second, some of the ceremonies surrounding
RLAs can be turned into public events, such as the dice-rolling ceremony used
to create entropy to select a random sample.
The question, however, remains open, whether RLAs really strengthen public
confidence. While the theory behind the audits is sound, the resulting sample
size is often very small (e.g. 523 ballots audited in an RLA given a total of
393,826 cast votes in the 2020 election in Denver, Colorado). Thus it remains an
open question whether the voters would find an audit with such a sample size
convincing or not.
Method: To answer the research question if RLAs really strengthen public
confidence in the outcome of an election, we conducted a user study with 105
randomly chosen US residents across all demographics using the Prolific platform.
We study several hypothesis, most importantly:1:
H1,1 When asked about their opinions about which number of ballots should be
selected for auditing, the participants provide a number higher than the one
prescribed by the RLA methodology.
H1,2 Participants’ confidence in the audit results changes when they are informed
about the number of ballots selected for auditing
Results: When asked which number of ballots the participants would prefer
to be audited, this number tended to be magnitudes higher than the actual
number required by the RLA for most of the participants (see Figure 1). The sign
test has confirmed that the difference between preferred and actual number of
ballots is significantly different from zero (p < .001, 95% CI for median difference
between preferred and actual ballots (as percentage of total ballots) is [3.23%,
16.1%]), thus, H1,1 is confirmed.
While the majority of the participants (70%, 74 out of 105) had a positive
attitude towards conducting RLAs, choosing either “maybe yes” or “definitely
1 For a more detailed description of the methodology and the rest of tested hypotheses
and conducted analyses, see the extended version of the paper [1]
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yes” as the answer to the question whether their confidence in the election result
would increase after an RLA, only 44% provided a positive answer to the same
question asked after presenting the number of audited ballots to the participants.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of changes of participants’ answers. The Wilcoxon
signed-rank test shows a significant difference between the “before” and “after”
answers (p < .001, Z = −4.47, effect size r = .33, moderate), thus, H1,2 is
confirmed.
Fig. 1: Left: Preferred vs. actual number audited ballots (as percentage of total
ballots) depending on the margin. The scale is logarithmic. Right: Percentage of
participants for each case of confidence change.
Conclusion: We recognize the value of RLAs in confirming the integrity of
the election result. However, our results show that as a measure to create trust,
they are not sufficient by themselves, and additional measures such as voter
education need to be considered. While this study is the first one to investigate
this issue, follow-up work is needed to better understand the factors influencing
voter’s trust and the effectiveness of various ways one can educate voters about
RLAs or raise trust via other measures.
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in risk-limiting audits. https://arxiv.org/abs/2109.07918, 2021.
2. Mark Lindeman and Philip B. Stark. A gentle introduction to risk-limiting audits.
IEEE Security & Privacy, 10(5):42–49, 2012.
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Abstract. In this paper we propose the usage of QR-Codes to enable
usable verifiable e-voting schemes based on code voting. The idea – from a
voter’s perspective – is to combine code voting proposed by Chaum with
the cast-as-intended verification mechanism used e.g. in Switzerland (using
a personal initialization code, return codes per option, a confirmation code
and a finalisation code); while all codes to be entered into the e-voting
system by voters are available as QR-Code (i.e. one personalised QR
voting code per voting option and one personal confirmation QR-Code).
We conduct a user study to evaluate the usability and user experience
of such an approach: both the code sheets and the election webpage are
based on usability research in this area but adopted for our idea. As
our proposal performs good wrt. usability, we discuss how such usable
front-ends enable more secure e-voting systems in respect to end-to-end
verifiability and vote secrecy.
1 Introduction
Developing e-voting systems with high level of security using non trustworthy
voting clients (i.e. malware infected voting machine or personal computer equip-
ment in case of remote e-voting) is very delicate and existing proposals come
with severe usability challenges. In the most recent past, this challenge – both
in academia as well as in conducting e-elections – was addressed with respect
to vote integrity. Several cast-as-intended verification methods have been pro-
posed to allow voters themselves to perform checks to verify that their vote has
not been manipulated; in particular that it has not been manipulated by their
compromised voting component. There are different schemes depending on the
accepted trust assumptions: e.g. methods involving return codes and rely on
trust in the postal service e.g. as used in Switzerland [1] or methods involving
a second hardware device and rely on trust in the independence of this device
from the device used to cast the vote, e.g. as used in Estonia [32]. The proposed
and applied cast-as-intended verification methods require additional involvement
from the voter. This involvement comes with usability challenges addressed in
various user centered research investigations and user studies – see e.g. [4,8]. One
well studied cast-as-intended verification method is the one based on return codes
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as it is used by the Swiss Post voting system in Switzerland. User studies and
improved voting materials and interfaces were studied e.g. in [17,22]. In particular
with the improvements of [17, 22], this method is – both from a security (wrt.
to integrity) and a usability point of view – very promising. From a usability
point of view the most challenging and error prone task is that voters need to
manually enter the initialisation code and the confirmation code provided on the
voting material (the personal paper code sheet) they receive via postal service.
This method (like other cast-as-intended verification methods) has one major
drawback: untrustworthy voting clients can violate vote secrecy. To address vote
secrecy although the voting client is not trustworthy, the code voting approach
has initially been coined by David Chaum in 2001 [9] and was re-addressed
in [28]. The idea of code voting is that voters enter a secret, individual code that
corresponds to their desired option on their personal paper code sheet. However,
combining both approaches, i.e. the return code approach as discussed in [17, 22]
with code voting seems not worth considering as the number of error-prone voter
tasks increases. Thus, researchers may not consider developing a corresponding
voting protocol as it is likely to not be usable.
But what if – and this is our main idea – the codes are included in QR-
Codes. Thereby, the task of entering codes becomes less error-prone and the
number of interactions can be reduced as the QR-Code can contain more than
one of the originally needed codes. We show how voting material could look
like for such voting schemes and that it enables usable vote casting and usable
verifying. Thereby, we enable new (more robust) types of usable verifiable code
voting schemes and invite the community to propose corresponding secure voting
protocols using the possibility to provide cryptographic data, even e.g. zero
knowledge proofs, in the QR-Codes. Thus, our contributions are as follows:
– An extension of the code sheet and voting webpage of [17] to enable QR-Code
based voting codes and confirmation codes.
– A user study to evaluate the usability of our code sheet and voting webpage.
– A discussion of opportunities for more secure voting protocols with our idea.
The approach that we take differs from how usability concerns are commonly
incorporated into the design of secure voting systems: So far, many voting
protocols were proposed and then invite the community to design voting material
and election webpages being as usable as possible with the given protocol. With
this paper, we provide usable front-ends for a verifiable secrecy-preserving e-voting
system and invite the community to propose adequate protocols.
2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we first explain the concepts necessary to understand the verifiable
code voting ceremony considered in this paper. Afterwards, we discuss related
work, i.e. research on the usability of verifiable voting as well as on code voting.
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2.1 Background
Verifiable Voting in General. Verifiability in the context of e-voting is no
issue, as long as voter privacy is not a requirement. Every voter can verify using
public data, if their intention is reflected in the final tally. This can be as simple
as checking if the voter’s name is alongside the clear-text vote and the sum of all
votes match the tally. If, however, voter privacy is a requirement, a more complex
process has to be established in order to provide vote secrecy and verifiability
at the same time. In this case, verifiability splits in two parts, i.e. individual
verifiability and universal verifiability. Universal verifiability can be delegated
to any public entity and provides strong proof whether the final tally has been
correctly derived from the recorded votes. Individual verifiability on the other
hand can only be conducted by the individual voters themselves as only they know
their true intention. Individual verifiability provides a strong proof to the verifying
voter whether their intention is contained in the cast ballot (cast-as-intended)
and if the recorded ballot corresponds to the cast ballot (recorded-as-cast). This
way, the verification is complete, from the voter’s intention to the final tally, and
hence is called end-to-end verification.
Security Model. For an end-to-end verifiable e-voting system offering vote
secrecy, its soundness is based on trust and computational intractability assump-
tions. The soundness of the end-to-end verifiable voting scheme is strengthened if
it operates within minimal trust assumptions. This includes that no unbeknownst
manipulation is possible while a minimal defined subset of entities is working
honestly, whereas entities can be devices and people. The scheme should also
not provide any single entity the capability to break secrecy. However, many
proposals rely on the trustworthiness of the voting device when it comes to vote
secrecy.
Verifiable Voting using Return/Confirmation/Finalisation Codes.
There are various approaches with different trust assumptions. Our paper focuses
on the approach used in Switzerland and as required in [1]: Voters receive their
individual code sheet via postal service, containing one initialisation code, return
codes for each voting option, one confirmation code, and one finalisation code.
Voters enter their initialisation code on the election webpage and then select their
voting option using the election webpage. Afterwards, they receive a return code
which voters are supposed to compare with the one next to their voting option
on the code sheet. If the return code is correct, the voter confirms its correctness
by entering the confirmation code. If the return code is incorrect, the voter is
supposed to vote via an alternative voting channel (postal or in person). Finally,
voters receive a finalisation code which should match the one on their code sheet,
as an assurance that their ballot has been recorded. The return code would be
enough to verify, however, from an organisational perspective it is recommended
to have the additional two steps and codes respectively in order to have a chance
to react to complaining voters. According to the requirements in [1] and the
voting material in [17], the initialisation and the confirmation code are very long
(more than 20 digits). The finalisation code should consist of 8 digits (0-9) and
the return code of 4 digits.
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Usability Considerations. In terms of the ability to cast a vote the most
error-prone task is to enter the initialisation code and then the confirmation
code.
Security Model. According to the general idea of verifiable voting, no single
entity should be able to break vote integrity. In particular, the voting client is
considered untrustworthy. Hence, the voting scheme must ensure detection of any
malicious vote manipulation. However, it is worth mentioning that a malicious
online collusion of the voting client with the printer used to print the voting
material or the postal service could break vote integrity. Hence, it is usually
recommended to operate the printer offline. This way, the trust assumption
remains that the postal service is working highly distributed and thus is more
difficult to abuse for large scale attacks.
Code Voting. Code voting has one goal: The human at the far end of the
e-voting system shall be enabled to provide a vote in privacy even though its
voting client is controlled by malware targeting vote secrecy. The general idea
from the voter’s perspective is as follows: The voter is provided with a unique
code sheet via a trusted secure channel and is supposed to enter the voting code
representing their chosen option via the insecure voting client.
Usability Considerations. Very short voting codes may be usable. However,
they are problematic from a security and operational perspective. Namely, the
minimum length of the unique voting code grows fast as it depends on the size
of the electorate times the number of voting options. As such, in many elections
with larger electorate or with larger number of voting options, four digits are
insufficient and longer codes are required in order to discriminate each eligible
vote cast. This problem usually is addressed by more complex system settings,
multiplexing different code semantics, e.g. voting card identifier and voting code.
From a usability perspective this results in either entering a longer code per
voting option or in entering multiple codes (e.g. voting-card number and voting
option).
Security Model. Only a minimum subset of entities should be required to
work truly honest in order to guarantee vote secrecy. In particular, the voting
client is assumed not being trustworthy in any aspect. Again, the voting scheme
must ensure vote privacy at this point. This is where Code Voting is at its best.
However, as already mentioned in section 2.1 the printer used to print the voting
material or the postal service could break vote secrecy together with the voting
client.4 Furthermore, a malicious printer could manipulate the QR codes leading
to a variety of attacks, such as leading the voter to a malicious website. Our
security model therefore assumes that the printed material is trustworthy, which
can be ensured e.g. via proper audits before the materials are distributed to the
voters.
Extending code voting. Note that there exist code voting proposals such
as [9, 13] which provide somewhat verifiability. Somewhat, because they only
address the (potentially) untrustworthy voting client while the overall soundness
4 Even if a malicious printer operates offline, it can insert subliminal messages for
malicious voting clients.
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relies on too many trust assumptions at the server-side. The proposal by Rui et.
al [14] is end-to-end verifiable and uses code voting but the election server must
be ultimately trusted for vote secrecy. This trust setting is not acceptable within
our security model. The proposal by Neumann et. al [24] lacks robustness as
the authorities are oblivious to any malicious voter attacking the system during
election phase. By sending different codes to the individual authorities, this rather
simple attack results in inconsistent counting results.
2.2 Related Work
In this subsection, we review related research, i.e. user studies on verifiable
electronic voting systems: researchers have explored various human factor related
dimensions of verifiable electronic voting systems, including research on voters’
mental models regarding verifiability in (electronic) voting and usability of
verifiable voting systems.
A number of studies have explored voters’ verification-related mental models
[25,26,29] and revealed a number of factors that would potentially prevent voters
from verifying, such as a lack of verification-related knowledge, effort required to
verify, and verification-related misconceptions. These factors need to be addressed
when introducing verifiable electronic voting systems.
Other human factor related electronic voting research focused on usability of
verifiable electronic voting systems. As such, a number of them evaluated user
experience and voter satisfaction in these system, e.g. [10, 11, 16, 18, 19, 27, 33].
While some studies reported high users satisfaction scores related to the voting
activity, others uncovered usability issues. In particular, a study into usability
issues of the Norwegian Internet voting system [11], which relies on a code-based
verification, identified a lack of understandability wrt. the different codes used by
the system and needed to cast / verify a vote. Distler et al. [10] investigated the
user experience of the Selene voting system, which uses code-based verification.
They reported participants feeling less secure after verifying than before.
Other works measure the effectiveness of verification, e.g. for Prêt à Voter and
Scantegrity II in [2,3], for BingoVote in [6], for StarVote in [4], for EasyVote in [8],
for Helios Internet voting system in [2, 15, 20, 31]. Some reported high rates of
verification effectiveness [4, 8], others reported several issues [2, 3, 6, 20] including
verification misconceptions, which resulted in participants being unable to verify
their votes successfully. Note that some of these schemes were developed using a
human-centered security approach. Therefore the high effectiveness rate is not
too surprising. It shows once more, how important it is to take this approach
when developing complex systems such as verifiable electronic voting systems.
Several of such works focused on the effectiveness of code-based verification, for
Estonian voting system in [12], for the Swiss voting system in [17] and for a mock
system with code-based verification in [23]. In particular, the results in [12,17]
show that voters have difficulties with detecting manipulations if the adversary
manages to tamper with the flow of the verification process, e.g. by removing
the verification code and all mentions of it from the user interface of the voting
wegpage. Marky et al. [22] furthermore propose an improvement towards the
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interface of the Swiss voting system that uses code-based verification, showing
high verification effectiveness as the result of the improvement.
Most relevant for our current work is the work by Kulyk et al. [17], which
proposed and evaluated modifications towards the Swiss voting system [1], show-
ing that while a high percentage of participants were not able to detect vote
manipulations introduced in the study using the original system, manipulation
detection was improved in the modified version.
Furthermore, there is work on the usability of code voting : Marky et al. [21]
investigated the usability of code voting, comparing different code modalities.
While the authors in [21] only used QR-Codes to include 8-digit voting codes,
they showed that using QR-Codes to enter the voting code is perceived as more
usable than manually entering the 8-digit voting code. Thus, their results serve
as basis for our research. The usability and acceptance of code voting as well as
code-based verification including voting codes was also evaluated in [16]. This
study reported that participants were more willing to use a system with the
highest security assurance in a real-world election, even if it was less usable,
which is likely given the complexity of entering and comparing different codes.
3 Voting Ceremony and Voters’ Voting Material
The goal of this section is to introduce and explain our design process as well as
our design decisions. Note that for this paper, our focus is on typical Swiss voting
events, e.g., popular initiatives, referenda, i.e. one question with four options:
yes/no/invalid/abstain. We discuss other election types in the discussion section.
3.1 Combining Code Voting with Verifiable Voting using
Return/Confirmation/Finalisation Codes
For this paper, we consider a combination of code voting with individual verifia-
bility proposals using return codes, confirmation codes and finalisation codes as
used in Switzerland [1]. For such a protocol the voting ceremony is likely to be as
follows: voters receive their individual voting material via postal service. Voters
choose their desired option and their corresponding voting code. Voters enter this
code in the voting equipment as depicted in fig. 1a. The device sends that code
to the server side of the voting system. The server side responds to that voting
code by sending back an according return code, depicted in fig. 1b. Voters can
then verify by comparing the return code with the one that is provided for that
specific option. In case the codes do not match, voters stop the voting process and
report to the election management board (EMB). If, however, the return codes
match, voters confirm the correct ballot casting by entering the confirmation
code (see fig. 1c). The server side then acts again by returning the finalization
code (see fig. 1d). If the code is wrong, voters report to the EMB. If it is correct,
the vote casting process is finished and voters can be ensured that their vote has
been cast-as-intended and recoreded-as-cast.
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(a) Voting code is entered. (b) Return code is checked.
(c) Confirmation code is entered. (d) Finalization code is checked.
Fig. 1: Abstract Voting Ceremony
3.2 Design Decisions
Usage of QR-Codes and Smartphones. As described in the usability part of sec-
tion 2.1 the length of the voting codes (or the need to have a voting card identifier
plus voting codes) to enter directly depends on the size of the electorate times
the number of voting options. To address these shortcomings and to enable
more types of election settings for code voting, we propose that voters use their
camera-equipped computer device, i.e. most likely smartphones, to cast a vote,
as nowadays smartphones are capable to scan QR-Codes. Thus, both the voting
codes and the confirmation code are provided as QR-Codes. Note that the ini-
tialisation code from the original Swiss approach as such is not needed anymore.
The corresponding information is part of the voting code.
Election Webpage instead of App. In order to ensure cross-platform reach,
we enable vote casting and verifying through a webpage which is accessible in
common mobile browsers, instead of implementing it as an actual app.
Voting material from [17] and not [22]. As described in section 2.2, some
research on the usability of voting materials using code-based verification exists
already. In particular, the approaches from [17, 22] take the voting material
used in Switzerland (for the return code approach) and improve its usability.
The proposed improvements are furthermore evaluated with regard to usability
as well as the ability of voters to detect election fraud. Both approaches to
improve the Swiss voting material are very similar as they change the design
to a more step-by-step instruction. Both studied the effectiveness wrt. voter’s
ability to detect various types of manipulations. Regarding simple manipulations,
both improvements enabled all participants to detect them. A more advanced
manipulation was only tested in [17]. While not all participants detected this
advanced manipulation, the results were promising. Furthermore, the authors
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conclude with proposals how to further improve the voting material to increase
this detection rate. Therefore, we decided to base the voting material for our
research on the proposal of [17] and try to address their proposals on how to
further improve it. In particular, their results highlighted the importance of clearly
defined voting steps; at the same time, it was shown that the voters primarily
pay attention to the voting webpage rather than the voting sheet, which could be
a problem if the voting client is compromised. For the latter reason we decided
to design the webpage with only the minimal required information and controls;
not distracting the voters from the voting sheet which is supposed to be their
main source of instructions.
3.3 Security Considerations
In order to adopt the voting material from [17] for our purpose, i.e. for verifiable
code voting, we first collected security requirements for the voting material. In
particular, as the voting client is assumed to be malicious (see section 2.1), one
would need to take into account the different possibilities in which a malicious
smartphone could try to record everything with the camera, even without the
voter granting permission. Based on that consideration, we came up with the
following list of design requirements relevant to security:
– The smartphone, i.e. the camera of the smartphone, should never get knowl-
edge about the voting options and the corresponding return codes [S0].
– The smartphone, i.e. the camera of the smartphone, should only get access
to the voting code belonging to the option the voter wants to cast [S1].
– The smartphone should only have access to the confirmation code if the
return code displayed on the screen of the smartphone is correct [S2].
– The smartphone should only have access to the finalisation code from the
voting material after it is displayed on the screen of the smartphone [S3].
The aforementioned requirements, are addressed by the following proposals:
– There is one voting card per voting option. It shows on one side the option and
the corresponding return code; and on the opposite side the corresponding
voting code. Thus, in total there are four different voting cards for the election
type we consider. This is required to address [S0, S1].
– The instructions in the voting material start with selecting the voting card
and returning the voting cards not needed back into the envelope. Note that
the election webpage has not yet been contacted nor were voters instructed
to use their smartphone. This is required to address [S1].
– The instructions in the voting material afterwards state that voters should
place the selected voting card on a specific area in the voting material while
having the voting code visible but not the return code. Note that the voters
were still not instructed to use their smartphone or even open the election
webpage. This is required to address [S1].
– The voting material is delivered in form of a leaflet – meaning that in the
inner part of the leaflet voters find the first instructions but only until the
344
Usable Verifiable Secrecy-Preserving E-Voting 9
step in which they should check the return code. They are only asked to
continue to the next and last page if the return code matches. This is required
to address [S2].
– The voting material should hide the finalisation code under a scratch field.
This is required to address [S3] as the finalisation code and the confirmation
code are on the same side of the page.
3.4 Final Voting Material
The voting material and the election webpage have been developed and iteratively
improved through feedback. The final version of the voting material is depicted
in fig. 2 (voting cards). [17] also includes a proposal for how to improve the
election webpage. However, as we wanted to display it only on a mobile device
and most likely a smartphone, we decided to keep it as simple as possible and
thus reducing any information on the election webpage to the bare minimum.
Another reason for such a minimalistic approach is derived from the findings
from previous research [17], namely, the need to ensure that the voters follow
the instructions on their trustworthy voting materials and are not distracted by
instructions on the untrustworthy voting wegpage that might be manipulated by
the attacker. The final version of the election webpage interfaces is depicted in
fig. 4 and the voting card in fig. 3.
4 User Study
The purpose of the user study is to evaluate our proposed design for the voting
materials. We want to answer the following research questions:
Effectiveness: Can voters successfully cast and verify their vote using the
proposed system?
Satisfaction: What is the mean System Usability Scale (SUS) [5] score of the
system?
In addition to these questions, we apply the modular User Experience Ques-
tionnaire [30] in order to measure the participants’ impression of the proposed
system wrt. perceived efficiency5, perceived perspicuity, perceived dependability,
and trust. We furthermore aimed to collect qualitative user feedback, in order to
identify problems and potential improvements.
4.1 Study procedure
Before the actual study, participants received the voting materials as well as
supplementary materials either via postal service or if possible in person from one
5 Note thatas opposed to efficiency as one of the three standard usability criteria, the
UEQ measures the subjective impression of whether the system feels efficient to the
user, as opposed to an objective measuring of e.g. time spent on using the system
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Fig. 2: Voting instructions
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Fig. 3: Voting Card (front and back side)
(a) Step 2 (b) Step 3 (c) Step 4
(d) Step 5a) (e) Step 5b) (f) Step 6
Fig. 4: Voting webpage
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of the authors. The supplementary materials include a description of the purpose
of the study and the study procedure as well as a role card. In the role card,
participants were told to imagine that they are voters living in Bern who want to
cast their vote with regards to a mock popular initiative “For responsible business
in protection of people and the environment”, with “yes/no/invalid/abstain” as
available voting options. For the sake of the study, the participants were asked
in the role card to cast their vote for a “yes” option. The participants were
given a time frame of nine days during which they could cast a vote remotely
and participate in the user study. For this study, the prototype webpage was
developed and hosted on the “2021.wahlwebseite.de”domain and the support
phone number on the voting material was the mobile phone number of one of
the authors. Once participants cast their vote, the webpage provided a link to
the SoSciSurvey survey platform to answer some questions. Note thatno data
was collected by the webpage. It was only counted whether the support hotline
was called and whether it was possible to solve their issue.
On the survey page, participants were presented with a consent form for
collecting their data within this survey. Once they agreed, they were asked
questions on whether they were able to complete vote casting and whether they
contacted the support before or during the process. Afterwards, the participants
were presented with questions from the SUS and UEQ questionnaires, asked to
elaborate on any problems they had experienced, what they liked and disliked
about the voting materials and the election webpage, and whether they had
any improvement suggestions. The survey ended with questions on demographic
variables (such as age, gender, education), previous experience with Internet
voting the participant might have had and information about the device (browser,
OS) that the participant used for voting.
4.2 Recruitment and ethics
The participants for the study were recruited via the snowball principle starting
with close friends and family. Participants were informed about the purpose of
the study (i.e. to evaluate the usability of the voting material and if it enables
voters to cast their vote), as well as told that they could withdraw from the study
without providing any explanation. The study was designed to be anonymous,
only collecting information that the participants chose to input in the survey
platform. The participants were not offered any reimbursement.
4.3 Study results
Overall, 40 participants took part in the study (while 50 received the study and
voting material), of them 22 women and 18 men. The participants were aged
19-81, with the median age being 44. Most of the participants had some higher
education degree (25 out of 40). Only three out of 40 participants had previously
cast their vote online. Three reported to have a background in security.
Effectiveness. Overall, 95% of the participants (38 out of 40) reported being
able to complete the voting procedure. Two participants did not succeed in
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completing the voting procedure even after having called the support. Their
device could not read the QR-Code. Note thatwe send these two the link to the
survey via email to collect their feedback. One of the 38 reported contacting
the study examiner at some point during the study. The issue with the election
webpage could be solved with the help of the support.
Satisfaction. The SUS scores given by the 38 participants ranged from 40 to
100, with a mean score of 84.14, corresponding to the grade “B” (good) according
to [5] and a standard deviation of 13.1. The mean value is close to the one
reported in [17], namely, 80.9.
UEQ. The participants rated the voting system highly across all the used
scales, with mean score of 2.2 (SD = 0.76) for dependability, 2.14 (SD = 0.9)
for efficiency, 2.07 (SD = 1.18) for perspicuity and 1.45 (SD = 1.15) for trust,
all on a scale from -3 to 3.
Feedback. Two of the authors analysed the answer provided regarding aspects
participants liked and disliked (including their proposals for improvements), as
well as problems they had. While more positive than negative answers were
provided, in this paragraph we will focus on the negative ones as they can help
to further improve the usability.
Regarding the question on encountered problems, 23 of the 38 participants who
could cast their vote reported that they had no problem at all. Seven reported
that they first had an issue with opening the webpage (e.g. due to a typo in the
webpage). Two reported that they had to switch browser / device as the first
setting did not enable them to scan the QR-Code. Three participants first put
the voting card the opposite way, i.e. they tried to scan the return code together
with the QR-Code containing the triangle.
Regarding the positive aspects of both the voting material and the webpage,
most people mentioned at least two of the following aspects: ’easy’, ’fast’, ’well
explained’, ’clear’, ’well structured’, ’good usability’, and ’easy language’. Often,
participants were – in particular – referring in their answers to the step-by-step
instruction.
Regarding the negative aspects of the voting material, 13 of the 38 mentioned
that there is nothing they did not like. At least three times the following types of
input were provided: eleven either asked specifically for further information (five
particularly asked for security related information) or – from their answers – we
deduced that they had misconceptions (e.g. one participant proposed to put the
actual option e.g. yes on the same page of the voting card as the QR-Code is)
which could be addressed by providing more information. Eight made a concrete
proposal how to rephrase or extend sentences. Furthermore, three thought that
the scheme is not very environmentally friendly and three, again, mentioned that
typing in the URL is error prone. Regarding the negative aspects of the webpage,
23 of the 38 participants did not mention anything, three only mentioned again
the issues with entering the URL, and two added a remark that the webpage
would look more official if it would be an actual election (e.g. it would have an
imprint). There was only one aspect which was mentioned at least three times:
the request for more information either through a video and/or by providing
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more information regarding the status in the process on the webpage. The request
for more information about the security and the reason for each of the steps
was also mentioned by four of the seven participants who provided input in the
final-remark-question.
4.4 Result discussion and limitations
Our user study shows that it is possible to design verifiable code voting systems
that achieve a high level of usability – with our proposals scoring high both in
terms of effectiveness (with almost all of our study participants being able to
successfully complete the voting procedure) as well as in terms of satisfaction and
user experience. It is worth mentioning, that the problems with the smartphone
and the camera would not have happened in a typical lab user study (as conducted
in [17,22]) in which participants would have used lab equipment. Due to the remote
character of our user study, we did not know which smartphone participants used
and were limited wrt. testing various combinations of smartphones-OS versions -
webbrowsers. Before using such an approach in the field, the webpage would need
to be tested with more potential combinations, to further reduce such issues.
Beside the positive usability and user experience, our results show potential
for further improvements and directions for future research: e.g. the URL for
the election webpage should also be provided as QR-Code to avoid errors when
typing the URL on the smartphone and it should be better explained in which
way the voting card should be placed before scanning it. As it is critical that the
camera of the voting device used to scan the QR codes does not capture any
information that is supposed to be hidden (most notably, the correspondences
between the voting cards and the voting options on them), additional studies
need to be done to make sure that the voters are aware of this aspect, and that
their interactions with the system do not lead to errors that might violate their
vote secrecy.
We also received comments unrelated to the actual usability but which
are worth to be considered as future work: Our participants wished for more
transparency regarding the scheme, including information on the security of
the system and explanations on why the individual steps are needed. While
providing such information was out of scope for our study, developing ways to
communicate it would be an important research direction for real-world elections.
Such information could also explain why it is needed to have paper-based materials
sent to voters and why the actual option cannot be printed on top of the QR-Code.
Furthermore, as mentioned by participants, our proposal relies on availability of
smartphones with cameras capable of scanning QR-Codes; while such assumption
might be trivially fulfilled in Switzerland (with recent surveys showing more than
97.2% of the population in possession of a smartphone)6, consideration of other
alternatives might be useful for the applicability of code voting in other settings.
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Swiss system as well as our improvement could require additional assistance to
be used by voters with vision impairments. Alternatives to the use of QR codes,
including more accessible ways to represent the codes (such as codes that are
designed to incorporate error correction [7]), need to be further investigated.
Limitations. The focus of our user study was on usability and user experience
aspects. We did so by sending participants their voting material home. By doing
so, we increased external validity compared to previous research being conducted
in the lab. However, casting the vote from home is a less controlled environment.
Thus, we cannot know whether participants asked others in the household for
help. We also don’t know how carefully they read the materials before and while
casting their vote. Different to [17,22], we leave an evaluation of the effectiveness
of the cast-as-intended verification for future work. As a consequence, we could
show good usability wrt. vote casting but we do not know whether voters would
be able to detect manipulations.
5 Conclusion
We proposed voting material and election webpage to enable verifiable secrecy-
preserving e-voting schemes based on machine readable data aka. QR-Codes.
This idea allowed us to remove the step in which the initialization code is entered
by voters. We evaluated our proposal in a user study. The results of the user
study show that users are able to actually use code voting in combination with
the return code approach from [1]. Thus, the introduction of QR-Codes on the
code sheet sent via postal service is a game changer: instead of hushing away from
the voters completely non-trustworthy camera-equipped, connected computing
device, we now can endorse or even mandate its usage in order to handle big data
chunks correctly, without lowering usability. From a cryptographical perspective,
the ability to confidentially handle big chunks of data at the voter’s side has
an immediate effect on the protocol design. This change enables the system to
provide the voter with cryptographically sound data such as digitally signed
encrypted data or zero knowledge proofs. This in turn allows to offload some
of the strong trust-assumptions at the server side and paves the way for much
more robust verifiable e-voting schemes using code voting. Now, it is up to the
community to propose corresponding schemes knowing that it is possible to
design usable voting materials and election webpages.
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Abstract. Verifiable voting schemes allow voters to verify their individ-
ual votes and the election outcome. The voting protocol Selene offers
verification of plaintext votes while preserving privacy. Misconceptions of
verification mechanisms might result in voters mistrust of the system or
abstaining from using it. In this paper, we interviewed 24 participants and
invited them to illustrate their mental models of Selene. The drawings
demonstrated different levels of sophistication and four mental models: 1)
technology understanding, 2) meaning of the verification phase, 3) secu-
rity concerns, and 4) unnecessary steps. We highlight the misconceptions
expressed regarding Internet voting technologies and the system design.
Based on our findings, we conclude with recommendations for future
implementations of Selene as well as for the design of Internet voting
systems in general.
1 Introduction
Elections are the foundations of democracy. To improve access to elections,
several countries introduced ways to conduct elections over the Internet (e.g.,
Estonia [12], or Switzerland [30]). To uphold democratic principles, voting re-
searchers have proposed secure and robust systems ensuring the integrity of
Internet elections. The goal is to satisfy two main security features among others:
privacy and verifiability. Privacy, in particular vote-secrecy, is well-known as it is
also mandated by the law in many countries. Verifiability comprises individual
verification meaning that each voter can check that their vote has been correctly
recorded, and universal verification meaning that the outcome of the election
can be confirmed by any observer [4]. Verification mechanisms seek to provide
assurance of the correct execution of an election and hence in the outcome.
Verifiability must provide convincing proof to any voter that their votes
are correctly cast-as-intended, recorded-as-cast, and counted-as-recorded [4]. To
achieve this, Internet voting schemes rely on cryptography, often at the expense of
usability (cf. [2, 19, 20]). Research on voting has shown that voters are concerned
by risks related to security [31,33] affecting their trust, especially as voters can
consider verifiability mechanisms as privacy breaches [24,28], or question their
necessity [2, 19]. This might be due to the novelty of verification, which has been
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used in only a few real elections with high stakes, e.g., [12, 30]. It might also be
due to the complexity of the verification, requiring the voters to perform extra
steps, understand complex mechanisms, or compare cryptographic data [5, 7, 8].
To counter this, the e-voting scheme Selene has been developed to minimize
the voters’ interaction with cryptography while providing individual and universal
verifiability [26]. Selene’s usability has already been demonstrated in studies with
voters [11]. However, usability studies of Internet voting protocols have shown that
mere usability is not sufficient in convincing voters about the correct processing
of votes [2, 13, 19]. This might be because the voters’ mental models do not align
with the verification procedure.
Mental models are the internal representations that humans derive from
interacting with a technology [25]. Mental models using the Selene protocol have
been evaluated in a previous study [37]. In this paper, we investigate an improved
implementation of the Selene protocol that builds on previous results. We evalu-
ate voters’ perceptions of the Selene e-voting protocol with 24 participants. To
achieve that, after letting them interact with the app, we asked the participants
to draw their understanding of voting and verifying using Selene.
Our contributions. We explore the voters’ understanding of the verification
mechanism in the Selene Internet voting protocol. For that, we performed an
analysis of the drawings and the answers and extracted four categories of mental
models: 1) technology understanding, 2) meaning of the verification phase, 3)
security concerns, and 4) unnecessary steps. We also classified the understanding
of participants into levels of sophistication of their mental models. Finally, we
discuss our findings and propose a list of recommendations applicable to Selene
and to other Internet voting systems, focused on 1) education of voters on risks,
2) need for correctness and transparency, 3) integration of simple interactions
with security features, and 4) design of several levels of verification.
Related work. Mental models are internal representations that humans
derive from the real world to interact with technology [14, 25]. The level of
sophistication of a mental model can differ amongst humans [9,14,15] and the
mental models must be sound enough that users can effectively interact with a
technology [16]. Generally, two types of mental models can be observed: functional
and structural models [25]. Functional models mean that users know how to use a
technology, but they do not how it works in detail. Structural models offer a more
detailed understanding of how technology works. Once a mental model has been
established, it is difficult to shift [32]. There are different ways to capture mental
models, such as interviews (cf. [34]), sketching, or think-aloud techniques [15].
Related work in the domain of privacy has demonstrated that the combination
of sketching and think-aloud is effective to capture the mental models [35].
Mental models have been investigated within the scope of security and pri-
vacy [1,3, 15,36] indicating that misconceptions within mental models can lead
users to engage in insecure behaviours, or in behaviours that do not match
their intentions. Mental models within the scope of verifiable voting have also
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been investigated. Acemyan et al. [3] let voters draw their mental models after
interacting with the three electronic voting schemes Helios, Prêt à Voter, and
Scantegrity II. This study reveals that mental models are almost exclusively
based on the voting process from their perspectives in all three protocols. Thus,
voters expressed rather functional mental models that did not describe how the
voting schemes worked. 75% of participants expressed to have recognized that
their votes have been encrypted when using the Helios protocol. The usability of
Helios [5] has been studied in many papers, such as [2,3,19]. Later investigations of
Helios confirmed that the probabilistic nature does not align with voters’ mental
models, and because of that, voters considered verification to be unnecessary [19].
In a previous study of the Selene protocol, Zollinger et al. investigated mental
models of the participants regarding technical properties that are required for
security [37]. Their results show that voters are aware of potential security issues
in Internet voting, but the presented verification mechanism did not convince
them to mitigate these security issues. Our study takes into account this previous
result.
Another line of research investigated perceptions of vote verification. As part
of the trials to deploy online voting in Norway, participants failed to determine
whether their votes had been submitted, although the scheme offers verifica-
tion [13]. Using Helios, between 10 and 43% of participants were able to verify
successfully [2,19]. Information provided to voters is crucial for the acceptance of
verification [20].
In summary, research has shown that mental models have to be sound enough
such that users can effectively interact with a technology. If voters have misconcep-
tions, they might be unsuccessful in verifying their votes, consider it redundant,
or question the security of the voting scheme. Adding to this body of research,
we report a detailed investigation of mental models regarding the Selene Internet
voting protocol.
2 The Selene Internet Voting Protocol
The app used for the user study is an implementation of the Internet voting
protocol Selene [26]. Selene allows voters to identify their plaintext vote in the
tally using a tracking number (or tracker) which is revealed to the voters after
the election’s outcome has been published. This is to provide coercion mitigation:
letting voters identify another tracker to show to a coercer. However, this feature
is not in the scope of the paper. Showing the voter the plaintext vote in the final
tally should be more understandable than more conventional verifiable schemes
that require the voter to check an encryption of the vote in the input to the tally.
2.1 Voter Experience and Protocol Setup
In this section, we summarize Selene’s cryptographic setup3.
3 A full cryptographic description of the protocol can be found in [26].
356
4 M. Zollinger et al.
Preliminaries: Each voter has a public/private key pair for use in the ver-
ification phase. The keys are generated and handled by the app; the voters
do not have to interact with them. An election public key is generated with a
corresponding private key. The public key is included in the app to avoid direct
interaction with the voters.
Setup (Authorities): First, the election authorities generate a list of unique
trackers. These trackers are encrypted with the public election key, secretly
shuffled, and each of them is associated with a voter. A commitment to each
tracker is created, sealing the relation between a tracker and a voter without
revealing it. Each commitment can be opened only by its associated voter, using
the voter’s private key and a secret term delivered after the tally has been
published.
Voting (Voters): To cast their votes voters log in to the voting app with
credentials that they received before the election. After a welcome page, they
select a candidate. Then, the app computes an encryption of their vote under
the election public key and sends it to the election authority. The latter stores
the encrypted votes next to the encrypted tracking number.
Tally (Authorities): When voting is over, the authorities extract the pairs of
encrypted trackers and votes, which they shuffle and decrypt to obtain the pairs
of plaintext trackers and votes which are then posted to the bulletin board.
Verifying (Voters): After the election, the secret value associated with the
commitment is sent to the respective voter. The app combines the secret and
the commitment and uses the voter’s private key to reveal the tracker, without
revealing the value to anyone else. We also highlighted one positive aspect
regarding verification: the correctness of the records can be verified by anyone.
2.2 App Design
To increase security, the interfaces are split into two apps: one for voting and
one for verifying. In case the voting app is compromised, it should not impact
verifiability. This should also indicate to voters that their vote is not recorded by
the voting app: when they check their vote, they retrieve a tracker and verify the
associated vote.
Within the interfaces, we do not communicate all the information regarding
the protocol. Instead, we stick to the interactions the voters perform: voting
and verifying. In particular, the setup phase was not communicated in advance,
and the tally is computed between the voting and the verification phases. Also,
most security interactions that voters have with the protocol are related to
encryption/decryption. In our app, the voter must explicitly push a button
with the label “Encrypt”, while the trackers are automatically decrypted. The
information is shown to the user through a loading screen.
Finally, the possibility to chose another tracker in case of coercion is not
provided in this version of the app since coercion mitigation was out of this
investigation’s scope.
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3 Method
To evaluate the users’ perceptions and understanding of the Selene Internet
voting protocol, we conducted a user study with 24 participants.
Selene has been partially implemented as a demonstrator in the UK with
a commercial partner [27]. For our study, we developed an interface where the
voters can perform the required tasks: voting and verifying their vote. The
interface design was informed by guidelines for Internet voting interface from
the literature [20]. We also implemented a backend server where the authorities
can set up elections, store votes, and compute the tally pairs (tracker, vote).
The apps simulated an election for a past parliament for Germany to give a
realistic scenario as recommended in [21,29]. Therefore, we used the ballots and
results from the last election in the constituency where the study took place. The
election had two contests, the first one had six candidates and the second one 20.
3.1 Procedure
Before interviewing the participants, they interacted with the Internet voting
scheme. With this, we wanted to know whether the participants were able to
verify their votes successfully. To capture this, we randomly manipulated one of
the two contests for all participants. This means that the voting option next to
the tracker did not correspond to the voter’s choice. The procedure of our study
was as follows.
We welcomed the participants by explaining that we are investigating an
online voting protocol and that they are going to vote in an Internet (dummy)
election followed by an interview. Then, we let them read the consent form and the
study’s data protection policy. Each participant provided demographics consisting
of age, gender, education, and occupation. We also asked about previous voting
experiences. The participants were introduced to the voting materials and devices
consisting of a letter with sealed voting credentials (voter ID and password) as
in a real election. Each participant received randomly chosen voting instructions,
i.e. voting option for each ballot. This was to preserve the participants’ vote
privacy since we took screen-recordings [21]. Note that we explored additional
user experience and usability aspects related to tracker-based protocols, that we
elaborate in [22].
Each participant cast two votes since we wanted them to experience the voting
scheme with and without a manipulated vote. In each round, the participants
were asked to cast a vote matching the instructions. In the second round, we
randomly manipulated one vote of a contest. When the participants reported
completion, the examiner gave the following scenario: two weeks have passed4
since the voting phase and the election results are now available. The participants
were asked to use the verification app5.
4 In Germany, where the study was conducted, this is the standard time frame between
the end of the voting phase and the announcement of the outcome.
5 The emphasis was placed on the individual check of the tracking number. We did
not explicitly ask the participants to recount the votes for universal verifiability.
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After the interaction with Selene was completed, we proceeded with the
interview part. We explained that we would like them to draw their understanding
of the following questions and that there are no wrong answers. The drawing area
was recorded with a camera, and the participant’s comments were audio-taped.
We told the participants when we started the recording and proceeded with the
semi-structured interview which was guided by the following main questions:
– Could you sketch how vote casting works according to your understanding?
– What to your understanding is the purpose of the tracking number?
– Why to your understanding is it necessary to see the list of all votes and not
only your own one or is it not necessary at all?
– How to your understanding does the vote verification work?
– Why do you think voters are asked to verify?
– Consider an election, would you want information on how the vote verification
works? Where or when would you like to receive this information?
In each question, the participant could integrate cards with pictures that we
provided into their drawings. The cards had pictures of the following components:
an icon representing the voter, a ballot, a ballot box, a smartphone, the icon of
the app, an icon representing the Internet, an icon for encryption and a server.
We provided the items to facilitate the drawing for the participants.
Participant were invited to ask questions, or to provide further feedback. We
did not compensate individual participants but they could participate in a raffle
for a voucher for online shopping in the value of about 100 Dollars.
3.2 Participants and Ethical Considerations
We recruited the 24 participants by mailing lists, social networks, and poster
advertisements that did not mention verifiability. Fifteen participants identified
as male, eight as female and one as other. The average age was 24.8 years
(Min=19, Max=40, SD=5.37). All participants reported daily Internet usage.
The study followed the guidelines provided by the ethics commissions at the
authors’ institution and conforms to strict national law. In particular, our studies
must limit the collection of personal data to preserve the privacy of participants.
To anonymise the data, each participant received a randomly assigned identifier.
Before the study, each participant signed a consent form that was recorded
separately such that data cannot be linked to participants’ identity. The following
information were provided to the participants: goal and procedure of the study,
risks associated with the participation, and how data storage and analysis is
handled. Finally, it has a paragraph regarding data protection policy. The study
was conducted before COVID-19.
3.3 Data Analysis
We transcribed the interviews and used a deductive coding methodology to
categorize the data. The categories were discussed before starting the coding and
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emerged from the questions given to participants and the existing literature on
the analysis of voters’ perception. Then, two researchers coded the interviews
independently. The agreement is given by Cohen’s Kappa was calculated at
0.822, referring to an almost perfect agreement [10]. Then, the coders compared
their findings and resolved disagreements. The drawings were categorized by two
researchers, ordering them according accuracy and then relating them to the
participants feedback about their experience.
3.4 Limitations
Although we took precautions and recruited participants beyond the university
campus, some of our participants had background in computer science or were
students. Consequently, our sample might not be representative. Our aim was to
provide a explorative stepping stone for further investigations.
Furthermore, if technology-savvy voters already demonstrate understandabil-
ity issues, those are likely to be exacerbated in a more general sample.
Another limitation is that the study was run in a lab hence a controlled
environment [17, 18], potentially leading to biased answers from the participants.
However, for the voting area, it is hard to conduct experiments over real elections
while preserving voters’ privacy [21].
One feature of Selene, the coercion mitigation mechanism, was not in the
scope of this study. Hence, we cannot draw conclusions about the voters’ mental
models regarding this feature. Finally, the results and conclusions are applicable
to countries with similar cultures (Germany).
4 Results
In this section, we present the results of our study. Previous studies that inves-
tigated Selene demonstrated a good user experience but some misconceptions
remain [11,37]. In this paper, we want to go further by asking the participants
explicitly how they understand Selene and represent it in drawings to reveal their
understanding of the verification mechanisms and their beliefs regarding Internet
voting technologies. In the remainder of this section, we first present levels of
sophistication before detailing the observed mental models explicitly.
4.1 Levels of Sophistication
Many participants had a good overview and provided a good explanation of how
the system works according to their understanding. We classified the drawings
in two types of mental models as described in [25]: 1) functional models and 2)
structural models. The functional model describes the drawings in which the
participants used the provided components without linking those components
together. The structural model describes the drawings depending on the use of
components and their relations to each other.
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(a) Functional Basic (b) Functional Advanced
(c) Structural Basic (d) Structural Advanced
Fig. 1: Four levels of understanding.
We can deduce two levels of understanding inside those two main categories:
basic and advanced. Figure 1 shows an example of drawing (reproduced) for
every category mentioned below. We describe the four levels as follows:
1. Functional basic (one participant): some components are used but are not
detailing the entire procedure. In Figure 1a, P22 used some components, but
the ballot and the ballot box are missing.
2. Functional advanced (seven participants): the components are used in
a specific order to express the functional tasks that were performed. In
Figure 1b, P21 used all components and grouped them while explaining his
experience.
3. Structural basic (nine participants): some components are used and related
to each other. In Figure 1c, P14 used some components and tried to relate
them but misplaced or did not use all of them.
4. Structural advanced (seven participants): the components and their rela-
tions were correctly set. In Figure 1d, P01 used all components and explained
the correct structure and relations between all of them.
Regarding the vote manipulation, we counted 20 participants who clearly
reported that they have seen a problem to the examiner.
Besides the general level of sophistication, the comments and drawings from
the participants can be grouped into: 1) technology understanding, 2) meaning of
the verification phase, 3) security concerns and 4) unnecessary steps which we
detail in the following sections.
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4.2 Technology Understanding
All participants gave their vision of how the voting system is designed and how
they understood the technology behind it. As described in Section 3, we provided
several components to participants. Some of them were related to a standard
paper-based system (ballot, ballot box), and others were related to online tech-
nologies (Internet, app, device, encryption, server).
Overall Voting Technology. From the 24 participants, seven did not use the
paper-based components in their drawings. All other components were used but
sometimes misplaced. Six participants thought that encryption occurs on the
server side, although the app mentioned that it is done locally. Three participants
placed the ballot box in the smartphone instead of the server. For instance,
participant P16 said: “The smartphone is the ballot box and the app is a tool.”
Nineteen participants provided a good description of their experience and
the technology in use. For example: “The smartphone uses the app to apparently
retrieve the data from the server of the electoral authorities and show the voter
which vote he has cast based on this tracking number.” (P06); or “The encrypted
vote is then forwarded via the Internet and placed in the digital ballot box and
added. And this ballot box is stored on a server where all election results are
then uploaded. And where they can then be retrieved again by the voter after the
election, for example by the verification app.” (P12).
Verification Phase. The procedure itself for individual verification was under-
stood, but the overall process remained unclear. As described in Section 2, the
app contains information about the tracking number in the verification phase,
but does not provide details on how the connection between trackers and votes
are made. Nevertheless, seven participants described how their vote was linked to
their tracking number. For example, participant P19 said: “It’s probably generated
from some data from my smartphone because it has to store it somehow because
I didn’t have to enter it anywhere”.
Only one participant (P17) misunderstood the content of the bulletin board
and thought that it shows links to voters: “We receive the list of, as far as I
understood, all voters.”
4.3 Meaning of the Verification Phase
Besides technical details of verification, we asked the participants to explain the
purpose of the tracking number and the bulletin board. Finally, we asked them
why verification is required. We describe their answers based on comments about
1) individual verifiability, 2) universal verifiability, and 3) general purpose.
Individual Verifiability. 23 of 24 participants explained individual verification
with the tracking numbers. Fifteen of them explicitly mentioned the correctness
of recorded votes, others explained a comparison between the recorded vote and
their vote intention. For example: “Here is a list of numbers and votes and these
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will be sent to my smartphone and I can compare them with my tracking number
to see if what I voted for finally reached the server.” (P04); or “I as a voter I can
check if I have voted correctly.” (P12).
Universal Verifiability. Participants expressed difficulties in explaining why
they can see all votes instead of only their own. Eleven participants talked about
recounting even if the app did not offer an intuitive way to do it, for example,
P02 said: “It wasn’t possible with the app but theoretically I could use all the votes
to check if everything is correct and of course I need all the votes for that.”. Two
participants also mentioned that the bulletin board was necessary to find their
own vote as the tracking number was stored locally on the phone. For instance,
P09: “I need them all at some point because I have to find my own.”
General Purpose. Three participants compared Selene’s features to actual
voting systems that do not allow them to verify. For instance, P01 said: “It offers
a way to see if the vote is present at all because in old systems that’s not there at
all”. Four participants mentioned transparency as a goal, e.g.: “[...] that we can
offer the citizens a certain transparency.” (P16); or “I do think it is necessary
just for the sake of transparency.” (P23). Five participants also mentioned it as
a confidence or trust feature, like P11 mentioned that it is “to give a little more
confidence.”
4.4 Security Concerns
All participants mentioned different security concerns and considerations during
the interviews. With respect to the previous section about the meaning of the
verification phase, the correctness of the result and the integrity of the elections
were mentioned by 15 participants as a security concern, e.g., P07 said: “There
is a bit of certainty that it was done correctly”.
All participants noticed the encryption of the votes. Three participants
questioned the encryption of other parts, for instance, the encryption of the
channel between the app and the server and encryption of the data on the server
itself, e.g., P05: “I didn’t pay attention to it but I hope there was an encrypted
connection to the infrastructure of the election office, via the Internet”.
Sixteen participants mentioned that they wanted to have information regard-
ing the verification phase in advance during the registration process for three
different reasons: First, four said that it would help them decide whether they
choose this app to cast their vote. Second, eleven mentioned that they would
evaluate the reliability of the app, and third six said that it would provide more
time to voters to understand how it works.
Nine participants questioned the implementation and said it had a direct
impact on their trust. For example, some participants questioned the origin of the
tracking number and whether it indeed shows their cast vote. For instance, P15
said: “It was cryptic in the sense that I just received it from the server, I couldn’t
understand if this is really the vote I cast.”. Furthermore, three participants
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questioned the system by describing it in a skeptical way, e.g. P05: “Hopefully
the votes cast are stored there in encrypted form”.
Attacks or bugs in the system were mentioned by nine participants, such as
ballot rigging or possible manipulations: “I would know theoretically whether they
were manipulated or not” (P20); “The votes that were cast could also, as it was
the case with me once, simply have been wrong somehow” (P10).
Four participants mentioned anonymity as one of their concerns linked to the
tracking number, e.g. P01: “They are anonymous because nobody has any idea
which tracking number the other person has.”
Concerns about dispute resolution were also mentioned by three participants,
two of them noticed that they cannot prove how they voted afterwards so
questioned how to prove a mistake, e.g. P19: “Somehow nobody can prove that
you have actually chosen something else.”
Only two participants mentioned the decryption of the tracking number in
the app, and one of them questioned the origin of the keys in use in the app.
Finally, two participants believed that from the bulletin board, one might figure
out whom a specific voter voted for, hence breaking privacy.
4.5 Unnecessary Steps
Thirteen participants perceived some verification steps as unnecessary. In partic-
ular, the bulletin board was considered as useless. For example, P09 mentioned:
“If I already know what my tracker is, I honestly don’t see the point of seeing all
of them.” Even if participants mentioned recounting of votes as an option, they
were not interested in doing it. For example, P06 said: “You could say that it’s
about comparing this list of votes with the overall election results, of course. But
then again, I do not see how the normal voter should actually do that with several
million eligible voters or several million votes cast”.
Even if most of the participants understood the purpose of individual verifi-
cation, two were not convinced by the provided information and questioned the
need of making the system verifiable. For instance, P03 mentioned that “It also
doesn’t help me to check if this is really part of the final result or not.”
5 Discussion
5.1 Lessons Learned
In this section, we discuss observations from our interview study and its results.
Impact of Vote Manipulation. In our study, the participants executed the
protocol twice. In the second round, the cast vote was modified, since vote
manipulations are recommended to measure the execution of a given mental
task [21, 29]. In our case, this manipulation showed a possible source of errors
in an Internet election to the participants. Twenty participants clearly reported
it to the examiner, we cannot tell if the four remaining participants did not
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understand or lacked confidence to highlight the issue, as mentioned in [23]. In
previous studies on the Selene protocol [11,37], such a threat was not shown to the
participants and the participants had more difficulties explaining why verification
is useful. Combined to the explanations provided in the app experiencing an
incorrect vote had a positive impact on the understanding of the participants.
Indeed, almost all of them had a good idea of the meaning of the verification
phase, in particular, showing the correctness of the result. Of course, we cannot
trigger such an attack and make voters experience errors in a real election, but it
shows that being aware of the risks helps understanding the meaning to a given
task.
Different Needs for the Users. Several participants expressed a need of
learning more details about the setup and the origin of tracking numbers, or
wanted to have additional proofs. The correct understanding of the available
features was not enough to convince them. This had a negative impact on
participants as it raised many questions and affected their trust in Selene. Several
participants said that they would prefer to have information regarding the system
before the elections to ensure their correct understanding and the reliability of
the system. Selene can provide additional mathematical proofs, and it is specified
in the original protocol that more verifiable data is available to the public.
More than half of the participants did not consider it necessary to access the
complete list of votes, even if some of them explained the possibility of recounting
the votes and the transparency that it provides. As mentioned in Section 2,
one important security feature in the protocol design, not tested here, is the
accessibility of the bulletin board in order to let a possibly coerced voter choose
another tracking number. It has been highlighted in a previous study that this
missing feature might help the voters to understand better the opportunity of
accessing the complete list of votes [37].
Bada et al. [6] acknowledged that risk awareness and understanding are pre-
requisites to change security behaviours. However, they also highlighted that
additional factors must be taken into considerations, in particular the adaptability
to the audience and to its needs is encouraged.
Impact of the Security Communication. In the apps, security-related in-
formation was communicated on several screens. First, several loading screens
between the direct interactions with the users showed the following information:
authentication, encryption of votes, and decryption of the tracking numbers.
Furthermore, before the vote encryption, the users were explicitly pushing a
button indicating “Encrypt” to encrypt their vote. Finally, the anonymity of
the trackers was explained inside the app before the verification. In two prior
studies of Selene [11,37], the authors highlighted that the security, even if visible,
remained unseen by the participants of their study. A possible reason for that
could have been the lack of interactivity with the security features. In our study,
using an “encryption button”, we observed that all participants mentioned this
feature. However, the drawings revealed that the location of the encryption com-
365
“Just for the sake of transparency” 13
putation sometimes remained unclear. This might be due to a lack of knowledge
in security properties and software design but it did not have a negative impact
on the participants. On the contrary, interacting with encryption had a positive
impact on the security concerns of the participants, as it made them aware that
a security feature is implemented. Similarly to previous studies, participants did
not notice the decryption of tracking number, since it was mentioned only in the
loading screen.
5.2 Recommendations
Based on our observations and the lessons learned above, we distill four recom-
mendations to inform the design of future verifiable voting schemes, applicable
to Selene but also other verifiable schemes.
1. Provide information to support transparency. The security concern
regarding correctness was often mentioned during interviews when explain-
ing the meaning of the verification phase. As discussed above, one reason
might be the impact of the vote manipulation but we can also mention the
verification app that gives several insights on verifiability to voters, among
which the correctness of records was cited. On the other side, few participants
mentioned transparency, but this did not justify the display of all votes for
them. For future implementations, our first recommendation concerns the
clear designation of each entity that a user might deal with and their purpose
to ensure a complete understanding of the expected tasks.
2. Provide education materials about risks. The vote manipulation made
participants aware of possible risks related to online voting and let them
better understand the meaning of the verification phase. We highlighted that
risk communication, control over verifiability procedures and easy security
interactions can lead to a better understanding of the tasks one must per-
form. To be accepted, an Internet voting system needs to convince enough
voters to perform those additional individual checks. It is recommended to
provide voters with materials to educate themselves on possible risks related
to Internet voting, and how to counter them. The Swiss Post voting protocol,
for instance, provides such access to voters [30]. In addition, informative
materials, such as TV spots or websites, could use an incorrect vote and show
voters how it can be detected with a verification mechanism.
3. Provide simple interactions with a security emphasis. The interaction
with the encryption button has shown to raise the awareness of participants
regarding the security implementation. Other screens in the app where se-
curity was shown without interactivity were mentioned by participants only
twice. This confirms the previous studies with this voting protocol [11, 37]
and related voting schemes [20]. Therefore, we recommend to communicate
security through simple interactions whenever possible. Following the exam-
ple of the encryption, naming the security tasks on a simple interaction like
pushing a button is enough to raise the awareness of users.
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4. Provide different levels of verification. Many participants understood
the verification features but were not always convinced by them, while
other participants considered certain information as unnecessary. Hence,
we recommend organizing the verifiable data and information such that it
is displayed only on demand. We can distinguish three levels of verifiable
information: 1) a minimal display, showing the individual vote to be verified
only, 2) a full display, showing the individual vote and the entire bulletin
board, and 3) a full access for experts, containing detailed specification on
how to perform additional checks. This last level will let any expert (eligible
to vote or not) verify more steps of the protocol.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We investigated mental models of 24 participants using the Selene Internet voting
protocol. We let them draw their understanding of voting and verification using
Selene and we interviewed them. The mental models demonstrated different levels
of sophistication, security concerns, and understanding. We also highlighted that
the tracker used to verify their individual votes was not enough for all users; in
contrast the full bulletin board given for universal verifiability was stressed as
unnecessary. Furthermore, we found that direct interaction with security features
had a positive impact on the awareness of a secure implementation. These findings
helped us to understand the users’ expectations in Internet voting applications,
and highlight their need of transparency and correctness for elections, as well as
more interactions with security features and more control on the process. Some
features were not explored yet in this study and as future work, we will test their
impact on the voters’ understanding and trust in the system. Also, the mental
models of voters with paper voting systems might differ and a comparison of
voters’ models with paper and internet voting schemes will be explored. Finally,
having a misconception of how the system works might not prevent a voter to
use it correctly. This is also an interesting future direction for our research.
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II. The USENIX Journal of Election Technology and Systems 2(3), 26–56 (2014)
367
“Just for the sake of transparency” 15
3. Acemyan, C.Z., Kortum, P.T., Byrne, M.D., Wallach, D.S.: Users’ mental models
for three end-to-end voting systems: Helios, prêt à voter, and scantegrity II. In:
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Evaluating Voter’s Assessment of Verifiability Using Text




Abstract. We develop a pipeline which collects the results of an online survey about general
understanding of people about verifiability. But in this case, this survey is shared on social
media and we will collect data automatically by web crawler tools and using machine learning
algorithm will train the algorithm to classify the received answers.
Keywords: E-voting scheme · Data Mining · Machine Learning · Online Survey · Text
Classifier.
1 Introduction
Elections are indispensable chunks of democracy. To boost voter’s attendance several countries(
e.g. Australia, Estonia and Switzerland) employ various manners to use technology and particu-
larly Internet. Since the integrity of an election is a crucial ingredient, secure and robust systems
recommended to defend democratic doctrines. Verification procedure, principally , designate to as-
sure the authentic result and accomplishment of an election. Generally, to bring about this Internet
voting schemes sacrifice their usability by employing cryptographic protocols. Recent studies on
voting affirmed that security is one the major worries of voters. Actually some of them notice the
verification operation as confidentiality infringement [3,2], or their obligation was interrogated by
the voters [1]. To retaliate this drawback it is vital to abate voter’s communication with cryptogra-
phy in the course of providing verifiability. Following this perspective, the Internet voting scheme
Selene introduced. Nonetheless the Selene’s usability is demonstrated in studies, but it is not accept-
able in satisfying voters about the correct handling of votes. The voter’s intellectual pattern might
be a justification for not cooperating with the verification. There are qualitative studies concerning
this problem to reveal more details about the mental model of voters.
2 Machine Learning Overview
We are currently living in a “data era,” where a colossal load of data is collected and stockpiled
regularly. On the basis of this burgeoning quantity of data, machine learning methods have become
inevitable. Text classification is a machine learning method that automatically corresponds tags or
categories to text. With the aid of natural language processing (NLP), text classifiers can inspect
and sort text by sentiment, topic, and customer intent – faster and more accurately than purpose.
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3 Main Idea
One of the biggest hardship conducting qualitative studies is that they usually evaluate a little
number of participants and even that takes along time. This motivates us to overhaul the previous
method and mix it with ML methods. In the first place, we need to design an online survey to ask
our desired questions for estimating voter’s mental model. Then share our online survey on several
social media platforms and ask people to answer these surveys (Most likely we should have a nice
incentive to convince them to engage on answering the survey). Our idea is to automate the whole
procedure as much as possible. The web crawlers are our big tools to collect our required data
automatically. Then we should polish the gathered data and prepare them for processing on deep
learning model which is trained before. To be more precise we can specify the whole process on the
following smaller steps:
• Designing an online survey: (it might contains more graphical features since in this case we
loss the personal counselling of participants media platforms.
• Ethical Considerations: Accompanying the emerge of data mining from social media, its
ethical guideline was announced. For example, even the information is public it must always
consider with respect to individuals’ privacy.
• Limitations Incorrect information can also be the main drawback of data mining systems.
When a user interacts on the social platform, he doesn’t assure us that he has been pristine in
his thoughts.
• Data Engineering: Data preparation and cleansing tasks can take a substantial amount of
time. Surveys of machine learning developers and data scientists show that the data collection
and preparation steps can take up to 80 % of a machine learning project’s time.
• Choosing a text classifier: Model selection is the process of choosing between different
machine learning approaches. So in short, different models.
• Initializing the model: Now it’s time to feed our model and train it.
• Ready to classify: In this stage, our model is trained and ready to predict( here we mean the
classification . So it takes a text and add a tag to this text.
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Abstract. We briefly describe a fault tolerant election result collation scheme 
for a hybrid election system which is conceptualized on homomorphic tally 
across multiple levels of collation hierarchy. This is to attain better user experi-
ence and inspire voter participation. 
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1 Introduction 
Prevalent voter abstention remains a challenge in most democracies with an average 
abstention rate of as much as 40–50 percent [1]. Democracy is fundamentally threat-
ened by voter apathy occasioned by lack of confidence in the outcome of the electoral 
processes. Without trust or confidence that elections will produce fair outcomes, vot-
ers may choose to stay home, thereby compromising the legitimacy of the government 
[2]. This is evident in Nigerian case where voter turnout is abysmally low. For in-
stance, during the 2019 national election, out of 84,004,084 registered voters, only 
27,324,583 valid votes were recorded, while 56,679,501 voters were disenfranchised 
[3]. The challenges of delay in the final collation of results, integrity of result and 
security of collation officers (CF) from the risk of travelling in the dead of the night to 
get results submitted for final collation coupled with falsification of figures and rec-
orded loss of life are unnerving [4]. Though Nigerian election management body is 
unrelenting about delivering a free and fair election, reports from both external and 
local observers still show that Nigerian elections were marred by poor organization, 
lack of essential transparency [5], widespread procedural irregularities, and significant 
evidence of fraud particularly during the result collation process and numerous inci-
dence of violence. To change this trend, elections must be secured, the outcome must 
be convincing to all parties and safety of all stake holders must be ensured. 
Majority of hybrid voting schemes in literature were designed to prevent electoral 
fraud during the ballot casting phase of elections in developed countries while result 
collation (RC) with fault tolerance and verifiability are not considered. Also most 
studies focused on the security requirements and technical specifications of its design 
without significant attention paid to social, political and environmental factors which 
has arguably determine voter confidence and participation. This approach considers 
the Nigerian context, where violence is a ready option by politicians, to present a fault 
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tolerant secured result collation scheme. This will be embedded with disaster recovery 
plan to ensure result integrity in the eventuality of an attack. It will be incorporated in 
the Nigerian voting system to reduce the use of violence by politicians as its usage 
will not affect the outcome of the elections. 
The scheme 
It is an enhanced result collation system using fault tolerance and homomor-
phic cryptography for security. Voters’ intentions captured on paper ballots aggregat-
ed in ballot box as marked ballots are tallied publicly within the polling unit while 
stake holders observe as demanded by the electoral law. Modifications include; gen-
eration of electronic copy of the result sheet (ER-sheet) in electronic format by scan-
ning a signed copy of the result sheet with provided equipment or filling an electronic 
form of the result obtained and sending it in an encrypted form differently to the dif-
ferent layers in the result collation hierarchy. ER-sheet contains the result of voting 
from the polling unit with signature of observing parties who observed the tallying 
process. The aggregation will be done with Paillier Cryptosystem, which allows con-
structing a publicly verifiable proof that all lower-level results were included in the 
final tally. To achieve verifiability of result collation process, a code will be generated 
from each polling unit and attached with each result displayed so all interested voters 
could check on the Bulletin Board. The plaintext paper copy is demanded by the law 
while encryption, homomorphic tallying and fault tolerance enhances integrity, verifi-
cation, disaster recovery and voters trust.  
Contribution 
Our main contribution is to develop a fault tolerant hybrid (paper and electronic) 
tallying system that is easier to use, deploy, verify and audit for better voters confi-
dence and participation. This work addresses problems associated with accessibility, 
verifiability and result collation, in a bid to improve trust and participation of voters. 
The method developed distributes the responsibility of delivering reliable result 
among various collation hierarchy and groups in a way that the final result gives 
higher confidence in the correctness of the overall outcome than can be obtained by a 
singular channel as it used to be. This scheme also introduces a disaster recovery plan 
to dissuade the use of violence during result collation (RC). 
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1 Introduction
In any e-voting protocols it is important to have a coercion-resistance property.
On the other hand, a secure e-voting protocol needs to be secure, universally ver-
ifiable, practical and usable. Despite numerous attempts, designing a coercion-
resistance e-voting which simultaneously provides all of the aforementioned basic
properties is still an open problem and many voting schemes have been designed
that aim to meet this property by proposing some counteracts at a technical
level. Our idea is to design a new voting scheme that offers receipt-freeness,
coercion-resistance and end-to-end verifiability properties.
In coercion-resistance systems, each coerced voter has the option to run some
counter-strategy to achieve her own goal instead of obeying the coercer. At the
same time, the coercer should not be able to distinguish whether the coerced
voter followed his instructions or ran the counter-strategy. From a technical per-
spective, there exist three different approaches in the literature which implement
this concept: fake credentials [2] masking [1]and deniable vote updating [3]which
enables each voter to overwrite her previously submitted ballot, that she may
have cast under coercion.
In both fake credential and masking approach, the counter-strategies appear
to be hardly usable by human voters. It is therefore likely that these two concepts
are ineffective in real practical elections and achieving coercion-resistance via
deniable vote updating is more promising.
2 Main Idea
Our idea is to propose another coercion-resistance voting protocol is the so-
called deniable vote updating. The idea is simple: while the voter might be
coerced to cast a particular vote in presence of an adversary, she can cast another
vote, overwriting her previous one, when the adversary is gone. The coercion
resistance property, in particular, is achieved due to deniability of vote updating
the adversary should be unable to tell whether the voter has cast another vote,
even if the voter would try to prove that they did not do it.
The starting point is using a public-key encryption scheme that allows to
re-encrypt a ciphertext without knowing the original message.This allows the
voter to encrypt her vote and then some other parties to re-encrypt the voter’s
ballot. Then for sake of verifiability, we need to make both encryption and re-
encryption steps, verifiable by using some zero-knowledge proof system and for
sake of coercion-resistance these two step should be indistinguishable.
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This is one of the main challenges we need to deal with. On one hand we need
to assign the ballot to legitimate voter and this usually is done by voter signing
the ballot which is required by voter knowing some secret key. On the other
hand the party who re-encrypt the ballot needs to prove the relation between
two ciphertexts by proof of knowledge of the randomness used in re-encryption
algorithm. These two proofs should be indistinguishable while the later party
has to do it without knowing the secret key of the voter. Our solution for this
challenge is either using some zero-knowledge proof system or none-interactive
witness-indistinguishable proof of knowledge, then define a system of equation
that connects all part of the ballot to the public key of the voter, and finally
generate a proof of knowledge of the solution for the system of equation.
Based on the above idea we propose a protocol that in its registration phase
for each legitimate voter Vi a pair of key (pki, ski) is generated. Then a list
listi =
[
pki, b0 = Enc(0)
]
is published on the bulletin board.
In voting phase some valid components are added to the voter list, listi.
There are two ways to generate and add valid components.The first one,“fresh-
vote” is generated by the honest voter, the owner of the secret key and the
second one “reEncrypte-vote” is generated by the posting trustee. To generate
a fresh-vote the voter Vi chooses her choice votei and encrypts it then add the
proof(proof of knowledge) of the and also a proof of knowledge of her secret key.
Formally the voter run the NIZK(x,w) algorithm to generate πct for relation
Ŗ(x,w) which in this case P1(x,w) is true. The reEncrypt-vote is generated
by the “Posting Trustee” in random times as follows: Choose some random
number(s) and reEncrypt the last component of listi and run the NIZK(x,w)
algorithm to generate πct for relation Ŗ(x,w) which in this case P2(x,w) is true.
Ŗ(x,w) = TRUE ⇐⇒ (P1(x,w) = TRUE) ∨ (P1(x,w) = TRUE)
x =
(
listpki = [pki, b0, (b1, π1), . . . , (bj , πj)], b), w1 = (vote, r
ct, ski), w2 = (r
re.enc)
P1(x,w1) = TRUE ⇐⇒ (b = EncPK(vote; rct)) ∧ (vote ∈ cList) ∧ PoK(ski)
P2(x,w2) = TRUE ⇐⇒
(




1. M. Backes, M. Gagné, and M. Skoruppa. Using mobile device communication to
strengthen e-Voting protocols. In A. Sadeghi and S. Foresti, editors, Proceedings of
the 12th annual ACM Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, WPES 2013,
Berlin, Germany, November 4, 2013.
2. E.Estaji, T. Haines, K. Gjøsteen, P B. Rønne, P. Y. A. Ryan, and N. Soroush.
Revisiting practical and usable coercion-resistant remote e-voting. In Krimmer,
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It is well known that elections matter and that people must be confident in
the fairness of election outcomes for democracy to function. It is also known that
computers are vulnerable and can be hacked. As a consequence, the combination
of two, e-voting, is doomed to be mistrusted.
Many experts insist that computers should not be trusted for voting, espe-
cially if it is done remotely. The main fear is that an adversary can undetectably
modify enough ballots to change the result of an election or influence the count-
ing process. Additionally, there are concerns regarding privacy and coercion,
which make many people see paper-based voting as a more trustworthy option.
It was not always like that, however. Ironically, the very first mechanization
done in a polling place was for preventing fraud in paper-based voting. Early
machines were counting the number of ballots to prevent ballot stuffing [4]. This
was more efficient than a glass ballot box, which could prevent votes insertion,
but did not guarantee that all of them would reach the tallying. Thus the process
of mechanization started with an intent to shift trust from electoral officials to
machines.
Nowadays, relying on computers is often treated as a source of problems
rather than a solution, even though machines are still better suited for repetitive
tasks and calculations. The study of the hand counting of votes finds error rates
of up to 2%[3] for candidate counts. This raises an interesting question of how to
audit elections when the margin of victory is less than a human error and recount
might give a different result. In the NSW 2015 state election, it would have taken
to miscount only 10,398 votes out of 4.56 million, which is about 0.002% of all
ballots, to shift 8 seats[2]. Such accuracy is beyond human capabilities.
Technically, every single election already relies on computers for maintaining
a list of eligible voters. Nevertheless, e-voting is still largely feared. One of the
reasons is contradictory requirements that make any e-voting system not perfect.
Each solution is a tradeoff between benefits and complexity with some trust
assumptions and expectations regarding voters. Since there is no consensus on
what tradeoffs are optimal, every system is guilty of prioritizing one property
over another because there are always circumstances where such a choice is
unwise. While some residual risk is unavoidable, perfection is expected.
Consider cast-as-intended (CAI) verification, which is typically a must re-
quirement. If a system requires a second device for vote verification, it is as-
sumed that it affects equal participation since not everyone has several devices.
Similarly, even a relatively powerful voting device that can handle cryptogra-
phy might be deemed a problem to equal suffrage. Alternative approaches based
on pre-delivered paper cards are accused of requiring trusted delivery channels
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and trusting printing authorities. Whenever CAI is not provided, a system is
regarded as vulnerable to vote modification. When it is, the system is guilty
of not protecting voters from coercion. If coercion is prevented, then CAI must
have been forgotten, or the coercer is too limited.
Encrypting vote in a voting device means that the voting device will see the
plaintext and breach voter privacy. Vote codes might increase the risk of vote-
selling. A public bulletin board threatens long-term privacy, but the integrity
of a private one requires trusting system parts or auditors. The homomorphic
tally cannot handle all types of elections. The mixing process does not protect
against an Italian attack[1] on privacy. Trusting electoral officials is deemed
to be dangerous, but a distributed system is called inefficient and impractical.
Sharing a secret key with no threshold implies the risk of denial of service,
while with a threshold, an adversary needs to corrupt fewer players to get the
key. Complex verification procedures (e.g. cast-or-challenge, proof simulation,
credential faking, etc.) are typically misunderstood, so voters perform verification
poorly. Simpler procedures require some additional private data and extra trust
assumptions. The list goes on and on. It is always possible to find why a system
is not perfect.
Additional challenge comes from ambiguous definitions. For example, it is still
unclear what coercer can do or whether a forced abstain should be considered
as coercion attack. Similarly, there is no standard definition for privacy or CAI;
all existing ones are tailored to a particular system. Should the Italian attack be
considered an attack on privacy? If so, what about systems that are based on
shuffling? Things get even more complicated if we consider electoral laws. For
example, since e-voting is rarely the only voting channel, it has to be possible to
link a voter to their vote to prevent multiple voting, thus no vote casting with
anonymous credentials, which is the only known solution to strong coercion.
The open question is how any e-voting scheme can satisfy all requirements.
Should each scheme customize definitions, or should we have standard ones?
Should we have a consensus on what properties are more important, or should
it be case-based? Should e-voting even try to solve all problems?
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Abstract. September 2021 has provided academia with the chance to unpack 
not only the e-ballot-box but also look at the nature of the first large-scale In-
ternet voting precedent in the autocratic context of Russia with its eagerness for 
legitimisation and regime maintenance. In general, this might be a precedent for 
the oxymoron of autocratic e-/i-voting technologies in the CIS area, which oc-
curred with the case of ‘sovereign Internet’. Therefore, this newly implemented 
phenomenon should be studied in the initial stages; otherwise, the terminus quo 
will be lost. 
Keywords:  I-voting ‧ E-voting ‧ Autocracies ‧ Hybrid regimes 
1 Diffusion of Innovations? 
The ability to cast votes remotely via smartphones and other digital devices was 
granted to Russia’s citizens only in September 2021 and only in the limited number of 
federal units. Before that, there were several local attempts with city-level portals [1] 
implemented sporadically in Moscow, for example. However, the coronavirus pan-
demic constituted a convenient ‘window of opportunity’ for the test-run of the Inter-
net voting, justified by the intentions to ensure the physical distance among the voters 
during the voting days [2]. Overall, this sounds like an instance of the government 
taking care of its citizens in a complicated epidemiologic context. 
Unfortunately, the whole scenario of innovation diffusion is gloomed by the pre-
ceding voting for the constitutional amendments, which were held offline from 25th of 
June and until 1st of July — right during the middle stage of the first coronavirus 
wave. Thus, we can assume that pandemic was not the initial rationale for implement-
ing Internet voting. 
Even if one falls for the ‘benevolent ruler’ bait, there are several questions that 
should be answered to have a comprehensive understanding of the case — why does 
Russia need Internet voting? These questions will be addressed in the following sec-
tion and will compile a baseline narrative for the publication series, which are devoted 
to the question of Internet voting in a competitive autocracy / hybrid regime.  
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2 Why and what to study 
As I mentioned, remote voting is not used in all over 85 units of Russia; for the Sep-
tember elections, only seven subjects were selected for the pioneer launch [3] (Fig. 1). 
This selection raises the first question — why precisely these regions were selected? 
Are they the most loyal to the ruling party? Or do they have the sufficient capacities 
to conduct a successful test? A positive answer to any questions would imply the 
blissful outcome for the ruling party due to the unlevel electoral field. Still, it might 
also expose the fear of it and the abusive nature of Internet voting. 
Fig. 1. A choropleth map with the indication of the regions, which introduced the Internet vot-
ing for the September 2021 elections 
The second question primarily relates to the digital divide and the image of an av-
erage voter: who “attend” elections via smart devices, and how do they vote? This 
question might shed light on the institutional trust in the government and the presence 
or absence/suppression of i-voting’s democratisation effect. 
The last question is about the rationality of introducing i-voting in an autocratic 
state with already twisted electoral mechanisms. The most common answer to the 
question ‘why do autocracies hold regular elections’ was ‘for the sake of legitimisa-
tion’, but why would anyone add another layer of it with the help of initially demo-
cratic innovation?  
Undoubtedly, these three questions do not cover the whole phenomenon of auto-
cratic e-/i-voting but at least initiate the discussion in this direction, since it seems that 
e-technologies obtained a more instrumental nature than ever and might be used by
every regime.
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1 Introduction and rationale 
The Italian government has recently adopted a decree for the gradual introduction of 
Internet voting (i-voting). One of the requirements in the decree is that “[t]he vote cast 
must not be attributable to the voter”1. When the government of Catalonia submitted a 
draft i-voting law, the regulation enshrined a similar requirement2. But governments 
are not alone, the first draft standards on i-voting for Canada’s municipal elections read 
“[t]he moment a vote is cast, the ballot must be severed from the voter” (8.1.1.1.)3.  
In i-voting, the resort to analogies with paper-based elections is a common practice. 
It has been used by governments, courts, election observers, and academia. In Switzer-
land, the Federal Chancellery has acknowledged that requirements for secret suffrage 
in i-voting are “analogous” [sic] to those in postal voting4. In Estonia, analogies are 
usually drawn with postal voting’s double-envelop system and the country’s Supreme 
Court compared the possibility to re-vote with a “virtual voting booth”5.   
Notwithstanding, remote electronic voting neither uses a double-envelop system nei-
ther the possibility to re-vote can be compared with a virtual voting booth. In our opin-
ion, these analogies are not only insufficient, but they are counterproductive. For this 
reason, we suggest an alternative approach to assessing and regulating secret suffrage 
in i-voting. This approach could be extended to other electoral principles as well. 
1 In the original: “Il voto espresso non deve essere riconducibile all’elettore” (art. 4.4). Available at: 
<https://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/2021-07/decreto_ministro_su_sperimenta-
zione_voto_elettronico_9.7.2021.pdf>  
2 In the original: “[…] a l'efecte que no es puguin relacionar els vots emesos amb els votants” (art. 5.l). 
Available at: <https://www.parlament.cat/document/bopc/178938.pdf#page=58'>  
3 Available at: <http://ciostrategycouncil.com/standards/technical-committees/technical-committee-re-
view-2/can-ciosc-111-x/>  
4 In the original, “Les exigences en matière de secret du vote posées aux trois systèmes de vote par Internet 
sont analogues à celles posses au vote par correspondance”. Available at: <https://www.bk.ad-
min.ch/dam/bk-intra/fr/dokumente/pore/bericht_des_bundesrateszuvoteelectronique-auswertungderein-
fuehru.pdf.download.pdf/rapport_du_conseilfederalsurlevoteelectronique-evaluationdelamis.pdf> 
5 See, for example: <https://digikogu.taltech.ee/en/item/08baa269-0baa-40b7-9b6a-f3635d349bfc> 
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2 Secret suffrage: a new framework for analysis? 
To assess and regulate secret suffrage in i-voting, we want to understand the legal assets 
that this principle is aimed at protecting. By understanding the goals behind the institu-
tionalisation of secret suffrage, we expect that clearer requirements could be elicited 
for the fulfilment of this principle in remote electronic voting. 
At the international level, there is an extensive assessment as well as academic liter-
ature on the principle of secret suffrage (see for example [1]). In general, it “is [consid-
ered] an aspect of free suffrage, which aims to shield voters from any pressure that 
might result from the knowledge of his [sic] choice by third parties” [2]. The Parlia-
mentary Assembly of the Council of Europe [3] has taken a further step by breaking 
down secret suffrage in three minimum standards: 
• Individuality: each voter makes an individual choice.
• Confidentiality: only the voter should know how they have voted, and that the voter
should be able to make their choice in private.
• Anonymity: there must be no link between the vote cast and the voter's identity.
3 Findings and open questions 
Assessing secret suffrage against these standards is better suited to regulate i-voting. 
First, their focus in on the legal assets that need protection (e.g., the importance of an-
onymity is recognised, yet it is not prescribed when the link between the vote cast and 
the vote is “severed”). Second, this approach better bridges legal standards and tech-
nical requirements (e.g., confidentiality is usually achieved by means of encryption, but 
which cryptographic schemes can fulfil it? Which implementations are secure enough?) 
Notwithstanding, some of the challenges in i-voting are not necessarily well captured 
by these three standards. In this sense, some questions remain open: 
• How can the standard of individuality be understood in remote (electronic) voting?
• Is there no room for analogy at all? Could we balance contending principles based
on existing assessments for remote paper-based voting?
• How to balance the need for accuracy in remote electronic voting regulations with
the need to convey how i-voting works to non-expert publics?
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Abstract. This research focuses on how the administrative capacities of one of 
the Peruvian electoral bodies are affected by the implementation of technology. 
In this particular case, on the implementation of the Automated Scrutiny System 
in the 2021 General Elections. 
It explores whether the expectations and/or perceptions of the citizens and espe-
cially of the users of this technology-citizen polling station members and tech-
nical coordinators hired by ONPE-collide or harmonize with those of the elec-
toral management body. 
Finally, based on these expectations and perceptions, it is shown how the capac-
ities of the street-level bureaucrats are also affected by the use of this technology 
and how the actions of these stakeholders affect the implementation of technol-
ogy. 
Keywords: Administrative capacity, Technological capacity, Street-level bu-
reaucrats. 
1 Research design 
1.1 Theoretical Framework 
In this research, the process of implementation of the Automated Scrutiny System will 
be analyzed using the framework of Lember, Kattel & Tonurist [1]; this framework 
evaluates the impact of digital capabilities in the administration of public entities 
through the analysis of how “routines” -internal and external- and “selection mecha-
nisms”-citizens/users, market-type behavior, networks, hierarchical behavior- affects 
and are affected by each other. 
1.2 Data Collection 
As part of the research, citizens who served as polling station members were surveyed 
and other stakeholders involved in the technology implementation process were inter-
viewed, such as the senior management of the electoral management body, the ICT 
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area, representatives of other Peruvian electoral bodies, specialists in technology law 
and officials of the executive branch related to technology and digitization. 
The information collected was compared with the data obtained as part of the electoral 
process in its first and second elections. In this sense, what was obtained was how the 
perceptions about the implementation of the Automated Scrutiny system corresponded 
with the expected results in terms of reducing the number of observed tally sheets, eas-
ing the workload of polling station members, and reducing the time required to digitize 
and compute the results of the polling stations 
2 Discussion and Results 
As an initial conclusion, the perception of the majority of stakeholders towards the use 
of the Automated Scrutiny System is positive. Even, under certain criteria, it is thought 
of as a solution that should be replicated and used at the national level. However, the 
results show that there are a series of external limitations that do not allow this tool to 
be fully exploited.  
Although there are tangible benefits from the use of the automated scrutiny system 
in certain areas of the country, it falls short of what is expected. Among the limitations 
found are the poor training -both virtual and on-site- of users, the current electoral reg-
ulations governing data computing processes, an extremely manual culture of the elec-
toral process that political organizations understand, the low digital infrastructure of the 
country, among others. 
Furthermore, the implementation of technology in an electoral process must be con-
fronted with the concept of electoral integrity. Transparency, honesty and security of 
results are the greatest assets of any electoral management body. For ONPE the imple-
mentation of the automated scrutiny system mustn't lead to a detriment of its capabili-
ties. This is why the organization must be in constant struggle with the powers of other 
actors and find a point where it can demonstrate that technology serves the process and 
does not harm it. 
For ONPE, to massify the use of this technology, there is a need of a great process 
of sensitization of society and political organizations, working with the legislative 
power and proposing changes that are adapted to the reality of the current electoral 
processes, seeking to eliminate the black boxes that technology represents and allowing 
citizen and academic audits of this type of systems. It is with this that ONPE will im-
prove its administrative capacities, standardizing the capacities of those officials who 
provide the service in an exogenous manner due to their capacities and autonomy in 
decision making. By making the right changes, it could achieve the objective of provid-
ing an effective and efficient service, which improves its image and could be replicated. 
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1 Research Idea
Intention to vote electronically is believed to be dependent upon one’s level of
trust towards 1) the (state) institutions responsible for organizing the elections;
2) the actual technology used to implement the e-voting system [1,3], both com-
ponents being about equally important. This distinction has been acknowledged
before in e-government trust research but has not found empirical verification.
The research idea I am going to propose here was inspired by Carter & Belenger
(2005) and Schaupp & Carter (2005) papers that studied which factors influence
e-government adoption and one’s intention to use e-voting, respectively. Both
relied on factor analysis to verify underlying latent structures in their data, as
did they include two types of trust in their models — trust of the internet versus
trust of state government [1,3]. However, their models also included a number of
system-specific factors such as perceived ease of use and system compatibility.
This prevented further latent dimensionality among trust variables from emerg-
ing because the effect of trust was largely overshadowed by usability-related
factors [1, 3]. 15 years later, with some vastly enriched data about e-voting at
our disposal, it might be fitting to dig deeper and perform a similar analysis on
trust-based components only. It has been established that the Estonian e-voting
system is already highly compatible and very easy to use, therefore these aspects
should not influence one’s likelihood to e-vote as much.
2 Research Design
The central framework of analysis is going to be Structural Equation Modeling
(SEM) and Confirmatory Factor Analysis, a statistical approach that allows
hypothesis-testing between observed and latent variables [2]. Factor scores com-
puted from the two latent factors will be set as response variables in two separate
OLS models with various socio-demographic factors plus e-voting (dichotomous)
as predictors.
Sample data for preliminary analysis was obtained from six cross-sectional
surveys about the Estonian e-voting system (2013-2019, spanning 6 elections
— 2 local, 2 national, 2 EP). Both voters and non-voters were included in the
model, the total number of observations being 3595. 7 trust-related variables were
recorded in the survey in 0-10 point Likert scale (treated as interval). Two of
them, trust towards 1) internet transactions in general; and 2) electronic voting
systems, were set to load on a latent factor that should ideally be interpreted
as ”trust towards technology”. Four others, trust towards the 1) government,
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2) parliament, 3) politicians, and 4) parties, were set to load on a factor what
may be labelled as ”institutional trust”. The remaining variable, trust towards
the president, was dropped from the analysis as it did not load clearly on either
factor and simply hampered factoring reliability.
3 Preliminary Results
The resulting latent factors appeared strongly correlated with each other (cor.
coef. 0.53). Generally, positive correlation makes sense — people who trust var-
ious state institutions would naturally also trust other things such as e-voting
systems. Such a strong correlation, however, indicates that respondents may have
subconsciously linked electronic voting with Estonian state institutions when an-
swering that question, despite its corresponding survey question targeting trust
towards electronic voting systems in general. It is only natural to make this
connection since for the vast majority of respondents, Estonian state-organized
elections are probably the only experience they have ever had with e-voting sys-
tems. In addition, the technology trust factor appears to be highly dependent
upon a single observed variable - trust towards e-voting systems (characterized
by low loading and high residual values for the other variable that was set to load
on that factor — trust in internet transactions). This is a strong indication that
in this model, the so called ”technology trust” factor describes trust towards the
Estonian e-voting system in particular and may not represent trust in e-voting
technology in general. In order to alleviate this issue, one or more technology
and/or internet related trust variables (e.g. trust in social media, trust in new
technological solutions in general) should load on this latent factor.
Keeping in mind that the aforementioned caveat might have led to some mis-
leading model coefficients, we may still carefully ponder over the most important
observed relationships in our models. Unsurprisingly, the most important pre-
dictor in determining one’s system trust factor score was whether or not they
voted electronically. Similarly, being more computer literate, better educated,
and being a native Estonian speaker increases one’s score on that scale. Interest-
ingly, party of choice (whom voted for) also seems to play a fairly significant role
here — those who voted for Centre Party or Conservative People’s Party scored
notably lower than others, even lower than non-voters. This might suggest that
these are the odd ones who do not take issue with responsible state institutions,
but are sceptical about the actual e-voting technology itself.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, several countries started introducing Internet voting (i-voting)
systems for improving their democratic processes. I-voting offers more accurate
and fast vote counts, reduces the logistic cost of an election organization, and
also allows voters with disabilities to cast their votes independently.
One of the main requirements for i-voting systems is privacy, which states
that voters are allowed to cast their vote in conditions of confidentiality (coercion-
resistance) and guarantees anonymity of their choices: namely, that it is not
possible to link the content of a vote to the identity of the voter. Most of
the current i-voting systems ensure privacy by encrypting voters’ choices and
anonymizing collected ballots via a mixing process that breaks the link between
the voter’s identity and the cast ballot by applying a random permutation and a
re-encryption. However, these algorithms are based on computational problems
like factorization and discrete logarithm, which will be easily solved by quantum
computers. As a consequence, the current state-of-the-art e-voting systems do
not guarantee long-term privacy.
In the EU H2020 Prometheus project we design and implement a proof-of-
concept (PoC) of a quantum-resistant i-voting system based on the state-of-the-
art post-quantum cryptographic protocols. Our solution focuses on:
– Functional design of the i-voting system. It defines APIs and the detailed
implementation notes of the solution using an interface description language.
– Implementation of a cryptographic protocol for proving correct shuffling in
zero-knowledge. The mix-net was recently published in [2].
– Vanilla implementation of LPR encryption scheme [5].
– Implementation of the underlying building blocks required for the proof of
a shuffle [1][3][4].
2 Implementation
The PoC implements three libraries that are integrated into an i-voting system
with backend and frontend implemented in Java and Typescript respectively.
? This work has received funding in the context of the EU H2020 project Prometheus
under grant agreement no. 780701. https://www.h2020prometheus.eu/
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– Math layer: implements the basic arithmetic operations over the polyno-
mial ring Zq[X], as well as encoding methods.
– Cryptographic layer: implements the following post-quantum cryptographic
methods required for the vote encryption and mixing at the voting layer:
• LPR encryption: An implementation of the lattice-based encryption
scheme [5]. Provides keypairs generation, scheme (encryption and de-
cryption) and encodings from/to byte arrays.
• CCM correct Shuffle: An implementation of the verifiable re-encryption
shuffle [2] over LPR ciphertexts.
• BKLP commitments: An implementation of the commitment scheme [1].
Provides key generation, scheme (commit and open), as well as zero-
knowledge provers and verifiers for arithmetic circuits.
• Preimages knowledge: Proves/verifies knowledge of preimages under
ivOWFs. Includes a dPL module [4], which gives incomplete ZK-proofs,
and a CDXY module [3], which is a generic compiler to transform in-
complete ZK-proofs into complete preimage knowledge proofs.
– Voting layer: implements the following methods, which internally utilize
cryptographic layer:
• Setup: Generates parameters and the election encryption keys.
• Vote: Encrypts votes, generates voting receipts and validates the votes.
• Mixnet: Verifiably shuffles and re-encrypts vote and generate zero knowl-
edge proof of mixing correctness.
• Count: Decrypts mixed votes.
Once fully implemented, this will demonstrate the feasibility of i-voting sys-
tems with long-term privacy, currently only possible at a theoretical level.
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Estonian Internet Voting System
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In this demo, we will be presenting a dedicated voting client for the Estonian
Internet voting system [1]. The client uses ESP32 IoT microcontroller platform
as its basis, and runs nothing but firmware and a voting application.
The solution also supports the individual verification protocol of the Esto-
nian i-voting system. As the screen of ESP32 is too small to show the QR-code,
we have implemented two versions of the solution.
In the basic setting, data needed for verification is transferred from the
voting device to the verification device via Bluetooth connection. This setup
also requires a modified verification app.
In the extended setup, the client has an external LCD capable of showing
the full QR code, so the verification app can be used in the out-of-the-box
configuration.
The main rationale behind developing a dedicated hardware platform for
voting client is the potential vulnerability of voter’s PC environment. Vote
manipulation can be detected with a verification app, but it is very hard for the
voter to make sure that there is for example no malware on her PC trying to
breach vote secrecy.
Of course, building a dedicated client for a special hardware is not a solution
for an average voter. However, it provides an extra option for tech-savvy people
interested in controlling every aspect of vote casting and willing to take extra
actions for such an option.
As a by-product, we have also produced the first completely open source
voting client for Estonian Internet voting. We intend to use it ourselves during
the upcoming local elections in October 2021.
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Abstract. This short paper provides a brief overview of Polys – a blockchain-
based online voting system. We concisely concern blockchain utilization, vote 
privacy and verifiability, as well as real use cases. 
Keywords: E-voting, Blockchain, Polys, Verifiability. 
1 Polys overview 
Polys is a blockchain-based online voting system. System development started in 
2017 and since then we have made a substantial architectural overhaul, namely, 
migrated from Ethereum to Exonum blockchain framework and upgraded encryption 
and anonymization schemes.  
Although blockchain has recently engendered a fair amount of criticism [1, 2], 
online voting systems can still benefit from applying blockchain technologies for two 
main reasons: immutability of data and verification of smart contract execution. 
Furthermore, blockchain technology itself has never been considered as a bulletproof 
that would solve all voting-related problems. In fact, it did not even aim to do so, e.g. 
vote privacy and voter eligibility are usually guaranteed by several additional 
techniques. We utilize blind signature scheme in order to provide voters’ anonymity. 
Voters’ Authentication is possible via predefined codes, SMS, e-mail or OAuth 2.0. 
In addition, there is a set of services that is called service layer. It is responsible for 
user authentication, blind message signing and several infrastructural tasks. Interested 
readers are referred to [3] for detailed description of our platform. 
Polys is mainly intended for use in an unsupervised environment meaning that vot-
ers vote remotely via the Internet using their devices. Despite the fact that we could 
probably face an untrusted terminal problem and enhanced threats to coercion which 
are common not only in Internet voting but in other voting scenarios, e.g. postal vot-
ing, we suppose that this voting method is still viable in several cases provided that the 
security guarantees are implemented thoroughly. 
If remote voting is an inappropriate option or higher guarantees for coercion-
resistance needed, we provide voting machines for precinct-based elections. These 
machines work in the same blockchain ecosystem as the internet voting, so these two 
environments could be used simultaneously or separately. 
393
Polys provides several ballot types: single-choice, multiple-choice, cumulative 
(with distribution of scores) and Yes No Abstain ballots for different voting scenarios. 
Concerning vote privacy, which comprises ballot secrecy, receipt-freeness and co-
ercion-resistance according to recent research, Polys guarantees ballot secrecy, i.e. 
voters obtain blind signature from ballot issuance service, encrypt the choice and send 
it directly to the blockchain via anonymous channel. Receipt-freeness and coercion-
resistance are much stronger notions of vote privacy and are in hard tension with vote 
verifiability that we are currently most focused on. 
Polys provides E2E verifiability meaning that it could be verified that the vote is 
cast-as-intended, recorded-as-cast and tallied-as-recorded. After casting a vote, the 
voter can find his/her transaction in the blockchain and verify how it is tallied after 
the voting ends and results are decrypted and published. Furthermore, we provide 
some tooling for vote observation – a piece of software that could access the block-
chain auditor node in order to verify transaction signatures and zero-knowledge 
proofs. 
2 Polys use cases 
As of February 2021, Polys is extensively used by educational organizations – 62% of 
all votes conducted on our platform. We also have several cases for nonprofits, politi-
cal parties, private companies and state authorities. The latter used our platform for 
participatory budgeting procedures in the Volgograd and Nizhny Novgorod regions of 
Russia and more than 340 thousands people in total were involved. For further details, 
please refer to [4]. 
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Abstract:  
With the practical implementation of the “eIDAS regulation”, which has been 
fully applicable since July 2016, the European Union has made great strides in 
recent years in successfully simplifying the cross-border online identification 
process for citizens. In addition, the “Single Digital Gateway (SDG)” regulation 
for the establishment of a uniform digital access gate for administration in the 
EU entered into force in December and the transition phase will end in December 
2023. A first part of became reality at the end of 2020. After all, there is an un-
broken trend towards the mobile and self-determined use of administrative ser-
vices: Today, citizens expect eGovernment services to always be conveniently 
usable via smartphone. Against this background, the mGov4EU (“Mobile Cross-
Border Government Services for Europe”, https://mGov4.EU) project, funded by 
the European Union as part of the Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gram, has started to enable mobile cross-border administrative services in Eu-
rope. These services will be demonstrated via three different pilots. Internet vot-
ing will play an important role, as one of the three pilot use cases. 
Keywords: Once-Only Principle, Single Digital Gateway, SDGR, DSM, 
mGov4EU, eID, eIDAS, mobile, eGovernment, Internet Voting; 
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1 mGov4EU in a nutshell 
The mGov4EU project assembles leading European experts from government, busi-
ness, and science in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Germany, and Spain, to enable secure 
and privacy-friendly mobile government services across Europe. mGov4EU will put 
the citizen at the center of the considerations and offer them new, secure, fast, and pri-
vacy-protecting options for managing their identity and personal data – regardless of 
whether they or the eGovernment service are located in the home country or another 
Member State. 
The regulatory framework for this project is provided by Regulation (EU) 2018/1724 
on the establishment of a Single Digital Gateway (SDGR) and for the cross-border pro-
vision of services together with the eIDAS Regulation (EU) 910/2014 related to cross-
border electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the in-
ternal market. The mGov4EU project puts the requirements of self-sovereign and mo-
bile citizens at the center of the considerations. It interconnects the existing eIDAS 
ecosystem with the new Single Digital Gateway to create a user-friendly overall system. 
Fig. 1. mGov4EU –Reference Architecture at a Glance 
2 Internet Voting as Part of the mGov4EU Piloting Efforts 
The project builds upon the existing eIDAS-Layer and combines it with user-centric 
mobile-based authentication, including a Single Sign-On (SSO) approach. At the same 
time, a privacy-preserving identity and consent management is established to provide 
cross-border application scenarios concerning E-Government processes and services. 
In addition, mGov4EU embraces the SDG-Layer - based on the blueprint developed by 
the TOOP project (Krimmer et al., 2021) - , striving for a collaborative engagement 
with provisioning platforms concerning the delivery and re-use of digital services 
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throughout Europe while holding up the key elements of trust and accessibility. 
During the three-year project period, several mGov4EU pilot applications will be de-
signed and implemented to validate the solution, modules and infrastructure services. 
The pilot applications include internet voting, smart mobility based on subsidized taxi 
rides, and mobile signature. The aims of the three pilots are demonstrating cross-border 
mobility, cross-border collaboration, providing additional cross-border information, 
such as foreign residence and for remote electronic voting settings. The pilots are 
planned to demonstrate their feasibility under real life conditions and in real life envi-
ronments like internet voting for the student’s council at the University of Tartu. 
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1 Introduction
Voatz, Inc. is an internet voting and election management company based in
Boston, MA, USA that has been involved in over 80 public and private elections
to date. Public elections have included elections in South America, Asia, and in
five states in the United States. Private elections have included political conven-
tions, universities, and non-profits. The overall platform is designed as a secure
platform to increase access to elections and increase election integrity.
An election that uses the Voatz platform can have up to three means for a
voter to access the election. Election access can be either in-person or remote.
– Voatz Mobile App (VMA), available for Android and iOS devices.
– Voatz Event Manager (VEM), available for iOS tablets.
– Voatz Web App (VWA), available for voting via modern internet browsers,
only for users who cannot use VMA.
Security features in VMA restrict voting to one person per device. By contrast,
VEM and VWA allow multiple voters per device and could be used for controlled
environments in which kiosks are allowed to connect to the internet.
One of Voatz’ major points of pride is our products’ accessibility to vot-
ers with various disabilities, including voters with visual impairments, dexterity
disabilities, cognitive disabilities, and a lack of mobility. In partnership with
the National Center for Accessible Media, Voatz incorporates accessibility and
usability design throughout its development process. Accessibility capabilities in-
clude VoiceOver and TalkBack screen readers, predictable layout and navigation,
configurable font size, voice control (on iOS), speech-to-text (for write-ins), and
flexible session timeout limitations. Voatz adheres to the following guidelines.
– The U.S. Elections Assistance Commission (EAC) Voluntary Voting System
Guidelines (VVSG v1.1) for usability and accessibility
– Worldwide Web Consortium’s Web Content Accessibility Guidelines 2.1 level
AA (WCAG 2.1/AA)
– Apple iOS and Android best practices for accessibility
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The two most significant concerns of mobile and internet voting are risks due
to malware and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Voatz has applied
multiple layers of security into its products to defend against these and other
attacks on the platform and voters’ devices. VMA and VEM check for insecure
physical and wireless connections that could compromise device security. Anti-
malware software in the app leverages a machine learning algorithm to scan for
data anomalies and known malware; such heuristic methods are the only known
way to detect previously unknown malware. Voatz utilizes redundancy and phys-
ically distributed servers to prevent single-point-of-failure attacks on hardware.
Voatz servers, databases, and blockchain nodes are protected by leading net-
work security technology that has the capacity to mitigate DDoS attacks that
are 30 times larger than the largest known DDoS attack. This security enables
voter privacy and vote verifiability on the platform. To date, there have been no
successful attacks on the platform during a live election.
Voter privacy is also ensured by anonymizing ballots. When a voter submits
a ballot, a Voatz server generates a unique, random ballot ID, called an anonID.
The ballot is encrypted and digitally signed by the voter. This authenticates the
ballot as legitimate and functions as a digital equivalent of a double envelope
for typical remote paper ballots. The digital signature is stripped from the bal-
lot data in a mixnet to complete the anonymization process. When a ballot is
recorded on the blockchain and arrives to the election officials, there is no data
linking the user to the ballot. The possible exception is when ballot approval is
conditional upon election officials accepting an accompanying affidavit.
Finally, the Voatz platform enables end-to-end verification. An election sys-
tem is end-to-end verifiable (E2E-V) if voters can verify that their votes were (1)
cast as intended, (2) recorded as cast, and (3) tallied as recorded. Benaloh de-
scribes that one means to establish an E2E-V system is by using “bulletin boards
which can be thought of as restricted shared memories” in which “each bulletin
board can be read by every process, but it can only be written by its owner, and
then only by appending new messages, not by altering old ones.” Benaloh noted
that at the time, implementing such a bulletin board was a difficult problem.
Today, however, we recognize that a system based on distributed ledger tech-
nology (e.g., a blockchain) has the precise properties of such a bulletin board.
A mere database allows data to be erased. Therefore, a key component of the
Voatz platform is in fact a permissioned blockchain in which each cast ballot is
immutably recorded on a distributed digital ledger. Any auditor, official, or voter
who is given access to an audit system that reads the blockchain will be able
to compare each ballot receipt and printable ballot with the blockchain record.
In particular, this allows voters to check if their ballots were cast as intended
(via the anonID on a ballot receipt), recorded as cast (on the election official’s
printable ballot records), tallied as recorded (if every ballot is recorded on the
blockchain), and reported as tallied, thus establishing the Voatz platform as an
E2E-V system.
For more information about Voatz, please visit https://voatz.com.
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